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EDITOR'S NOTE
Thank you for your interest in the Fall 2013 Issue of the Water Law Re-

view. In the pages that follow, you will find another great collection of articles
and student writing highlighting some of the challenges and complexities wise
water management presents. The Issue begins with four articles that provide
useful and thought-provoking analysis of some of water law's most timely and
perennial topics.
In You Can Lead Livestock to Water...A Survey of Evempt Livestock
Wells in the West Professor Tiffany Dowell provides us with a valuable analysis of livestock watering exemptions throughout the West. Professor Dowell
reviews the statutory frameworks of each state where the prior appropriation
doctrine governs groundwater, comparing the extent and implications of exemptions for livestock wells and watering. She concludes with an examination
of recent litigation concerning livestock watering exemptions.
Our next two articles do an admirable job highlighting the broad spectrum
of opinions surrounding state application of the public trust doctrine. The
topic is polarizing for many of us here in Colorado, where initiatives to amend
the state constitution to subordinate our historical prior appropriation system
to a robust public trust doctrine have been likened to dropping a nuclear
bomb on Colorado water rights by Justice Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme
Court. But like so much else in the world of water, what draws us in and
makes the public trust a frequent and fascinating topic in the Water Law Review is how the interplay of geography, history, and culture shapes our perspective. As these two fine articles demonstrate, what seems unwise in Colorado is arguably indispensable in Hawaii.
Marie Kyle contributed our first article focusing on the public trust, The
Four Great Waters Case:An ImportantExpansion of Wai'hole Ditch and the
Public Trust Doctrne. The article gives us an excellent examination of the
historical development of water resources in Hawaii and the Hawaiian Supreme Court's expansion of the state's unique public trust doctrine in recent
years. Our second public trust article, No Fictions Requred: Assessmg the
Public Trust Doctane in Pursuit of Balanced Water Management, comes
from Russell McGlothlin and Scott Slater. The authors provide us with a wellreasoned and thoroughly researched argument that the public trust is an ambiguous legal fiction no longer required in a modern legal environment where
substantive laws and regulations better protect the public's interest in balanced
water management.
Jenny Small wrote our fourth and final article, Renewable Energy on Tibal Land & Water Resources:Jenez Pueblo.The article highlights just one of
the many legal complexities Native Nations face when pursuing renewable
energy projects - the application of federal Indian reserved rights for what are
often water-intensive operations. Ms. Small points to the challenges Jemez
Pueblo faced when trying to develop a solar energy project as emblematic of
the opportunities and challenges renewable energy represents for all Native
Nations.

We are also proud to bring you another Issue full of excellent student
writing, which may be found in the Case Notes, Conference Notes, and Court
Reports sections. Notably, Water Law Review members Alexander Louden
and Holly Taylor each contributed insightful analysis of California's new Human Right to Water statute and the recent United States Supreme Court case,
TarrantRegional Water District v. Herrnmann,respectively.

We hope you will enjoy reading this Issue as much as we enjoyed putting
it together. The Water Law Review is fortunate to have the support of outstanding staff, Advisory Board members, and most importantly, readers like
you. Thank you for your continued support!
Everette R Bullard

Editor-in-Chief
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Most western states require a person seeking to drill a well to obtain a
permit from the state. Permit applications frequently trigger expensive and
time-consuming processes, including requiring the state to investigate and
make specific findings with regard to availability of water for the requested use
and the potential impact the proposed use would have on other water users.
Many statutory schemes, however, contain an exemption from these permitting processes for wells that applicants will use for livestock watering.
As the agricultural industry has changed and operations have grown over
the decades since the enactment of these livestock well statutes, important
questions regarding statutory interpretation have arisen. What qualifies as livestock watering? Do limitations exist, either based on the quantity of water
appropriated or on the specific type of use of the water? How much water may
a user appropriate for livestock purposes before the state requires a permit be
obtained? Understanding the existing limitations on exempt livestock wells is
necessary and important, both for the state's interest in conserving water and
the producers' interest in ensuring compliance before investing extensive capital in an operation.
This article, which is limited to discussion of groundwater only, discusses
each of the livestock watering exemptions in the West and the litigation that
has surrounded these statutes. First, this article provides a basic overview of
the prior appropriation doctrine and the concept of exempt wells. Next, this
article looks specifically at statutory exemptions for livestock watering by state.
Finally, this article reviews recent litigation surrounding livestock watering exemptions in the West.
I. THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
In the western United States, the principal of prior appropriation generally
governs groundwater rights administration. Unlike the riparian approach followed by most eastern states,' prior appropriation does not look at the location
of the landowner in proximity to the water, but instead it provides a "first
come, first served" basis for those who appropriate water for beneficial use.
Prior appropriation begins with the premise that all groundwater belongs to
the people of the state.' The first person to divert water and put it to beneficial
use obtains a right to such use, and that right is given priority over all subsequently obtained, or "junior," rights.' Prior appropriation essentially means
"first in time, first in right."' Therefore, a senior water appropriator has a right
to his or her share of water before a junior appropriator can obtain his or her
share. In times of shortage, a senior appropriator will get his or her entire al1. John C. Tracy et al., Exempt Wells: An Introducdon, 148 J. CoNTEMP. WATER
RESEARCH & EDUC. 1, 1 (2012).

2. See Reed D. Benson, Ahve but Irelevant: The lPnor Appropnation Doctrme mhToday's Western Water Law, 83 U. CoLo. L. REV. 675, 679-80 (2012).
3. See id. at 676-77, 680.
4. F Arthur Stone& Sons a Gibson,630 P.2d 1164,1169 (Kan. 1981).
5. Id.; Benson, supra note 2, at 676-77.
6. Tracy, supra note 1, at 1.
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lotment, and the junior appropriator might not get any water if there is not a
sufficient quantity of water beyond the amount which the senior water right
holder has the right to appropriate. Thirteen states follow the concept of prior
appropriation to govern groundwater resources: Alaska, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah; Washington, and Wyoming.!
Most prior appropriation states require a potential appropriator to go
through a permitting process before withdrawing water. This process varies by
state but can be expensive and time consuming. For example, in New Mexico,
an application for a well permit not only requires both published notice and a
period for the filing of objections but also requires that prior to granting a
permit, the state engineer make specific findings that water is available for appropriation, the proposed withdrawal will not impair existing water rights, and
the proposed withdrawal is not against the public interest or conservation goals
of the state.! This application process can take many years and tens of thousands of dollars to complete.!

II. EXEMPT WELLS GENERALLY
Recognizing the burden placed on would-be appropriators and the minimal amount of water used by certain types of wells, many states have exempted
certain types of wells from at least some portion of the permitting process."
These have come to be known as "exempt wells." Common exemptions include wells withdrawing only limited quantities of water or wells used for specific purposes, such as domestic use or livestock watering."
The rationale behind the exemptions is that the relatively small amount of
water withdrawn does not justify the extensive permitting process usually required for larger withdrawals." Additionally, due to the large number of domestic well applications, requiring the traditional permitting process for limited
withdrawal wells would pose severe administrative difficulties for state governments." Some estimates indicate there may currently be over one million domestic wells in the West with tens of thousands more added each year."

7. See Water Systems Council, Who Owns the Water: A Summary of Evising Water
Rghts Laws 3 (Oct. 2009).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 72-12-3(D)-(E) (1978).
9. Brief for New Mexico Groundwater Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bounds v. New Mexico, 201 1-NMCA-01 1, 252 P.3d 708 (2010), overruledby 2013-NMSC037, 306 P.3d 457 (2013).
10. Tracy, supra note 1, at 1.
11. Nathan S. Bracken, Scalpels v. Hammers: Migadig Exempt Well Impacts, 148 J.
CONTEMP. WATER RESEARCH & EDUc. 24, 24 (2012).
12. Drew L. Kershen, Domestic Well Exemption in Oklahoma GroundwaterLaw - Impact andImplications,64 OKLA. L. REv. 563,564 (2012).
13. Judge's Ruhg Could Impact Domestic Well Permits, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, July
12, 2008, http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/state/apwelI07-12-08.htm.
14. Bracken, supra note 11, at 24.
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All of the prior appropriation states, with the exception of Utah, recognize
at least some form of exemption for certain wells." Additionally, four states
that do not follow a strict prior appropriation approach for governing groundwater use also provide a form of exemption from their general statutory
schemes for certain wells: Arizona, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas." Thus, a
total of sixteen states recognize exempt wells.
The portion of the permitting process from which exempt well applicants
are excused varies by state. In Oregon, for example, although a livestock well
applicant is excused from the registration and permitting requirements generally imposed, the applicant must still file the well with the Water Resources Department, pay a recording fee, and provide a map showing the location of the
well." While most states only provide exemptions from some portion of the
permitting process, three states - Idaho, South Dakota, and Wyoming - also
exempt domestic wells from priority administration, meaning that exempt
wells are not subject to curtailment in favor of senior water users in times of
shortage."
Similarly, the types of wells these statutory exemptions cover vary by state.
Some states exempt certain types of wells without referencing the quantity of
water. In Washington, for example, the statutory exemption for stock watering
does not contain any limitation on the quantity of water that may be withdrawn
for this purpose." Other states look not at the type of well but only at the quantity of water, allowing exemptions for any wells utilizing less than a set amount.
Following this approach, Alaska provides an exemption from the permitting
process for wells withdrawing less than "a significant amount of water," regardless of the use." Most states, however, apply a hybrid exemption, focusing both
on the type of use and the quantity of water appropriated."

M. LIVESTOCK WATERING EXEMPTIONS BY STATE
Of the sixteen states providing for exempt groundwater wells, all but Alaska and Montana recognize some form of specific exemption or priority treatment for wells utilized for livestock watering purposes. The parameters of each
statute vary by state.

15.

Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., EristagRegulation ofEnempt Wells in the United States, 48 J.

CONTEMP. WATER REsEARCH & EDuc. 3, 3-4 (2012).

16.

Id. at 4.

17.

ORE. REv. STAT. $§ 537.545 (5)-(7).

18. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Tiffany Dowell, The inpHeations of Bounds v. State of
NevMexico, 148J. CONTEPi.WATER RESEARCH & EDUC. 17, 18 (2012).
19. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 90.44.050 (2013); Five Corners Family Farmers v.
Washington, 268 P.3d 892, 900-01 (Wash. 2011).
20. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, S 93.035(b) (2004).

21.

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §S 42-111(l)-(2) (1995).
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A. ALASKA
Alaska requires potential appropriators to file an application before water
may be appropriated.' Although Alaska does not expressly exempt livestock
wells, it provides an exemption from the application requirement for uses that
do not qualify as "a significant amount of water."' Regulations define a "significant amount of water" as the consumptive use of more than five thousand
gallons from a single source in a single day; the daily or recurring consumptive
use of more than five hundred gallons per day from a single source for more
than ten days per year; the non-consumptive use of more than thirty thousand
gallons per day from a single source; or any use that might adversely affect
water rights of appropriators or of the public interest.' Thus, Alaska exempts
wells withdrawing less than the defined amounts, including those used in connection with livestock, from the application process.
B. ARIZONA
Arizona provides an exemption for all withdrawals of groundwater for
non-irrigation uses from wells with a pump capacity of thirty-five gallons per
minute or less.' However, in 2006, Arizona imposed additional restrictions on
drilling exempt wells located within one hundred feet of the service area of a
municipal provider with an assured water supply designation within an active
management area.'
Additionally, in certain areas, stock watering wells are granted additional
exemptions. Currently, in active management areas, withdrawals from exempt
wells drilled after April 28, 1983 are limited to ten acre-feet per year for uses
other than domestic or livestock.' Similarly, if subsequent active management
areas are created in the future, no withdrawals would be permitted except
those for domestic use or stock watering.' The applicable statute defines stock
watering as "the watering of livestock, range livestock, or poultry."" Within an
active management area, Arizona exempts stock watering wells and releases a
well owner from needing a groundwater right or withdrawal permit, complying
with spacing rules, using water metering devices, paying groundwater withdrawal fees, and filing an annual groundwater use report.' Exempt well owners
must only file a notice of intent to drill, use a licensed well driller, and pay the
required filing fee before drilling may occur."'

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

ALASKA STAT.

30.

ARIz.

§ 46.15.040(b) (1986); ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, S 93.035(b) (2004).

§§ 93.035(a), (c).
Id. S 93.035(b).
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-454(B) (2008); see also id. S 45-402(8) (2003).
Id. § 45-454(C) (2008).
Id. 45-454(B)(2).
Id. 45-454(B)(3).
Id. S 45-454(M)(3).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,

DEP'T

OF

WATER

RES.,

EXEMPT

WELLS

(2006),

http://www.azwater.gov/azdwr/StatewidePlanning/SWAG/documents/Exempt
31.

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

45-454(G).

avadable

at

wells80406.pdf.
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C. COLORADO
Colorado provides an exemption from the permitting process for wells

producing less than fifteen gallons per minute that are used for "the watering
of poultry, domestic animals, and livestock on farms and ranches."" Colorado
generally allows exempt stock watering wells only on tracts of land of thirty-five
acres or more." Different requirements, including limitations on the amount of
water that may be pumped per minute, may be imposed on wells located within Designated Groundwater Basins.'
D. IDAHO
Idaho exempts domestic wells from the permitting process, the payment
of an application fee, and the requirement of a measurement device." Idaho
provides a two-prong definition of "domestic use." The first prong of the test
applies to stock watering, defining domestic use as including the use of water
for "livestock and for any other purpose in connection therewith" if the total
use does not exceed thirteen thousand gallons per day. ' Even if stock wells fall
within this definition, they are still subject to inspection and licensing requirements."
E. KANSAS

Kansas, too, exempts domestic wells from the state's permit requirement."
However, domestic well owners are not exempt from providing information
regarding water use to the chief engineer." Kansas defines domestic uses as
including water used "for the watering of livestock, poultry, farm and domestic
animals used in operating a farm[.]"" To fall within the domestic use definition, livestock must be (1) pastured and not confined to a feedlot; (2) cattle
feedlots must have fewer than one thousand head capacity; and (3) other animals in a confined feeding operation must consume less than fifteen acre-feet
per year."
32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602(1)(b) (2013); COLO. Div. OF WATER RES., GUIDE TO
COLORADO WELL PERMITS, WATER RIGHTS, AND WATER ADMINISTRATION (2012) at 2, available athttp://water.state.co.us/DWRIPub/Documents/wellpermitguide.pdf.
33. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602; COLO. Div. OF WATER RES., supra note 32, at 2;
see also Sherry A. Caloia et al., The Water Rghts Deternination and Admnistraion Act of
1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 39,
44 n.20 (1999).
34. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602(l)(a); id. S 37-90-105(1)(b) (allowing exemption for
livestock wells pumping up to 50 gallons per minute).
35. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-221(K)(1) (2012); id. § 42-227 (2001); id. S 42-701(7) (1998).
36. Id. S 42-111(1)(a) (1995).
37. Id. § 42-227 (2001).
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-728(a) (1981).
39.

Id.

§ 82a-705a

(1957).

40. Id. S 82a-701(c) (2009).
41. See KAN. ADMIN. REGs. § 5-1-1(aaaa)(1) (2008) (distinguishing between "stockwatering"
and "domestic use"); see also email from Lane Letourneau, Kan. Dep't of Agric., to author
(Sept 9, 2012, 02:10 pm MDT) (on file with Water LawResie1); email from Lane Ltourneau,
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Under this rule, while a well serving any number of cattle on pasture and
any amount of water consumed could qualify as domestic, no cattle feedlots
over one thousand head capacity may fall within the exception. Other types of
livestock in confined operations, such as confinement hogs or sheep feedlots
are not limited as to capacity, but are limited in the total amount of water a
user may withdraw each year, whereas no such water quantity limitation is imposed on a cattle feedlot of less than one thousand head capacity."
F. MONTANA

Montana provides a quantity, rather than use, exemption to the permitting
process and, therefore, does not expressly address livestock watering. Specifically, wells located outside domestic management areas are exempt if they
appropriate thirty-five gallons a minute or less and do not exceed ten acre-feet
of withdrawal per year." Although these wells are exempt from the permitting
process, a well owner must still file a notice of completion and, upon filing, the
state is required to issue a certificate of water right."
G. NEBRASKA

Generally, Nebraska statutes exempt all single water wells that are only capable of pumping fifty gallons per minute or less." In addition to state statutory
requirements, Nebraska also allows local natural resource districts to pass
rules, including permitting requirements for certain wells, but such additional
permitting is not allowed for water "used to water range livestock."" Also, although the state may issue stays on drilling in over-appropriated and fully appropriated basins, wells for the watering of range livestock are exempt from
any such stay." However, all wells, including exempt livestock wells, must register with the state."
H. NEVADA
Nevada provides a pernitting exemption for domestic wells, including
wells used for "the watering of livestock and any other domestic animals" so
long as the withdrawal from the well does not exceed two acre-feet per year."
Kan. Dep't of Agric., to author (Sept. 8, 2012, 05:39 pm MDT) (on file with Water Law Reriew). A vested right does exist for confined feeding facilities with a capacity of one thousand
head or more that was privately owned and operated before May 1, 1986; such operations are
certified for the lesser of their actual use or fifteen acre-feet of water per year. Id. § 5-2-4.
42. Id. § 5-1-1(aaaa)(1) (2008); see also email from Lane Letoumeau to author (Sept. 9,
2012), supra note 41; email from Lane Letourneau to author (Sept. 8, 2012), supranote 41.
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-306(3)(a)(iii) (2013).
44. Id. S 85-2-306(5).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-735(1)(b) (2004).
46. Id. § 46-735(1)(c).
47. Id.§ 46-714(3)(f) (2009).
48. Id. § 46-602(1) (2013); see also email from Pam Bonebright, Neb. Dep't of Natural
Res., to author (Sept. 25, 2012, 6:15 am MDT) (on file with Water LawReview).
49. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 534.013(2), .180(1) (2007).
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The Nevada State Engineer does, however, retain the discretion to require
registration of domestic wells' and to limit the depth of such wells or even
prohibit drilling altogether if water districts or municipalities in the area can
furnish water in lieu of a domestic well.

I. NEW MExico
New Mexico not only requires that a person seeking to appropriate water
for livestock purposes file an application with the state engineer but also requires the state engineer to grant the permit upon its filing, leaving the state
engineer no discretion to review or analyze the application." Thus, livestock
wells are exempt from the typical requirement of publication, notice, investigation, and findings by the state engineer.' If an applicant seeks to drill a livestock well on federal land, the applicant must submit proof to the state engineer that he or she is legally entitled to place livestock on the land where the
water is to be used and he or she has received permission to access the portion
of the land necessary to drill the well.' The New Mexico Supreme Court recently upheld a facial constitutional challenge brought against the domestic
well statute, finding that the statute did not violate the constitutional doctrine of
prior appropriation."

J. NORTH

DAKOTA

Wells drilled for livestock purposes in North Dakota are exempt from the
state's permit requirements so long as the total amount of water appropriated
is less than 12.5 acre-feet per year. North Dakota defines "livestock uses" as
"the use of water for drinking purposes by herds, flocks, or bands of animals
kept for commercial purposes."" All appropriators, including those drilling
livestock wells, must notify the state engineer of the well's location and acrefeet capacity.'

50. Id. S 534.180(2).
51. Id. §§ 534.120(3)(c)-(d).
52. See N.M. STAT. ANN. S 72-12-1.2 (West 2003).
53. See id,
54. Id.
55. See Bounds v. New Mexico, 2013-NMSC-037, 306 P.3d 457 (2013); see also Benson,
supra note 1, at 700 n.146 (although the livestock watering statute is a separate provision and is
not at issue in Bounds, the statutes are nearly identical, and the Court's ruling will likely be
equally applicable).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-04-02 (2013). Although the statute applies to "constructed
works, dams or dugouts", it is presumed that this includes the construction of wells. See Nathan
Bracken, Exempt WellIssues in the Wes4 40 ENvTL. L. 141, 177 (2010).
57. Id. S 61-04-01.1(9).
58. Id.
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K. OKLAHOMA
In Oklahoma, any person may appropriate groundwater from his or her
own land for domestic use without a permit.' "Domestic use" includes the use
of water by a natural individual for "farm and domestic animals up to the
normal grazing capacity of the land[.]"' There is no express limitation on the
amount of water that a domestic well may withdraw, but domestic wells are
subject to sanctions against waste."
The Oklahoma Water Resources Board expanded the definition of "domestic use" to include an exemption for water withdrawn by natural individuals for "agricultural purposes."' The Oklahoma Water Resource Board construes this regulation as applying a 5 acre foot per year limit on wells used for
"agricultural purposes."'
Certainly the Oklahoma Water Resource Board's "agricultural purposes"
definition appears broader than the more limited statutory definition and
would include, for example, a feedlot or dairy that would likely not fall within
the statutory "domestic use" definition as it would have more cattle than the
normal capacity of the land. Importantly, both of these definitions limit the
exemption to "natural individuals," thereby excluding corporations or partnerships from falling within the exemption.
L. OREGON
Oregon law exempts wells for several uses, including those for "stockwatering purposes," from the requirements of registration and permitting." A
person drilling an exempt well, however, must file the exempt well with the
Water Resources Department, pay a $300 recording fee, and provide a map
showing the location of the well within thirty days of drilling completion."

M. SouTH DAKOTA
Generally, a person seeking to appropriate water in South Dakota must
obtain a permit from the Water Management Board." An exemption exists,
however, for well owners seeking to make "reasonable domestic use" of water.' The state limits reasonable domestic use to twenty-five gallons per minute
on an average daily basis and to 25,920 -gallons per day or less as necessary for

59.
60.

OKIA. STAT. tit 82,
Id. S 1020.1(2).

§

1020.3 (1973).

61. See id. § 1020.3; see also email from Lou Klaver, Okla. Water Resources Bd., to author (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:03 pm MDT) (on file with Water IawReview).
62. OKIA. ADMIN. CODE 785:30-1-2 (2008).
63. Email from Lou Klaver to author, supra note 61.
64. OR. REV. STAT. S 537.545(1)(a).
65. See id. SS 537.545 (5)-(7).
66. S.D. CODIFIED LAws S 46-5-10 (1993).
67. Id. S 46-5-8.
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domestic purposes.' Additionally, South Dakota considers domestic purposes
to be the highest use of water, taking precedence over all appropriative rights."
The definition of "domestic use" includes stock watering." Originally,
however, the South Dakota statute did not provide a definition of "stock watering." Courts were left to interpret the phrase, and, in doing so, strictly limited
the permissible uses to the consumption of water by animals." In 2012, the
South Dakota Legislature amended the statute to define the phrase more
broadly than the court's interpretation. Thus, under the current South Dakota
law, stock watering is defined as "[ulse of water not exceeding eighteen gallons
per minute on an average daily basis for livestock in a confinement operation,
including water for drinking, sanitary and general welfare purposes, and for
like purposes by those caring for the livestock[.]"" Importantly, the quantity
limitations for domestic use are applicable to stock watering as well."
N. TEXAS
In Texas, the preferred method of groundwater management is to place
such management in the hands of various local groundwater conservation districts located throughout the state." The Texas Water Code provides that wells
"used solely" for providing water for livestock or poultry on a tract of land
larger than ten acres that are "incapable of producing more than twenty-five
thousand gallons of groundwater per day" are exempt from the permitting
requirements of local groundwater conservation districts.' Thus, local groundwater conservation districts may not require a permit or restrict the production
for exempt wells, even during times of drought." Importantly, even though
livestock wells are exempt from the permitting process, they must still be registered in accordance with the rules of the local district, be equipped and maintained to confirm with-rules regarding installation, and must have a drilling log
on file with the local district."

68.

S.D. ADMIN. R. 74:02:01:01(7) (2012).

69. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-5(1).
70. See id. § 46-1-6(7).
71. See In The Matter of the Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Applicability of
Domestic Water Use for Longview Farm LLP's Well, No. CIV. 09-63 (LongviewFarm), 14 (1st
Judicial Cir. Mar. 22, 2010).
72. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-6(7) (2012).
73. See S.D. ADMIN. R. 74:02:01:01(7); see id. 74:02:01:01(1) (if a confined feeding operation exceeds reasonable domestic use, it is deemed a "commercial use").
74. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2013).
75. Id. S 36.117(b)(1); but see §36.117(d)(1) (allowing a district to cancel a previously granted exemption and require a permit if the well is located in Hill Country Priority Groundwater
Management Area and is no longer used solely for domestic or livestock watering).
76. See Carl R. Galant and Russell S. Johnson, Exempt Uses of Groundwaterand Surface
Water, 33 ST. BAR OF TEx., no. 3, Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Law Section Report, Mar.
2009, at 3, available at http://www.mcginnislaw.com/images/uploads/news/09-03-01_Galant
Johnson-exemptuses-of-groundwater.pdf.
77. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.117(h)-(i) (West 2011).
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These requirements, however, are merely a baseline, and local groundwater conservation districts may broaden the exemptions." For example, the
Brazos Valley Groundwater Conservation District doubles the maximum production allowed for exempt wells, allowing an exemption for domestic or livestock wells capable of producing up to fifty thousand gallons per day." Similarly, the Bluebonnet Groundwater Conservation District exempts "agricultural
wells" rather than the narrower stock well definition contained in the state
statute from portions of the permitting process and from production limitations."
Also of note, at least one Texas groundwater conservation district expressly excludes Confined Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFOs") from the livestock watering exemption." Thus, while a CAFO may not qualify for exemption in certain counties, they may well be able to drill a well without completing the permitting process in other areas of the state.
0. UTAH
Utah recognizes no exempt wells, finding instead that any impairment,
even de rnnirnus,is unacceptable." Thus, all livestock wells must go through
the general permitting process with the Utah State Engineer."
P. WASHINGTON

Washington exempts certain wells from the permitting process, including
wells used for "stock-watering purposes."" There is no limitation on the quantity of water for stock-watering purposes under this statute." Although the statute does not define the phrase "stock-watering purposes," agency interpretation has given this phrase broad meaning beyond merely livestock consumption of water." The state, however, may require exempt users to provide information regarding the means and quantity of water withdrawal."

78.

See TEx. WATER CODE ANN. S 36.117(a) (West 2008).

79.
BRAZOs VALLEY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIsT., RULES OF THE BRAZOS
VALLEY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIST., S 8.1(a) (2013), http://brazosvalleygcd.org/wp-

content/uploads/2012/12/BVGCD-Rules-Adopted-5-9-13.pdf.
80. BLUEBONNET GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIsT., RULES OF THE BLUEBONNET
GROUNDWATER

CONSERVATION

DIST.,

S

8.3(B)

-

(C) (2013),

http://www.bluebonne

tgroundwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Bluebonnet-GCD-Rules-17-043.pdf.
81.
See NORTH PLAINS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DisT., RULES OF NORTH PLAINS
GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIST., S 1.49(D), (N); 6.4 (2013), http://www.northpla
insgcd.org/downloads/category/5-district-documents.html.
82. See, e.g., Waymentv. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151 n.11 (Utah 2006).
83. UTAH CODE ANN. S 73-3-2(1)(a) (West 2013).
84. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 90.44.050 (2013).
85. See Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington, 268 P.3d 892, 900-01 (Wash. 2011).
86. See infa Parts V(A)(2).
87. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 90.44.050 (2013).
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Q. WYOMING
While Wyoming does not exempt stock wells from the permitting process, it does provide exemptions from certain requirements in the adjudication
process." Moreover, domestic and stock wells are given a "preferred right"
over all other uses, regardless of the date of priority.' Thus, if a non-preferred
well interferes with a preferred well, the non-preferred user must either reduce
his use to eliminate the interference or provide water to the preferred user."
While Wyoming does not define "stock use," it does limit the permissible rate
of withdrawal to twenty-five gallons per minute."

IV. LITIGATION CONCERNING LIVESTOCK WATERING
EXEMPTIONS
Although domestic exemptions have been the focus of ongoing controversy throughout the West,' there has been very little litigation specifically involving exempt wells for stock watering purposes. The cases that have been decided, however, indicate that the potential for future litigation is extreniely high
because similar issues are likely to arise in other states.
A. WASHINGTON

The most in-depth analysis of exempt livestock wells has occurred in the
state of Washington. Like some other western states, wells used for stockwatering purposes are exempt from the permitting process.' Specifically, the
statute provides that "any withdrawal of public ground waters for stockwatering purposes, or for the watering of a lawn or of a noncommercial garden
not exceeding one-half acre in area, or for single or group domestic uses in an
amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day, . . . or for an industrial

purpose not exceeding five thousand gallons a day" is exempt from the permitting process." Additional statutory language refers to these withdrawals as
"small withdrawals" and "minimal uses."' This statute has generated two main
questions: (1) Does the five thousand gallon exemption apply to wells used for
stock-watering?; and (2) What constitutes stock-watering purposes?

88. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-930(a), -935(b) (2013); see also email from Lisa Lindemann,
State Engineer's Office to author (August 13, 2012 09:43 am MDT) (on file with Water Law
Rel'ief).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.§ 41-3-907.
Id. S 41-3-911(a).
Id. S 41-3-907.
See Richardson, supra note 15, at 3.
See supra Part III(P).
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. S 90.44.050 (2013).
Id.; id § 90.44.051 (2013).
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1. Quantity Limits

Since 1945, state agencies, the Washington Attorney General, and Washington courts have examined and interpreted the stock-watering exemption,
often reaching different conclusions.
A.AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

Historically, state agencies including the Department of Ecology and the
Pollution Control Hearings Board, interpreted the statute to limit all withdrawals, including those for stock-watering purposes, to five thousand gallons
per day.' In 2001, the Pollution Control Hearings Board reaffirmed this interpretation in De Vries v. DepartmentofEcology.'
In De Vies, a dairy of 2,261 cows relied on the stock-watering exemption
for its water use, which was between thirty-nine thousand and fifty-six thousand
gallons per day." The Department of Ecology argued the dairy violated the
statute because the dairy exceeded the five thousand gallons per day limit,

which the Department argued applied to stock-watering.' The dairy argued
that the five thousand gallon exemption did not apply to water used for stockwatering purposes."
The Board found that the stock-watering exemption was limited to five
thousand gallons per day." Relying upon the phrases "small" and "minimal"
used in related portions of the statute, the Board concluded the Legislature
must have intended the quantity limitation to apply to all four exempt purposes.' " This was consistent with the original purpose of the exemptions, "to save
both the state and the small appropriators the trouble and expense involved in
the permitting process since these small withdrawals were viewed as unlikely to
have a significant impact on the water system or to affect the outcome of disputes."" According to the Board, "Itlo read this section otherwise would result

in an unlimited, and uncontrollable, potential for withdrawal of groundwater."" Thus, the Board granted summary judgment to the Department on this
issue."

96. See Cheney, PCHB 96-186 (Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd. Apr. 18, 1997);
Fleming, PCHB 93-320, 94-7, 94-11 (Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd. Dec. 22,1994);
Green, PCHB Nos. 91-139, 91-141, 19-149 (Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd.1993);
memorandum from JayJ. Manning, Director, Dept. of Ecology 3 (Dec. 4, 2008).
97. DeVries, PCHB 01-073 (Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd. Sept. 27, 2001).
98. Id. at 4-5. The herd was expected to increase in size to 4,400 cows, which were expected to consume 110,000 gallons per day. Additionally, it was estimated that at completion,
the amount of water used by employees, for washing the equipment, to mist the cattle, and for
dust control would be somewhere less than 10,000 gallons per day. Id.
99. Id. at 7-8.
100. Id. at 7.
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. at 15-16.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 19.
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B. 2005 ATroRNEY GENERAL OPINION
In 2005, the Washington Attorney General released an opinion responding to an inquiry from two members of the Washington State Legislature who
sought clarification as to whether the five thousand gallon limit in the exempt
well statute applied to stock-watering." The Attorney General, going against
the prior interpretations of the Department of Ecology and the Pollution Control Hearings Board, found that the quantity limitation did not apply to the
stock-watering exemption." The Attorney General found the exemption
"makes it plain that groundwater withdrawals for stock-watering are exempt
from the permit requirement, and that the exemption is not limited to withdrawals of less than 5,000 gallons a day."" The stock-watering prong of the
exemption, unlike the other three categories, does not contain language specifically limiting the amount of the withdrawal." Because the statute did not provide an express exemption and because the Attorney General reasoned that
the subsequent statutory references to "small withdrawals" and "minimal uses"
were simply shorthand for the exemptions the statute set forth, rather than an
indication that a quantity exemption should apply, the stock-watering was exempt regardless of the volume of water withdrawn."
Although the Attorney General recognized "it could be suggested that an
'open-ended' exemption for stock-watering is inherently inconsistent with the
general policy of requiring permits for groundwater withdrawals in order to
provide for an orderly and consistent administration of an important and limited public resource, the state's water supply," this did not alter the Attorney
General's conclusion."' The Attorney General reasoned the Legislature had
carefully chosen its words in defining the exemptions and may have concluded
the total amount of water used for this purpose was sufficiently small to allow
an open-ended, categorical exemption."' Additionally, because the statute allows the Department of Ecology to obtain information on the use of groundwater for exempt uses, including stock-watering, if such withdrawals are harming the quantity of water available, the Department of Ecology can bring this to
the attention of the Legislature."' Thus, the Attorney General concluded there
was no quantity limitation on exempt stock-watering wells."'

106. WASH. ATTORNEY GENERAL, AGO 2005 No. 17, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY
LANGUAGE EXEMPTING WITHDRAWALS OF GROUNDWATER FOR STOCK-WATERING (2005),
avadable at http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/opinion.aspx?section-archive&id-5872#
ftn2.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 3.

109.

Id. at 4.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
See id. at 2.
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C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

In addition to the conflict between the state agencies and the Attorney
General, dicta in various appellate court opinions differs as well. As the 2005
Attorney General's Opinion noted, in 2003 the Washington Court of Appeals
read the statute as providing an unlimited quantity of water for stock-watering
purposes. ' Although the case did not directly involve the stock-watering exemption specifically, the court in KIn v. Pollution Control Hearing Bd., described the exemption as applying to "any amount of water for livestock[.J""'
The Washington Supreme Court, however, took the opposite view in
Postema v. Polludon ControlHearingsBd., explaining that the statute "allows
domestic and stock watering uses of up to five thousand gallons without a
permit[.]"' The Supreme Court made a similar statement in Hi/is v. Department of Ecology, holding a permit is not required for the withdrawal of water
"not exceeding 5,000 gallons per day for single or group domestic uses or other specific purposes.""

In 2011, the Washington Supreme Court faced the -precise question of
whether the five thousand gallon limitation applies to stock-watering wells in
Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington. In that case, the Easterday
Ranches sought to operate a large cattle feedlot, approximately thirty thousand
head, in Franklin County, Washington." It was estimated the cattle would
drink between 450,000 and 600,000 gallons of water per day." Mr. Easterday
contended, and the Department of Ecology agreed, the withdrawal of groundwater by the plaintiff constituted stock-watering purposes and was exempt from
statutory permitting requirements."' Five Corners Family Farmers, the Center
for Environmental Law and Policy, and the Sierra Club filed a declaratory
judgment action, seeking a ruling that the statutory stock-watering exemption
was limited to five thousand gallons per day." The trial court held that the
statute unambiguously provided an exemption for any quantity of water used
for stock-watering purposes."
The Washington Supreme Court agreed, concluding "there is only one
reasonable interpretation of RCW 90.44.050's exemption clause."" Under the
court's reasoning, the statute is divided into four separate categories: (1) stockwatering purposes; (2) watering of a lawn or noncommercial garden not exceeding one-half acre in area; (3) for single group or domestic uses in an
115. See id. at 4 n.2.
116. Kim v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 61 P.3d 1211, 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
117. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 739 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
118. Hillis v. Dept of Ecology, 932 P.2d 139, 142 (Wash..1997) (en banc).
119. Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington, 268 P.3d 892, 895 (Wash. 2011) (en
banc).
120. Id.
121. Id. (explaining that Easterday Ranches acquired a water right from a neighboring farm
that provided approximately 58,921 gallons of water per day for consumption by the cattle, but
had no water right for the remaining water to be consumed).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 901.
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amount not exceeding five thousand gallons per day; or (4) for an industrial
purpose not exceeding five thousand gallons per day.'" Each category is limited
only by the specific qualifying phrase, and the stock-watering exemption contained no such phrase." Thus, the Washington Supreme Court found that
withdrawals of water for stock-watering purposes were not limited in quantity."
This type of issue could easily arise again in other states with statutes drafted similarly. In Oklahoma, for example, exempt domestic uses include "(1)
the use of water for agriculture purposes by natural individuals, (2) use of water
for fire protection, and (3) the use of water by non-household entities for
drinking water purposes, restroom use, and the watering of lawns, provided
that the amount of groundwater used for any such purposes does not exceed
five-acre feet per year."'" It is certainly possible, if not likely, a question could
arise as to whether the five-acre foot per year limitation applies to all of the
domestic uses, or merely to the use of water by non-household entities described in the statute.
2. Permitted Uses
In addition to the question regarding whether Washington imposed a
quantity limitation, the meaning of the phrase "stock-watering purposes" was
also unclear. The statute provides no definition for this phrase," nor is this
phrase found in the dictionary." Thus, the Pollution Control Hearings Board
in De Vies was left to determine the type of uses the Legislature contemplated
with little guidance.
First, the Board determined that the phrase "stock" was short for "livestock" which is defined as "domestic animals kept for use on a farm or raised
for sale or profit."" Based on this, the Board determined that the exemption
was not limited to open range livestock, but could apply to animals kept in
confinement or concentrated operations." Moreover, the exemption did not
speak to the type or size of the operation, meaning that it applied equally to
family farms and "commercial farming operation[s]," and applied to operations regardless of the number of animals housed."
Second, the Board noted that the Legislature elected to use the plural
term "purposes," indicating that more than one stock-watering purpose exists." Based upon this, the Board held the exemption "covers all reasonable

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 895.
128. Okla. Admin. Code § 785:30-1-2 (2011); see also Kershen, supra note 12, at 568 (discussing potential ambiguity in the statute with regard to the application of the five acre foot limit
to agriculture purposes).
129. De Vries, PCHB 01-073, at 9.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.

Issue 1

YOU CAN LEAD LIVESTOCK TO WATER...

17

uses of water normally associated with the sound husbandry of livestock."'
The Board reasoned the exception applies to "all reasonable uses of water
normally associated with the sound husbandry of livestock," including drinking, feeding, cleaning stalls, washing cattle, washing feeding or milking equipment, controlling dust surrounding animals, and cooling the animals."
Other states have also taken a broad approach to defining stock-watering
as more than water consumed by animals. Idaho, for example, defines domestic uses, which are exempt from the permitting process, as including water for
"livestock and for any other purposes in connection therewith.""

B. SouTH DAKOTA
Like in Washington, controversy surrounding the stock watering provision
of the South Dakota statute has resulted in litigation.
1. Factual Background
Longview Farms, LLP ("Longview") built a large scale, confined swine
breeding facility in South Dakota consisting of 4,900 sows and producing up to
70,000 piglets per year." Longview is a South Dakota limited liability partnership, and each of its owners resides in Iowa." Longview first filed an application for a water rights permit for commercial use associated with its confined
feeding operation, but later withdrew its application after several individuals
requested a hearing on the permit.'" Instead, Longview informed the state it
would drill a well not exceeding reasonable domestic uses, as defined by South
Dakota regulations."' Longview would use the water from the well primarily for
washing the facilities and the livestock and, if quality allowed, for consumption
by pregnant or nursing sows."' Longview represented the well would have a
total water usage of seventeen thousand gallons per day, the use would not
exceed eighteen gallons per minute, and the maximum pumping rate would be
less than twenty-five gallons per minute.'" Longview's proposed production
numbers, therefore, fell within "reasonable domestic use" as defined by South
Dakota law.'" Thus, the South Dakota Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources did not require Longview to obtain a water rights permit to
withdraw water from the well it constructed.'"

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
IDAHO CODE ANN. S 42-111(l)(A).
LonpgewFams, No. CIV. 09-63, slip op. at 4 (N.D. 1stJudicial Cir. Mar. 22, 2010).
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
S.D. ADMIN. R. 74:02:01:01(7) (2012).
Loigppew Farms,slip op. at 2.
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2. Water Rights Management Board Ruling
The group of individuals who had objected to Longview's commercial
permit filed a petition with the Water Rights Management Board ("Board")
seeking numerous declarations regarding the meaning of "stock watering" under the statute and its application to Longview. " Specifically, the petitioners
sought determinations that Longview's proposed uses were not within the
"domestic use" definition, commercial operations are not covered by the
"stock watering" provision, the power washing of livestock facilities is not a
"domestic use," and if regulations allowed Longview's actions, those regulations conflicted with South Dakota statutes."'.
The Board found in favor of Longview, denying each of the requests for
injunction by a five-to-one vote." Specifically, the Board found: (i) Longview
was not required to obtain a permit because the proposed uses would not exceed the maximum withdrawal limit of twenty-five thousand nine hundred
gallons per day and was within the limitations for allowable pump rate; (ii) the
use of exempt well water for human sanitation and consumption is allowed;
(iii) power washing of facilities and washing livestock are considered stock watering; and (iv) stock watering includes all uses of water for the benefit of the
animals, including misting, washing, sanitation, and power washing of facilities
where the animals are confined.' The petitioners appealed to the FirstJudicial
Circuit Court."
3. First Judicial Circuit Court Decision
On appeal, the petitioners raised four issues: (i) whether the Board erred
in determining Longview was exempt from permitting because its use would
not exceed 25,920 gallons per day, irrespective of what it used the water for;
(ii) whether the Board erred in determining water could be used for human
consumption and sanitation even though Longview is not an "individual, family unit, or household" as required by statute; (iii) whether the Board erred in
ruling Longview could use exempt wells to power wash its facilities; and (iv)
whether the Board erred in determining Longview did not need a permit because the term "stock watering" includes "all uses of water for the benefit of
the animals such as misting, washing, sanitation, or power washing facilities
where livestock are confined.". The court sided with the petitioners and reversed the decision of the Water Rights Management Board."'
First, the court determined the mere fact that Longview's well would withdraw less water than permitted by the domestic exemption did not mean that it
constituted "reasonable domestic use" oqf water." The court held the statute
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 2-3.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8, 11, 14, 15.
Id. at 1, 6.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 10.

I
Issue 1

YOU CAN LEAD LIVESTOCK TO WATER...

19

contained two separate requirements that must both be met to fall within the
exemption: (i) the well may not exceed the maximum quantity of water per day
or the maximum pumping rate; and (ii) water must be withdrawn and used for
a reasonable domestic purpose simply because Longview sought to appropriate less than the maximum allowable quantity of water, it fell within the domestic use provision.'"
Second, the court found "stock watering " is limited to the consumption of
water by animals for drinking." Longview argued that the intended use of water - for human consumption and sanitation, power washing livestock facilities, and washing livestock - fell within the definition of "stock watering" because human hygiene is necessary to prevent disease and infection in a hog

breeding and farrowing operation.' The court rejected this argument, finding
that "stock watering does not include all uses of water for the benefit of ani-

mals," but instead means "consumption of water by animals for drinking.""'
The court also found the other uses proposed by Longview - washing of facilities and equipment, washing of animals, and misting of animals - constitute
sanitation purposes, not stock watering.'" Thus, Longview was required to ob-

tain permits for such uses."
4. Legislative Action
In 2012, the South Dakota Legislature modified the state's exempt well
statute in order to broaden the definition of "stock watering" beyond the
court's construction in Longview. Specifically, the amendment expressly states
"stock watering" includes "water for drinking, sanitary and general welfare
purposes and for like purposes by those caring for the livestock[.]"'" This
amendment essentially overrules the court's determination that stock watering
is limited only to the water animals actually consumed.
C. KANSAS

Kansas courts have recognized, although not yet had occasion to directly
address, potential issues arising from the Kansas livestock watering exemption:
"Does the term 'livestock' mean two cows for the purpose of furnishing
dairy products to the farm family, or does it mean a commercial dairy? Or,
perhaps does it mean feeding two steers for home consumption; or does it

154. Id.
155. Id. at 12-13. Based on the plain statutory language, the court also determined that
domestic uses for sanitary purposes were limited to use by individuals, family units, and households.
156. Id. at 12,14.
157. Id. at 13-14.
158. Id. at 15-16. These sanitary purposes are not exempt because the sanitary exemption is
limited to individual, household and family use, thereby excluding a corporate, commercial
entity like Longview.
159. See id.at 17.
160. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-6 (2012).
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mean a feedlot containing several hundred cattle? These questions have not
been before our Supreme Court."1'
In dicta, however, the Kansas Supreme Court stated feedlots and commercial dairies constitute industrial, rather than domestic uses.' On the other
hand, the court commented a farmer or rancher running a "normal" number
of livestock on his or her land is a domestic user, even if the rancher owns, for
example, one thousand head of cattle." The resolution of this issue has been
left for another day.
V. CONCLUSION
It certainly appears that the controversy surrounding water use in the West
will only intensify as time goes on and as water becomes an increasingly scarce
resource. Exemptions for livestock watering wells are likely to face both scrutiny and litigation in the coming years. It is critical for both government and
landowners to understand the existing limits under current statutory exemptions with regard to livestock watering.

161. F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Kan. 1981) (quoting Arno
Windscheffel, Kansas Water Rights: More Recent Developments, 47 J. KAN. B.A. 217, 218
(1978)).
162. Id.
163. See id.The court fails to provide a definition of the term "normal" as used in the opinion.
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INTRODUCTION
American legal regimes governing water face a pivotal moment in history.
Just as water resources in this country confront unprecedented threats, states
must decide between two fundamentally opposing paths for managing their
increasingly scarce water resources in the future: privatization, whereby water is
treated as a commodity and marketed as such, or recognition of water as a
public good under the public trust doctrine. In 1892, the United States Supreme Court ruled in its seminal Illinois Central RairoadCo. v. Illhnois decision that each state holds certain natural resources in trust for its citizens and
protects these resources from the "obstruction or interference of private parties."' While water is among the resources protected by the public trust, the

* J.D. 2013, Vermont Law School; B.A. 2010, University of Puget Sound. A special
thanks to Jack Tuholske for his continued guidance on this topic.
1. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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scope of the trust and the extent to which it limits private development remains uncertain and varies tremendously from state to state.'
Perhaps the clearest example of the clash between private and public interests in water can be seen in Hawaii, where conflicts between large land plantations and native Hawaiians over water within the state date back for centuries. In recent decades, community groups sought to restore Hawaii's water
resources by fighting legal battles against private companies whose diversions
have left many streams dry. In 2000-in one of the most important recent cases
expanding the public trust-the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that "all water
resources" within the state are subject to the public trust.' In In re Water Use
PermitApplications ("Waidhole Ditch"), native Hawaiians and local farmers
sought to restore water to streams that some of the State's most powerful private interests had diverted, including former sugar plantations whose predecessors participated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy during the late
1800s.' Applying a broad reading of the public trust doctrine, the court vacated
in part the Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management's ("Commission") decision on the ground that it failed to restore flows to the streams
sufficient to protect the public's rights in the waters of the streams.'
Twelve years after its celebrated decision in Waidhole Ditch, Hawaii's
highest court again confirmed that the public trust doctrine is a valuable tool
for reining in private rights in water in order to promote public purposes. As
in Wazhole Ditch, local community groups in In re 'lao Ground Water
Management Area ("Four Great Waters") sought to defend the rights of the
public in Hawaii's water resources by challenging two of the largest private
entities within the State-the Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company and the
Wailuku Water Company.' In its decision the court unanimously vacated the
Commission's decision granting water permit applications to the companies
and restoring little to none of the instream flows necessary to sustain four major Maui streams.'
In addition to expanding upon the jurisdictional analysis in Waidhole
Ditch, the court held that the Commission's decision setting instream flows for

2. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctnes:
Classificationof States, PropertyRights, andState Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1,
3-5 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust
Doctrines:Public Values, PrivateRights, andthe Evolution Toward an EcologicalPublic Trust,
37 EcOLOGY L.Q. 53, 55-57 (2010).
3. Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to
GroundwaterResources, 9 VT.J. ENvL. L. 189, 219 (2008).
4. hi re Water Use Permit Applications ( Waidhole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 , 484-85 (Haw.
2000).
5. Isaac Moriwake, Water as a "PublicTrust" in HawaiY: Public-InterestEnvironmentalism and Native Hawaiian Rights (2012) abstract available at http://citation.allacade
mic.com/meta/pmla-apa-research citation/4/1/7/9/3/
p417935_index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
6. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 501.
7. In re 'lao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications (FourGreat Waters), 287 P.3d 129, 132 (Haw. 2012).
8. Id. at 132-33.
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the Na Wai 'Eha water system failed to comply with the public trust in several
respects.' First, the court found that the Commission failed to properly consider the rights of Native Hawaiians and the impact of its amended instream flows
on "traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices."" In addition, it held
that the Commission's analysis of instream uses was incomplete because it
failed to "fully consider" all instream uses, which the Commission must weigh
against noninstream uses before setting instream flow standards." Finally, the
court concluded that the Commission violated the public trust doctrine by
failing to adequately pursue alternatives to diverting Na Wai 'Eha water, such
as using recycled wastewater and other sources that would allow more water to
remain in the streams." Reversing the Commission's decision, the court explained that "[w]here the Commission's decision-making does not display a
level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority
these [public trust] rights command under the laws of our state, the decision
cannot stand.""
The Four Great Waters decision is a significant. expansion of public trust
principles and confirms that Hawaii is a leader among states in protecting public rights in water. Part I of this Article discusses the unique historical development of water resources in Hawaii. Part II dissects the Four Great Waters
decision, separately addressing each of the court's holdings pertaining to the
public trust. The Article addresses the impact of the decision on the evolving
notion of the public trust in Part III and argues that the Four Great Waters
decision expands public trust principles by advocating for a more active role
for the courts in reviewing decisions involving trust resources. Specifically, it
focuses on the court's exercise of jurisdiction and suggests that-by emphasizing the importance of judicial review of actions impacting trust resources-the
decision promotes public participation in public trust decision-making. Finally,
the Article discusses the heightened standard of review the court applies in
decisions involving the state water resources trust. These developments solidify
the public trust doctrine's concrete ability to protect public interests in water
by applying a precautionary. approach to the protection of public trust resources.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER
RIGHTS IN HAWAII
Although water law regimes differ from state-to-state, the system of water
rights in Hawaii is particularly unique. For the most part, the Hawaiian system
of water rights does not resemble the riparian or prior appropriation system to
which most states adhere." Instead, "[it is the crystallization into legal form of
9.
I.at 152.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 133.
12. Id. at 163.
13. Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
14. 2 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
173 (2004); Maivan Clech Lam, The Kuleana Act Revisited: The Surivalof TradidonalHadai-
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customs of ancient origin that were developed among natives."" As Hawaii's
highest court explained, Hawaii's system of water rights "is based upon and is
the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs and the methods of Hawaiians in
dealing with the subject of water."" Accordingly, an understanding of the way
native Hawaiians treated water is necessary in order appreciate the way in
which the state governs water today.
A. THE ANCIENT HAWAIIAN SYSTEM OF WATER

Historically, water in Hawaii belonged to the King, who governed through
a system akin to feudalism. The King owned all the land and set aside some
portion of the land for himself and divided the remaining land between his
chiefs, who in turn subdivided it aniong "lesser chiefs and ultimately to tenant
commoners who occupied and cultivated the soil."" Although certain rights
accompanied the possession of land-such as for water and fishing-there was
no concept of private ownership in water under this ancient system." Instead,
"water privileges were earned through participation in the construction of the
irrigation systems" and "were retained only by the productive application of
the waters to which one was thereby entitled."' In fact, when the Kingdom of
Hawaii adopted its first written constitution in 1840, it stated that although all
land on the Islands belonged to the King, "it was not his own private property"
but "belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom [the King] was
the head."" Accordingly, no person had the right to convey land without the
consent of an individual authorized to act on behalf of the kingdom." Before
the Great Mahele, therefore, "all land remained in the public domain.""
B. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IN WATER

In 1848, in an event known as the Great Mahele," the King divided all
lands in Hawaii between himself, the chiefs, the agents of the chiefs (known as
konohiki'), and finally, the people themselves.' Each division of land is called

ian Commoner Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REV. 233, 234 n.6 (1989) (cautioning against
"forceling] an Anglo-American legal construct on a uniquely Hawaiian social reality").
15. 2 HUTCHINS, supranote 14, at 173.
16. Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 395 (1930), alfd, 52 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1931).
17. Bradford H. Lamb, Robinson v. Anyoshi: A FederalIntrusion Upon State Water Law,
17 ENvTL. L. 325, 328-29 (1987).
18. 2 HurCHINS, supranote 14, at 173.
19. Lamb, supm note 17, at 329.
20. HAW. CONST. of 1840, availableathttp://www.hawaii-nation.org/constitution-1840.htmi.
21. Id.
22. Lamb, supra note 17, at 330.
23. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 n.5 (Haw. 1973) (defining
"Mahele" as "to divide or apportion").
24. Lamb, supra note 17, at 325 (defining "Konohiki" as "an agent of the chief in charge of
... ahupuaas").
25. HUTCHINS, supa note 14, at 173; Neil M. Levy, Native HanaiianLand Rights, 63
CAL. L. REV. 848, 854-55 (1975).
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an "ahupuaa."" Until 1973, the courts in Hawaii adhered to the system of
ownership in water the Mahele land division established.' Under this system,
water running through an ahupuaa was considered private property and belonged to the owner of that division of land, who derived title to their lands
through the Mahele.' The Hawaiian courts repeatedly held that an owner of
land had private ownership of surplus water of a stream.' In 1867, for example, the court in Peck v. Baily approved a diversion of water from land with
appurtenant water rights to a tract of dry land, stating that "lilt is very evident
that each party has rights to the water courses running through their lands."'
Similarly, in its 1904 decision in Hawilm Commercial& Sugar Co. v. Wai/uku Sugar Co., the court held that konohkis could transfer surplus waters without limitation." The court explicitly stated that surplus water "is the property of
the konohbik, to do with as he pleases."" Finally, in 1930, the court in Terntory v. Gay held that a sugar company that owned a division of land owned the
surplus water of the stream, and could use the waters however it wished, irrespective of the impact the diversion had on downstream users.'
C. A SHIFT TO PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF WATER: JUDICIAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST

In 1973, despite this long line of cases treating water as private property,
the Hawaii Supreme Court in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson "reversed
course" and held that all freshwater within the state is "held in trust by the state
for the common good of its citizens."' McBryde involved a dispute between

26. Lamb, supra note 17, at 325 (defining an "ahupuaa" as "a division of land running from
mountains to the sea").
27. 'lao Ground Water Mgmt. Area, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 162 (Final Decision)
(Comm'n
on
Water
Res.
Mgmt.
2010),
http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf ("Starting with the very
first water case addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court and continuing until 1973, surface
waters in Hawai'i could be treated as private property.").
28. See Christine Daleiden, Hawaii's Ditch Systems: Water Allocation After the Sugar
Cane, 10 JUL Haw. BJ. 28, 28 (2006).
29. Eg.,Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47, 70 (1917); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v.
Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 675, 680, 682-83 (1904); see also 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 14,
at 176 (Surplus water refers to water "in excess of that required to satisfy the [existing rights]
attaching to the waters of such stream."); Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. at 680 (noting that surplus water is "the water, whether storm water or not, that is not covered by prescriptive rights
and excluding also riparian rights, if there are any.") (citation omitted). This is significant given
that surplus water constituted the majority of the surface waters. See Williamson B.C. Chang,
JudicialTakings: Robinson v. Ari'oshiRevisited,21 WIDENER LJ. 655, 663-64 (2012).
30. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658, 671 (1867).
31.
Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. at 680 ("It is undisputed and clear that such tunnel water
is the property of the defendant and may be used by it as it sees fit.").
32. Id.; see also McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Haw. 1973).
33. Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 377, 388 (1930) (involving the territory of Hawaii's
attempt to enjoin the Hawaiian Sugar Company from diverting water).
34. Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 1,163 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf (citing McBryde
Sugar Co., 504 P.2d 1330).
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two sugar companies over water in the Hanapepe River." After the construction of a tunnel diminished the flow of the river, the McBryde Sugar Company-one of the primary users of Hanapepe water-filed suit against a number of
smaller water rights holders and sought a declaration of the water rights along
the river." In its landmark decision, the court held that the state was the owner
of all of the water flowing through the river, and that while the owners of riparian or appurtenant water rights were entitled to use the water, they had no
property right in the water itself.' The court explained that because water is
"common property to be used by all who had a right of access to it," no individual "may acquire property to running water in a natural watercourse."
According to the McBryde court, the right to water under the Mahele "was
not intended to be, could not be, and was not transferred to the awardee, and
the ownership of water in natural watercourses, streams and rivers remained in
the people of Hawaii for their common good."" Interestingly, the court stated
that none of its prior decisions had established "[tihe owner of an Ahupuaa
may apply the water belonging to it to what land he pleases," and that even if
they had established such a rule, they did so in dictum." In a later decision,
however, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that its decision in McBryde
"was premised on the firm conviction that prior courts had largely ignored the
mandates of the rulers of the Kingdom and the traditions of the native Hawaiians" and "was a necessary and proper step in the rectification of basic misconceptions concerning water 'rights' in Hawaii."" Similarly, in Waidhole
Ditch, the court explained that "Post-MLahele water rights decisions ignored
th[e] duty, [encompassed in the water resources trust], treating public water
resources as a commodity reducible to absolute private ownership, such that
no limitation existed or was supposed to exist to the owner's power to use the
waters as he saw fit."" However, the court noted that, "Iblased on founding
principles of the ancient Hawaiian system and present necessity, this court

35. McBryde, 504 P.2d at 1333.
36. Id. at 1334 (noting that "both McBryde and Gay & Robinson are diverting water from
the Hanapepe River basin, so much so that the mouth of the Hanapepe River is practically dry
throughout the year."); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477
U.S. 902 (1986) ("McBryde sued. . . to obtain a declaration of the rights of various parties along
the Hanapepe upstream and downstream to various water rights, appurtenant, prescriptive,
'ancient,' or otherwise derived.").
37. McBryde, 504 P.2d at 1345.
38. Id.at 1339.
39. Id (referring not only to the Mahele but also the subsequent Land Commission Award
and issuance of Royal Patent).
40. Id. at 1335-37. See Elizabeth Ann Ho-oipo Kala'ena'auao Pa Martin et al., Culturesm2
Con/lct m Hawaif.- The Law and Poltics of Natve Hawadan Water Rights, 18 U. HAw. L.
REV. 71, 100 n.71 (1996) ("Property interests in the water itself were extinguished as owners
merely had appurtenant or riparian rights to use, not to own water.").
41. Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 67, 69 (Haw. 1982). See generallyid at
63-69 (re-examining the development of Hawaiian water law and upholding the conclusions
and rationale of the McBryde decision).
42. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 451 (Haw. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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finally reasserted the dormant public interest in the equitable and maximum
beneficial allocation of water resources."'
In an attempt to explain the McBryde court's seemingly radical departure
from its previous decisions, one commentator noted that the justices on the
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1973 saw a conflict "between the traditional Hawaiian values and laws, on the one hand, and the Western approach which had
guided [its previous decisions], on the other hand."" The court further observed the way other states approached water rights and realized that none of
the states seemed to "permit private ownership of water in the manner that the
Hawaii Supreme Court had apparently approved.""
Regardless of reason for the court's dramatic shift towards recognition of
the public trust, the concept of public ownership in water was reaffirmed when
Hawaii incorporated the public trust doctrine into its constitution in 1979, and
again in 1987 with the adoption of the state's Water Code." Article XI, Section
1, of the Hawaii Constitution states "[alll public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people."' Accordingly, it imposes a duty
on the State to "conserve" and "protect" its natural resources "[flor the benefit
of present and future generations" and^ to promote their use and development
"in a manner consistent with their conservation."" Article XI, Section 7 further
provides that the State "has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the
use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its people."" As the Hawaii
Supreme Court noted in Waiahole Ditch, the Hawaii Constitution explicitly
adopted the public trust doctrine "as a fundamental principle of constitutional
law in Hawaii."' Moreover, when the legislature enacted the State Water Code
in 1987 to protect Hawaii's surface and ground water resources, it "engrafted
the [public trust] doctrine wholesale in the Code.""
Since departing from the private property paradigm for water in 1973,
Hawaii's modern laws governing water have often clashed with the State's historical system of water rights, especially in cases where decades-old private
diversions conflict with public interests in water. As the Commission explains,
the duty to treat water as a public trust resource-which the McBryde decision
initiated and a constitutional amendment and enactment of the Water Code
later confirmed-"fundamentally turns on its head the laws that were prevailing
when the ditches [at issue in the Four Great Waters case] were constructed
and whose diversion practices continue to this day."".

43.

Id. (citations omitted).

CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER: HAWAI'S PLANTATION DITcHEs 36 (1996).
45. Id.
46. HAw. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7; HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C (2013).
47. Id. S 1.
48. Id.
49. Id. S 7.
50. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 444 (Haw. 2000).
51. Id. at 442.
52. FoalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 162 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010),
http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMA0601-02.pdf (citing McBryde Sugar
Co., 504 P.2d 1330).
44.
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II. THE "FOUR GREAT WATERS' CASE
A. HISTORY OF DIVERSIONS IN THE NA WAI 'EHA
At the heart of the Four Great Waters case is a system of streams in Central Maui called Na Wai 'Eha. ' Na Wai 'Eha--otherwise known as "the four
great waters of Maui"-is the collective name for the Waihe'e River and the
Waiehu, 'Iao, and Waikapfl streams.' Given the abundance of water flowing
through the Waihe'e River and the Waiehu, 'Iao, and Waikap5i streams, the
water resources of the Na Wai 'Eha played a prominent role in the culture of
ancient Hawaiians and even supported the second largest population on
Maui.' Describing the historical importance of the Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission explains:
Idjue to the profusion of fresh-flowing water in ancient times, Na Wai 'Eha
supported one of the largest populations and was considered the most abundant area on Maui; it also figured centrally in Hawaiian history and culture in
general.... The four ahupua'a of Na Wai 'Eha and their streams comprised
the largest continuous area of wetland taro cultivation in the islands. . .. In
addition to extensive agricultural production, traditional and customary practices thrived in Na Wai 'Eha, including the gathering of upland resources.'
The waters of the Na Wai 'Eha continue to play a central role in modem
Hawaiian life. The streams help recharge the groundwater supplies upon
which more than half of Maui's population relies." In addition, their streamflows are essential to the ecological health of Maui, providing crucial habitat
for a variety of fish and wildlife species. ' The Commission itself ranked the Na
Wai 'Eha streams as "Blue Ribbon Resources," meaning they hold among the
"very best resources" of their kind."
Despite their ecological and cultural importance, users have diverted the
waters of the Na Wai 'Eha to irrigate sugar plantations for more than a century. This diversion has left many of the streams dry.' Today, two private companies divert the majority of the Na Wai 'Eha streams: the Hawaiian Com-

53. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 132 (Haw. 2012).
54. Id. (stating that the Waihe'e and the 'lao are two of Maui's largest rivers).
55. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 10.
56. Id.at 8-9.
EARTIJUSTICE,
Na
Wai
'Eha,
57. Background
on
http://earthjustice.org/features/background-on-na-wai-eha (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
58. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 13-14 (describing the various amphidromous fish species living in the Na Wai 'Eha streams); see also id.
59. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 13.
60. Id. at 17 (recognizing that "stream flows in Hawaii have decreased significantly over a
90-year period."). Historically, an average of about 67 mgd was diverted from the four streams
for sugar cane irrigation. Id. at 32. See also Restore Stream Flow, EARTIJUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/ourwork/campaigns/restore-stream-flow (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); D.
Kapua'ala Sproat, Wai Through KanawKai Water for Ha waiis Streams andjustice for Hanwan
Conmumnties, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 127, 145 n.82 (2011) (documenting the history of the state's
sugar plantations over the past 150 years).
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mercial & Sugar ("Sugar Company"), the last remaining sugar plantation in the
State; and the Wailuku Water Company ("Wailuku"), a former sugar plantation that sold all of its lands for private development and is now in the business
of selling the diverted stream water to the public." Wailuku-the largest diverter of Na Wai 'Eha water"-began cultivating sugar cane in 1862." Although
Wailuku ceased its sugar operations in 1988, it continues to divert large
amounts of water, which it delivers to customers using the Wailuku Ditch System." In addition to its water-delivery agreements with the Maui County Department of Water Supply ("Water Department") and the Sugar Company,
Wailuku provides water to a variety of other entities, including real estate and
business developers, a golf course, and irrigation companies using the water
for dust control.' These diversions have had a devastating impact on the
streams of the Na Wai 'Eha. According to the Commission, Wailuku, the
Sugar Company, and three additional water users currently divert all of the
dry-weather flows of the Waihe'e River and the Waiehu Stream." Furthermore, both the 'lao and the Waikapu streams are often dry downstream of the
diversions, at least partially as a result of the diversions."
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, Earthjustice represented two community organizations-Hui o Na
Wai 'Eha ("Hui") and Maui Tomorrow Foundation"-in petitioning Hawaii's
Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the instream flow
standards for the Na Wai 'Eha water system." Instream flow standards designate the amount of water that must remain in a stream 'to protect fishery, wildlife, recreational, aesthetic, scenic, and other beneficial instream uses."" Accordingly, these standards also determine the amount of water diverted from
the streams and are the water code's primary tool for protecting surface waters

61. See generallyMoriwake, supra note 5.
62. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32-33; No Be Lolo! Get the Facts,
EARTIJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/factsheets/fiction-v-fact.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012).
63.

FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32.

64. Id. at 26; Answering Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d
129 (Haw. 2012) (No. SCAP-30603).
65. See Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management's Answering Brief, supra
note 64, at 6. Currently, Wailuku alone diverts seventy to ninety percent of the Waihe' e River's
annual total flow, as well as forty to sixty percent of the North Waiehu stream, thirty to fifty
percent of the 'Tao stream, and sixty to eighty percent Waikapti stream. FinalDecision, Case
No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32-33.
66. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 60-62.
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id.
69. Maui Tomorrow is a nonprofit organization focused on protecting Maui's "irreplaceable
open space and natural areas." MAUI ToMoRRow, http://maui-tomorrow.org/?pageid-303
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
70. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 131 (Haw. 2012).
71. HAW. REV.STAT. § 174C-3 (2013).
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in accordance with the public trust." The Commission also sets interim instream flow standards ("IIFS") in order to "protect the public interest pending
the establishment of a permanent instream flow standard."" In their petition,
the community organizations argued that the IIFS for the Na Wai 'Eha
streams-which had been in place since 1988"--failed to adequately protect the
environmental concerns, recreational activities, and native Hawaiian practices
the public trust safeguards." Accordingly, they requested that the Commission
amend the IIFS for each stream in order to restore streamflows sufficient to
protect these uses."
Around the same time, the Commission received several applications for
use of groundwater from the 'Iao Aquifer System, which is located in the
mountains above the Na Wai 'Eha and serves as a source of the Na Wai
'Eha streams." Under the water code, the Commission may designate "water
management areas" to regulate surface and ground water use whenever disputes arise over the use of water within a certain geographic area." After the
72. Waiihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000) (explaining that instream flow standards
are "the primary mechanism by which the Commission is to discharge its duty to protect and
promote the entire range of public trust purposes dependent upon instream flows."). The
Commission is required to set IFS for each stream "whenever necessary to protect the public
interest in the waters of the State." HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-71(1) (2013).
73. HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (2013).
74. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 131. See also Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO601, 141 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dinr/cwrm/cch/
cchma0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf. However, the court noted an important difference between
the 1988 IIFS and the IIFS included in the current decision: While the Commission set the
IIFS in 1988 as the status quo at that time "without further amounts of water being diverted
offstream through new or expanded diversions," the Commission's decision at issue stated that
"the IIFS will 'remain' as established above diversions, but does not contain the restriction
limiting new or expanded diversions." Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 132 n.2. (citing HAw.
CODE. R. S 13-169-48 (LexisNexis 1988)).

75. See FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 136.
76. Id. Specifically, they argued that the Commission "violated the constitutional public
trust's and Code's protections of instream uses by abandoning 'lao and Waikapi Streams,"
"violated its constitutional duties to protect Native Hawaiian rights to the extent feasible," "reversed the public trust's and Code's mandates by maximizing offstream diversions and failing to
hold private commercial users to their burden of proving maximum reasonable-beneficial use,"
"failed to consider and mitigate the impact of variable offstream demand on instream needs,"
"failed to hold HC&S to its burden of proving that use of Well 7 is not practicable," "failed to
hold the Companies to their burden of justifying their system losses," "failed to consider the
practicability of recycled water resources," and "erroneously inflated HC&S's acreages by adding
two new fields used only for wastewater disposal." Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Four Great
Waters, 287 P.3d at 129.
77. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132. The Commission received applications from the
Maui County Department of Water Supply, a county agency providing water to approximately
35,700 services on Maui and Molokai, Departmentof Water Supply: Our Mission, COUNTY OF
MAUI, HAwAII, http://www.co.maui.hi.us/index.aspx?nid-126 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013), and
the Wailuku Water Company, the successor of the Wailuku Sugar Company, Partners: WauWATERSHED
P'SHIP,
W.
MAUI
MOUNTAINS
ku
Water Company, LLC.,
http://www.westmauiwatershed.org/about-wmmwp/partners (ast visited Sept. 15, 2013).
78. HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-41 (2013) (governing water management area designations);
Id. S 174C-3 (defining "water management area"); see also Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt,
Surface Water Management Areas, HAw. DEFT. OF LAND & NAT. RES.,
http://state.hi.us/dinr/cwrm/sw.ma.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Surface Water
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Commission designates a water source as a water management area, all existing
users have one year to file a Water Use Permit Application ("WUPA")." After
the Commission designated the 'lao Aquifer System a Ground Water Management Area ("GWMA") in 2003, the Water Department, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku filed permit applications." Because the water systems in
the Na Wai 'Eha are connected-and because instream standards limit the
amount of remaining water users can divert for offstream uses"-the Commission decided to consider the permit applications and IIFS petition together in
a combined case hearing, or "Contested Case Hearing.""
In April of 2009, the Commission's hearing officer issued a proposed decision resolving the WUPAs and setting IIFS for the Na Wai 'Eha." By
amending the IIFS for each of the four streams, the proposal would have restored 34.5 million gallons a day to Na Wai 'Eha, approximately half of the
diverted flows.' The proposed decision also required that the Sugar Company
use Well No. 7-an alternative water source to Na Wai 'Eha water-to satisfy
fourteen million gallons per day (mgd) of the company's water requirements.'
In its final decision, however, the Commission rejected many of the conclusions contained in the proposal." The Commission amended the IIFS for
two of the four streams, but essentially retained the existing IIFS for the other
two streams." It directed the companies to return only 12.5 mgd-less than a
fifth of the total diversions-to Waihe'e River and the Waiehu Stream."
Moreover, because the Commission "maintained the status quo" for the 'Tao
and Waikapti streams, it did not restrict any of the parties' diversions from
Management Areas] (noting that the Commission will designate such areas when it "finds that
serious disputes respecting the use of surface water resources are occurring.").
79. HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-50(a) ("All existing uses of water in a designated water management area . . . may be continued after the effective date of designation only with a permit
issued in accordance with [the code]."); id. § 174C-50(c) ("An application for a permit to continue an existing use must be made within a period of one year from the effective date of designation.").
80. FourGreat Waters,.287 P.3d at 135. See also Surface Water ManagementAreas, supra
note 78.
81. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 6-8 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
82. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132, 134. As the concurrence pointed out, "[ilnasmuch
as the Commission held a combined contested case hearing, there was the potential question of
whether rights granted by issuance of permits in the WUPA process might adversely affect
Petitioners' constitutional rights in the IIFS determination." Id. at 175 (Acoba, J., concurring).
Note that in 2008, while the hearings were pending, the Commission designated the four
streams of the Na Wai 'Eha as a Surface Water Management Area. Id. at 135. Like the
GWMA designation, this triggered the requirement that all users currently diverting water from
the streams obtain existing use permits in order to continue any diversion from these streams
after the IIFS is established. See FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 162.
83. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 136.
84. See id. at 136-37.
85. Id.at 137.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 137-38.
88. FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 173-74 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
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those streams." The final decision also lowered the amount of water it required the Sugar Company to pump from alternative sources." Hui and Maui
Tomorrow, along with the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), challenged
the Commission's decision and sought review of its conclusions in court."

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. JURISDICTION

The facts giving rise to the Four Great Waters decision are remarkably
similar to those in Waidhole Ditch. As in Waiihole Ditch, sugar plantations
had historically diverted the streams at issue in Four Great Waters, which continued to suffer decreased flows even after the decline of the sugar industry."
The Commission's designation of a groundwater management area in both
cases triggered the requirement that existing users apply for water use permits."
In addition to these permit applications, the Commission in both instances
received petitions to amend the IIFS affected by existing diversions and held a
combined contested case hearing to resolve both the IIFS petitions and water
use permit applications." And, as in Waidhole Ditch, the affected parties challenged the Commission's decision establishing IIFS and resolving permit applications for existing water users in court."
Despite the striking similarities between the Four Great Waters and the
Waiahole Ditch cases, however, one important fact distinguishes the two. In
Wadhole Ditch, the parties seeking an upward amendment of the IIFS had
also filed permits to reserve water." In contrast, neither Hui nor Maui Tomorrow-the two parties seeking an upward amendment of the IIFS from the
Commission in this case-filed permits to reserve water, thereby calling into
question their ability to participate in the proceedings. The court's exercise of
jurisdiction over this case, therefore, represents a significant expansion of the
public trust by increasing the number of individuals and organizations able to
assert it.

89.

See Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 137-38.

9 0.

Id.

91. Id. at 138. Although the parties originally filed their opening briefs in the Hawaii Court
of Appeals, the Hawaii Supreme Court granted their application to transfer the case to the supreme court. Id.
92. See Background on Na Wai 'Eha,supra note 57.
93. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 131 (Haw. 2012); Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 423
(Haw. 2000) (citing, interaha,HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-41(a), 47(a) (1993)).
94. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 422, 425, 428-29.
95. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 132; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 422.
96. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 424. Several entities, including the WaikAne Community
Association, Hakipu'u 'Ohana, and Ka IAhui Hawai'i (collectively, "WWCA") filed petitions to
reserve water under HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-49(d), which states that the Commission "may
reserve water in such locations and quantities and for such seasons of the year as in its judgment
may be necessary. Such reservations shall be subject to periodic review and revision in the light
of changed conditions; provided that all presently existing legal uses of water shall be protected."
Id. at 423 n.3.

Issue 1

THE "FOUR GREAT WATERS" CASE

33

Although the Commission, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku each challenged the court's jurisdiction and claimed that the Hui and Maui Tomorrow
lacked standing because they had no property interest in the increased streamflows, the court flatly rejected these arguments." In addition to holding that it
had jurisdiction over the challenge to the Commission's decision, the court
"t[ook] th[e] opportunity to elaborate on the jurisdictional analysis
from [ Waihole Ditch]."" The court's analysis of jurisdiction is significant, as it
represents a dramatic extension of Wazahole Ditch and extends the right to
enforce the public trust beyond the class of individuals claiming traditional
water rights.
1.Jurisdiction Under the State's Water Code
In Hawaii, judicial review of the Commission's decisions may only occur
in a "contested case," which the courts have interpreted as an agency hearing
that (i) is required by law and (ii) determines "the rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties."" Regarding the first criteria for a contested case hearing, the
court noted that the law may require an agency hearing, either pursuant to a
statute, administrative rule, or by constitutional due process." Although the
court recognized that neither a statute nor administrative rule required a hearing to set an IIFS,"' it found that the setting of an IIFS implicates constitutional
due process." Regarding the second criteria for review of a contested case
hearing, the court found that the Commission's setting of the IIFS involved a
determination of individual water rights." According to the court, the Commission's decision, by retaining the existing IIFS for two of the streams, "necessarily affected [the organization members'] access to water" by "endors[ing]
the upstream diversions that remove water" from those streams."
To have a due process right to an administrative hearing, a party must
have a property interest within the meaning of the due prdcess clause, which,
in turn, requires that the individual possess a "legitimate claim of entitlement"-not merely a "unilateral expectation."" According to the court, Hui
97. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 139-45.
98. Id. at 140.
99. Id. (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Haw.
1994)). The state's water code provides that "[alny person aggrieved by a final decision and
order in a contested case . .. is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter ..... HAW.
REV. STAT. § 9 1-14(a) (2013).
100. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 140 (citing Pele Def Fund, 881 P.2d at 1214).
101. Id. In fact, the water code defines an IIFS as ".a temporary instream flow standard of
immediate applicability, adopted by the commission without the necessity of a public hearing,
and terminating upon the establishment of an instream flow standard." HAW. REv. STAT. §
174C-3(9); see also Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 431 n.15 (Haw. 2000) (noting that neither the
water code nor the Commission's rules require a hearing regarding petitions to amend IIFS)
(citing HAw. REV. STAT. S 174C-3).
102. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 140.
103. Id. at 143.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 140-41 (citing Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 773 P.2d
250, 260 (Haw. 1989)).
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and Maui Tomorrow had a property interest in the Commission's amendment
of the IIFS because members of the two organizations "own or reside on land
in the area of Nd Wai 'Eha and rely upon that water to exercise traditional and
customary rights . . . ."" The court distinguished Sandy Beach Defense Fund

v. City Counc, a case in which plaintiffs challenged a city council's issuance of
permits to developers pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act by asserting property interests of an "aesthetic and environmental nature."". Holding that this did not constitute a "property interest," the court in Sandy Beach
explained that "[w~hile we have recognized the importance of aesthetic and
environmental interests in determining an individual's standing to contest the
issue, we have not found that such interests rise to the level of 'property' within
the meaning of the due process clause . . . ."'
Significantly, the court in Four Great Waters held that Hui and Maui
Tomorrow asserted interests that were "readily distinguishable" from those at
issue in Sandy Beach.'" First, while the parties in Sandy Beach were not "owners of property contiguous to the development" at issue,"' the court explained
that Hui and Maui Tomorrow "own or reside on land in the area of Ni Wai
'Eha, and rely upon that water to exercise traditional and customary rights,
including kalo fanning.""' Second, the court noted the interests of the community organizations had statutory support because the water code specifically
"supportis] their entitlement to water for kalo farming.""' Although the relevant provisions in the water code specifically refer to Native Hawaiian rights
and appurtenant rights,"' the court's notion of property was not so limited. The
court explained that property interests:
are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimen-

sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."'

Thus, the Commission could have used the same rationale to find a similar
property interest had the community organization members not been Native
Hawaiians. Because the water code explicitly supports a broader array of additional statutorily designated instream uses- including ecological, recreational,
and even aesthetic values" -and because Wam-hole Ditch held that public trust

106. Id.at 143.
107. SandyBeach DeL Fund,773 P.2d at 260-61.
108. Id.at 261 (citation omitted).
109. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Specifically, the court referenced HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-101(c)-(d) (2013) ("Native
Hawaiian water rights"), and HAw. REV. STAT. S 174C-63 (2013) ("Appurtenant rights").
114. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 142 (citing Int'l Broth. of Painters & Allied Trades v.
Befitel, 88 P.3d 647, 655 (Haw. 2004)).
115. HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-3.
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doctrine was "engrafted" wholesale into the code,"' the Commission should
have accepted this rationale as sufficient so long as members of the community
organizations simply resided in the Na Wai 'Eha area and relied upon that
water to exercise recreational or aesthetic rights."'
Even without extending its rationale to include purely aesthetic interests,
for example, the court's finding of jurisdiction is nevertheless significant because it expands the notion of standing articulated in its previous Waidhole
Ditch decision, which contained only a brief analysis of jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court in WaiThole Ditch found that it had jurisdiction "because of
the individual instream and offstream 'rights, duties, and privileges' at stake.""
However, unlike the parties in the current case, each of the parties that sought
to amend the IIFS in Wahole Ditch had also filed water permit applications."' Waihole Ditch required a hearing for the private companies, therefore, only because amending the IIFS would impact the petitioner's permit
applications." In contrast, neither Hui nor Maui Tomorrow applied for a
permit in this case. Thus, the companies claimed that the organizations had no
right to appeal the Commission's decision under the State's Water Code and
lacked any type of general constitutional standing to challenge the amended
IIFS."' Therefore, the Commission, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku each
claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case."
In fact, the Sugar Company warned that recognizing a property interest in
traditional and customary practices would be a "grave departure" from the
fundamental principle that "the range of interests protected by procedural due
process is not infinite."" According to the company:

lal sea change in the law would result ifan agency's denial of a request to enable the expansion of Native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices
beyond the status quo ante were held to impinge on a "property interest"
within the meaning of the due process clause. While Hawai'i law recognizes
protections for such practices, never before has a Hawai'i appellate court
held that the right to engage in such practices constitute s] "property" per se,

116. Waidole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 442 (Haw. 2000).
117. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
118. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 431 n.15 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Haw. 1994)). With regard to the existing applications, the court
found that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because both the water code and the administrative
rules specifically required a hearing as part of the WUPA process. Id.
119. Id.at424.
120. Answering Brief for Appellee at * 14-15, FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2012)
(No. CCH-MAO6-01) [hereinafter Wluku Water Co.'s AnswenagBieA.
121. Answering Brief for Intervenor-Appellee at 22-23, Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129
(Haw. 2012) (No. 30603) [hereinafter SugarCo. AnsweringBrk4; id. at 15, 19.
122. Sugar Co. Answerig Brief, supra note 121, at 11; Wailuku Water Co.'s Answering
Bief; supra note 120, at 14-15.
123. Sugar Co. Answering Brief; supra note 121, at 17 (quoting Int'l Bd. of Painters & Allied
Trades v. Befitel, 88 P.3d 647, 655 (Haw. 2004)).
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nor has any court regarded as a "property interest" a claim of entitlement to
engage in such practices to a greater degree than in the present.'
Despite the Sugar Company's claim that recognizing a property interest in this
case would entail a radical departure from the court's precedent, and that "the
implications of setting such precedent would be far-reaching and profound,"
the court found that the community organizations had a stake in the streamflows protected by due process."
Significantly, the court rejected the claim that downstream users "cannot
assert property interests to more water than they currently use . . . ."" Accord-

ing to the Sugar Company, recognizing that members of the organizations had
a property interest simply because they exercise traditional and customary
rights in the area would "enable the law of traditional and customary rights to
be wielded as a sword for righting past wrongs rather than its current use as a
shield against further diminution caused by western notions of property
rights."" Nevertheless, the court explained that simply because downstream
water users have historically been deprived "does not negate those downstream users' interest in the water."" Citing Waiihole Ditch, the court noted
that neither Hawaii's Constitution nor its Water Code "differentiate among
'protecting,' 'enhancing,' and 'restoring' public instream values [like native
Hawaiian rights], or between preventing and undoing 'harm' thereto."" Accordingly, the court concluded that an IIFS determination implicates due process and that therefore, Hui and Maui Tomorrow had a right to judicial review."
2. Ko'olau Agricultural&the Importance ofJudicial Review of Decisions Impacting an Irreplaceable Res
Although the court found that its conclusions discussed above provided
sufficient support for its ruling, the court's discussion of jurisdiction did not
end there. Instead, the court stated that "the analysis of one more case merits
consideration."... To support their argument that the organizations had no
property interest in the IIFS, the companies had relied heavily on Ko'olau
124. Id.
125. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129,145 (Haw. 2012); id.
126. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 143. The court rejected the argument in Sugar Conpany Answering Briefthat the organizations were not deprived of any property interest because
establishing an IIFS does not implicate an individual's right to use water, but "merely specifies
the amount of water that must remain in a stream." Sugar Co. Answering Brie; supra note 121,
at 16. The Sugar Company noted that "Ibly definition, an instream flow standard represents the
volume of water that must remain in a particular stream." Id.
127. Sugar CornpanyAnsweringBrief; supra note 122, at 17.
128. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
129. Id. (citing Wmaihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 462 (Hawv. 2000)). In Wahole Ditch, the court
stated that "the public trust authorizes the Commission to reassess previous diversions and
allocations, even those made with due regard to their effect on trust purposes." Wadhole Ditch,
9 P.3d at 461.
130. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 145.131. Id. at 144.
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Agncultural Company v. Commission On Wter Resource Management,
which held that an agriculture company did not have a property interest in a
designated Water Management Area ("WMA").'" The Sugar Company argued
that the regulatory impact of setting an IIFS is akin to designating a WMA
because it is "generalized in nature;" it does not determine how much water a
particular individual or entity may withdraw, but simply designates the amount
of water that must flow through a stream at a particular location."" However,
the court noted several important differences between WMA designations and
IIFS determinations, including the type of analysis required for each, the necessity of judicial review, and the extent to which their resolution impacts the
rights of potential water users.'" According to the court, each of these factors
favored recognizing a due process right and, hence, a right to a hearing and
judicial review in the context of IIFS determinations."
Most important for purposes of this Article, the court emphasized the necessity of judicial review in cases dealing with public trust resources." Again
citing language from Waihole Ditch, the court noted that judicial review in
the public trust context "provides a level of protection against improvident
dissipation of an irreplaceable res."" According to the court, "the ramifications
of an erroneous IIFS could offend the public trust, and is simply too important to deprive parties of due process and judicial review."" Reaffirming its
holding in Wauhole Ditch, the court stated that "[iln short, the IIFS matter
[because] Itihey have both immediate and lasting impacts on individual water
users."" The court held that the petitioners had a right to judicial review of the
IIFS determinations on the grounds that such standards play an important role
in promoting the public trust." Thus, the Four Great Waters case opens the
door for members of the public to challenge a whole host of State actions and
decisions concerning the State's water resources trust. Moreover, by discarding
the traditional property-based view of water rights, the decision institutionalizes
a broader role for a much more expansive portion of the public to play in such
decisions.
3. Justice Acoba's Concurrence
Although Justice Acoba concurred in the court's decision to vacate and
remand to the Commission, he advocated for a finding of jurisdiction by applying an even more expansive interpretation of the public trust doctrine."'
Justice Acoba would have found jurisdiction under the State's Water Code
132.
1996).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Ko'olau Agric. Co. v. Conm'n On Water Res. Mgnt., 927 P.2d 1367, 1379 (Haw.
Sugar Co. Answerng Brie, supra note 121, at 22.
FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 144.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id. (citing Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 465 (Haw. 2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64 (AcobaJ., concurring).
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and Article XII, Section 7, of the Hawaii Constitution, which requires that the
State protect the traditional and customary rights of native Hawaiians." Furthermore, he claimed that the court would have had jurisdiction under the
Water Code and the Hawaii Constitution if the community organizations
claimed, in the combined contested hearing, that the two companies and the
Water Department's permit applications adversely affected their constitutional
rights." Here, Justice Acoba referred to Article XI, Section 1 of the Hawaii
Constitution, which establishes that "[aIll public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people," and imposes a duty on the
State to protect these resources.'"
Most significantly, Justice Acoba argued that the community organizations
had a right to challenge the IIFS in court based Upon general public trust principles." He stated that the court's jurisdiction "arises under the public trust
doctrine embodied in Article XJ, Sections 1 and 7 of the Hawaii Constitution
as implemented through provisions [of the Water Code] affording judicial
review.'" Although Justice Acoba acknowledged that "standing to sue to enforce the public trust doctrine is uncertain under the I Waidhole Ditch court's]
reference to 'individual instream and offstream rights, duties, and privileges,"'
he argued that the organizations should have a valid claim based solely upon
public trust principles." Citing these overarching principles, Justice Acoba
explained that the Commission's establishment of IIFS "may violate the principles of preserving the right to water for 'the common good'"" and of "preventing 'private water rights' from 'injuriously affecting [] the rights of others.'"" He argued that, "consistent with such principles, a public trust claim
raised by members of the public who are affected by potential harm to the
public trust should be cognizable."" Accordingly, Justice Acoba concluded
that the law entitles the petitioners-"as members of the public who are affected by the setting of an IIFS"-were entitled to a hearing "in order to protect
the public trust.""'
Justice Acoba makes explicit what the FourGreat Waters majority implies
in its analysis: because judicial review of decisions involving public trust resources is an essential component of the doctrine and is necessary to protect
basic public trust principles, all individuals injured by harm to those resources
should be able to defend their interests in court""

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 164.
Id.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; id.
Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1342 (Haw. 1973)).
Id. (citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 295 n.8 (Haw. 1982)).
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
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B. DECISION ON THE MERITS
In its declaration of policy, Hawaii's Water Code states that the Code
"shall be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial use of the waters
of the State."" In its landmark Waidhole Ditch decision, the Hawaii Supreme
Court interpreted this provision as not only mandating "liberal interpretation
in favor of maximnum beneficial use," but also "demandling] adequate provision for traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, wildlife, maintenance of
ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and enhancement
of the waters for various uses in the public interest.""
Turning to the merits, the Four Great Waters court first concluded that
the Commission violated its duty under the public trust doctrine by failing to
adequately consider the effects of its amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices," which the State recognizes as a public trust
purpose." Although the court found that the Commission satisfied the first
step of the analysis by identifying the scope of traditional and customary native
Hawaiian rights, it concluded that the Commission failed to "articulate 'the
extent to which those resources I. . .] [would] be affected or impaired by the
proposed action,'" and failed to "specify what feasible action [could] be taken
to protect native Hawaiian rights.". The court noted that the Commission's
failure was particularly apparent with respect to its decision not to restore any
streamflow to two of the streams, the 'lao and the Waikapti." Given that the
users of the stream testified that their water was insufficient to support their
kalo farming needs," the court noted that the effect of the Commission's decision essentially meant denying these users the water they need to exercise their
traditional and customary right to cultivate kalo on their property."
Because it found that the Commission violated its duty to protect Native
Hawaiian rights to the extent feasible, the court vacated the Commission's
decision."' Remanding to the Commission, the court stated that, "IsIhould the
Commission determine that the amended IIFS will negatively impact protect-

153. HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-2(c) (1999).
154. Wajilhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 458 (Haw. 2000).
155. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 146.
156. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 449 ("In line with this history and our prior precedent [] and
constitutional mandate, we continue to uphold the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional
and customary rights as a public trust purpose.") (citations omitted); see also HAw. REv. STAT. S
174C-101(c) (requiring the Commission to ensure that it does not abridge or deny traditional
and customary rights of Native Hawaiians); Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d
1068, 1082 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing that Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution
"places an affirmative duty on the State and its agencies to preserve and protect traditional and
customary native Hawaiian rights" and provides the State and its agencies the power to discharge
this duty).
157. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 149 (citing Ka Pa'akaiO Ka Ama, 7 P.3d at 1084).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 149.
161. Id.at 150.
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ed native Hawaiian practices and that protection of those practices is feasible,
the Commission may enter amended IIFS to reflect that protection.""
1. Incomplete Analysis of Instream Uses

Hui and Maui Tomorrow next argued that the Commission violated the
public trust doctrine and the Water Code's protections of instream uses by

refusing to amend the IIFS for the two streams." The court agreed, noting that
the Commission's analysis of instream uses was incomplete because it only
considered one instream use-amphidromous species-and failed to fully consider other instream uses protected under the Code.'" The Water Code provides a non-exclusive list of statutorily designated instrean uses, which include:
(1) Maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats;
(2) Outdoor recreational activities;
(3) Maintenance of ecosystems such as estuaries, wetlands, and stream vegetation;
(4) Aesthetic values such as waterfalls and scenic waterways;
(5) Navigation;
(6) Instream hydropower generation;
(7) Maintenance of water quality;
(8) The conveyance of irrigation and domestic water supplies to downstream
points of diversion; and
(9) The protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights."
Although the court recognized that maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat is among the instream uses the Commission must consider, it noted that
the statute required the Commission to weigh all instream uses in setting
IIFS." While nothing prevented the Commission from retaining the IIFS for
the two streams had the Commission found that they "sufficiently protected"
the public interest, the court stated that the Commission failed to explain in its
decision why it focused on amphidromous species while ignoring evidence of
other instream uses." The court ordered the Commission to consider evidence of other instream uses on remand, because the Comnission had based
its decision not to restore water to two of the streams entirely on its conclusion
that they showed "limited 'reproductive potential' for amphidromous species.""
By emphasizing that the public trust requires consideration of a whole
range of public interests, the court affirmed that the doctrine is not limited in
the values it protects, but instead applies to a wide range of public interests in
water. This is an important holding consistent with the expansive conception

162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 132, 150.

164.

Id. at 133.

165.
166.
167.
168.

HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-3 (1998).
Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 152.
Id.
Id.
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of the public recognized by the California Supreme Court in its seminal Nadonal Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County ("Mono Lake")
decision.'" As in that case, the Four Great Waters decision demonstrates that
in order to comply with the public trust, the State must adequately address all
evidence presented regarding a broad and continually evolving range of public
values in water." Combined with its expansive interpretation regarding which
individuals and entities may participate in hearings involving water resource
allocations, the court's decision opens the door to a more involved public and
requires that the public have a meaningful say in the protection of a whole
suite of public interests.
2. The State's Duties Under the Public Trust in Permitting Diversions
The court next addressed the Commission's approval of diversions. At the
outset, the court discussed the applicable burden of proof.'' Although the Water Code does not place the burden in the context of an IIFS petition on any
particular party, the court noted that its prior cases impose a duty on the
Commission to establish instream flows that "protect instream values to the
extent practicable' and 'protect the public interest."'" The court explained that
it would therefore base its review of the Commission's analysis of the stream
diversions upon the Commission's fulfillment of this duty.'3 According to the
court, in order to satisfy the "close look review governing public trust resources," a decision by the Commission must "evince[] 'a level of openness,
diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority these rights
command under the laws of [the] state.""'
Having articulated the appropriate burden of proof, the court next looked
at whether the Commission met this burden in calculating the diverting parties'
acreage, its treatment of system losses, and its consideration of alternative water sources."'According to the court, the Commission failed to meet its burden
in its calculation of the diverting parties' acreage." Hui and Maui Tomorrow
challenged the Commission's decision that allowed the Sugar Company to
include certain fields found to be marginal for farming in its acreage calcula-

169. Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983)
(noting that although public trust uses were "traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries," they "are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs" and
have been expanded to include an array of uses, such as fishing, hunting, bathing, swimming,
and boating).
170. See Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 152.
171. Id.at 154.
172. Id. (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (1988); in re Water Use Permit Applications ("Wadhole IF), 93 P.3d 643, 653 (Haw. 2004)). The community claimed that the Commission "failled] to hold private commercial users to their burden of proving maximum reasonable-beneficial use." Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supi note 64, at 14-15.
173. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 154.
174. Id. (citing In reWaiola O Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 685 (Haw. 2004)).
175. Id.at 156.
176. Id. In addition, the court held that the Commission improperly "took judicial notice of
facts affecting an alternative water source for the fields." Id.
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tion.'" Agreeing with the community groups, the court held that the Commission did not have sufficient evidence to support its decision to treat certain
fields differently in its acreage calculation.' Therefore, the court held that the
Commission violated the public trust by authorizing one of the companies to
divert Na Wai 'Eha water to irrigate two of its fields without providing sufficient analysis to support its decision."' The court explained that the Commission provided no evidence to support the wisdom of cultivating the two fields
and included them in the company's acreage without explanation." Accordingly, it held that the Commission's analysis failed to show that the Commission
"considered these fields with 'a level of openness, diligence, and foresight'
required when authorizing the diversion of our public trust res," and remanded to the Commission to reconsider whether to issue the Sugar Company a
permit to divert Na Wai 'Eha water to irrigate its fields.'
The court found that the Commission similarly failed to meet its burden
of "protectfing] instreamn values to the extent practicable" in its treatment of
losses from the diverting parties' ditch systems."' According to the court, the
Commission failed to meet this burden when it assumed that two of the diverters' could reduce losses to their systems by half by lining their reservoirs."
Citing Wazahole Ditch, the court noted that although reasonable estimates are
permitted at the early planning stages in setting an IIFS, the Commission failed
to provide any analysis regarding how it reached its estimate." Accordingly, the
court instructed the Commission to "'reasonably estimate' losses, mindful of
its duty to 'protect instream values to the extent practicable.'"" Thus, this part
of the decision demonstrates the heightened burden the court is willing to
place on water right holders to justify their continued use of the State's water.
However, the court upheld the Commission's decision to require that the
Sugar Company line its reservoir in order to prevent large system losses." In
so doing, the court read the Commission's power under the public trust doctrine broadly. In its celebrated Waidhole Ditch ruling, the court stated that the
authority and the duty of the State "to preserve the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state . . . empowers the state to revisit prior

diversions and allocations, even those made with due consideration of their
effect on the public trust.""' The court in the Four Great Waters case gives
meaning to this expansive articulation of the State's authority by noting that the
177. Id. Hui and Maui Tomorrow argued that the Commission violated the public trust
because it "erroneously inflated [the Sugar Company's] acreages by adding two new fields used
only for wastewater disposal." Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 64, at 14-15.
178. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 156-57.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 157.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 159 (citing HAW. REv. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (1988); Wahole II, 93 P.3d 643,
653 (Haw. 2004)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 158.
187. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 453.
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Commission's decision ordering the Sugar Company to line its reservoir in
order to prevent significant system losses is "commendable and shows the
'diligence' and 'foresight' expected of the Commission in its management of
the public trust.""
Finally, the court addressed the Commission's consideration of alternative
sources that the companies could use to irrigate their fields in place of Na Wai
' Eha water." The community organizations claimed that the Commission
failed to hold the Sugar Company to its burden of proving that it was not practicable for the company to use water from alternative sources, such as Well
No. 7 and recycled wastewater." In its final decision, the Commission determined that the Sugar Company was only required to pump 9.5 million gallons
per day from Well No. 7, which is less than it had used historically.' Moreover, it directed the company to pay only the additional cost of pumping from
this alternative source, not installation costs." The Commission claimed that
its consideration of the capital and energy cost to the Sugar Company of installing additional pipelines and pumps and running Well No. 7 justified this
decision." As the Commission noted, the Water Code requires that the
Commission weigh instream values with the importance of noninstream purposes, "including the economic impact of restricting such uses."" According to
the Commission, therefore, its decision was justified because "[tihe law does
not prescribe a specific method for weighing that economic impact.""
The court made clear that "guidance is necessary in this area" because the
Commission's two-pronged justification was "contradictory."" The court refuted the Commission's first argument that the Commission is not required to
analyze practicable alternatives when it sets IIFS.'" Under Waizhole Ditch,
operation of the trust requires the State to "consider the cumulative impact of
existing and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement reasonable measures to mitigate this impact""' The court therefore accepted the
188. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 158.
189. Id. at 159-63.
190. Opening Brief for Appellant-Petitioners, supra note 64, at 14-15.
191. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 171
(Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrmI/cch/cchma0601/

CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
192. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 171.
193. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, at 171.
For example, the Sugar Company estimated that it would cost approximately $475,000 to add
another pump and distribution line and more to reach Field 715. Id. at 85. In addition to the
capital and energy costs, the Commission considered the extent to which the increased pumping
would reduce recharge to the aquifer. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; Id. at 171.
194. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-6 1, at 110 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. S174C-71(2))
("In considering a petition to adopt an interim instream flow standard, the commission shall
weigh the importance of the present or potential instream values with the importance of the
present or potential uses of water for noninstream purposes, including the economic impact of
restricting such uses.").
195. Id. at 142.
196. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160.
197. Id.
198. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000).
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Commission's second argument-that alternative sources must play a role in
the Commission's determination of an IIFS-because alternative sources necessarily "diminish[] the 'importance' of diverting Na Wai 'Eha water for noninstream use."'"

Moreover, while it acknowledged that the Counission must consider offstream uses, including the economic impact of restricting those uses, the court
rejected the notion that cost alone may be the determinative factor.' The
court cited the Water Code's declaration of policy, which states that "[the
state Water Code shall be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial
use of the waters of the State.""' Drawing upon this broad statement of policy,
the court concluded that "[a]llowing a water user to divert water from the public trust res when that user has exclusive access to an alternative water source
that is currently [unused] or under-used" would violate the Legislature's intent
as expressed in the Water Code." This conclusion is consistent with
Wadhole Ditch, in which the court stated that the Commission "is not obliged
to ensure that any particular user enjoys a subsidy or guaranteed access to less
expensive water sources when alternatives are available and public values are at
stake,"" and that "[sltream protection and restoration need not be the least
expensive alternative for offstream users to be 'practicable' from a broader,
long-term social and economic perspective."'
Significantly, the court emphasized that the State must adhere to the precautionary approach in deciding whether to approve use of water resources
protected by the public trust. The Wazahole Ditch decision praised adoption
of the precautionary principle, which only a limited number of public trust
cases have cited.' As the court explained in Waidhole Ditch, under the precautionary principle, where there is "considerable conflict or uncertainty in the
evidence," the Commission "must articulate its factual analysis with reasonable
clarity, giving some reason for discounting the evidence rejected."' It noted
that the public trust places the burden on permit applicants to justify their
proposed uses "in light of protected public rights in the resource"-a burden
imposed as a result of the doctrine's "inherent presumption in favor of public
use, access, and enjoyment.""
The Four Great Waters decision illustrates the extent to which the public
trust imposes a heightened duty on the State in authorizing consumptive uses
when faced with uncertainty or conflicting evidence about those uses. In dissenting from the Commission's final decision, the hearing officer asserted that
199. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160.
200. Id. at 162-63.
201. Id. at 160 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (1993)).
202. Id. at 160.
203. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 477 (quoting FnalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 19
(Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma
0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf).
204. Id. at 477.
205. Id. at 466-69.
206. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 152 (citing Warihole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 475-76).
207. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 472.
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the Commission failed to meet its duty as "trustee of the state's public water
resources.""' One of his primary objections was that the Commission accepted
the Sugar Company's claim that restricting its ability to cultivate its entire west
Maui fields would force it to shut down all of its sugar operations." According
to the hearing officer, the Commission could not assume, absent additional
information supporting this "doomsday scenario," that the company's assertions "overcame the presumption in favor of the public trust resource, the
streams of Na Wai 'Eha.""
The court agreed, concluding that the Commission failed to meet this
burden by justifying a reduction in the amount of water the Sugar Company
was required to use from alternative sources based upon the cost to the company, even though the Commission acknowledged that it lacked the information needed to truly determine cost." Moreover, the court criticized the
Commission for adopting the diverting party's testimony without considering
evidence in the record that contradicted the company's arguments." Building
upon its decision in Waidhole Ditch, the court explained that, "[wihen such
critical information is missing, the Commission must 'take the initiative' to
obtain the information it needs.""
In conclusion, the court held that the Commission violated the public trust
in its consideration of Well No. 7 as an alternative source to diverting Na Wai
'Eha water."' Similarly, it found that the Commission erred by refusing to consider recycled wastewater as an alternative source to diverting Na Wai 'Eha
water "based solely on the current lack of infrastructure."' According to the
court, the Commission's consideration of alternative sources failed to demonstrate "a level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the
high priority these [public rights in water] command" under the public trust."'
IV. AN IMPORTANT EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
The Four GreatRivers decision contributes to the evolving concept of the
public trust in several ways. In its leading public trust case, the Supreme Court
in Illinois CentralRailroadCo. v. Illbrois held that "Itihe doctrine is founded
upon the necessity of preserving to the public the use of [waters protected by
the trust] from private interruption and encroachment.""' Thus, public owner208. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 7 (Miike, Comm'r, dissenting).
209. Id. at 6-7.
210. Id.
211. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 163.
212. Id. at 161-62.
213. Id. at 163.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 693 (Haw. 2004)).
217. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892). Similarly, in Geer v. Connecticu4 the Court stated that "the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common
ownership, is to be exercised . .. as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not ... for the
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good." Geer v. Connecticut, 161
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ship in a resource necessarily protects against private interests seeking to use
the resources for their own personal gain. The Four Great Waters decision
demonstrates that the public trust in Hawaii is capable of accomplishing this
fundamental purpose of the public trust doctrine.
Equally important is the decision's expanded view of standing, which
broadened the class of persons able to challenge decisions impacting trust
resources. The participation of everyday citizens made the most significant
successes in the development of the public trust doctrine possible-"by the
public protest of 'commoners' demanding that government exercise its public
trust mandate.". As one public trust scholar explains, the doctrine is "too valuable a public resource to leave with the legal profession, particularly at a time
when so few of my colleagues are defending public interests and resources are
being privatized on a truly massive scale."'9 Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine is criticized on the grounds that its impact is primarily seen at the administrative level. After analyzing the case law and administrative documents postMono Lake, Professor Dave Owen asserts that his "[m]ost striking" conclusion
concerns the doctrine's limited impact in the courts.'
However, the Four Great Waters decision suggests that-at least in Hawaii-the impact of the doctrine is not limited to administrative agency decisions and that the courts play a crucial role in promoting the public trust. Professor Joseph Sax had a vision of the public trust doctrine that would allow
citizens to "circumvent legislatures and administrative agencies" and "take their
concerns directly to the courts.""' By providing individuals with access to the
court in order to challenge decisions pertaining to trust resources-and by applying a heightened standard of review to those decisions-the Four Great Waters case serves as a blueprint for public trust litigants in all jurisdictions.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW IN PROTECTING AN
IRREPLACEABLE TRUST RES

The Four Great Waters court found that jurisdiction was appropriate, noting that judicial review in the public trust context "provides a level of protec-

U.S. 519, 529 (1896). As Professor Echeverria notes, Geeris one of the Court's "most comprehensive exposition on the public ownership doctrine," and although the decision was later overruled, "the court's articulation in Geer of the public ownership doctrine still controls. John D.
Echeverria & Julie Lurman, "PerfectlyAstounding" Public Right Wdle Protection and the
Takings Clause, 16 TUL ENVTL. LJ. 331, 340 (2003). "Every state apparently continues to
subscribe to Geeis definition of public sovereign rights in wildlife." Id.
218. Mark Dowie, In Law We Trust Can environmental legislation still protect the commons?, ORION MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2005 at 6, avadable at http://www.orionmagazine.org
/index.php/articles/article/122/.
219. Id.
220. Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Publc TrustDoctrine, and the Admnuistrative
State, 45 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1099, 1104 (2012) ("In the post-1983 California freshwater cases
available on Lexis and Westlaw, no court has cited the public trust doctrine as a reason for
ordering anyone to do anything.").
221. Id. at 1108 (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Publc Trust Doctrinei2 NaturalResource Law:s
Effectivejudiciallntervention,68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 560 (1970)).
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tion against iniprovident dissipation of an irreplaceable res."' The term res
has its roots in Roman law and refers to a resource that by its nature cannot be
privately owned, but must be used in common.' Because the "beneficial interest in any res communes is held by the people in common," the government's authority to "divest the people of their common interest is limited by
the interests of the people.""' The concept of a public commons-the public
res-lies at the heart of the public trust doctrine. However, although this concept dates back to the Justinian Institute,' courts rarely discuss it in these
terms.
The court-by using phrases originally employed by the Arizona Supreme
Court and later adopted in Waiihole Ditch-advocates for a robust role for
the courts in the public trust context. In Arizona Centerfor Lawn the Public
Interest v. Hassell, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that "[ludicial
review of public trust dispensations complements the concept of a public
trust."' The court described the role of the judiciary in light of the government's role as trustee, noting that:
the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust. The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just
present generations but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review provides a level of protection againstinprovident dissipationof an iTeplaceable res.m

Judicial recognition of the public res has a profound impact on public trust
litigation. Because these resources belong in part to future generations who
currently lack a voice in their disposition-and because they are inherently
finite and irreplaceable-they have a unique importance and delicacy that warrants heightened judicial review. In turn, this review will result in the enforcement and strengthening of public trust principles. The Four Great Waters
decision is an example of this continued development of the doctrine.
The court's emphasis on the importance of judicial review in the Four
Great Waters case suggests that several important principles apply to decisionmaking under the public trust.m It indicates, for example, that the judiciary
may play a more prominent role in reviewing state actions pertaining to trust
resources given that the public trust is both a statutory and constitutional guarantee. As a right granted under the State's constitution, "the ultimate authority
222. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012) (quoting Waihole Ditch, 9 P.3d
409, 455 (Haw. 2000)).
223. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 515, 529 (2002). These
resources included, for example, "the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its
shores ... landl wild animals." Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896).
224. Torres, supra note 223, at 530.
225. Tuholske, supra note 3, at 214.
226. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Aiiz. Ct. App.
1991).
227. Id. at 169 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
228. Note that this discussion is technically dicta because the court found a statutory and
constitutional due process basis for its jurisdiction. See supra Part II.A.2.
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to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii rests with the courts of this
state."' However, courts also play an important role in the application of the
Water Code, which requires "the check and balance of judicial review sufficient to protect against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res."' Accordingly, a decision that could offend the public trust if made incorrectly isin the words of the court-"too important to deprive parties of due process and
judicial review."" Given that many states have similarly adopted the public
trust language into their constitutions and state water codes,' the notion that
the public trust doctrine provides a dual means and an additional justification
for obtaining judicial review reaches far beyond Hawaii.
The Four Great Waters decision is consistent with what appears to be an
emerging trend in water law cases; providing citizens lacking traditional water
rights with a voice in decisions allocating water resources. For example, in
Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Company, the Montana Supreme Court held that a conservation organization, Montana Trout Unlimited
("MTU"), had a sufficient "ownership interest" in the waters of the Big Hole
River Basin to require a hearing before the Water Court in a water adjudication despite the fact that the organization lacked any type of ownership of a
water right claim.' After the state Water Court issued a temporary preliminary
decree in the Basin, MTU objected to the water rights claims of the Beaverhead Water Company and requested a hearing.' Beaverhead argued in response that the organization lacked standing, asserting that "a claim for a water
right is the only method of establishing an 'ownership interest' in the use of
water."' The Water Court agreed, noting that although MTU's members had
environmental and recreational interests in the water, these interests were insufficient to establish standing absent an "ownership interest in water or its
use.""' According to the Water Court, only the state Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation or the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
were authorized to represent the public's interest."'
The Montana Supreme Court flatly rejected these arguments, concluding
that nothing in Montana's water adjudication statutes or its case law limits who
can file objections to a decree."' According to the court, the notion that the
only way to establish an ownership interest in the use of water is through a
claim for a water right is wholly inconsistent with the concept that water rights

229. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012) (quoting Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d
409, 455 (Haw. 2000)).
2 30. Id.
231. Id.
232. See generallyRobin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Pubhc
Trust Doctries: Publc Values, 1ivate Rihts, and the Evolution Toward an EcologicalPubhc
Trust supra note 2, at 53 (surveying the public trust doctrine as it applies in different states).
233. Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 184 (Mont. 2011).
234. Id.at 180.
235. Id.at 180, 185.
236. Id.at 181-82.
237. Id.at 182.
238. Id.at 183.
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are solely usufructory, and convey no "actual physical ownership."' The court
found that MTU had standing based upon its environmental and recreational
interests in the water, which it held were sufficient to establish an ownership
interest based upon the public trust." Accordingly, the court held that the water court must hold a hearing on MTU's objections."
Like the decision in Montana Trout Unlimited, the Four Great Waters
decision represents a departure from the traditional notion of a water rights
dispute involving a conflict between two water rights holders. In both cases, the
courts rejected jurisdictional challenges and allowed individuals and organizations to participate in a hearing without filing a water right claim or applying for
a permit to use water."' Accordingly, these decisions do away with the notion
that standing to enforce the public trust requires a property interest that can
only be established through a claimed water right, and support a broader notion of the public trust doctrine based on non-traditional rights in water. An
expanded notion of standing is critical for water allocation decisions in the
Twenty-First Century, as ever-increasing demands for water clash with increasing demands for broad public uses. Especially in areas of the country where
climate change will diminish water resources," an expanded view of jurisdiction is vital for ensuring that allocation decisions reflect our common ownership of water. This is an impossible task under a system that allows only those
who claim water "rights" to participate in these decision-making processes.
B. A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW GOVERNING THE STATE
WATER RESOURCES TRUST

The court in the Four Great Rivers case also indicates its willingness to
serve as a check on the Commission and look more closely at the Commission's decisions to ensure compliance with public trust principles. Wai-ihole
Ditch established that the public trust doctrine imposes a "higher level of scrutiny" on Commission decisions favoring private uses because "the public trust,
by nature and definition, establishes use consistent with trust purposes as the
norm or 'default' condition."' According to the court in that case:
the constitutional requirements of "protection" and "conservation," the historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
239. Id. at 185.
240. Id. at 185-86. The court found that these interests were distinct from the general public's and could be adversely affected by a decree. Id. at 185. Accordingly, the court stated:
based upon the State's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust for the
benefit of its people, and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big
Hole River basin that MTU-under the facts of this case-has a sufficient ownership interest in
water or its use to demonstrate "good cause" to require the Water Court to hold a hearing or
hearings on its objections under [Montana state law]. Id. at 186.
241. Id. at 186.
242. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012); Id. at 185-86.
243. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony ofState Water Law, 29
STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 10-14 (2010) (discussing the impacts of climate change on water resources,
both in the United States and globally).
244. Wazihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000).
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rights, and the common reality of the "zero-sum" game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment.'"
Since its landmark Waidhole Ditch decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
further addressed the heightened standard of review governing the water resources trust on several occasions. For example, in the case Wadhole II the
court noted that, "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust
is a state constitutional doctrine, this court recognizes certain qualifications to
the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's decisions," which
compromise public rights in water."" Similarly, in In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka ,
Inc., the court distinguished the traditional standard of review governing decisions of the Commission from review of the Commission's decisions pertaining to the state water resources trust; again, the court noted that the "special
public interests in trust resources" mandates a heightened standard of review."'
The Four GreatRivers decision builds upon this line of cases, articulating
the precise standard of review the public trust requires. For example, given
that both the Water Code and the court's prior decision "have affirmed the
Commission's duty to establish IIFS that 'protect instream values to the extent
practicable' and 'protect the public interest,'"'" the court states a decision by
the Commission will satisfy the "close look review governing public trust resources" only where it "evinces 'a level of openness, diligence, and foresight
commensurate with the high priority these rights command under the laws of
our state."" By employing the "closer look" language in combination with its
description of the Commission's duty under the public trust, the court not
only clarifies the Commission's duty to protect the public's interest but emphasizes its own role in advancing public trust principles and affirms that the
judiciary will impose a more searching standard when dealing with trust resources.
The Four Great Water court's application of this searching standard to the
Commission's decision demonstrates that the public trust is more than an abstract principle the courts occasionally give lip service. Rather, it provides the
judiciary with broad authority to mandate concrete, substantive results and
grants them wide latitude in fashioning outcomes that adequately protect the
State's trust resources. The Four Great Waters decision envisions a public
trust doctrine that not only permits, but encourages, the State to take whatever
actions are necessary to protect trust resources-from amending instream
245. Id.
246. Waahole I 93 P.3d 643, 650 (Haw. 2004) (citing WaiaholeDitch, 9 P.3d at 455).
247. In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 684 (Haw. 2004) (holding that the Commission failed to discharge its duty under the public trust when it granted a water permit authorizing the construction and installation of a well); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Modem Public
Tust Principles:Recognizing Rights and Integratzng Standard, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699,
731 (2006) ("IThe Moloka'i courtl broadened its base of authority with regard to natural resources within the state in order to provide the maximum protection for such resources.").
248. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 154 (Haw. 2012) (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C71 (2)(A); Waidhole 11 93 P.3d at 653).
249. Id. (citing Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d at 685).
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standards to ordering a diverting party to take costly measures to minimize
system losses or find alternative sources-even if such actions may reduce established water rights.'
CONCLUSION
The Hawaii Supreme Court's recent decision in the Four Great Waters
case is an important expansion of the public trust doctrine. Perhaps most importantly, it builds upon the court's landmark ruling in Waiehole Ditch by
envisioning a broader role for both members of the public and the courts in
protecting against "improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res." Because
judicial review of decisions impacting public trust resources directly furthers
the doctrine's overarching purpose of protecting public rights in water, other
jurisdictions should adopt a similar approach. For now, the Four Great Waters decision demonstrates that Hawaii will continue to pave the way in advancing public trust principles and serve as a model for other states seeking to do
the same.

250. Therefore, the decision does more than merely define the geographic boundaries of the
trust or the types of purposes protected by the trust. Cf Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 445-48
(outlining the "scope" and "substance" of the trust).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine is controversial.' This article evaluates whether
the public trust doctrine should be applied to water management. To illustrate
the issue, consider the following legislation proposed in Michigan:
The waters of the state, including groundwater, are held in trust by the state.
The state shall protect these waters and other natural resources that are sub-

ject to the public trust for the benefit of present and future generations.'
Some states have enacted legislation applying the public trust doctrine to
water management.' Other states, however, have rejected such application. For
1. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditonalDoctrine, 19 ENvrrL. L. 425, 426 (1989) [hereinafter The
Headwatersofthe Public Trusil (noting that the public trust doctrine is "perhaps the single most
controversial development in natural resources law"). Compare Michael C. Blumm, Public
Propertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law: A Modern View ofthe Public Trust
Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 573, 595-97 (1999) (hereinafter Public Propertyand the Democratzzation of Western Water Lau] (arguing that the public trust doctrine serves as a democratizing
influence by incorporating the interests and liberty of the public at large in legal rules governing
the use of natural resources), Kith James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust
Doctrinein a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 19 ENVrL. L. 527, 549 (1989) [hereinafter A Fish Out
of Watel (arguing that modem public trust doctrine threatens constitutional democracy and
individual liberty by allowing courts to supersede the determinations of representative institutions and by disingenuously immunizing state actions from Fifth Amendment challenges on the
basis of a legal fiction of public property). Illustrative of the attention applied to the doctrine,
Professor Huffman calculated that more than 1,700 articles referencing the public trust doctrine
were published between 1990 and 2007. James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths:
A History of the Pubhc Trust Doctrine, 18 DuKE ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 1, 13 n. 59 (2007)
[hereinafter Speaking ofInconvenient Truths].
2. H.R. 5319, 95th Leg. (Mich. 2009). The proposed legislation, which was not adopted,
provoked significant controversy. See Sheri McWhirter, Scripps' Water Rihts Bill Draws Citicism: Michigan House Bill No. 5319, THE RECORD-EAGLE (Mar. 24, 2010) available at
http://record-eagle.com/grandtraverse/x794091158/Scripps-water-rights-bill-draws-criticism
(reporting an explanation by the bill's legislative author that the bill was intended to "end the
idea of groundwater as a commodity" and to curtail groundwater uses that are not sustainable;
reporting argument by opponents that the bill would transfer "all private property water rights to
the state without proper compensation").
3. See, e.g., N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 481:1 (2013) (declaring the state to be trustee of the
waters of the state for the public benefit); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S 1390 (2008) ("it is the policy
of the state that the groundwater resources of the state are held in trust for the public"). Michigan law also declares that "waters of the state are valuable public natural resources held in trust
by the state." MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.32702(c) (2008). The Michigan courts have explained
that such declaration "merely recognize Isi the importance of natural resources, including water,
and exhortis] the Legislature to exercise its police power to conserve them... land does] not
attempt to claim ownership of water by the state itself." Mich. Citizens for Water Conserv. v.
Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 221 (Mich. CL App. 2005).
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instance, an Idaho statute provides ". . . the public trust doctrine shall not ap-

ply to. .. [the appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights... or any other procedure or
law applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho."' Voters in Ohio overwhelmingly approved a ballot initiative to amend the state constitution to provide that "[giround water underlying privately owned land and nonnavigable
waters located on or flowing through privately owned land shall not be held in
trust by any governmental body."'
Given such policy divergence among the states and the extensive controversy surrounding the doctrine, it is proper to ask whether the adoption of
legislation declaring state waters subject to the public trust is necessary or prudent. This article argues that policymakers should resist calls to adopt the public trust doctrine as the basis for water resource management; instead, they
should develop a coherent and, comprehensive body of water management
laws designed to maximize public welfare. We conclude that reliance on the
public trust doctrine as a basis of water management would be imprudent, not
only because its utility has faded with the law's evolution, but because it threatens to impede the development of a coherent and unified body of water management laws.'
Originating in Byzantine law and promulgated over the course of centuries,' the public trust doctrine is based on a legal fiction that certain common
and shared natural resources, such as air, water, and wildlife, are "public property" held in trust by the state for the public's benefit.' The legal fiction of public ownership, or state trusteeship, over natural waters does not infer proprietary ownership by the state or the public, but rather provides a legal shorthand
to express the societal importance of water and the state's sovereign power to
regulate and manage it for the public's benefit.'For centuries, this legal fiction
served a vital practical purpose. Before the development of the modem regula-

4.
5.

IDAHO CODE ANN. S 58-1203(2)(b) (2013).
OHIO CONST. art. I, S19b(E). The vote, held in 2008, was 71.95 percent in favor of the
initiative. OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION, REPORT FROM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE GOVERNOR, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THE CITIZENS OF

OHIO app. at 249 (2008) avadable at http://mwy.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2008/
gen/Report/AnendedOfficialResults/Statelssues.pdf.
6. See discussion iafra Parts IV and V.

7. Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust The TheoreticalImphcaons of the Public Trust
Docrinefor NaturalResource Managemen4 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 481 (2001).
8. 111.Cent R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
9. Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950-51 (1982) (explaining that the
notion of public ownership of water is "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance
to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource"). The public trust doctrine is not objectionable because of its fictional foundation. See

Hope M. Babcock, The Puhic Trust Doctrne: What a Tall Tale

They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REv.

393, 394, 400 (2009) (noting that courts routinely resort to legal fictions to achieve efficient and
equitable results, and arguing that the public trust doctrine is a good legal fiction because it
performs a gap-Filling function in the absence of positive law). However, for the reasons we
explain herein we conclude that the public trust doctrine is a poor substitute for specific water
management laws, and that it threatens to confuse and frustrate the development of water management law. See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
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tory state, the law largely adhered to a classical liberal theory of property,
which generally favored individual autonomy over broad public interests."
Protectable interests were principally limited to the defense of property." In
that legal environment, the fiction of "public property" served as a necessary
analogue to private property, providing a property basis to control private activities that threatened essential public interests, such as access to navigable
waters-the public trust doctrine's classic application."
A legal fiction of public property m water is no longer necessary to protect
public interests.. Modem legal jurisprudence and the growth of the administrative state have evolved to recognize and protect public interests in natural
resources independent of the legal fiction of public property." Indeed, the
legal contours of what constitutes private property have generally changed to
accommodate the protection of public interests." This is particularly true in
the context of water management where public and private interests are deeply
intertwined due to water's immense and diverse societal importance and its
nature as a transient and shared resource.'" Private property interests pertaining
to the acquisition, distribution, sale, transfer, and use of water are routinely
defined to yield to statutory or judicial protections of the public interest." As
the notable law professor, Frank Trelease, rhetorically asked, "Why is it better

10. See Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to ClassicalLiberal Property Theory, 20
VT. L. REv. 299, 299, 306 (1995) (reviewing and critiquing the classical liberal theory of property); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1668 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson, Property
rn Land, 102 YALE. L.J. 1315, 1352-54 (1993); Ryan, supra note 7, at 484.
11. See Frazier,supranote 10, at 306-07.
12. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Sovereignty rn Natural
Resources: Questionig the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633 (1986) ("Most
simply put, the historical function of the public trust doctrine has been to provide a public
property basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed
contrary to the public interest."). See generally Harrison C. Dunning, The Pubhc Trust: A
FundanentalDoctrine ofAmerican PropertyLaw, 19 ENvTL. L. 515, 519-23 (1989); Alexandra B. Klass, Modem Pubc TrustPrinciples:Recognizing Rights and IntegratingStandards,82
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 702-06 (2006); Carol Rose, The Comnedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 721-23 (1986) [hereinafter Comedy of the Comnmonsl (analyzing the notion and implications of "property" bestowed in a disorganized public).
13. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 665 (explaining that the public trust doctrine arose at a
time, long since gone, when sovereign power depended on ownership, and that modern judicial
construction of sovereign police power does not turn on such strained legal fictions).
14. Throughout the law, modern jurisprudence is refining the definition of private property
to include appropriate conditions for the protection of public interests. See Lazarus, supra note
12, at 669-773; Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Pivate Property,PublicRights and
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 274-287 [hereinafter A Dozen
Propositions].
15. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 668 ("The relationship of the sovereign police power to private property has been marked by the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in the face of
the sovereign police power's growth.").
16. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Rightin Water, 9 HASTINGS W. Nw.J. ENVTL L. &
POL'Y 1, 4 (2002).
17. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 655.
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to say '[tihe state owns the water, therefore it may regulate its use' instead of
'Ithe state may regulate the use of water?'""
Even though the public trust doctrine is no longer needed to protect the
public interest in water resources, skeptical readers may naturally ask what
harm would come from embracing the doctrine with respect to water management. As we will explain, such an approach threatens to impair the development of a coherent body of water management law. Notably, application of
the doctrine to the use of water substitutes a superficial and ambiguous legal
doctrine where specific substantive and procedural provisions are necessary."
Further, on the basis of public "ownership" of a resource, some advocates
assert that the doctrine demands specific substantive results and removes administrative and judicial discretion over water resource decisions," presumably
even to the detriment of overall public welfare. Such extreme agendas should
be avoided in favor of balanced and nuanced water management. Finally, as a
judicially-fashioned doctrine, judicial precedence and restraint inherently limit
the public trust doctrine" and, thus, it is ill-suited to address many modem
water allocation problems. Unlike the judiciary, the legislative and executive
branches have broad latitude to adopt specifically tailored laws and statutes to
establish a consistent and sophisticated legal framework to manage the resource."
We evaluate the public trust doctrine with several fundamental policy objectives in mind. One measure of evaluating any water management policy is
how well the policy maximizes social welfare, or, in economic terms, its "utility."' In pursuit of maximum utility, policymakers must thoroughly consider
and balance competing and often countervailing social, environmental, and
economic objectives." For example, policymakers must weigh consumptive
water uses against ecological and other instream demands. Likewise, policymakers must balance the need for flexible water management against the desire for legal certainty to promote beneficial planning and investments.' Ap18. Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REv.
638, 645 (1957) [hereinafter Government Ownership.
19. See inha Parts V.A and V.B.
20. See e.g., James M. Olson, Navgatrng the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Publc Trus4
andInternationalTrade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103, 1130-32 (2006).
21. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 712-14. 22. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, S 5:44 (2010) [hereinafter LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES].
23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12-13 (8' ed. 2011) ("Utility"
refers to wealth, happiness, and welfare in both monetizable and non-monetizable metrics); see
also Lloyd R. Cohen, The Publc Trust Doctrine:An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L.
REv. 239, 255 (1992).
24. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 298 (emphasizing the importance of balancing public and private "rights" to "maximize the value of the sum ofprivate and public resources."); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD,
VALUING GROUNDWATER, 61-65 (1997) (discussing the difficulty and importance of calculating
values for groundwater and presenting valuation methods); DIANA GIBBONS, THE EcONOMIC
VALUE OF WATER 65-71 (1986) (discussing the empirical evidence of the economic rationale
for inclusion of instream values in water use decisions).
25.

See POSNER, supra note 23, at 66.
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propriate limitations must, of course, bind utilitarian goals.' Most notably,
utilitarian goals must respect the settled and reasonable expectations of individuals and the public concerning the operation of the law.'
These competing policy priorities require a mature and impartial analysis.
Implicated policy issues include: (i) how to properly define property interests
in water; (ii) when and how to apply regulatory oversight; and (iii) how to
properly distribute the burdens of regulation among competing water users.
The development of specific water management laws and institutions compels
a careful consideration of these fundamental policy inquiries. By contrast, legislative adoption of the public trust doctrine as a water management principle
evades this necessary analysis; it introduces undue ambiguity as regulators and
courts seek to discern the legislature's intent in legislating a legal fiction that the
judiciary fashioned to address legal deficiencies in a past legal era.'
This article explores these issues in five parts. Part II discusses the development of the public trust doctrine, including its selective application to water
management. Part III considers the policy underpinnings of modern water
management as a context for evaluating proposals advocating a broader application of the public trust doctrine to water resource management. Part IV discusses why the public trust doctrine is neither necessary to achieve balanced
water management, nor to modify existing allocations to adapt to changing
circumstances. Notably, Part IV also explains that the public trust doctrine is
not needed to protect reasonable water management laws from Fifth Amendment takings claims, nor will the doctrine provide a defense from takings liability where such liability is otherwise justified. Part V examines why application
of the doctrine to water management may impede efforts to establish a coherent and balanced body of water management laws. Finally, Part VI concludes
with a brief discussion of how states may approach water management strategies to balance public and private interests in a legally-defensible manner.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The scope of the public trust doctrine's application is vague." Advocates
champion the doctrine's amorphous character,' which has been described as
26. See POSNER, supranote 23, at 16-20,, 42, 63-66 (examining moral and practical limitations of efficiency, utility, and utilitarian theories and arguing that the economic concepts of
efficiency and utility are vulnerable on the grounds of, inter aba, moral injustices stemming from
wealth inequality, impacts to personal liberties and autonomy, and costs on voluntary transactions).
27. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberatmg the Publc Trust Doctrine From Its HistoricalShackles,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185, 186-189 (1980) [hereinafter Liberanagthe PubEc Trust Doctrinel.
28. See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 692 (discussing the evolution of natural resources law to
balance competing private and social goals and explaining that the public trust doctrine's reliance on notions of property law and trusts threatens to undermine the law's development in this
respect).
29. See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trus4 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
351, 359 (1998) [hereinafter Sax and the Idea ofthe Publc Trust ("cases and commentators on
the public trust have been uncomfortably vague about its reach.").
30. See Publc Property and the Denocratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at
575 (noting that one of the reasons for the popularity of the public trust doctrine is that it some-

Issue 1I

INPURSUIT OFBALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT

59

"amphibious," indicative of its modem expansion in some instances to resources beyond navigable waters," or "androgynous" and "chameleon-like," to
characterize the vast diversity of remedies it may provide." At its core, the doctrine is a legal fiction the courts created to justify enhanced judicial scrutiny of
governmental transactions involving common and shared resources, and "to
avoid judicially perceived limitations or consequences of existing rules of
law."'
Historically, the public trust doctrine principally protected public access to
navigable surface waters for a limited set of public purposes (e.g., navigation,
commerce, and fishing). More recent decisions in some jurisdictions have
broadened the doctrine's application to an expanded set of public interests,
including environmental protection and resource conservation, which may
effectively prevent public access in some instances." Such expansion of the
doctrine's scope differs substantially among the states."

times seems to be all things to all people); Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Pubhc Trust Doctrie
and CoastalZone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REv. 521, 526-27 (1992)
(discussing purported benefits of the doctrine's flexibility in application).
31. See Scott W. Reed, The Pubhc Trust Doctrine:Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 107, 116 (1986).
32. Pubhi Propertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 575,
579 (arguing that the "chief characteristic of the doctrine is not so much the resources to which
it attaches or the scope of uses it favors, but the diversity of remedies it-provides to resolve resource conflicts").
33. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 656.
34. See Cohen, supra note 23, at, 254; Patrick Deveney, Title,Jus Publicum, and the Public
Trust An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 41, 52-53 (1976); see also Molly Selvin,
The Public Trust Doctrmie in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L.
REV. 1403, 1408 (1980); The Headwatersofthe Pubc Trus4 supra note 1, at 428-30; Speakin oflnconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 19-20.
35. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
ClassificationsofStates, PropertyRights, and State Summanes, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1,
17-24 (2007) [hereinafter A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Publc Trust Doctrnes (discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine in the East from the "federal public trust doctrine" centered on the protection of navigation, commerce, and fishing in navigable waters to
state articulations that promote an expanded set of public uses and interests); Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Publc Trust Doctries: Pubihc Values,
Private Rrghts, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Publc Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53,
80-91 (2010) [hereinafter A Comparative Guide to the Western States'PublicTrust Doctrhel
(discussing the emergence of an ecological public trust doctrine in California and Hawaii, and to
a lesser extent in other western states); see also William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and
the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REv. 385, 387 n.2 (1997) [hereinafter Democracy, Distrus4 and the Public Trust] (discussing doctrine as a source of judicial authority to supervise and limit natural resource use).
36. See generallyA Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
35, at 30-43, Kith A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Pubhlic Trust Doctrne, supra
note 35, at 76, 188-96.
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A. THE NOTION OF PUBLIC WATER
The common law originally classified natural waters as res nulliusproperty of none-or res communes-property of all." The res communes
principle originated from the Institutes ofJustinian, which declared: "[Bly natural law these things are common to all mankind: air, running water, the sea,
and as a consequence the shores of the sea."" Open access to natural waters
was, of course, essential to economic activity when navigable waters were the
primary means of transport of goods and people." The French civil code,
Spanish civil law, and the English common law each perpetuated the characterization of natural waters as a common and public resource." This notion
ultimately evolved to treat navigable water resources as pubhlcijurs, public
property held in trust by the state for the public's benefit."
B. THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is founded on this characterization of water as
pubhcijuns. As the doctrine developed through English and ultimately American common law, courts applied it to proscribe public divestment of the beds
and shorelines of tidal-and later navigable-waters in a manner inconsistent
with the public's right of access for traditional public uses such as navigation,
commerce, and fishing.' The doctrine effectively imposed a public easement
on all private rights held in navigable waters, whereby any activity impairing
traditional public uses of a navigable waterway was subject to abatement or
37. Sullivan v. Richardson, 14 So. 692, 709 (Fla. 1894); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513
P.2d 627, 631 (Idaho 1973); Walbridge v. Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912); see also
Government Owmership, supra note 18, at 640.
38. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont 1933).
39. See Cohen, supra note 23, at, 254; see also Comedy ofthe Commons, supra note 12, at
753-54, 772-74.
40. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 634-35.
41. E.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935).
42. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1988) (refusing to
adopt a position denying the state an ability to retain fishing, hunting, and bathing rights for the
public); Shively v. Bowbly, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894) (explaining similarities and differences
between English and American conceptions of the doctrine); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 463-64 (1892) (holding that grant of harbor and lakefront to a railroad company was invalid insofar as the state had abdicated its trust over lands beneath navigable waters and to allow
such conveyance is inconsistent with state's obligation to preserve such water for public use);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (as traditionally applied in the United States, the
doctrine embodied federal and state components; the federal navigation servitude granted the
federal government paramount control over commerce in interstate navigable waters, while the
states maintained sovereign ownership of the beds of navigable waters within their respective
borders); see also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 636-37 (noting that the doctrine recognized three
types of interests in navigable waters and submerged lands: the jus pubhcum, the common right
of the public for unobstructed use of trust lands and waters for traditional trust purposes; the jus
pivatum, referring to private interests to use and possess trusts lands and waters that remain
subject to the public rights vested in the public under the jus publicunr,and the jus regium, the
sovereign's powers to regulate navigable waters and submerged lands on behalf of the public);
Speakmg oflnconvenient Truths, supra, note 1, at 93-94 (noting the extension of the trust from
tidelands to navigable waters was a product of American common law).
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removal.' Although states differ both as to what constitutes navigable waters
and what public uses the trust protects, the principal purpose of the traditional
doctrine has remained to preserve public access to navigable waters and their
shores.'
The seminal case defining the traditional public trust doctrine in the United States is Illinois Centra/Railroadv. Ihlois." In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that there was no unconstitutional impairment of contract
when the Illinois legislature repealed a prior grant to the railroad of a substantial portion of the Chicago lakefront and harbor because the state's tide to the
harbor and its shores was subject to the public trust." The court concluded that
any grant of trust property to a private entity was necessarily revocable, explaining that "the State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as
to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, ... than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace."" The core principle emanating from Illimois Central and other traditional public trust cases is that public rights to access navigable waters and their shores for trust purposes shall be preserved."
C.THE ECOLOGICAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Concurrent with the rise of the modem environmental movement in the
early 1970s, environmental advocates, notably Professor Joseph Sax, began
promoting a broader application of the public trust doctrine that would extend
its geographic reach beyond navigable waters and expand the scope of protected trust values to include ecological, aesthetic, and recreational values, as well
as other aspects of resource conservation." Sax argued that the doctrine could
be used as a legal basis for "effective judicial intervention" to protect natural
resources and attendant environmental values." His argument was effectively a

43. See SpeakingofInconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 94, 97-98.
44. Ill. Cent, 146 U.S. at 452-53; compareCWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115,
1121 (Alaska 1988); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 373-74 (Cal. 1980), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380-81 (Cal. 1971); Idaho
Forest Indus. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1987);
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-72 (Mont. 1984); Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 71
(NJ. 1821); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 703
(1988); see also The Headwatersof the Publc Trust, supra note 1, at 462-63.
45. II. Cent, 146 U.S. 387.
46. Id at 452.
47. Id at 453.
48. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 637-40.
49. Joseph L. Sax, The Publc Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. Effective Judicial
Intervention,68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556-57 (1970) [hereinafter Effectivejudiciallntervention.
50. Id. at 474, 555-58 (asserting that the public trust doctrine could be "useful as a tool of
general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource
management problems"); see also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 642 (characterizing Sax's assertions
as an argument that the doctrine contains at least three potential characteristics essential for the
development of an effective legal basis for environmental protection: (1) a legal right vested in
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"natural law" theory, asserting that certain public interests are "so intrinsically
important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society
as one of citizens rather than of serfs."" In select cases, the courts have applied
the trust doctrine expansively to further ecological interests." However, as we
shall explain, in these cases the courts have principally ordered comprehensive
procedural consideration of ecological interests by public decision makers,
rather than commanding specific substantiveresults."
The leading case for the "ecological" public trust doctrine is National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court." In that case, the California Supreme
Court held that the public trust doctrine imposed an affirmative duty on the
state water board to reconsider the effect of permitted water withdrawals by the
City of Los Angeles's Department of Water and Power ("DWP") from nonnavigable streams in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, withdrawls that significantly
reduced inflow into Mono Lake." The reduced inflow caused the lake level to
recede, thereby impairing the lake's environmental, scenic, and recreational
assets." Although the state issued licenses to DWP in 1940, authorizing DWP
to make withdrawals, DWP did not utilize these licenses until the late 1960s."
Although the court recognized that it could have resolved the conflict on other
legal grounds," the plaintiffs' claims rested on the public trust doctrine." The
case thus presented a conflict between the public trust doctrine and California's appropriative water rights system, a conflict that the court described as
"the two systems of legal thought .. . on a collision course.""
the public, (2) enforceable against the government, and (3) capable of interpretation consistent
with contemporary environmental concerns).
51. EffecdveJudicialIntervenion, supra note 49, at 484 (citing Martin v: Waddell's Iessee,

41 U.S. 367, 414 (1842)).
52. See, e.g., Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (applying the
public trust doctrine to require state water board to consider reductions of authorized withdrawals), cert denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985 (Haw. 2006) (holding that the public trust imposes on the state an affirmative duty to protect trust resources from
pollution); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (applying the public
trust doctrine to management of surface water and groundwater withdrawals and impoundments); Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho, 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995) (overturning
summary judgment on grounds that public trust doctrine conferred standing to an environmental group to challenge a timber sale on state forest lands based on possible impacts to ecology of
navigable stream); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires evidence of planning by appropriate state agencies with respect to allocation of water rights); Lake Beulah Mgmt.
Dist v. Wis. DNR, 335 Wis. 2d 47 (2011) (requiring consideration of environmental harm to
waters of the state when reviewing a permit application for a high capacity groundwater well); see
also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 647-52.
53. See discussion in/a Part II.D.
54. NatAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719:
55. Id. at 728-29.
56. Id. at 711.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 728, n. 28.
59. Id. at 712.
60. Id. ("[tihis case brings together for the first time two systems of legal thought: the appropriative water rights system... and the public trust-. . . Ever since we first recognized that the
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DWP argued that the appropriative water rights system subsumed the
public trust doctrine, and, by virtue of its state-granted licenses, it enjoyed a
vested right in perpetuity to take water without concern for the consequences
to the lake's ecology." The court rejected this defense, explaining that possession of existing water rights did not preclude a later reconsideration and reallocation to mitigate ecological impacts."
The National Audubon opinion expanded the public trust doctrine in
several key ways. First, it recognized that the public trust doctrine evolves with
the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways." In this
respect, the court found that the scope of protection afforded by the trust includes ecological, scenic, and recreational purposes." Second, the opinion
extended the geographic reach of the doctrine to include withdrawals from
non-navigable tributaries that affect navigable waters." Third, the court emphasized that water rights remain subject to the public trust and the state's continuing supervisorial duty under the trust." Fourth, the court explained that the
state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account and protect
public trust uses whenever feasible, both when initially planning and allocating
water resources and continually thereafter through the supervision of existing
and ongoing withdrawals." Finally, the court emphasized that "[in exercising
its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is
not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of
current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.""
Several other California opinions followed National Audubon and affirmed the public trust doctrine's broader ecological application in cases affecting water management.' Courts in several other states have similarly applied,
or alluded to a willingness to apply, the doctrine to the withdrawal and use of

public trust protects environmental and recreational values the two systems of legal thought have
been on a collision course.") (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (1971); Ralph Johnson,
Publc TrustProtection for Stream Flows andLake Levels, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 233 (1980)).
61. Nat'IAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.
62. Id. at 728-29.
63. Id.at 719.
64. Id. ("The principal values plaintiffs seek to protect, however, are recreational and ecological-the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for
nesting and feeding by birds. Under Marks v. Whitneyit is clear that protection of these values
is among the purposes of the public trust.") (internal citations omitted).
65. Id. at 721. The court refrained from determining whether the public trust extends to
protection of fishing, emironmental values, and recreation interests in non-navigable streams.
Id, at 721 n. 19.
66. Id.at 727-28.
67. Id.at 728.
68. Id.at 728.
69. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588,
601 (Ct. App. 2008) (extending the public trust doctrine to wildlife); United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201-02 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the public trust
doctrine empowers the state to modify both federal and state appropriative permits and riparian
rights to meet state salinity and other water quality standards in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta).
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water. These states include Hawaii," North Dakota," South Dakota," Utah,"
and Wisconsin." Notably, the Hawaii Supreme Court has strongly embraced
the doctrine, holding that the public trust reinforces existing statutory duties to
protect natural water bodies and may impose additional instream flow requirements and resource conservation duties on the state."
The states have differed as to whether the doctrine applies to nonnavigable surface waters and groundwater. Hawaii, Vermont, and New Hampshire
specifically apply the doctrine to groundwater, fully removing the navigability
restriction inherent in the traditional doctrine." Although California has not

extended the doctrine to groundwater," National Audubon required the state
to consider the impacts to navigable water bodies stemming from withdrawals
of water from tributary nonnavigable streams." That reasoning could imply
that the public trust doctrine might extend to groundwater extractions that
adversely impact navigable waters. Other state courts have ruled that the public

trust doctrine does not apply to groundwater." Additionally, a ballot initiative

70. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw. 2000) ("Under the
public trust, the state has both the authority and duty to preserve the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state.").
71. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 463 (N.D. 1976) ("[Tlhe Public Trust Doctrine requires, as a minimum, evidence of some
planning by appropriate state agencies and officers in the allocation of public water resources"
and "permits alienation and allocation of precious state resources only after an analysis of present supply and future need.").
72. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 835 (S.D. 2004) (citing United Plainsmen, 247
N.W.2d at 463, with approval for the proposition that the public trust doctrine requires a state
to undertake public planning before it grants permits for appropriation of water).
73. SeeJj.N.P. Co. v. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982) ("The State
regulates the use of water, in effect, as trustee for the benefit of the people").
74. See Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Wis. DNR., 799 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Wis. 2011) (requiring consideration of potential environmental harm in reviewing an application for a high capacity groundwater well).
75. See, e.g., Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1003 (Haw. 2006); In re
Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 684 (Haw. 2004); In re Water Use Permit Applications,
9 P.8d at 466-67 (explaining that the state must apply a "precautionary principle" in protecting
water resources); see also LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, at § 5:57
(summarizing the Hawaii Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning the application of the
public trust doctrine to the conservation of surface water and groundwater within the state).
76. See N.H REv. STAT. ANN. § 481:1 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S 1390 (2011);
Waiola 0 Moloka4 Inc., 83 P.3d at 668. Legislatures in Michigan and Maine introduced bills
recognizing the public trust doctrine's application to groundwater but ultimately did not enact
either piece of legislation. See H.R. 5319, 95th Leg. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 886, 124th Leg. (Me.
2009).
77. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (CL
App. 2003) (noting that the public trust doctrine has no direct application to groundwater
sources).
78. Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983), cert denied sub
nom. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
79. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d
174, 221-22 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding public trust doctrine does not apply to nonnavigable waters); Rettkowski v. State, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (noting the court has
never held extended the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters or groundwater).
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in Ohio amended the state constitution to provide that groundwater and nonnavigable waters "shall not be held in trust by any governmental body.""
D. REQUIREMENTS OF THE ECOLOGICAL PUBLIC TRUST IN THE WATER
MANAGEMENT CONTEXT

An important difference between the new "ecological" public trust cases
and the traditional "public access" cases is the nature of the duty each imposes
on the government and the judicial remedies the doctrine may afford. The
traditional cases protecting public access to trust resources applied substantive
restrictions on activities-private or governmental-in navigable waters that impaired public access to navigable waters." By contrast, the ecological-based
cases have largely avoided substantive commands; instead, the cases have principally imposed proceduralremedies, insisting on consideration and protection of public values, including ecological and other instream interests, to the
extent feasible. 2
The standard articulated in NationalAudubon-consideration and protection of trust values " whenever feasible""-reflects the need to balance instream
interests with consumptive needs."' Feasibility, however, is not an absolute
standard requiring protection of trust resources whenever technically possible;
rather it is a reasonableness standard requiring a determination of whether
protection of instream values is feasible in relation to competing social priori-

80.
OHIO CONsT. art. 1, §19(b)(E) (2008).
81.
See, e.g., In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis.
1924) (holding that the state did not have power to change navigable waters into agricultural
fields no matter how great the public benefits of doing so); Priewe v. Wis. State Land and Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896) (overturning state legislature's grant to a private party
of title to a lake bed and permission to drain the lake despite a legislative finding that drainage
was required for public health). Professor Lazarus summarized three types of traditional public
trust cases: (1) those that require that the challenged governmental action satisfy a public trust
purpose; (2) those that require that the disputed action occur only after consideration of any
adverse impact on the trust resource, and then only if such impact is either minimal or necessary; and (3) those that require specific legislative authorization for executive branch agency
decisions. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 651-55. The general rule emanating from the traditional
cases was that the use of trust property (e.g., navigable waters and their shores) was limited to
public trust purposes (e.g., navigation, commerce, or fishing). Effective Judici2/ Intervention,
supra note 49, at 477. Court may allow defeasances of trust resources to private ownership, but
only to promote the natural uses the people traditionally made of the property. Id at 486-89.
For example, Professor Sax explained that the doctrine could allow a private owner to build a
dock on a navigable waterway such as the San Francisco Bay, but not fill the bay for trash disposal or a housing project. Id at 477.
82.
See PublicProperty and the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at
590-97 (arguing that recent ecological public trust cases require "fairness and 'reasoned decision-making' from administrators, rather than particular substantive results").
NadAudubon Soc)', 658 P.2d at 728.
83.
84. See id. (holding that the state must "preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust"); see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
453, 4 53 (Haw. 2000) (noting that the state's duty to consider the public trust "may not readily
translate into substantive results," and that "reason and necessity dictate that the public trust may
have to accommodate off-stream diversions inconsistent with the mandate of protection, to the
unavoidable impairment of public instream uses and values").
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ties." Accordingly, the public trust doctrine should not prohibit private uses of
water resources that impose reasonable burdens on common public values.
Rather, the doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the government to perform a thorough, fair, and deliberate "hard look" at those values, and to protect them whenever feasible.' This standard is similar to the procedural requirements of many environmental review statues (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act," the California Environmental Quality Act," or the New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act"), which require public agencies
to demonstrate comprehensive consideration of the environmental impacts of
85. See NatdAudubon Socv, 658 P.2d at 728 ("[als a matter of practical necessity the state
may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses"); see also
State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Ct. App. 2006) (public trust
does not require that state resolve conflicts in favor of public trust values "whenever possible"
because determination as to feasibility is a matter for the state to decide); Michael C. Blumm,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property The Accommodation Principe, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 649, 666 (2010) [hereinafter The Public Trust Doctrine and PrivateProperty]
(arguing that although the public trust doctrine has had a transformative effect on private property rights in trust resources to accommodate the protection of public rights, the doctrine has not
eliminated private property tights); Barton H. Thompson, The Public Trust Doctrin: A Conservadve Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENvTL. LJ. 47, 61 (2006) (discussing
the California Supreme Court's opinion in NatlAudubon Soc'yas a balancing of private interests inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine with the public interests reflected in the public
trust doctrine); Effective.judicial Intervention, supra note 49, at 559-60 (explaining that the
judicial role is not to impose substantive results or usurp legislative or administrative discretion,
but rather to ensure a truly democratic and representative decision-making process); but see
discussion infra Part V.C, reviewing efforts by some advocates to cast the public trust doctrine as
a substantive rather than procedural standard, including the prohibition of particular uses of
water.
86. PublicPropertyand the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1,at 58994 (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Envt. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Sax also framed the
public trust doctrine as a common-law form of the "hard-look" doctrine, and argued that the
doctrine compels public bodies to take note of, and properly respond to, shifts in public interest
while also closely scrutinizing government actions to privatize natural resources. See Effective
JudcialIntervention, supra note 49, at 560-63; see also Sax and the Idea of the Public Trus4
supra note 29, at 355.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331- 4375 (West 2006); Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Nat. Res. Defense
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) ("Congress in enacting NEPA ... required only that the agency
take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences before taking a major action.") (citations
omitted).
88. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 2011) [hereinafter CEQA]; PublicProperty and the Democratizaton of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 591 (stating that the
public trust doctrine's mandate to consider adverse effects and to protect public uses where
feasible in the ecological context is similar to the requirements of CEQA); but see Cynthia L.
Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 583-86 (arguing that the standard required by the public trust
doctrine in the water management context is, in fact, substantive, rather than just procedural,
and that the duty imposed by the doctrine is far more arduous than the requirements of
CEQA).
89. N.Y. ENVYL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (West 2011); Stewart Park & Reserve
Coal., Inc. v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the court's role "to review the
record to determine if the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a
'hard look' at them, and make a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis for its determination.")
(citations omitted).
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an agency action and to undertake feasible mitigation efforts." In the water
management context, courts have typically afforded deference to legislative
and regulatory decisions so long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to
demonstrate comprehensive consideration of competing societal interests."

III. THE GOAL IS BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT
A. MANAGING WATER RESOURCES FOR THE "TRIPLE BOTToM LINE"

To evaluate the public trust doctrine in the context of water management,
it is necessary to define the desired policy goal. In our view, the goal of water
management should be to maximize the social utility stemming from the resource by considering and balancing all social, economic, and environmental
interests-the "triple bottom line." In doing so, water management must also
protect reasonable public and private expectations developed under the applicable legal framework.
Professor Sax advocated the public trust doctrine as a means to protect legitimate, yet underrepresented, public values concerning natural resources
against "rent seeking" by discrete pecuniary interest." In other words, Sax
promoted the public trust doctrine as a means to "balance the scales" by inserting common public interests that states might otherwise wrongly exclude

90. Review of federal agency decisions under the Federal Administrative Procedures Act is
often also undertaken under a "hard look" standard of review. See, e.g., GreaterBoston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851 (supervisory function of the court calls for intervention if the court
"becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems.")
Hard look analysis is particularly required when an agency decision "touches on fundamental
personal interests in life, health, and liberty." Enrd.Del Fund,439 F.2d at 598.
91. See e.g., Casitas Municipal Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 459 (2011)
(noting "Iilmplementation of the public trust doctrine requires not only the balancing of the
various public trust values, but also the weighing of those values against other, broader public
interests"); Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 757, 767
(Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to apply the public trust doctrine to modify a water management plan
to enhance environmental values because "a responsible body did weigh and consider the public trust uses of the lake"); Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thenualito Irrigation Dist., 257
Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (CL App. 1989) (noting the state's power to accommodate different water
demands and refusing to require the state to elevate fishery protection as an absolute priority
over other uses of water); see also Democracy, Distrust,and the Publc Trus4 supra note 35, at
452 ("Because resource decision making is inherently a technical process that requires the balancing of competing goals, judicial enforcement of these constitutional provisions must refrain
from second-guessing those value balances. Instead, courts must restrict themselves to ensuring
that the government understood and implemented the polity's concern with environmental
conservation"); Thompson, supra note 85, at 69 ("[TIhe public trust doctrine should not override democratic decisions regarding trust assets. To the contrary, courts should employ the
public trust doctrine to aflirm and preserve the authority of the legislative and executive branches over trust assets.").
92. See Liberating the Public Trust Doctrne, supra note 27, at 186-89; PublicProperty
and the Democratzationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 582, 590; Joseph Sax and the
Idea of the Public Trust, supra note 29, at 357-58; Effective judicialIntervention, supra note
49, at 473-74.
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from resource management decisions." Sax's premise was understandable in
1970, when he published his seminal public trust article given the emerging
public recognition of environmental exploitation and the relative deficiency of
laws to protect public interests in natural resources as compared to the present." However, as social perceptions have evolved, the policy "pendulum" has
swung meaningfully to vindicate Sax's goals. The federal and state governments have adopted laws to protect environmental values, including those
intended to foster balanced water management and the protection of broader
public values respecting the resource.' As we explain below, such substantive
laws are better suited than the public trust doctrine to balance competing environmental, social, and economic interests."
B. PROTECTING REASONABLE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPECTATIONS

As with other natural resources, appropriate protection of reasonable expectations, both public and private, is essential to a balanced and efficient water management policy. As Sax explains, "Itihe essence of property law is respect for reasonable expectations. The idea of justice at the root of private
property protection calls for identification of those expectations which the legal
system ought to recognize."" Sax advocated an ecological application of the
public trust doctrine as a means to infuse consideration of legitimate, yet diffuse, public expectations into the legal system.'
Professor Sax correctly advocated for mutual consideration of reasonable
public and private expectations in the management of natural resources. Applied to water management, we offer the following observations. First, specific
circumstances naturally influence expectations. For instance, a comparatively
minor withdrawal that is unlikely to adversely affect public interests may warrant less scrutiny than larger withdrawals. Second, water management must be
sufficiently adaptable to accommodate evolving social norms and new technical and scientific understanding." Third, this need for adaptability must be
counterbalanced against the desire for legal certainty on which planning and
investments can rely." Last, effective water management policy requires consideration of the "distribution" of regulatory burdens among competing water
users when assessing the reasonableness of private expectations in relation to
93. See EfIecdve judicial hitervention, supa note 49, at 557-65; see also Democracy, Distist,and the Pubc Trust, supia note 35, at 433 ("Despite the technocratic flavor of his conments, the general thirust of Sax's analysis remains toward politics, that is, political ordering,
choices, and access. For Sax, a major goal of the doctrine is to 'equalize' the political playing
field in order to ensure that pro-trust interests be able to attempt to influence the decision makers.").
94. See Effectivejudicial Intervendon, supm note 49, at 473-74.
95. See LAw OF WATER RIGTrrs AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, at S 5:57.
96. See infra Parts IV and V.
97. Lberating the Pubic Trust Doctrine, supra note 27, at 186-87 (citing Frank I. Michaelman, Proper; Utity and Fainess: CommIents on the Ehical Foudation of Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967)).
98. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 27, at 186-89.

99.
100.

See iAfia note 106, and general discussion infra Parts IV.A and IV.F.
See discussion infra notes 103, 104, and 105and accompanming text.
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water management.." In fact, whether a water regulation will withstand a constitutional attack is likely to depend, in large part, upon whether it distributes
regulatory burdens in a manner consistent with reasonable private expectations
relying on the state's underlying framework of water laws.'"
A central tension underlying many water management issues is the competing policy pnionities of legal certainty on one hand and adaptable management on the other. Legal certainty in the reliability of water supplies is important because it streamlines water management and promotes investment in
the resource, including voluntary efficiency upgrades and reallocations of water
from lower to higher-valued uses.'" Conversely, uncertainty can deter sociallyvaluable investments in the resource.'" Sufficient legal certainty is also necessary to support voluntary water transfers, including voluntary reallocations of
water from consumptive to instream uses.'"
Absolute legal certainty (i.e., guaranteed protection of existing allocations),
on the other hand, is neither practical nor efficient.'" The quest for legal certainty cannot come at the expense of the inherent need to adapt and modify
water allocations over time to address changing circumstances, evolving societal goals, and technical understanding."' Private individuals must reasonably

101.

See Dan Tarlock, The Creation ofNew Risk Shanag Water EntitlementRegimes: The

Case of the Truckee-Carson Settlemen4 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 674, 688-90 (1995) [hereinafter

Creation of New Risk Shanng Water Entitlement Regimesl (describing water rights as a system
of risk allocation among competing users).
102.
See infra Parts IV.F and IV.G.
103.
See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) (the "doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the compelling need
for certainty in the holding and use of water rights"); see also Changmg Conceptions, supranote
12, at 702 ("Undoubtedly, the most difficult problem facing environmental and natural resources law is to reestablish some level of certainty and security in private interests in natural
resources"); Legal certainty is important in many facets of water management including procedures for acquisition of rights, relations among users and between users and instream interests,
assumption of reductions under shortage conditions, and administrative procedures necessary to
modify management decisions and to resolve conflicts. POSNER, supra note 23, at 68-69; A

Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 268.
104.
See, e.g., In re Detennination of Rghts to Waters of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d at
666 ("Uncertainty concerning the rights of water users has pernicious effects. Initially, it inhibits
long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters in a stream system. .
Uncertainty also fosters recurrent, costly and piecemeal litigation. . .") (citations omitted).

105. Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Thnngs to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 623, 624, 638, 657 (2008).
106.
See POSNER, supia note 23, at 68 ("Economic theory implies that property rights will be
redefined from time to time as the relative values of different uses of land [or in our case water]
change."). Although Posner notes the importance of legal certainty to promote investment and
the potential disutility created by uncertainty on people who are risk adverse, he also acknowledges that "the amount and consequences of uncertainty are easily exaggerated." Id. at 69.
107. We should also acknowledge that optimal water management often requires partial
sacrifice of important societal interests to accommodate other overriding interests as necessary
to maximize overall public welfare. For instance, we may need to tolerate a use that is less than
optimally efficient out ofrespect for water rights priorities and the legal certainty that the priority
system affords. Conversely, we may need to sacrifice legal certainty to allow for reasonable and
necessary adaptability of the management system.
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temper their expectations to accommodate the necessity of adaptive management.
The law's distribution of regulatory burdens among competing water users
provides a means to reconcile this tension between the competing goals of
legal certainty and adaptability." Water users shape their expectations based
upon applicable water laws. Where the state fails to adhere to the legal framework-notably applicable water rights priorities-and thus, violates reasonably
formed expectations, the state is legally vulnerable, including possible takings
liability.'" Conversely, distribution of regulatory burdens pursuant to a transparent water rights system will likely fare better under judicial scrutiny.'
Where the state maintains and adheres to a clear and predictable water rights
system, water users can rely on the legal framework to plan and invest in waterdependent enterprises despite water supply variability caused by natural conditions or adaptive management.'" Thus, the water rights system can afford a
significant degree of legal certainty while, nonetheless, maintaining flexibility to
adjust total, system-wide allocations over time as necessary to accommodate
public interests.
C. PRIVATE RIGHTS IN "PUBLIC" WATER

The law's characterization of property interests in water reflects a balancing of diverse public and private expectations concerning the resource. States
have long deemed naturally-occurring water as "public" property."' In consistent fashion, many state constitutions and statutes declare water to be publicly or state-owned,"' or held in trust by the state,"' although states differ as to.
108. See discussion mfra Parts IV.F, VI.
109. See El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 468, 494
(CL App. 2006) (holding that state could not burden only a senior water right holder in contravention of water rights priority law without sufficient justification). Although the court decided
this case pursuant to an administrative mandamus action, the same reasoning could apply in an
inverse condemnation context. See discussion infraPart IV.G.
110. See MacDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598, 599 (Mont. 1986) (upholding against takings
claims a statutory change in the quantification format for state water rights from a flow-based
regime to a total allowable diversion quantity even though the change resulted in a lower total
allowable appropriation); Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107-08
(S.D. 1973) (upholding against takings claims the state's authority to limit the rights of riparian
owners to domestic uses or to uses granted under state's statutory prior appropriation scheme);
see alsodiscussion ifra Part IV.F.
111. For a defense of the prior appropriation doctrine against proposals for water management that rely on bureaucratic reallocation, see Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the
Wise Administrator,and the Goddam Bureaucra4 14 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 207, 216 (1974); see
also infa text accompanying notes 262-64.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
113. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, S 5 (property of the public); MONT. CONST. art. LX,
§ 3(3) (property of the state); WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (property of the state); CAL. VATER
CODE S 102 (West 2013) (property of the people); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-101 (West 2013)
(property of the state); S.D. CODIED LAws § 46-1-3 (2013) (property of the people); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (West 2013) (property of the public).
114. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, S 1 ("held in trust by the State for the benefit of the
people"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271:20 (2013) ("held in trust by the state for public use");
TEX.1VATER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(a) (West 2013) ("held in trust for the public").
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who is the owner and what they own."' Each state also provides for the right to
use water in the manner provided by state law, often in the same statutes characterizing water as publicly or state-owned."'
There is well-settled accord among the states that a water right, regardless
of type, is a usufructuary right; a water right only conveys a right to use water
on a recurring basis."' Usufructuary water rights are nonetheless property interests that afford rights to control, consume, earn income from, and, in many
cases, transfer the entitlement."' Thus, as a species of property, the Constitution affords water rights protection from government expropriation."' Gov-

115. CompareCOLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5 ("every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated"), with MONT. CONST. art. IX, S 3(3) ("all surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric
waters"), and with WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 ("all natural streams, springs, lakes or other
collections of still water"). See also, Government Ownership, supra note 18, at 642 (evaluating
differences in statutory and constitutional treatment of water "ownership" among several states
and explaining that "[ijf real differences were intended by the framers of these varying statements, the courts have failed to find them and have blurred the distinctions").
116. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, S 13 ("All surface and subsurface waters reserved to
the people for common use ... are subject to appropriation."); N. M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2
("The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of
-New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A)
(2013) (West) ("[Wlaters of all sources ... belong to the public and are subject to appropriation
and beneficial use as provided in this chapter."); CAL. WATER CODE S 102 (West 2013) ("All
water within the State is the property of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water
may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S
90.03.010 (West 2013) ("[All waters within the state belong to the public, and ... shall be
hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use . . .").
117. See, e.g., Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Zanker, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 170 n.2 (Ct. App.
2006) ("Water itself is not subject to ownership in California by private parties. Instead, a party
can own the right to use water."); Vill. of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667
(Fla. 1979) ("The right of the owner to ground water underlying his land is to the usufruct of the
water and not to the water itself."); In re Application U-2, 413 N.W.2d 290, 298 (Neb. 1987)
("The protected right of landowners is the right to the use of groundwater, and does not reach
the ownership of the water itself."); see also City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 7 (Colo. 1883);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964).
118. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) ("[Olnce rights to use water are acquired, they become vested property rights. As such,
they cannot be infringed by others or taken by governmental action without due process and just
compensation."); King v. White, 499 P.2d 585, 588 (Wyo. 1972) ("A water right is a 'property
right of high order,' with 'none of the characteristics of personal property,' and it is real property."); Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 29 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Idaho
1934) ("A water right is real property and may be sold and transferred separately from the land
upon which it has been used, the same as any other real property.") (quoting In re Rice, 299 P.
664, 666 (Idaho 1931)); Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 114 Ohio St.
685, 696 (1926) ("A water right is a species of property in and of itself...");see also Norman K.
Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey ofthe Evolution of Western Water Law in Response
to Chanming Economic and Publc Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 351 (1989)
("[Ain appropriative water right, once vested, became a constitutionally protected property
interest. It could be sold, leased, or transferred in other ways. It was a usufructuary right, or a
right to use, and was protected as a property right.").
119. Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) ("A vested
water right is a type of private property that is subject to the Fifth Amendment prohibition on
takings without just compensation."); see also discussion infa Part IV.G.
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ernment agencies also frequently treat water rights as property for other purposes, such as taxation."
On the other hand, constitutional or statutory expressions of public ownership or state trusteeship of water does not afford the state a propietaryownership interest in natural waters. Rather, such expressions simply reflect the
state's sovereign regulatory control over water resources." For this reason,
when a public agency seeks to obtain water for a proprietary purpose, such as
for a park or to purvey water to others, it cannot take the desired water at will;
it must comply with applicable state laws and procedures to obtain a water
right in the same manner as any other user."
The duality of pubhc control of water combined with private ights to use
water reflects the resource's unique physical attributes and vast societal importance." Water rights support public and private consumptive water uses
essential to the public welfare. Yet property rights in water are interests in a
shared resource that impact diverse and often countervailing public interests."
The state must therefore regulate water use to curb waste, promote and protect the public's interest in the use of water, and mitigate negative externalities
of water use."

120. The tax assessor may separately assess water rights depending on the tax regime of a
particular state. See, e.g., In re Assessment of Taxes, Booth, 15 Haw. 516, 516 (Haw. 1904);
CAL. S'rrE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ASSESSORS' HANDBOOK S 542 ASSESSMENT OF WATER
COMPANIES AND WATER RIGHTS, PART II: ASSESSMENT OF WATER RIGHTS 6 (2000), available

at http://www.boe.ca.gov/proptaxes/pdf/ah542.pdf. Similarly, water rights owners may exchange
their water rights for like-kind property pursuant to section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code.
See Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295.
121. State v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 285-87 (Ct. App.
2000) (construing a state statute declaring all waters to be the property of the people as indicative
of the state's sovereign control of water resources and not proprietary ownership); Walbridge v.
Robinson, 125 P. 812, 814 (Idaho 1912) (a state's interest or title to water is not "in the proprietary sense, but rather in the sovereign capacity as representative of all the people for the purpose
of guaranteeing that the common rights of all are protected . . ."); Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210,
221-22 (Wyo. 1903) (holding that an expression that the water is the property of the public
denotes a state's sovereignty over the resource as a representative of the people and does not
indicate proprietary owner).
122. See, e.g., Supedor Court of Riverside Cnty., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285; see also City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 n.7 (Cal. 2000).

123. David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property hi Tulare v. United States, 38
McGEORGE L. REv. 461, 473-74 (2007) (noting that "[wlater rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our normal sense and everyday understanding about property in land and chattels" because water is "neither static nor well-defined," and that for this reason, "water ill-fits
property's foundational concept of possession and defies the very order and predictability" that
are intended from designated property rights); Gray, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the various
physical and legal factors that render water rights a unique form of property and "seldom affect
real property and other property rights").
124. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1935); Gray, supranote 16, at 4125. See, e.g., Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 449 (1916) ("Water rights, like all
other rights, are subject to such reasonable regulations as are essential to the general welfare,
peace and good order of the citizens of the state, to the end that the use of water by one, however absolute and unqualified his right thereto, shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others entitled to the equal privilege of using water from the same source, nor injurious to the
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Rhetorical emphasis on competing property characterizations of water or
water rights is largely devoid of sophisticated analysis. The balancing of reasonable public and private expectations should ultimately define the scope of
property interests in water.'" The notion of public ownership of water does not
provide helpful guidance to clarify and balance public and private expectations.
We should clarify that our argument is focused only on the management
of the allocation and use of water. The notion of "public property" may be
appropriate as a definition of lands and resources that the state should preserve for open access by the public." However, with respect to the use and
conservation of water resources (apart from physical access to surface water
bodies), a fictitious characterization of water as public property is unnecessary
and confusing and detracts from the development of substantive water management policy.'"

IV. BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT DOES NOT NEED THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
As discussed above, the legal fiction of water as public "property" once
served an important public interest by establishing an analogue to private
property, when legal protections were largely centered on private property
interests." Although debate will naturally continue regarding the extent to
which government should intrude into the autonomy of private property," the
law's shift away from a classical liberal approach to property law--with its traditional bias for personal autonomy over collective interests-is undeniable.'

rights of the public.") (quoting In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 514 (Or. 1914); see also discussion infra Parts IV.C-F.
126. See discussion wha Parts IV.F-G. The legal understanding of private property interests
in natural resources has substantially evolved to accommodate regulatory oversight to protect
reasonable public expectations. As Professor Lazarus observed, "modem trends in natural
resources law increasingly have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural
resources and substituted new notions of sovereign power over those resources." Lazarus, supra
note 12, at 633.
127. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 62 (arguing that "some degree of common property is
essential in a nation in which private property is (rightfully) dominant. A world in which all land
and resources are privatized would be not only unworkable from a utilitarian perspective but
socially weaker."); see also Comedy of the Commons, supra note 12, at 722-23, 775-81 (discussing the important role and socializing effect of public property in the historical and modem
context).
128. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 64 ("The public trust doctrine, however, loses much
of its animation, strength, and unique justification if and when it moves beyond its traditional
focus on balancing private and common property and turns instead to purely environmental
considerations."); see also discussion i/ia Part V.
129. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
130. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 273-87; Lazarus, supra note 12, at 66872, 674; see also Frazier,supra note 10, at 365-66 (1995); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:
An Essay, 100 YALE LJ. 127, 128-29 (1990).
131. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 668 ("The relationship of the sovereign police power to
private property has been marked by the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in the face
of the sovereign police power's growth.").
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Building from early cases such as Eucld v. Ambler," the law has evolved to
recognize the legitimacy of government police powers to enact laws and regulations to protect diffuse public interests directly." In our increasingly populated
and interconnected society, the very contours of what constitutes property
have adapted to accommodate reasonable regulatory intrusions necessary for
protection of broad public interests." This significant legal shift has supplanted
the need for a legal fiction of public property in natural resources." Thus, a
state may act upon its ample police powers to manage water resources in a
manner that effectively balances diverse and competing interests in the resource."
A. THE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL USE DOCTRINE PROVIDES A MORE
DIRECT MEANS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST

A core tenet of virtually all state water management laws is the requirement that users must put water to beneficial purposes by reasonable means.'
The specific terms used among the states vary between "reasonable," "benefi132. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (upholding comprehensive zoning law as a valid exercise of municipal police powers).
133. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962) (denying a takings
claim relating to a safety regulation that prohibited operation of a previously legal sand and
gravel pit in a suburban area because the regulation was a reasonable and a non-compensable
exercise of a city's police power); accordGorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (upholding
city setback ordinance as a valid exercise of the police power); but see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987) (criticizing the reasoning in Goldblatt for assuming that
due process, equal protection, and takings clause analyses are the same with respect to the level
of scrutiny of property regulations). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124-25, 131 (1978) (discussing regulations that the courts upheld despite "substantial individualized harm" to property owners). See alsoJohn Leshy, A ConversationAbout Takings and
WaterRigts, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1985, 2000-2003 (2005).
134. See A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 273-87. Rose provides an apt example of
the evolution of common law protection of public interests into statutory protections, specifically
with respect to pigsties in expanding urban communities. Id. at 274. She notes that as cities
grew, the noise and smell of pigsties increasingly became the target of nuisance suits, but that
such suits are now virtually nonexistent because general public legislation about animal husbandry in urban areas has superseded such nuisance actions. Id.
135. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 657-64, 679-91 (arguing that developments in the law,
including liberalized standing requirements, growth of administrative law and procedure, and
expanded application of the nuisance doctrine and tort law have supplanted the need for the
ecological public trust doctrine as a basis for judicial review of government decisions relating to
natural resources).
136. See discussion infra Parts IV.A and IV.C. Water management is largely a state affair.
See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAw IN A NUTSHELL 372 (4th ed. 2009).
137. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, S 13; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; N.M. CONsT. art.
XVI, § 3; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(a) (2013) (West); FLA. STAT. §§ 373.019(16),
.223(1) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-91 (West 2013); HAw. REV. STAT. § 174-49(a) (2013);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-104 (West 2013); 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6 (2013); IND. CODE S 1425-1-1 (2013); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.110(l)(a) (West 2013); Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-702 (2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.035 (West 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.12 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OR.
REv. STAT. § 537.525(3) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-4, -8 (2013); TEx. WATER CODE
ANN. § 11.025 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-1-3, 73-3-1(4) (West 2013); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-101 (West 2013).
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cial," or "reasonable and beneficial."'" The meaning and legal requirements of
the terms "reasonable" and "beneficial" vary among the states." Some states
require that the state's limited water supplies "be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable."" Other states provide that beneficial
use defines the scope of a water right."' In general, such standards-which for
simplicity we refer to as the "beneficial use requirement"-prohibit unreasonable or wasteful uses of water deemed contrary to the public interest."' Accordingly, there is no property interest in a use that does not comport with the
beneficial use requirement."
The beneficial use requirement has evolved with social norms.'" Historically, the requirement largely focused on the avoidance of wasteful uses of
water given the scarcity of supply, particularly in western states.'" Modern application of the beneficial use requirement arguably includes consideration of
See 1 JOSEPH W. DELIAPENNA, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 9.03(b)(1)-(2)
138.
REGULATED RIPARIANIsM (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3rd ed. LexisNexis 2013) [hereinafter Regulated
Ripaananism];see also discussion infra notes 136-37.
139. Regulated Riparianism, supra note 138, SS 9.03(b)(1)-(2). Dellapenna discusses variations in the use of the terms "reasonable" and "beneficial," as well as definitions of such terms
provided by the Model Water Code, the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, and by certain states. He further explains that many states express preferences for various uses and criteria
to be applied by administrative agencies in management of water resources that may, in effect,
act as a proxy for definitions of these terms.
140. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; GA. CODE ANN. S 12-5-91 (West 2013); Miss. CODE ANN. §
51-3-1 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.12 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-520 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-4 (2013).
141. -N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit
of the right to the use of water."). Laws of several other states have nearly identical language.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-62-101, art. III, S (b)(2) (West 2013); NEv. REv. STAT. §
533.035 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.2(A) (2013);
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.525(3) (West 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-8 (2013); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2013); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (West 2013).
142. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 (West 2013); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws S 46-1-4 (2013).
143. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (West 2013);
OR. REv. STAT. S 540.610 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4.5 (West 2013); see also Steven J.
Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483, 487-88
(1982).
144. See In re Water of Long Valley Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 665 (Cal. 1979) ("a reasonable use of water varies with the facts and circumstances of the particular case"); Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967) ("a reasonable use of water depends on circumstances of each case"); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45
P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935) ("What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed
conditions, become a waste of water at a later time."); Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v.
Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 194-95 (Mich. CL App. 2005) (reasonableness is
determined by whether the use of water by one user is reasonable and consistent with a corresponding use by others); In re Water Right Claim No. 1927-2, 524 N.W.2d 855, 858 (S.D.
1994) (explaining that beneficial use is an evolving concept that can be expanded consistent with
changing societal values).
145. See generallyGETCHES, supra note 136, at 137-38; see also Tulare Irrigation Dist. v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935) (holding that field flooding to
exterminate rodents was wasteful and non-beneficial); Blaine Cnty. Inv. Co. v. Mays, 291 P.
1055 (Idaho 1930) (holding that flooding to form ice to preserve soil moisture was not beneficial).
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environmental and other social values." Specifically, one may argue that in
order to put water to beneficial use "to the fullest extent ... capable,""7 for the
"best utilization,"" or "consistent with the best interests of the people,""' it is
necessary to consider and balance the full range of costs and benefits of .all
potential uses of water." Social, economic, and environmental concerns are
each important considerations, as each carries definite public value.'
The beneficial use requirement has historically had more influence ensuring consideration of public interests in relation to the initiation of new water
uses (e.g., pursuant to a permit application) than influencing efforts to force
reallocation of water from existing uses.' To date, courts have been reluctant
to limit an existing and ongoing water use on the grounds that the use is no
longer beneficial in light of alternative and more beneficial water uses." Such
judicial reluctance is arguably justifiable because the courts must balance the
benefits of water reallocation against the uncertainty and disutility resulting
from reallocation under the pretext of "comparative beneficial use."" However, pursuant to the beneficial use requirement, courts may nonetheless curtail
existing water uses that substantially impair the public interest or that constitute
a public nuisance." A water right holder cannot assert a right to use water in a

146. See ROBERT E. BECK & OWEN L. ANDERSON, Elements of Pnor Appropiation, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs, § 12.02(c)(2) (Amy L. Kelly ed., 4th ed. Lexis Nexis/Matthew
Bender 2011) [hereinafter Elements ofPnorAppropiatdon].
147. CAL. CONST. art. X, S 2 (West, 2013).
148. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-6(3) (West, 2013).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-04-01.1 (West 2013).
150. Trelease, supra note 111, at 4 (noting that "Iwlhat is to be maximized is welfare from
water use, not water use itself").
151. See, e.g., Coto. REv. STAT. ANN. S 37-92-103(4) (West, 2013) (defining "beneficial
use" to include appropriations for instream recreational and environmental uses); HAw. REV.
STAT. S 174C-3 (West 2013) (defining instream uses as beneficial uses of water for instream
purposes and listing examples); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-10(b) (defining "beneficial use" to
include instream uses and listing examples); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 314 (Colo. 2007) ("Maximum utilization does not mean that every
ounce of Colorado's natural stream water ought to be appropriated; optimum use can be
achieved only through proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental and
economic concerns."); State v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho 1974)
(aesthetic and recreational uses are beneficial uses even though not included in a list of beneficial uses set forth in state constitution).
152. See Gregory A. Thomas, Conservbn Aquatc Biodiversity: A Cridcal Companson of
Legal Tools for Augmenbng Streamlows in Cahfonia, 15 STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 3, 27-31 (1996);
see, e.g., State of Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993) (acknowledging state policy to balance consumptive and instream interests, but refusing to include impacts
on flora and fauna as factors for setting allowable withdrawals within a general stream adjudication, reasoning that such factors cannot operate to impair existing water rights).
153. See GETCHES, supra note 136, at 137-38.
154. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing the importance and social
benefit that stem from legal certainty in relation to water rights); see also 2flia notes 262 and
264.
155. See e.g., Natl Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728 n.28 (Cal. 1983) (acknowledging an argument by the California Attorney General that the state water board could
review water rights harmful to the public interest for curtailment pursuant to the beneficial use
doctrine).
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way that fails to comport with the beneficial use requirement." Furthermore,
the legislature may specify uses or circumstances that would not comport with
the beneficial use requirement" thus empowering the judiciary and regulatory
agencies to curtail existing uses deemed by the legislature to be unreasonable
or non-beneficial.
State actions that enforce the beneficial use requirement to balance instream and consumptive demands will generally not incur takings liability because no water right exists for non-beneficial uses. Thus, a user may not claim
inverse condemnation if the user is applying the water right to a non-beneficial
use." As the Supreme Court of Washington explained:
A vested water right is a type of private property that is subject to the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on takings without just compensation. Nevertheless,
the concept of "beneficial use", as developed in the common law .. . operates as a permissible limitation on water rights."
To the extent application of the public trust doctrine to water resource
management demands only thorough procedural consideration of the feasibility of protecting instream interests (as opposed to substantive results),'" the
beneficial use requirement and the public trust doctrine impose the same procedural bar. The beneficial use requirement, however, is preferable because it
does not rely on legal fiction, ambiguous standards, and narrow doctrinal constraints." Unlike the public trust doctrine, the beneficial use requirement also
does not present the risk of arbitrary favoritism for particular uses." Rather,
the beneficial use requirement demands a candid and fact-specific assessment
of potential water management options to determine which will best advance
the public welfare."
B. RIPARIANISM AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION

Aside from the core beneficial use requirement, states employ diverse water management approaches. Eastern states, which have historically enjoyed
ample water supplies, have traditionally adhered to a riparian doctrine of water
156. Elements ofPnorAppropdation, supm note 146, § 12.02(c)(2). Such a result is similar
to applications of the public nuisance doctrine as a basis for judicial intervention with respect to
environmental and natural resource problems in general. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 660-64.
157. Elements ofPnorAppropiation,supra note 146, § 12.02(c) (2).
158. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
159. Wash. Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) (citing
Wash. Dept. of Ecology v. Adsit, 694 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1985)).
160. See discussion supraPart II.D.
161. See discussion i2/ia Parts V.B and V.D.
162. See discussion M2/a Part V.C.
163. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 188 (CL
App. 1986) (holding that the state water board has broad power to prevent unreasonable methods of use, which includes balancing between water quality and diversions of water for consumptive uses); Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, 181 P.3d 252, 260 (Colo. 2008) (holding that the
state requirement that water be put to optimal use requires the state to provide proper regard for
all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns).
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use derived from English common law."' The riparian doctrine generally imposes reciprocal rights and obligations on landowners abutting a water body,
whereby each riparian landowner possesses the right to withdraw water from
the abutting water body for reasonable uses." Similar principles govern
groundwater use in these states. Landowners overlying a source of groundwater possess rights to withdraw groundwater as a right appurtenant to land ownership." Many riparian states, however, have adopted regulatory and permitting schemes that modify many of the limitations inherent in the riparian doctrine."
Western states have repudiated the riparian doctrine in favor of the prior
appropriation doctrine because of water scarcity and the need for non-riparian
water uses." Prior appropriation, which originated from western mining camps
in the 19' century West," does not limit withdrawals to riparian landowners.
Instead, it mandates that users obtain water rights through historic use and
prioritizes water rights based on the date of initial appropriation."' Earlier appropriators are granted priority to available water over later appropriators."'
C. STATE PERMITTING AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

As water scarcity, growing population, and emerging environmental values
have led to increased water conflicts, states have adopted more robust permitting and oversight systems. All western states, except Colorado, utilize administrative permitting systems to control the acquisition, use, transfer, and termination of water rights."' Hawaii and many eastern states have also modified
common law riparianism in favor of "regulated riparianism," which incorporates various permitting schemes."' Although permitting systems are more
164. See Iw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, S 1:1.
165. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945); Harris v. Brooks,
283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); Carlsbad Mut. Water Co. v. San Luis Rey Dev. Co., 178
P.2d 844, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); see generally Regulated R arianism, supra note 138, S
6.01.
166. RegulatedRiananism,supra note 138, §§ 22.02-.03; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 858 (2013).
167. See, e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.042 (West 2011).
168. Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, supra note 118, at 348-49; 1 WELLS
HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-144 (1974); see
GETCHES, supra note 136, at 272-73. California applies a hybrid of the two legal regimes. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980); Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 923-24 (Cal. 1884).
169. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140; 140 (Cal. 1855); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, Western
Water Lawi Transition,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317, 318-320 (1985).
170. Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 24 (Ct. App. 1998).
171. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1148 (Colo. 2001); Am.
Falli Reservoir Dist No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433, 438 (Idaho 2007).
172. See LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:44. Colorado administers water rights through the judiciary by means of a "water court," with assistance from the
state engineer. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (West 2013); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
of Cnty. of Arapahoe v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 551 (Colo. 1992).
173. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-210 to -219 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
22a-368 to -374 (West 2013); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (West 2013); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 55 373.216, 373.219 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. S 12-5-31(b)(1) (2013); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-27 (2013); see alsoJoseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets
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common and comprehensive for surface water, states continue to develop and
strengthen groundwater permitting programs as well."'
Permitting statutes generally require the state's permitting agency to consider broad public interests prior to issuing or modifying a permit, including
protection of minimum streamflow or aquifer levels for environmental and
other instream purposes." Generally, the state may deny a water right application or condition the grant of any permit as it deems appropriate to protect the
public interest."
States routinely rely on various other water management laws as well. Examples include laws pertaining to: local or system-wide planning, monitoring,
data collection and reporting,'" maximum total withdrawals,' management
L, Ripanan States, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 305, 314-35 (2004) (hereinafter Special Challenges];
LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:90; George W. Sherk, Eastern

Water Law Trendsm State Legislaon, 9VA. ENvTL. Lj. 287, 291-92 (1990).
174. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 324.32723 (2008) (requiring a permit for large quantity
withdrawals and other specified circumstances); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §1020.9 (West 2011)
(allocating groundwater resources among overlying landowners by a percentage formula); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-60 (2013) (requiring groundwater withdrawal permits in designated capacity
use areas); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1418 (2013) (requiring groundwater withdrawal permit for
daily withdrawals in excess of 57,600 gallons); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.050 (West
2013) (requiring a permit to withdraw groundwater, albeit with numerous exceptions to the
permitting requirement). See generally LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note

22, § 4.28.
175. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.080(b)(1)-(8) (2010); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45153 (2010); CAL. WATER CODE SS 1253-1259 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.042 (West
2011); HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-49(4) (2010); see also Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448-49
(Idaho 1985) (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 and requiring the Director of Water Resources to consider factors such as protection of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, aesthetic
beauty; and water quality in assessing an application for water rights); Stempel v. Dep't of Water
Res., 508 P.2d 166, 172 (Wash. 1973) (citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(3) in holding that the protection of the quality of the natural environment must be a condition to issuance
of water use permit). See generallyLAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, §
5:52.
176. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (state may deny permit if denial is "demanded by
the public interest"); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)
(2010) (director of Department of Water Resources may grant, deny or condition pennit for
appropriative permit); IOWA CODE § 455B.267 (authority to deny permit if withdrawal would
impair navigability of a water body, the long-term availability of water from a ground or surface
water source, or otherwise adversely affect the public health or welfare); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46234, -235 (2010); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. S 533.370 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7
(West 2010); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.153 (West 2010); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290
(West 2010); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.147 (Vernon 2010) (providing for analysis of impacts on bays, estuaries, and aquatic life in denying or approving permit to appropriate water);
MD. CODE ANN. § 5-507; N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 15-1501(4); Central Platte Natural
Res. Dist. v. City of Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1996) (holding that protection of endangered whooping crane was in the public interest and justified denial of water permit). See also
LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:52; George A. Gould, A WesternerLooks at Eastern Water Law Reconsidertion of PnorAppropriaionin the East; 25 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 89, 93 (2002). The state can also expressly condition a permit to
yield to later-in-time modifications. CAL. CODE REGs., tit. 23 §780 (2013).
177. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10610, 10610.4 (West 1992) (enacting the Water
Management Planning Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-351, -352 (2011) (authorizing a ten-year
program of detailed geological and hydrological studies); MASS. GEN. LAvs ANN. ch. 21G, S 3
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criteria for specific water sources," instream flows for fish habitat," preferential uses,"' well drilling,' water supply showings for land use approvals," use of
reclaimed water," and water right transfers." Additionally, environmental review statutes, such as the California Environmental Quality Act and the New
York State Environmental Quality Review Act ensure that government agencies fully consider environmental impacts to water resources when approving
water withdrawals or other projects affecting water resources."
Some state water management laws are far from comprehensive, and
some are in need of refinement."' However, the states possesses ample police
powers to manage water resources to protect the public interest without relying
on the public trust doctrine.
D. WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The courts may also play a significant role in water management through
water rights adjudications." The courts possess the power to adjudicate water
(West 1985) (enacting Massachusetts Water Management Act); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §
324.32725 (West 2008) (encouraging the creation of a water users committee to evaluate water
trends within a watershed and to assist in water management planning).
178. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-319 (West 2010) (generally prohibiting withdrawals
from highly-appropriated basins and subbasins); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:22-7 (West 2001) (prohibiting withdrawals from the Raritan River when river flow is less than a certain rate).
179. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-21 (1993) (providing for declaration of capacity stress areas when
demands exceed supply and for the promulgation of rules to protect public interests); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-411 to -421 (2010) (designating Arizona's active groundwater management areas and criteria).
180. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE S 1257.5 (West 2011). See generallyJesseA. Boyd, Note,
Hip Deep: A Survey of State Instream Flow Law From the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific
Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1151 (2003) (discussing how one may change instream flows in
Rocky Mountains, Great Basin, and Pacific states to benefit the fishery resource).
181. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (ranking water use priorities in times of shortage);
CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2010) (declaring water for domestic purposes as the highest
use of water, followed by irrigation use).
182. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-91-101 to -113 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
19a-209a (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1(4)(b) (West 1953).
183. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10912, 10914-10915 (West 2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.27.097 (West 2010).
184. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13550-13557 (West 2009). See-generally Ginette
Chapman, Note, From Toilet to Tap: the Growmg Use of Reclaimed Water and the Legal
System's Response, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 773 (2005) (explaining various water reuses).
185. See e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725, 1735 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §
105.22 (West 2011). See generally George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party
Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1 (1988); LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra
note 22, §§ 5:71-5:85.
186. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 2011); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
M 8-0101 to 8-0117 (Gould 2011).
187. See LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:97 (arguing that eastern state permit systems often present a confusing and vague mix of permitting criteria between
property rights protection and administrative allocation, and that as a result such systems fail to
define with any precision the public interest in water management).
188. See, e.g., Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993); In re the
Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992). See generally Stuart T. Waldrip, Water
Rghts-Finahty of General Adjudication Proceedings in the Seventeen Western States, 1966
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rights and establish water management plans pursuant to statutory procedures,
the state's beneficial use requirements, and inherent legal and equitable powers vested in the courts." Many states provide a statutory process for initiation
and processing of comprehensive adjudications by a state water management
agency, followed by judicial review and adoption of the agency's recommended decree (with or without modification by the court).'" Adjudication decrees
typically limit or condition withdrawals with respect to both the resource as a
whole and individually by each water right holder. In so doing, the adjudication may cap water withdrawals, which, in some states, may not otherwise be
possible."' Most decrees also reserve jurisdiction for the court to monitor and
impose new orders, resolve future disputes, and amend the judgment as necessary to adapt the management plan to changing conditions or water supply
needs."
Adjudication decrees often also impose a comprehensive management
plan that is tailored to the unique physical conditions of the water source and
local water needs." In some circumstances, more effective and efficient management is possible pursuant to a judicially-fashioned management plan than
under generally applicable laws."
E. THE STATE'S POLICE POWER PROVIDES AMPLE AUTHORITY TO
MANAGE THE INITIATION OF NEW WATER WITHDRAWALS

As discussed, states possess ample police powers to impose water management laws to balance competing water demands and ensure the resource's
long-term sustainability." The states possess robust powers to restrict and condition initiation of new water withdrawals," limited only by constitutional

UTAH L. REV. 152; Scorr S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND PoucY
(2011) [hereinafter WATER LAW AND PoucY].

§ 9.09, 9.10

189. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2013) (defining "plan of augmentation");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-234 (2013) (describing elements of adjudication required by statute);
Cal. Am. Water v. City of Seaside, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 536 (Ct. App. 2010). (discussing
implementation of a "physical solution" as an equitable remedy).
190. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2868 (West 2013) (as applied to surface water);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 539.005-.220 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. SS 42-1406, 42-1412
(West 1994). See generaly A. Lynne Krogh, Water Right Adjudications in the Western States:
Procedures Constitutionality, Problems & Solutions, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV 12, 19-21
(1995).
191. See, e.g., In re Water of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656, 665-69 (Cal. 1979).
192. See, e.g., Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 486, 491-92 (Ct. App. 2003).
193. See, e.g., Cal.Am. Water, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 532-33, 536.
194. See, e.g., Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665-69 (subordinating the priority of unused riparian rights within a general stream adjudication to eliminate the legal uncertainty caused by the
potential activation of unquantified riparian rights under the state's common law); but see A.
Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finatyin General Water Rights Adjudications, 25 IDAHO L.
REV. 271 (1989) (arguing that adjudications are expensive, controversial, and often do not
achieve finality with respect to water rights).
195. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
196. See e.g., Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist.
77 P.3d 62, 77-78 (Colo. 2003).
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boundaries." In fact, generally, there is no protected expectation that a court
will grant a new water right.'"Thus, constitutional restraints are unlikely to burden reasonable and even-handed regulation of new water rights.'"
F. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IS NOT NEEDED TO REDIRECT AND
REALLOCATE EXISTING WATER USES WITHOUT INCURRING TAKINGS
LIABILITY

Water management cannot be static if it is to serve the public interest. Old
allocation decisions must be susceptible to modification to accommodate. new
scientific and technical understanding, as well as evolving perceptions of the
public interest. Some champion the public trust doctrine as a perceived basis
for the state to reallocate or restrict existing water rights without incurring takings liability.' However, as explained below, the public trust doctrine should
have no bearing on takings analysis. Rather, a takings analysis should consider
reasonable public and private expectations undistorted by legal fictions." As
long as the state adheres to water management protocols that do not violate
reasonable private expectations, the state should not be liable." On the other
hand, the public trust doctrine should not shield the state from takings liability
where such liability would otherwise arise."

197. See e.g., Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 485 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (holding that state
water regulations must comport with the dormant commerce clause).
198. Catherland Reclamation Dist. v. Lower Platte N. Natural Res. Dist., 433 N.W.2d 161,
166 (Neb. 1988) (holding that a water right applicant has no property right in a mere application
for water rights); Vill. of Tequesta v.Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a potential user does not obtain property right in water until he or she diverts water and
applies it to beneficial use).
199. See e.g., Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 741-43 (Wis. 1974) (upholding permitting requirement from equal protection challenge). See generallyRegulated Ripananism, supra
note 138, §§ 9.04(a)-(b).
200. The reasoning of those arguing such views is that the trust imposes a public servitude on
all water rights and, thus, subordinates the privileges of a water right holder to state actions that
serve the purpose of furthering the public interest. On this basis, some may argue that there is
no compensation requirement where the state restricts private use of a trust resource because
the public trust - the jus pubhcurn - burdens a title to a trust resource - the jus pivatum, and
therefore, no liability will arise where the state takes action to fulfill its trust responsibilities. See
Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 584-87;
Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evoling Pubhlic Trust in Western
Water,37 ARiz. L. REv. 701, 709-10 (1995). Therefore, some may argue that the state does not
recognize vested rights as against a subsequent exercise of the trust PubEc Propertyand the
Democratizationof Western Water Law, supra note 1, at 584-85; see also LAw OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 5:58 (noting that "Itihe major impact of the public
trust doctrine is its potential to require retroactive reallocation," and discussing the takings question in relation to retroactive imposition of the public trust doctrine).
201. A Fish Out of Water, supra note 1, at 560; see discussion imbra Part IV.G. For a discussion of the social and economic costs of using the public trust doctrine to avoid compensation of
government takings, see Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check:
PropertyRights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western Water Law
Contex4 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 1063, 1111-34 (2009).
202. See izh notes 211-222 and accompanying text.
203. See ifiaPart IV.G.
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Determining whether a government restriction of a water right amounts to
an uncompensated taking is a difficult legal inquiry. As Professor Tarlock observes, "Itihe determination of when a government action is or is not a taking
is one of the most intractable problems of modem jurisprudence and on
which little consensus exists either at the philosophical or the doctrinal level.""'
These complexities are heightened in the water management context because
there is little guiding precedent."' Additionally, takings law in the real property
context is often incongruous to takings inquiries concerning water regulations."' For example, should courts evaluate a mandatory withdrawal reduction
to a water right under either of the two per se taking tests, i.e., the Loretto
physical takings test and the Lucas elimination of all economically beneficial or
productive use test?"' Or, should courts evaluate the mandatory reduction
under the multifactor balancing test applied in Penn CentraP" Also, how does
this inquiry apply to a water right for which the entire advantage is the right to
temporarily use a given quantity of water on a recurring basis?"' If the Lucas
test applies to water rights,' the analysis may also confront the "denominator
problem," i.e., whether the reduction deprives the user of all economically
beneficial use of a portion of the right or just diminishes the value of the right
as a whole."' Where the water right is attendant to land ownership, as with
riparian rights, should a court evaluate the takings claim with respect to only
the water right, or should the water and land assets be evaluated together as a
whole?
These questions remain largely unresolved. Takings liability in the water
management context typically arises where the government is acting in a proprietary manner, either physically taking water for its own use or reallocating it
to other proprietary users.' Such circumstances are distinguishable from state
204. LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 22, § 3:92.
205. See Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and The Pubhc Trust Doctrine: Some
Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIz. ST. LJ. 423, 429-30 (1995) (discussing the complexities of takings categorization in the water context).
206. Seeid. at 430-31; RegulatedRpatianismn, supra note 138, § 9.04(a).
207. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982); see also Grant, supranote 205, at 42931 .(discussing whether courts should evaluate takings claims in the water rights context as real
property, to which the Lucas test applies, or akin to personal property, to which it does not
apply).
208. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting forth an
ad hoc factual test that balances the economic impact of the regulatory restriction, the owner's
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action).
209. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428; see also Grant, supra note 205, at 428-34.
210. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
211. See Grant, supra note 205, at 432-33. The Lucas court reasoned that the answer to the
"denominator problem" "may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminutiod in (or elimination of) value." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
212. See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 644-46 (Ohio 2005) (allowing
a takings case to proceed against a city where the city's groundwater production allegedly interfered and diminished plaintiff landowner's ability to produce groundwater). Three older Supreme Court cases similarly found the federal government liable for takings where the govern-
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regulations that effectively arbitrate between competing public and private interests in water."'
Federal courts have decided a few cases regarding takings claims in response to federal actions providing instream flows for endangered species,
which reduced water supply for consumptive use."' Three of these cases held
that the federal actions, which reduced the claimants' water supply, should be
evaluated as physical takings.' However, because these cases concern federally-imposed restrictions, questions remain concerning takings law as applied to
the state management of water allocations among competing water uses."
ment expropriated water from a private user for its own use or for a third party's proprietary
use. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (holding that a physical taking occurred where the
federal government expropriated a downstream riparian landowner's water rights by damming a
river upstream, storing the water and diverting it for irrigation and utility projects); United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752-53 (1950) (holding that a physical taking occurred
where the federal government expropriated downstream riparian land owners' water rights by
capturing, storing and diverting water from two California rivers for sale to private energy and
irrigation interests); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 408 (1931) (holding that a
physical taking occurred where the federal government took a paper company's water rights and
conferred them to a power company to use for wartime production of electrical power).
213. See, e.g., Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774
(Minn. 1980). In Crookston, the court explained that "[1]ike zoning legislation, legislation which
limits or regulates the right to use underlying water is permissible." Id. The court distinguished
between regulation that operates for the sole benefit of a governmental enterprise and disproportionately burdens a few landowners for which compensation is due and regulation that arbitrates between competing public and private interests in water for which no compensation is
due. Id.
214. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing a
takings claim to proceed against federal restrictions reducing federal contract water deliveries);
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that federal
requirement upon a California water district to release water to which it was entitled from its
diversion works for a fish ladder for endangered fish should be analyzed as a physical taking);
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (holding
that reductions in water deliveries pursuant to federal irrigation contracts to coinply with instream flow requirements necessitated by the Endangered Species Act rendered plaintiffs' usufructuary right to that water valueless, and thus effected a physical taking); but see Klamath
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005) (criticizing the reasoning in Tulare
Lake and denying a takings claim where the federal government halted irrigation deliveries to
contracting farmers for a year because low water levels threatened endangered fish species).
215. Stockton, 583 F.3d at 1369; Casitas,543 F.3d at 1296; Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319 (reasoning that "luinlike other species of property where use restrictions may limit some, but not all
of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right to the use of water accomplishes a complete
extinction of all value."). Contra Klamath., 67 Fed. Cl. at 538 (criticizing the reasoning in Tulare
lake).
216. As a general matter, the federal government may not take water without regard for state
water rights, but rather must perfect water rights for federal activities in the same manner as any
other proprietary user. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-75 (1978) (holding that
federal government must comply with state laws regarding control, appropriation, and use of
water). Moreover, it is unclear whether a physical taking can occur in cases involving irrigation
contracts where the irrigator does not possess the water right, but only possesses a contractual
right to receive water obtained from the irrigation project. Compare Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319
(holding that reductions necessitated by the Endangered Species Act impaired water deliveries
pursuant to irrigation contracts and effected a physical taking of plaintiffs usufructuary right to
that water), with Knamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 540 (denying a takings claim where the federal government halted irrigation deliveries pursuant to an irrigation contract to protect endangered fish
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In the state context, takings analysis should focus on reasonable public and
private expectations and the distribution of regulatory burdens among competing water users."' Water rights, like all property, are inherently subject to reasonable regulatory constraints to avoid injury to other water rights holders and
the broader public."' Accordingly, water rights holders must tailor their expectations pertaining to water rights to accommodate the inherent nature of water
as a shared and variable resource."' Expectations must incorporate uncertainties arising from natural fluctuations in supply, the actions of other water users,
and reasonably tailored state regulations to protect public interests.' A water
rights priority, thus, does not guarantee an absolute quantity of water but rather
constitutes a risk allocation priority among competing beneficial users of water." A water right holder may reasonably expect legal protection of the priority his right affords. However, he should not expect that it will yield a perpetual,
definite, and specific quantity of water."
The relevance of reasonable expectations within takings jurisprudence
correlates with the premise that takings liability does not arise unless the government action exceeds the relevant background principles of state law.' For
example, regulations adopted to abate a public nuisance will not incur takings
liability because property law does not protect activities that result in a public
nuisance." Likewise, Supreme Court precedent suggests that "'reasonable

species), and Anderson, supra note 123, at 468-70, 489-90, 506 (arguing that the Tulare court
erred in equating the beneficial use of water by federal contractors with usufructuary water rights
and asserting that the right to make beneficial use of water in one's possession (e.g., as a result of
water supply contract) is separate and distinct from a water right, which affords a nonpossessory
right to withdraw water from a watercourse), andJohn Leshy, supra note 133 at 1985 n.2.
217. The United States Supreme Court's takings opinions have emphasized that a principal
purpose of the takings doctrine is to compensate for the destruction of investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Penn Central,
438 U.S. 104, 124; see also A Dozen Propositions,supra note 14, at 267, 285-86 ("ITihe essence of traditional takings law is an effort to balance private rights and public rights as they coevolve over time."); Grant, supra note 205, at 437-42; TARLOCK, supranote 22, S 3:92.
218.
See supra Part IV.C and cases cited rnfra note 222; see also The Pubhc Trust Doctrine
andPrivate Property,supra note 85, at 653.
See discussion supra Part III.A, IV.A, IV.F.
219.
220. This point is not intended to suggest that all state actions directed at protection of a
public interest in the water source are necessarily consistent with reasonable expectations and
immune from takings liability. State actions that deviate from applicable state water management
laws arguably exceed the scope of reasonable expectations and may be subject to takings liability. See infra Part IV.G.

221.

See A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppropriation:Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L.

REv. 881, 886-87 (2000). We note that water rights within water systems that are comprehensively managed to balance water supplies and system-wide demands (e.g., adjudicated water
supplies) typically afford greater legal certainty for water rights holders, with a greater likelihood
of rendering a reliable quantity of supply.

222.

See Leshy, supra note 133, at 1986-87, 1991.

223. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (citing Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Conrnents on the Ethical Foundations of lust
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1239-41 (1967)); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); A Dozen Propositions,supranote 14, at 276-77.
224.
Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 113 (1999), aFd,247 F.3d 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The nuisance exception accommodates the same principle articulated by the
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investment-backed expectations' cannot exist in activities that the government
may declare contrary to environmental protection and resource conservation
goals."' Applied to the water management context, one may view reasonable
state regulations adopted to protect the public's interest in water resources
(e.g., adjusting baseline flows for environmental and other instream purposes)
as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power consistent with the state's
background property laws concerning water use.' Takings liability, therefore,
should not arise even if existing water rights are retroactively impaired as a
result of reasonable regulations, provided that prior and paramount rights are
given due regard in the allocation of supplies available for consumptive use.'
A number of cases have applied such reasoning to uphold water permitting or
other water management laws that restrict the use of water rights against takings
challenges.'
G. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WILL NOT SHIELD THE STATE FROM
TAKINGS LIABILITY WHERE LIABILITY SHOULD OTHERWISE ARISE

Although reasonable water use regulations are likely to withstand takings
challenges for the reasons discussed above, the government may incur takings
liability where restrictions on water rights violate reasonable private expectaSupreme Court in Lucas that the government is not liable for regulation to abate a nuisance or
nuisance-like activity because such "uses" of property do not inhere in a property owner's title.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[Alll
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not
be injurious to the community."); A Dozen Propositions,supranote 14, at 275-76.

225. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 673 (citing and discussing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1008-09 (1984)).
226. The Hawaii Supreme Court adopted this logic, citing the Lucas takings exception for
pre-existing regulatory limitations on title. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
490 (Haw. 2000). The court upheld the denial of an application for a groundwater withdrawal
permit on the grounds that the withdrawal was inconsistent with a comprehensive regulatory
system governing withdrawals in designated groundwater management areas. See id. at 490-91.
The court reasoned that "the reserved sovereign prerogatives over the waters of the state precludes the assertion of vested rights contrary to public trust purposes," and is therefore a preexisting limitation on title under Lucas. Id. at 494. However, for the reasons discussed, there is
no need to rely on the public trust doctrine to conclude that water rights are subject to a preexisting limitation on title - i.e., potential state modification to protect public interests. See discussion supra Part IV.F.
227. This is certainly true where the water withdrawal permit expressly conditions the right
on the prospect of future state modification. Arguably, the same result arises even without express permit language where the action is supported by background water management principles. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 ("It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted
by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers ... .") (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
228. See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328-29 (Ariz.
1981); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 492-95; F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1172-74 (Kan. 1981); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595-96
(Kan. 1962); Crookston Cattle v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Minn.
1980); McDonald v. State, 722 P.2d 598 (Mont. 1986); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728,
733 (N.D. 1968); Kline v. State ex rel. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 759 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Okla.
1988).
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tions. The takings analysis, therefore, will often properly turn not on whether
the state may reallocate water for protection of public values, but on how the
state distributes the burdens of reallocation among public and private interests.'" As discussed above, it is not reasonable for a water right holder to expect that a water right will be immune from state regulations that seek to protect legitimate public interests.' On the other hand, a water right holder can
reasonably expect that the state will adhere to applicable water rights principles
when regulating water uses. A water right holder may also reasonably expect
that the state will apply water regulations without arbitrary discrimination and
consistent with due process and other constitutional limitations.
Where the burdens of water regulations are not fairly distributed consistent with applicable state water rights principles, a court may find the government liable for a takings claim, notwithstanding a defense based in the public trust." For example, a takings claim may succeed in a prior appropriation
state if the state were to limit water available to a senior water right holder for
instream flow purposes but not demand the same of junior water rights holders."' Consistent with this reasoning, a California -appellate court ruled that the
state water board could not condition the transfer and assignment of a senior
priority appropriation permit by requiring the recipient water district to curtail
its withdrawals to facilitate the attainment of downstream water quality standards when the water board did not impose similar conditions on junior water
rights holders."' Although the court recognized the state's authority to impose
appropriate conditions on state water rights to achieve water quality standards,
it refused to condone the disparate treatment that burdened only the senior
water right holder and not the junior priority rights holders.' To so allow, the
court explained, would eliminate the entire advantage of possessing a senior
right, effectively defeating the reasonable expectations of the water district receiving the senior priority right.' Although the district brought this case as an
administrative mandamus action, the same reasoning could support an inverse
condemnation claim where the state applies state regulations in an arbitrary
and disparate manner, inconsistent with state water management principles.
Takings liability might also arise if the state were to expropriate water from
a senior water right holder for consumptive use by the state or to make additional water available for another user."' Such expropriation by the state would
229. See Lngle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980), abrogatedon othergrounds by LI gle, 544 U.S. at 542.
230. See discussion supraPart III.C; supra text accompanying notes 218-22.
231. See notes 228-231 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., id. at 494-96.
233. Id. The California Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the importance of adherence to
the state's priority principles in the context of an adjudication of groundwater rights, rejecting the
view that the state should allocate groundwater pursuant to a principle of equitable apportionment that ignored legal priority, even in an overappropriated groundwater basin. City of Barstow
v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 858 (Cal. 2000).
234. ElDoradoIrationDist., 48 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
235. Id. at 494-95.
236. See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ohio 2005) (holding that
landowners have a property interest in the groundwater underlying their land, and governmental
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be effectively equivalent to federal expropriations historically held to be a
physical taking, unless it were undertaken pursuant to some preexisting state
water management principle."
In riparian states, a state's general adherence to reasonable and evenhanded standards when distributing the burden of water use regulations among
affected water users will likely immunize the state from takings liability.. On
the other hand, a state-imposed reduction or modification to a riparian water
right that starkly deviates from expectations of fair treatment may incur takings
liability. Examples might include disparate treatment of individual water users
without a rational basis or state expropriation of water for proprietary purposes."
Where water regulations materially compromise a water right holder's reasonable expectations for fair treatment, the public trust doctrine is unlikely to
provide a defense against a takings claim. Modem opinions of the Supreme
Court have made clear that "claims of sovereign ownership are but legal fictions that offer no special immunity to challenges of transgressing constitutional limits."" In consistent fashion, the Federal Court of Claims explained that it
interference with that right by virtue of drilling nearby wells that impede the groundwater supply
to landowner's wells can constitute an unconstitutional taking); State Hwy. Comm. v. Ponten,
463 P.2d 150, 155 (Wash. 1969) (holding that "there is a property right (correlative though it
may be) in percolating waters," and the state was liable for its taking of landowners' groundwater
through interference with groundwater supply caused by highway construction); see also Schick
v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1320-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Dermody v. City of
Reno, 931 P.2d 1354 (Nev. 1997); Volknann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18, 23-24 (N.D.
1963).
237. As noted above, when the state or any of its subdivisions desires to obtain water for
proprietary purposes (as opposed to state regulation for the common public benefit), the state
must adhere to state water management laws in the same manner as other proprietary water
users. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. Thus, if instead of conforming to the state
water management regime, the state sought to expropriate water for proprietary purposes, the
state would likely be found liable for a physical taking. See McNmara, 838 N.E.2d at 644-46.
238. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
239. See, e.g., Schick, 504 So. 2d at 1320-21; Volknann, 120 N.W.2d at 23-24; McjVanara, 838 N.E.2d at 646; State Hwy. Comm. v. Ponten, 463 P.2d 150, 155-56 (Wash. 1969).
240. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 675.
241. See id. at 713. Lazarus cites to several Supreme Court opinions in the context of
dormant commerce, supremacy, and takings clause challenges, including Sporhase v. Neb. ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982) (holding that sovereign ownership of water does not
excuse disparate treatment of out-of-state water users from the negative implications of the
commerce clause), Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979) (holding similarly in
relation to claims of sovereign ownership of fish by the state), and Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (rejecting the govemment's takings defense based in the federal navigable servitude - a historical companion of the public trust doctrine - explaining that the doctrine simply expresses the government's important public interest in the flow of navigable interstate waters). Lazarus also notes a characterization of the Iinois Central decision by Justice
Brennan as standing merely for the basic proposition that "all private rights of property, even if
acquired through contract with the State, are subordinated to reasonable exercises of the States'
lawmaking powers in the areas of... environmental protection." Lazarus, supra note 12, at 713
(citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Certain
courts have invoked the public trust doctrine to justify decisions denying takings claims in relation to state prohibitions of private activities in navigable waters (e.g., filling. dredging, or development), explaining that under the Lucas takings exceptions for state actions consistent with
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does "not read National Audubon as standing for the proposition that water
rights in California are beyond the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
In summary, takings analysis in the water context should reflect a common
sense approach. The state needs adequate flexibility to modify water allocations over time as necessary to promote the public welfare without risk of takings liability. However, the state must respect applicable water management
laws and water rights priorities. The public trust doctrine does not change the
necessary analysis of the relative regulatory burdens of a particular water management action, nor provide guidance on how to prudently balance public and
private interests within the state's water management regime.' Instead, the
state must address these difficult legal issues directly and transparently without
the cloud of an antiquated legal fiction.'
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE THREATENS TO IMPEDE
BALANCED WATER MANAGEMENT
Not only is the public trust doctrine not needed for the state to effectively
manage water resources, reliance upon the doctrine-particularly legislative
efforts to declare state water resources subject to the public trust-is ill-advised.
This is so for at least four reasons discussed below.
A. USE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FOR WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT WOULD BE A SUPERFICIAL "SOLUTION"

Public welfare suffers if policymakers embrace the public trust doctrine in
lieu of developing detailed standards and procedures that acknowledge competing policy goals. Balanced water management follows from a mature dialogue about the reasonableness of public and private expectations and the
proper role of government, markets, and other institutional forums. Reliance
on the public trust doctrine would stifle this necessary dialogue. In lieu of canrelevant background principles of state law, such private actions were inconsistent with the public trust doctrine and thus state law. See Thompson, supra note 85, at 54 (discussing cases reaching such holdings). A relevant inquiry, though beyond the scope of this article, would be the
nature of comparative public and private expectations regarding the private activity prohibited in
these cases. For our purposes, state actions that deviate from applicable water right principles,
and thus compromise reasonable private expectations, are likely to lead to takings liability consistent with the Supreme Cofirt precedent discussed above.
242. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 457 (2011), afd,708 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
243. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 674-679, 702-10; Govermnent Ownership, supra note
18, at 654.
244. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 674-79, 702-710; Government Ownership, supra note
18, at 654. For a candid acknowledgement of the limitations of state constitutional provisions
declaring public ownership of natural resources, see Klass, supra note 12, at 719 (explaining that
such state constitutional provisions "by necessity contain broad, aspirational language usually
devoid of the specific standards necessary to implement concrete measures to protect the environment in a complex world," and acknowledging that "the critics are correct that the type of
clarity and detail needed to implement environmental policy is better suited to legislative and
administrative pronouncements (or even common law) and is not at home in constitutional
documents.").
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did analysis, the doctrine presents ambiguous standards emanating from antiquated notions of public ownership of water resources. The doctrine provides
no specific procedural or substantive standards to guide decision-makers and
lacks transparency as a basis for decision-making. Simply put, it cannot provide a policy "shortcut" to the sophisticated and detailed analysis that is necessary to foster balanced water management
Although substantive law is fully able to protect public interests with respect to water management, some may nonetheless continue to promote the
public trust doctrine for its aspirational or visionary connotation." This premise should be abandoned. The law should instead embrace balanced water
management for the sake of increased public welfare; not because of an obsolete characterization of water as "public property."
B. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS

The public trust doctrine is further problematic because the ambiguous
scope of its application would create uncertainty and conflict. The proposed
Michigan legislation cited at the beginning of this article is a good example. If
the Michigan legislature enacted the legislation, the law would have declared
that the waters of Michigan are to be "held in trust."' Such bare embrace of
the public trust doctrine as a basis for water management would not inform
how or under what conditions the state should apportion available water, nor
how the state should distribute regulatory burdens among competing water
users. Those left to interpret the statute would have to determine which public
interests are covered by the trust, and whether the legislature intended a procedural review of the "feasibility" of protecting those interests, or instead intended specific substantive results for future water management decisions."'
As another example, Vermont has adopted a statute that declares groundwater subject to the public trust, but also declares that various consumptive
uses of groundwater are deemed to comply with the public trust requirements." These uses include: withdrawals for which the state has issued a permit, domestic and residential uses, withdrawals for public water systems, withdrawals for permitted potable water supplies, farming conducted consistent
with statutory terms, and licensed dairy processors or milk handlers.' Like245. Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Pubbc Trust Apphcation of the Pubc Trust Doctrne to
Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 236 (2008) (arguing that application of the
public trust doctrine to the protection of water resources "provides an important statement that
can shift public views in favor of protecting public resources. The public trust 'crosses over from
the law to a pure statement of social vision.'") (citations omitted); A Comparative Guide to the
Western States'Public Trust Doctrine,supra note 35, at 83 ("IT]he legal recognition of a 'public trust' provides both a rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact
and functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to act for the
long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental values . .
246. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
247. See discussion supraPart II.D.
248. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1390 (2008); § 1418(b) (2010).
249. Id S 1418(b).
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wise, legislation proposed in Hawaii (but not adopted) would have designated
certain agricultural uses as a public trust value.' The intent of such declarations is unclear. Is the intent to designate certain uses, such as domestic and
agricultural uses, as more deserving of water than other uses?" If the legislature can assign the public trust crown to certain consumptive uses deemed
worthy of that prestige, is there any rational limit to such coronation? Could a
state, for instance, designate water used for production of semiconductors-a
high water-demand industry-a public trust value to reflect its importance to
high wage employment and tax revenue?
These examples highlight the significant confusion that can stem from
statutory adoption of the public trust doctrine. Such ambiguity invites unnecessary conflict because solutions and consensus are more likely to emerge where
stakeholders can readily ascertain the likely implications of a defined management structure rather than circumstances in which fear of uncertainties
thwarts compromise." Such potential confusion and resulting conflict is unnecessary in light of the ample alternatives to protect the public interest in water management discussed above. "
C. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT WOULD FOSTER EXTREMISM

Another risk the public trust doctrine presents in the water management
context is the potential misuse of the doctrine in support of extreme positions
that are incongruous with overall social welfare. Some argue that the public
trust doctrine mandates protection of trust values over other interests (e.g.,
consumptive use withdrawals), or even flatly prohibits particular uses of water,
presumptively even if the broader public welfare suffers as a result.' Those
250. The legislation proposed designating public trust purposes to include "resource protection, domestic uses, upholding the exercise of native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights,
and the conservation and protection of agricultural activity on lands identified and designated as
important agricultural lands. . . ."S.B. 1296, 25th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009). We note that
the Hawaii Supreme Court has explained that a Hawaiian statute that articulates a policy preference to preserve water supplies for, among other purposes, municipal uses, public recreation,
public water supply, agriculture, and navigation "generally mirrors the public trust principles." In
re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 457-58 (Haw. 2000) (citing HAw. REV. STAT. §
174C-2 (1999)).
251. State legislatures can, and often do, articulate preference among water uses, but these
pronouncements are specifically articulated as the will of the public's representatives. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-157(B) (1994); CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 1943); IowA
CODE §§ 455B.266(2)(a)-(i) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-502(d) (West 2010); MINN
STAT. §§ 103G.261(a)(1)-(6) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §61-04-06.1 (West 1977); VA. CODE
ANN. S 62.1-2421 (West 1989).

252. See Creation ofNew Risk Sharng Water Enddement Regimes, supra note 101, at 68688 (describing the Truckee-Carson Settlement as a basin-wide settlement in which compromise
was fostered by an understanding of, and commitment to, an equitable and transparent physical
solution).
253.

See discussion supraParts IV.A-F.

254. See e.g., James M. Olson, Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Pubic Trust,
and InternationalTrade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103, 1130-32 (2006) (arguing
that the public trust doctrine prohibits the alienation or transfer of water for private commercial
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espousing this view essentially seek to replicate the strict substantive restrictions traditional public trust cases employ to limit the state's discretion to
manage water.' Dissatisfied with prior political, administrative, and judicial
results, some promote the public trust doctrine as a means to vindicate their
insular views.' For example, one author urges reliance on the public trust doctrine to effectively overturn the Michigan Court of Appeal's adoption of a
"reasonable use balancing test"" because such a test could allow private water
users to take and use water off-parcel.' These advocates seek to remove the
discretion of administrative and judicial decisionmakers and instead prohibit
certain uses made by private enterprise." Such a view is antithetical to balanced water management. If the public. trust doctrine is applied to favor public
trust values-however they may be defined"-over other public interests, the
purposes unless there is explicit legislative authority and the purpose is primarily a public one,
and that regardless of the purpose, the use, transfer, or withdrawal of water cannot significantly
impair the public trust); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, Protecting the Pubhlic Trust and Human
Rights in the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1333, 1343-45 (2006) (arguing that
"Ipirivatization, whether it is by taking over municipal services or by selling water in bottles, can
be at odds with protecting the public trust in water."); Koehler, supra note 88, at 543 (arguing
that "the doctrine places a substantive burden on the state to protect trust resources affected by
water rights and to allow harm to these assets only when it is infeasible to do otherwise."); see
also State Water Resources Control Board Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (2006) (explaining
and dismissing argument by plaintiffs that in resolving conflicts between public trust values and
competing water uses, the state must favor public trust protection whenever possible); Noah D.
Hall, Protectng FreshwaterResources in the Era of Global Water Markets: Lessons Learned
From Bottled Water, 13 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 1, 46-51 (2009) (discussing arguments and
efforts by opponents of bottled water to use the public trust doctrine to support their claim that
water cannot be sold for profit, but dismissing such theories as likely untenable and noting that
no court has ever applied the doctrine to bar the sale of water for profit). Advocates for an application of the public trust doctrine that would effectively prohibit private uses of water often
correlate with interest groups that denounce "commodification" or "privatization" of water. For
an assessment of the arguments for and against private rights, private enterprise, and market
forces respecting the acquisition and distribution of water, and an overview of the attendant
global controversy, see Montgomery F. Simus & James G. Workman, The Water Ethic: The
Inexorable Bith ofa CertainAlenable Right 23 TUL. ENVTL. 14. 439, 441-42 (2010).
255. See Olson, supra note 254, at 1130-31; see also discussion supra Part II.B (discussing
the traditional public trust doctrine).
256. See Olson, supranote 254, at 1118-19; see also Hall, supra note 254, at 46-51 (discussing the embrace of the public trust doctrine by bottled water opponents to seek substantive
restrictions on water bottling not otherwise available from existing regulatory and judicial venues); Democracy, Distrust,and the Publc Trus4 supra note 35, at 407-33 (evaluating and ultimately dismissing comparisons and analogies between the public trust doctrine and the processbased doctrine of equal protection that demands enhanced judicial scrutiny of political decisions
concerning discrete and insular minorities or suspect classis).
257. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174,
194 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
258. See Olson, supra note 254, at 1118-19.
259. It appears that some modern advocates believe that the public trust doctrine inherently
prohibits or disfavors uses of water for private business ventures. See discussion supranote 254.
Such positions are counter to the central goal of water management to maximize public welfare,
which requires that water management laws facilitate inclusion of all public interests. See discussion, supra Parts III, IV.A.
260. Presumably, public trust values in the water management context would be limited to
instrean interests. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal.
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doctrine simply becomes a tool to benefit special interests to the detriment of
the broader public welfare, despite the societal consequences." Most legal
authority has rejected claims that the doctrine removes management discretion
or compels substantive (as opposed to procedural) results."' Still, the potential
for misuse of the doctrine is another reason to favor specific water management laws over the public trust doctrine and its inherent ambiguities.
D. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WOULD BE AN INADEQUATE BASIS TO
MANAGE MODERN WATER PROBLEMS

Application of the public trust doctrine in the water management context
not only lacks clarity but its historic, geographic, and substantive limitations
would also restrain its effectiveness, albeit appropriately.' Although the doctrine's reach has expanded in some instances, courts will likely be reluctant to
expand the doctrine beyond its traditional moorings of navigable waters and
historically protected interests out of respect for judicial precedent, separation
of powers, and constitutional limitations.' Direct water management laws, by
1983) (dismissing an assertion by the California Attorney General that "trust uses" encompass
all public uses, so that in practical effect the doctrine would impose no restrictions on the state's
ability to allocate trust property, and noting that "Imlost decisions and commentators assume
that 'trust uses' relate to uses and activities in the vicinity of the lake, stream, or tidal reach at
issue."). However, the definition of public trust values is not entirely settled. See Lazarus, supra
note 12, at 649-52 (discussing an expansive array of applications of the public trust doctrine to
resources other than navigable water).
261. In this respect, we should be mindful of the vast context in which water supports social
welfare. Consumptive uses of water, typically by private interests, support critical elements of
social welfare, including food, shelter, energy, products, and jobs. Likewise, environmental and
other instream water uses have definite value despite certain difficulties in calculating that value.
See GIBBONS, supra note 23, at 65-71 (1986). Whether any particular use advances or impairs
the public interest is case-specific, and often subject to dispute. Thus, the scope of affected
public interest in relation to the allocation of water should be broadly perceived, and narrow
characterizations .of the public interest that ignore, or arbitrarily discount, the vast scope of applicable costs and benefits should be resisted.
262. See, e.g., State Water Resources Control Board.Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) ("[lin determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect public trust values like fish
and wildlife in a particular instance, the Board must determine whether protection of those
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest."'); Parks v. Cooper, 676
N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (explaining that South Dakota's Water Resources Act evinces a
legislative intent both to allocate and regulate water resources that, in effect, codifies public trust
principles); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comrnm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461, 463 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires the state engineer to
undertake water planning to determine the effect of a proposed allocation on the present water
supply and future needs of the state); see also Thompson, supra note 85, at 65 (explaining that
no public trust case has ever directly overturned a legislative decision and that most have either
upheld legislative or executive actions or preserved opportunities for the democratic branches of
government to exercise authority over trust resources); Hall, supra note 254, at 5 (noting that no
court has ever applied the public trust doctrine to bar the sale of water for profit or to prohibit
commercial bottled water operations); Pubhlic Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law, supra note 1, at 590 ("The result lof recent ecological public trust cases] has been a
judicial emphasis on process fairness and 'reasoned decision-making' from administrators,
rather than particular substantive results.").
263. See Lazarus, supa note 12, at 710-15.
264. See id.
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contrast, are not so constrained, and instead will stand or fail, as they should,
on a candid comparison of reasonable public and private expectations and the
constitutional propriety of the government's allocation of water among competing interests.' If, on the other hand, "rogue" judges were to rely on the
public trust doctrine as a basis to exceed the limits of existing laws and constitutional norms, the result would be contrary to the rule of law, democratic
government, and the traditional interpretive role of the judiciary.'

VI. FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR BALANCED WATER
MANAGEMENT
In this final section, we briefly review how specific water management laws
may be tailored to address modern water supply issues without reliance on the
public trust doctrine's shortcomings. In contemplating how states may improve
their water management laws, we should observe that problems concerning the
allocation of water generally arise either from overuse that threatens the sustainability of the resource or from ineficient use; meaning, either excessive use
in relation to a specific demand or inefficient allocation in relation to other
competing uses for the water (i.e., the "opportunity cost").' In general terms,
states may address such problems through the following seven management
strategies:
1. Effective water management requires accurate technical understanding. Thus,
the collection of data and the development of state, regional, and local water
management plans are often appropriate initial efforts.
2. Grounded in sound science and technical data, states should establish maximum system yields. States should also monitor total (combined) water use
and restrict the system-wide use as is necessary to ensure long-term sustaina265. See discussionsupra Parts IV.E-G.
266. See Speakug ofInconvenient Truths, supra note 1, at 98-101, 103 (arguing that if the
jus publicum-i.e., the public right that traditionally affords public access to navigable water and
related submerged lands-is conflated with the much broader public interest, "a special interest
can be converted to a public right by the stroke of a sympathetic judge's pen" to the jeopardy of
the rule of law and the democratic process).
267. Economic theory describes these problems as results of the tragedy of the commons
and the tragedy of the anticommons. The commonly referenced tragedy of the commons results
in the overuse of the resource where multiple users possess open access to use the resource
without a cost-effective means to monitor and constrain each other's use. See Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45, 1248 (1968); see also Special Challenges, supra note 173, at 311-13 (discussing the tragedy of the commons in relation to the use
of water). In other words, where water belongs to everyone, it is in no one's particular interest to
preserve it. The less frequently discussed tragedy of the anticommons results in an underutilization of a resource where multiple parties hold rights to exclude use by others. The tragedy of the
anticommons may explain underutilization of voluntary market transactions to efficiently reallocate water from lower to higher-valued uses. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, WaterMarkets
as a Tragedy of the Anticommons, 33 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POLY REv. 723, 725-27
(2009). One may view both problems in the context of the Coase Theorem, whereby otherwise
efficient voluntary transactions do not occur where transaction costs exceed the gains of trade.
R. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cos43J.L & EcON. 1, 5-6,15-16,40,43 (1960).
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bility of the resource and appropriate protection of environmental and other
public interests.
3.

States should apportion system-wide yields into well-defined individual water
rights that quantify and limit the amount that can be withdrawn, particularly
with respect to significant users that are likely to impose a material impact on
the water supply source.'

4.

To avoid unnecessary conflict and constitutional infirmities, states must afford all relevant interests, including environmental and other diffuse public
interests, due process when establishing system-wide yields and individual water withdrawal allotments.

5.

States should base restrictions on withdrawals on technical findings and apply
water use limitations consistent with the state's water rights laws. Likewise,
states should avoid arbitrary discrimination against particular water users
based on the location or purpose of use without regard to resource impacts.
Such restrictions may result in inefficient allocations and may also transgress
constitutional norms such as due process, takings, and dormant commerce
clause limitations.

6.

States should establish oversight institutions, if not already in effect, to monitor and manage the water system, modify the management system when appropriate, and resolve any conflicts that may arise among stakeholders. State
or local agencies, the courts, and various hybrid strategies may be viable so
long as the oversight is responsive to future management needs and the state
affords due process to affected interests.

7.

States should establish well-defined rules and procedures to facilitate voluntary transfers of water rights, which stimulate conservation and efficient reallocations.' States must regulate transfers to afford appropriate protection of

268. Efforts to provide greater definition and legal certainty for water rights often correlate
with scarcity. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) ("The doctrine of prior appropriation, the prevailing law in the Western States, is itself largely a product of the compelling
need for certainty in the holding and use of water rights."); A Dozen Propositions, supra note
14, at 269, 273 (discussing the common correlation between the evolution of property rights and
scarcity). This correlation is revealed by the difference between the historically loosely-defined
riparian rights in the water-endowed eastern states and the better-defined appropriative rights in
the water-scarce western states. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 45 (noting that property rights are
correlated with scarcity, and comparing riparian and prior appropriation states as an example).
The legal elements of riparianism and prior appropriation are discussed supra at Part IV.B. As
water supplies become more scarce in relation to demand, law and policy typically respond by
better defining the entitlements and limitations that embody a water right. This shift is evident in
the transition in eastern states from common law riparianism to regulated riparianism that imposes permitting regimes with quantified withdrawal allowances. See Special Challenges, supra
note 173, at 315, 317, 327-29. In addition to permitting requirements, eastern states have also
begun to develop comprehensive planning initiatives to manage their water resources in the face
of emerging scarcity conditions. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-520 to -525 (2013);FLA.
STAT. §§ 373.012-.200 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. S 62.1-44.38:1 (2013).
269. Voluntary transfers among users also affords the potential to: (1) incentivize conservation by those that may achieve gains by transferring saved water, (2) reallocate water allocations
to higher-valued uses, and (3) foster accurate water pricing, which thereby correlates water use to
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affected third-party water rights holders, the environment, and other public
interests. However, excessive regulatory burdens, or opportunities for thirdparty impediments, may raise the transaction costs of consummating transfers
and thereby preclude efficient reallocations when the transaction costs exceed
the gains of trade." States should scrutinize and tailor transfer rules to balance protections for other water users and instream interests with the social
benefits realized by voluntary exchanges.
Even-handed water management strategies, such as those outlined above,
may accommodate competing public and private interests and balance countervailing policy goals. For example, the system can promote legal certainty
while facilitating flexible and adaptive management."' Although the state may
adjust consumptive uses from the common source as necessary, users can
employ voluntary exchanges to hedge against the uncertainty that results from
the prospect of system-wide adjustments. Individual users that have a need of
higher degrees of certainty (e.g., municipal and industrial users) may acquire
higher priority rights while those who are willing to bear the risk of shortage
may rely on lower priority water rights."' Although there is no absolute certainty in relation to the collective quantity of available supply from any particular
source, the state can promote legal certainty by developing and adhering to
transparent allocation rules on which water users can plan, undertake voluntary transfers, and structure investments. In this respect, a well-defined water
rights system is essential to efficient water management."'

the marginal utility of the use. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Principlesfor Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL.
LJ. 335, 336, 354, 358 (2002); see also POSNER, supra note 23, at 41 (noting that "creation of
individual (as distinct from collective) ownership rights is a necessary, rather than sufficient,
condition for the efficient use of resources" because "[elfliciency requires a mechanism by
which the [property owner] can be induced to transfer the property to . . . someone else.").
Although voluntary transfers provide significant opportunities for improved efficiency in the use
of water, water markets are unique because of the shared and transient nature of the resource.
As a result, water markets often face significant challenges that can prevent eflicient transfers
from occurring. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 267, at 742, 782.
270. Bretsen & Hill, supra note 267, at 726, 728. But see Special Challenges, supra note 173,
at 310 (arguing that "[wlater is a commodity for which transaction costs are too high to allow
large-scale markets, and its importance to human life precludes denying access to those who
cannot pay for it").
271. Well-defined property rights that establish the opportunities and limitations inherent in
the right are essential to the effective management of the resource consistent with public and
private expectations relating to the resource, particularly as population and scarcity of the resource increase. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 43-45.
272. A variety of transfer arrangements may be appropriate, including absolute water right
sales, leases, dry-year fallowing options, and transfers based on groundwater substitution.
273. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 97 (noting that water right markets are often impeded by
difficulties in determining who owns which rights and in what scope or quantity, and further
stating that the institution of a title system for water rights analogous to the systems used to record land tide would promote efficiency of water markets).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although the notion of a public trust in water resources has powerful rhetorical appeal as a "legal shorthand" to express public rights in a transient resource, the doctrine is insufficient and counterproductive to the development
of a mature water policy." It offers a legal "crutch" that avoids a direct dialogue about how the state should properly balance competing interests and,
consequently, fosters confusion regarding applicable legal standards. It may
also harm the public interest if special interests are successful in misusing the
doctrine to preclude balanced water management by casting an insular viewpoint as mandated by the public trust.' The law cannot turn on such talismanic charms. As Professor Frank Trelease observed several decades ago:
It must always be remembered that when we say "alakazam," or "state ownership," or the "state holds in trust," no genie out of a bottle brings us a beautiful maiden draped in pearls, and no magical solution is provided for difficult
problems of adjusting the relations of an individual to the state .. . in the
complex field of development of water resources.
The public trust doctrine simply does not offer an appropriate shortcut to
the development and application of specific water management standards and
procedures whereby complex and diverse public interests are candidly debated and evaluated on a case-specific basis. For this reason, policymakers should
resist calls to legislate or adopt the public trust doctrine as the basis for water
resource management, and instead apply their attention to developing a coherent and comprehensive body of detailed water management laws designed
to maximize public welfare.

274.
275.
276.

See discussion supra Part V.
See discussion supm Part V.C.
GoverrnentOwnership, supranote 18, at 654.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As the Walatowa (Jemez Pueblo) journeyed from their world towards the
sun, they endured cold and hunger, nearly vanishing, but the Sun saved them.'
As they confronted their enemies, the Sun then granted them a means to save
themselves with a hero.' They settled in a valley surrounded by springs, a soda
dam, and a stream.' Lifetimes later, they now implore the Sun to empower
them to avoid ever needing to be saved again.' This time around, Jemez Pueblo wishes to harness the power of the sun for community development
through renewable energy. Jemez Pueblo exemplifies the potential of tribal
renewable energy for Native Nations and the United States despite significant
challenges stemming from the scarcity of water.'
Through a discussion of tribal renewable energy potential for Native Nations and the United States, an evaluation of federal Indian reserved water
rights, and a study of Jemez Pueblo's project, this article addresses just one
*
Jenny Small received her JD from Boston University School of Law in 2013. She is
grateful for the support of her family. She appreciates Professor Jay Wexler's help in pursuing
this article. She also greatly enjoyed working with the editorial staff of University of Denver
Sturm College of Law WaterLawReiew.
1. The Oriin Story and the Mythical History of the Jemez People, 29 AM.

ANTHROPOLoGIsT 722, 723 (1927).

2. Id. at 723-24.
3. Id. at 725.
4. See Susan Montoya Bryan, N.M. Tribe Hopes to Profit from Solar Energy, DENVER
PosTJan. 18, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_14212689.
5. Id.
6. See Debbie Leonard, Doctrinal Uncertamty in the Law of Federal Reserved Water
Rights: The PotentialImpact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 611,
635 (2010).
99
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facet of the many legal complexities facing Native Nations in one of their most
significant development endeavors. Briefly, tribal renewable energy bestows
benefits upon native communities, including a reduction of man's footprint on
the environment and greater independence through community development.
Despite the potential benefits of renewable energy, however, each Native Nation must secure access to an already scarce supply of water.' A nation's best
chance to obtain its needed water supply is through the federal reservation
doctrine.' Native Nations then must physically obtain, and deliver the water for
their renewable projects." They resolve their rights through adjudication, litigation, and water compacts." While natural resources, like the sun, can impart
upon a nation a promising future, other natural resources, like water, possess
the means.
At this intersection of natural resources, Jemez Pueblo struggles to define
its future." Its energy endeavor emblematizes the opportunities and challenges
for all Native Nations." Jemez Pueblo hopes to create the first tribal solar energy project." Its struggle to realize its project educates all Native Nations about
reconciling their rights, quantity, and access to water."

II. TRIBAL RENEWABLE ENERGY POTENTIAL WATER DEMAND
Tribal renewable energy allows Native Nations to utilize their locations to
empower their communities." While Native Nations have yet to fully capitalize
on renewable energy, they aggregately own five percent of the land in the United States and ten percent of the United States' "renewable energy potential.""
According to one consultant, if the Navajo Nation were to employ just onethird of its solar energy potential, it could provide the entire United States with
7. Clarence D. Council et al., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Paper Presented at the 2000 Annual
Conference of the American Solar Energy Society: Using Renewable Energy on Native American Lands (June 16-21, 2000), available at http://appsl.eere.energy.gov/ tribalenergy/report native_1ands.cfm.
8. See Lee Herold Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use
Consistent aith the Reservations Purpose, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1988).
9. See Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, PracticalReasonig, and Negotiated
Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2010).
10. See generallyPromoting the Negotiation and Implementation of Water Settkments in
Indian Country: Heanag on Indian Water Rights Before the S. Comm. on Indian Alkurs, 112th
Cong. 26 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on Indian Water Rights) (statement of Maria O'Brien,
Legal Comm. Chair, W. States Water Council).
11. Id.
12. See Reid Peyton Chambers &John E. Echohawk, Iplementing the Winters Doctrine
of Idian Reserved Water Rights: ProducigIndian Water and Economic Development Without Injuinng Non-Indian Water Users?,27 GONz. L. REV. 447, 454 (1991).
13. See Bryan, supra note 4.
14. See id.
15. Megan Kamerick, Jemez Solar Plant Would Sell to Grid, N.M. Bus. WEEKLY., Aug.
17, 2008, http://w'ww.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2008/08/18/story3.htmnl?page=all.
16. See Leonard, supra note 6, at 611.
17.
See Renewable Energy on Native Lands, HOUSE DEMOcRAT CO.Ni. ON NAT.
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/issue/renewable-energy-native-lands
REsoURCEs,
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
18. Id.
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energy "through the rest of this century."" Native Nations and others are beginning to recognize such potential through the development of approximately
twenty-five renewable energy projects on tribal lands.' These tribal projects
pioneer a growing market of renewable energy that can benefit Native Nations
and the United States."
As Native Nations exploit their resources to develop their economies, they
strive for greater empowerment to fulfill their spiritual obligations to protect
the land and to secure their own long-term survival. Income from renewable
energy will allow Native Nations to focus on needed services, such as basic
infrastructure.' For example, Jemez Pueblo's project could provide the money
to improve the treatment of wastewater and provide sanitary water." Leaders
with the Jemez Pueblo also indicate that without a better drainage system, their
community will not be able to pursue agriculture." Its impoverishment contributes to its lack of basic services, which in turn, perpetuates its poverty.
Renewable energy also enables Native Nations to satisfy their duties to
protect the land and nature as its "guardians."" Because land and resources,
such as the sun, hold prominent places in some indigenous cultures, many
Native Nations have a vested interest in pursuing renewable energy." Some
Native Nations focus on sustainability because they have a "spiritual connection[]" with the land." For example, the Navajo Nation has an environmental
charter expressing a desire to "promote harmony and balance between the
natural environment and the people of the Navajo Nation."" Navajo peoples
believe that they must preserve the lands they inhabit "as trustee [s] of the environment for succeeding generations."" Similarly, in a request for the Department of Energy funding for a biomass project, the Quinault Indian Tribe de19.
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20.

HOUSE DEMOCRAT COMMrTEE ON NAT. RESOURCES, supra note 17.

21. See Justin Gerdes, Obarna Administration ClearsBarniers Holding Up Tibal Renewable Energy, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ justingerdes/201.2/11/29/obama-administration-clears-barriers-holding-up-tribal-renewable-energy/.
22. See Bryan, supra note 4.
23. Id; Tammy Belone et al., Pueblo of Jemez Dep't of Resource Protection, PowerPoint
presented at the EPA Region VI Summit: Pueblo ofJemez Renewable Energy Projects, (Dec. 3,
2009), availableatwww.tribesandclimatechange.org/docs/tribes_138.ppt.
24. Heather Scofield, Hope for a Bright Future, DURANGO HERALD (Apr. 1, 2012, 9:03
PM), http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20120402/NEWSOI/704029947/0/NewsO5/Hopefor-a-bright-future.
25. See id.
26. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Alternative EnergyDevelopment in Indian Country: Lighting the
Way for the Seventh Generation,46 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 456 (2010); NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N,
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scribed its peoples' objective as "fulfill[ing] the role of caretakers of the land as
their ancestors did.""
Tribal renewable energy also helps to secure Native Nations' long-term
survival." Reportedly, climate change disproportionately affects Native Nations." Numerous Native Nations must cope with the fish and wildlife species
that have been part of their communities since "time immemorial" disappearing and altering the nation's sustenance.' Furthermore, some communities,
like the Inuit in Alaska, have begun to experience physical changes to their
homelands because of rising sea levels overtaking the coastline." Tribal renewable energy enables Native Nations to develop their economies while also realizing their traditional duties and protecting their lands.

m. TRIBAL RENEWABLE

ENERGY CHALLENGES: WATER
SUPPLY

Although ripe with potential, tribal renewable energy often depends on
water.' Even the least exhaustive option imposes additional burdens on fresh
water sources." Many sources already serve state-permitted water users. Regardless, Native Nations can secure a paramount claim to water under federal
water rights doctrines." Their ability to use reserved water rights, however,
depends upon the scope and quantity of their reserved federal water rights."
A. RENEWABLE ENERGY AS AN ADDITIONAL USE OF SCARCE WATER

Tribal renewable energy imposes an additional demand on scarce water
resources." Water is rare, only renews in limited quantities throughout the
hydrological process, and already caters to many life-sustaining functions!?
Although 70% of the earth is water, only 2.5% is fresh water, 70% of which is

31.
Quinault Indian Nation - 2011 Project, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://appsl.eere
.energy.gov/tribalenergy/projects detail.cfm/project id-185 (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
32. See NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, supra note 26, at 17.
33.

Id. at 2.

34. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 343 (D. Or. 1979); Kronk, supra note 26, at
452.
35. Kronk, supra note 26, at 455.
36. See Leonard, supra note 6, at 614.
37. See discussion mfra Part III.A.
38. See Gina McGovern, Note, Settlement or Adjudication: Resohmng Indian Reserved
Rights, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 195, 196 (1994); see also Richard B. Collins, The FutureCourse ofthe
Winters Doctrine,56 U. COLO. L. REV. 481, 481 (1985).
39. See discussion infra Part III.B.
40. See discussioninfra notes 160-197 and accompanying text.
41. See Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 12, at 454; Leonard, supra note 6, at 635;
Storey, supra note 8, at 179.
42. See John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water
Disputes InvolingIndianRikhts, 28 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 63, 64 (1988); Christopher L. Kukk &
David A. Deese, At the Waterk Edge: Regional Con/1ictand Cooperation over Fresh Water, 1
UCLAJ. INTL L. &FOREIGN AF. 21, 27 (1996).
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in the ice caps.' Accordingly, only 0.007% of all water is a fresh source that
humans can access.- This scarce resource serves a variety of needs, with agriculture monopolizing most fresh water.' Water is even scarcer in locations
likely to host a renewable project." For instance, water accounts for only 0.2%
and 0.3% of New Mexico and Arizona, respectively."
In general, renewable energy water consumption is on par with, or exceeds, water consumption for fossil fuels-generated energy.' Therefore, water
scarcity might negate the gains of sustainable energy.' Geothermal and hydroelectric power require the most vater." Solar energy can use more water than
coal or nuclear energy." Solar photovoltaic systems, however, require less water than traditional power sources.'
Even if solar energy consumes less water than alternative energy sources, it
still depletes a limited resource." Solar energy requires large quantities of water
both for constructing the facility and for cleaning the panels during operation.'
On the scale of a project like the one Jemez Pueblo proposed, the operation
would involve 16,689 gallons of water per megawatt per year (about 59,000
gallons for Jemez Pueblo's 3.5 megawatt project).' At the very minimum, the
project would use water for maintaining the solar panels with four washings per
43. Leah Sandbank, Note, Drty Laiundry: Why InternationalMeasures to Save the Global
Clean Water Supply Have Failed, 13 FORDHAM ENvTL. LJ. 165, 169 (2001); Human Appropriationof the World's Fresh Water Supply, UNIV. OF MICH.: GLOBAL CHANGE Gan. 4, 2006),
http://wmy.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange2/current/ectures/freshwater-supply/freshwate
r.html.
44.
45.

UNIv. OF MICH., supra note 43.
Sandbank, supranote 43, at 170.

46. See H. David Gold & Jason Bass, The Enegy- Water Nexus: Socioeconomic Considerationsand Suggested Legal Reforms in the Southwest, 50 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 563, 567 (2010).
47. How Much of Your State is Wet?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://ga.water.
usgs.gov/edu/wetstates.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
48. Gerard Wynn, Renewable Energy Water Use May Be Higher 7an Conventional
Methods,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
15,
2012,
5:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/15/renewable-energy-water-use_n_1347054.html;
Water in a Low-Carbon Economy: Resource Scarcity, Chinate Change and Business in a Finte
World, STOCKHOLM ENV'T INST. (2012), http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager
/documents/Publications/Climate-mitigation-adaptation/SEI-PB-2012-3C-Water-for-Energy.pdf.
49.
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50. Diana Glassman et. al., The Water-Energy Nexus, WORLD POL'Y INST. 13, 15-16
(Mar. 2011), http://www.worldpolicv.org/sites/default/files/policypapers/FHE%20WATERENERGY%20NEXUS-O.pdf.
5 1. Id.at 5.
52. Wendy Wilson et al., Burning Our Rivers: The Water Footprmnt of Electricity,RIVER
NETWORK 28-29 (Apr. 2012), http://www.rivernetwork.org/sites/default/fdes/ BurningOurRivers_0.pdf.
53. See Leonard, supra note 6, at 634-35.
54. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FES 12-24 DOE/EIS-0403, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcr STATEMENT (PEIS) FOR SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN SIx
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(2012),
http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/SolarFPEIS
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year.' For another solar photovoltaic project, the Las Vegas Sun reported that
in desert areas, like Las Vegas or New Mexico, companies wash their panels
more than advertised because of the dirt build-up that reduces their efficiency
by about 3%.' A block of solar panels could use more water per year than a
residential block.' Such an amount is relatively small compared to the total
withdrawals from the Rio Jemez." Nevertheless, while the sun represents a
renewable resource, fresh water might not regenerate quickly enough to sustain the demands of renewable energy projects.' Thus, Native Nations should
be aware of their projects' minimal impacts on water. Because all renewable
energy projects require some water, Native Nations must find a source to supply their new demand.'
B. SOURCES OF WATER RIGHTS

Based on already existing allocations of water, Native Nations hoping to
pursue renewable energy projects likely need to displace current users.' Although most users secure their rights under state law through the riparian doctrine or prior appropriation theory, Native Nations can base their claims on a
federal reservation of water.' These reserved rights often provide Native Nations superiority over state users because they pre-date state permitted claims.'
Thus, water rights under federal law may provide Native Nations the means to
achieve their renewable projects if they can navigate the uncertainties of federal common law.'
States maintain primary responsibility for allocating water." Each state has
its own laws governing water distribution, usually modeled after either the riparian or prior appropriation systems." Generally, eastern states adopt the

56. PUEBLO OF JEMEZ DEP'T OF RES. PROT., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
3.5-MEGAWATr SOLAR GENERATING FAcILITY AT THE PUEBLO OFJEMEZ SANDOVAL COUNTY,
NEW MExico 3 (2009).
57.
58.
59.

Tavares, supra note 54.
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CUBA SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DIsT., Rio PUERCO & Rio JEMEZ
SUBREGIONAL WATER PLAN 2000-2050 12-10-14 (2004), http://www.ose.state.nm.us/water-

info/NMWaterPlanning/regions/MiddleRioGrande/SEC12-10-QuantifyingFutureWaterDeman
d.pdf.
60. See Kukk & Deese, supra note 42, at 27.
61. See Storey, supra note 8, at 179.
62. See Leonard, supra note 6, at 613-14.
63. See Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, PracticalReasonmg, and Negodated
Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1133, 1139 (2010).
64. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 6, at 617; see also Chambers & Echohawk, supra note
12.
65. See Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers, 30 TULSA LJ. 61, 63 (1994); see also Storey, supra note 8, at 180.
66. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCEs LAw: A PLAcE-BAsED BOOK OF
PROBLEMS AND CASES 843 (2d ed. 2009).
67. Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A BrandNew Water Law, 8 U. DENv. WATER L. REV.
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riparian doctrine of proximity to water, while western states opt for the prior
appropriation doctrine of first-come, first-serve."
The riparian system confers water rights based on appurtenance to a water
source." The eastern states adopted the riparian doctrine from England." Under this system, an individual must buy property connected to the water source
to acquire the rights." Many states, however, have begun implementing a modified riparian system requimng water users to acquire a permit." Generally,
under the regulatory riparian system, state agencies distribute a conunon
property right." The water user must apply for a license from the state agency."
The agency evaluates the collective uses of the water sources and determines
which applicants merit a permit.' This regulated riparian method allows permits for non-appurtenant land." The permit user can only receive unallocated
water, and often for only a temporary period." Thus, Native Nations in a riparian state might be able to obtain water permits for their renewable projects for
a temporary time period, but have no guarantee and must compete with other
possible users."
Alternatively, the prior appropriation doctrine dominates most western
states." In the late nineteenth century, the federal government encouraged
exploration and exploitation of resources, as exemplified by the 1872 Mining
Act." Under this system, the government prompted miners to discover resources by granting them land for locating and patenting a claim to a valuable
mineral resource." This philosophy of resource exploitation contributed to the
water right allocation system in the western United States." Particularly, mining
was profitable because the miners possessed the mineral rights without the
burdens of land ownership." In addition, with a priority system for the first
user, miners did not have to worry as much about subsequent upstream users
diverting all the water." Similarly, the federal government's desire to promote
68. Id.
69. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Rpainanism 6 the United States, 95 MARQ.
L. REv. 53, 65 (2011).
70. Id.at 64.
71. Seeid.at 65.
72. Dellapenna, supranote 69, at 85; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 844.
73. See Dellapenna,supra note 69, at 54; Olivia S. Choe, AppurtenancyReconceptuahzed:
Managng Water inan EraofScarcity, 113 YALE LJ. 1909, 1912 (2004).
74. Dellapenna, supranote 69, at 54-55.
75. Id. at 87-88.
76. See Choe, supra note 73, at 1912.
77. See Dellapenna,supra note 69, at 87-88.
78. See id.
79. Reed D. Benson, Alve but Irrelevant The PriorAppropnation Doctrine in Today
Western Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REv. 675, 676 (2012).
80. 30 U.S.C. S 22 (2012); Michael Graf, Applcation of Takings Law to the Regulation of
UnpatentedMiring Clains,24 EcOLOGY L.Q. 57, 59 (1997).
81. Graf, supra note 80, at 60.
82. Dana Smith, Note, DoctrinalAnachronism?: Revisiting the PracticablyIrrpableAcreage Standard in Light of InternationalLaw for the Rights of Indgenous Peoples, 22 ARiz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 691, 694 (2005).
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agriculture in the United States also contributed to devising the prior appropriation doctrine.' Farmers could hardly pursue agriculture under the riparian
system because in the western states, surface water was too far away to be put
to use without an irrigation system."
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, the first person to put a quantity
of water to a beneficial purpose has the senior right to the continued use of
that water." During droughts, senior users get first priority on existing flows
and can exhaust all the water to satisfy their right." Consequently, a junior user
might not receive any water regardless of his potential superior purpose." If
the senior appropriator, however, is not currently using the water beneficially,
then the junior user can appropriate it." Although many Native Nations may
have used the water prior to settlers in the west, they would have a hard time
staking a senior claim for the water because they might not be able to prove a
continual beneficial use and likely do not have the required state permits."
Thus, native nations pursuing renewable energy projects likely cannot secure a
dependable supply of water under the prior appropriation doctrine and would
also have to compete with other users under the regulatory riparian system.
Rather than having to ascertain their rights from the states, Native Nations
can redeem their water rights under federal law." These federal water rights
are often superior to those of state-permitted users, partially because of their
date of reservation." In the case of a conflict, federal reserved water rights can
displace state users." The federal government recognized a Native Nation's
water rights as they existed prior to conquest, known as aboriginal rights." Aboriginal rights can include water rights to sustain traditional practices such as
fishing." Such rights can also support pre-conquest domestic activities like irnigation for the Pueblos." In expanding upon Indian-reserved rights, the Supreme Court also recognized reserved water rights for non-traditional practices, such as activities to sustain the treaty-created Indian homelands.' The reservation of water for broader purposes is known as Winters rights, after United States v. Winters." Although the concept is still evolving, Native Nations

85. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 843.
86. See id.
87. Alexandra B. Klass, Property RWts on the New Frontier: Chmate Change, Natural
Resource Developmen4 andRenewable Energy,38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 65 (2011).
88. Smith, supranote 82, at 694-95.
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91. See Anderson, supranote 63, at 1137.
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95. See Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18 N.M. L. REv. 403, 437 (1988).
96. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1905).
97. See Hughes, supra note 95, at 437.
98. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
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Issue 1 RENEWABLE ENERGYON TRIBAL LAND& WATER RESOURCES

107

may be able to realize superior claims to water under the Wnters doctrine for
their renewable projects.'"
The Supreme Court first recognized a separate doctrine of water rights for
native nations for their traditional uses of water."' A native nation can establish
limited water rights under the aboriginal doctrine, which reserves water for
Native Nations for traditional practices." When the conquerors adopted Native Nations as their "wards,"" they did not abrogate the water rights that they
then possessed and continued to use."
In the 1905 foundational case United States v. Winans, the federal government sued a state-permitted water user on behalf of its ward, the Yakima
Nation of Indians." Two brothers, the Winans, received a license from Washington State to operate fish wheels on the Columbia River." Through their fish
wheels and operations, the brothers blocked the Yakima Nation from their
traditional access to fish."' The federal government endeavored to restore the
Yakima's privileges." Modern technology had left the Yakima and other native
peoples without fish."
Wnans emblematized the conflict between industrialization and traditional practices, while also pitting Native Nations against state-permitted businesses."' As the trustee of the Yakima (and many other native nations facing a loss
of their ways), the United States argued that the state-granted water rights conflicted with the Yakima's aboriginal rights."' The wheels effectively eliminated
the common rights the Yakima and others had to fish."' The federal government had reserved these rights in a treaty founding a reservation for the Yakima Nation "not [as] a grant of rights to the Indians, but [rather as] a grant of
right from them, - a reservation of those not granted.""" According to the government's interpretation, the treaty never abrogated the Yakima's fishing
rights."4
100. See Anderson, supra note 63, at 1136-37, 1139-44.
101. See Wnans, 198 U.S. at 382-83.
102. Taylor Henderson, Five Tribes' Water Ris: Examinig the Aamodt Adjudications'
Mechem Doctrne to Predict Tribal Water Rihts Litgation Outcomes in Oklahoma, 36 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 125, 131 (2012); Hughes, supra note 95, at 437-38.
103. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 4 (1831).
104. See Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Rght to Wildhie Capital (PartII):
Asserting A Sovereign Servitude to ProtectHabitat of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REv. 355,
432 (2001).
105.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 377.
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489, 508 (2006).
110. Seeid.at489.
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112. Blumm & Brunberg, supranote 109, at 529-30.
113. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Henderson, supra note 102, at 131.
114. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; see also Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 109, at 530.
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The Court agreed with the government."' The Court reasoned that any
ambiguous language must be construed in favor of the Indians because of their
unequal bargaining position." Accordingly, the treaty's silence on fishing rights
indicated that those rights would continue to endure."' In the eight-to-one majority opinion, Justice McKenna acknowledged that the Yakima Nation had "a
servitude upon every piece of land as though described therein" to accomplish
their fishing rights."' Consequently, those treaty-protected rights were valid
against the federal government, the states, and any of their grantees."'
By recognizing a right to the fish, the Court also acknowledged a reservation of water to sustain the fish.'" Wians confirmed water rights for traditional
activities regardless of the language in the treaties."' To achieve water rights
based on the Winans theory, a native nation must demonstrate that the activity
requiring water conforms to a traditional practice.'" Although the rights date
from "time immemorial,"'" they only exist to fulfill that tradi'ional practice.'"
Accordingly, native nations have the rights to preserve a resource with the necessary amount of water.'" Wnans water rights for fishing, therefore, cannot
serve another pursuit.'" Winans rights do not afford water for modern needs,
such as renewable energy."
During the twentieth century, however, at least one court recognized arguably broader aboriginal water rights for the Pueblos.'" Pueblos are an "ancient
people whose history goes back into the farthest reaches of time."'" Although
Spain recognized the Pueblos as sovereigns, Mexico identified them as ordinary citizens." Upon acquiring the territory that was home to the Pueblos, the
115. See Wians, 198 U.S. at 381-82, 384.
116. See id. at 380-81.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 381.
119. Id. at 381-82.
120. See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 109, at 538-39.
121. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-84.
122. See Wood, supra note 104, at 365-66.
123. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1983); see generally Daniel
G. Kelly, Jr., Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial,75 COLUM. L. REv. 655, 655 (1975) (stating non-treaty possessory rights exist based on continuous occupation since time immemorial and that possession under the treaties also considers Indian habits and modes of life).
124. See Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in RepananJwisdictions: Water,
Water Everywhere, PerhapsSome Dropsfor Us, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1203, 1227 (2006).
125. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 384; see also Peter C. Monson, Case Note, United States v.
Washington (PhaseII): The Indian Fishmg Confct Moves Upstream, 12 ENvrL. L. 469, 477
(1982) (stating the "reserved rights doctrine" implicitly provides the right to protect fishing habitat with the right to take fish).
126. See generally Winans, 198 U.S. at 382-83.
127. See Babcock, supla note 124, at- 1227.
128. See New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1000 (D.N.M. 1985)
(explaining the Pueblo's rights to the Rio de Lucero), motion granted, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1313
(2007).
129. Robert L. Lucero, Jr., Note, State v. Romero: The Legacy ofPueblo Land Grants and
the Contours ofJunsdictionin Inian Country, 37 N.M. L. REv. 671, 672 (2007) (citation omitted).
130. Aamod4 618 F. Supp. at 1000; see alsoLucero, supra note 129, at 675-76.
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United States had to decide whether it would treat them as "wards," similar to
its treatment of other indigenous peoples, or govern them as new citizens
along with the rest of the new inhabitants from Mexico.' The federal government perceived the Pueblos as different from other native peoples because
they held land in fee simple and had homelands."
The United States struggled to categorize the Pueblos in its web of Indian
policies." An early abrogated Supreme Court case, United States v. Joseph,
determined the Pueblos were not entitled to federal protection." However, in
1910 Congress passed the New Mexico Enabling Act, granting New Mexico
statehood." Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined the Pueblos merited federal protection in United States v. Sandoval."
Consequently, the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico in State of N.M ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt tackled several issues,
including whether the Pueblos had aboriginal water rights." Because the Pueblos used irrigation systems prior to conquest, the District of New Mexico held
that their domestic water use constituted a traditional practice protected under
the aboriginal water reservation doctrine." In 1985, Nambe Pueblo secured its
water rights for domestic and irrigation needs after nine years in court." These
Pueblo aboriginal water rights, like Winans rights, probably cannot supply
water for renewable energy." Nonetheless, Aamodt demonstrates the possibility for a court to consider broader traditional uses, especially for the Pueblos."'
A reservation of water for aboriginal practices, whether fishing or irrigation,
endures from time immemorial, but the water rights are subordinate to the
exercise."'
Three years after the Winans Supreme Court recognized that federal Indian land reservations were not a grant to Native Nations, but from them, it
addressed the issue of a reservation of water rights for non-traditional practices." The federal government reserved water rights for Native Nations through
initial treaties, as first formally recognized in the case Winters v. United
States.'" In this 1908 case, the United States, as trustee for the Gros Ventre
and Assiniboing bands, sued Henry Winters and his affiliate companies.'"
131. Aamodt 618 F. Supp. at 1001; see also Lucero, supra note 129, at 677.
132. Lucero, supranote 129, at 677.
133. See id.
134. United States v.Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1876); see also id. at 678.
135. Henderson, supra note 102, at 135.
136. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913); see also Lucero, supra note 129, at
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137. New Mexico ex rel.Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1005 (D.N.M 1985).
138. Id. at 1009-10.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1010.
141. See id.
142. See Blumm & Brunberg, supra note 109, at 538-40.
143. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 576-78 (1908).
144. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-78; see also A. Dan Tarlock, TibaiJusice and Property
Rkibts: The Evolution of Wmters v. Umted States, 50 NAT. REsoURCEsJ. 471, 477-82 (2010).
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Winters owned land upstream from the reservation on the Milk River and
diverted the river's water." Using the prior appropriation theory of first-intime, Winters and his colleagues claimed a superior right to the water."'
The United States challenged Winters' claim on the basis that it had reserved water for the bands." The United States argued that it granted a "tract
of land" in 1888 to the Gros Ventre and Assiniboing peoples for them to become productive members of an agricultural society, and impliedly included
water rights as a means to achieve this goal in the treaty." The federal government argued that this reservation of water independently provided native nations water rights.'"
In accepting this theory, the Court reasoned the tribes would never have
abdicated their land without receiving something in return from the federal
government."' Even if the treaties did not delineate water rights, the Court
determined the language of the treaties was ambiguous and therefore, applied
a canon of construction dictating that ambiguities be construed in favor of the
tribes." Through this recognition, the Court carved out an exception to state
appropriation laws." The case created an opportunity for Native Nations to
establish superior water rights as long as they had a treaty with the federal government for a permanent homeland."
Even if Native Nations did not have a treaty, Wjnters established a reservation of water rights for nations pursuant to any federal policy promoting an
Indian homeland." Under this logic, in the adjudication of the Tesuque &
Nambe/Pojoaque Stream System in Aamod4 the New Mexico District Court
determined that Nambe Pueblo had Wmters water rights because an executive
order designated a reservation of land, and therefore a reservation of water."
The executive order recognized that Spain reserved certain rights for the
Pueblos and that the United States honored that reservation."' Because the
United States recognized the Pueblos as its wards, the district court reasoned
that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which designated land for the Pueblos,
could also reserve water rights for them." So long as a Native Nation has some

146. Mission 2012: Clean Water, MASS. INST. OF TECH., http://web.rnitedu/12.000/
www/m2012/finalwebsite/problem/waterrights.shtml Gast visited Nov. 8, 2013).
14 7. Id.
148. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 565-67; see also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Righis
and the FederalTrust Responsibity,46 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 399, 409-10 (2006).
149. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565-67.
150. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 565-67; see alsoTarlock, supra note 144, at 477-82.
151.
Witers, 207 U.S. at 576.
152. Id.; see alsoAnderson, supra note 63, at 1141.
153. See Witers, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
154. Anderson, supra note 148, at 411; see also Hearngon Indian Water Rights, supra note
10, at 28 (indicating that tribal water rights are "federal enclaves").
155. See generallyRoyster, supra note 65, at 71.
156. New Mexico exrel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985).
157. Id.at 1000-01.
158. Id.
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kind of federal agreement reserving land for it, the nation should be able to
establish Winters rights."
While a Native Nation seeking a claim for scarce water for a renewable
project ought to try to establish its federal water rights under the Winters doctrine, case precedent is divided as to whether Winters rights can support modem water uses." Within a short three years' time, the Supreme Court extended water rights from traditional practices to non-traditional practices, but within one hundred years' time, it has failed to explain the scope of non-traditional
practices."' The implicit reservation of water with a federal agreement must
accompany a reservation of land to promote a federal objective.'" The ambiguity regarding the scope of the water rights resides in the understanding of the
federal purpose." While each treaty or agreement might be unique, federal
land reservations generally aimed to sustain Indian homelands.'" The uncertainty about the breadth of Winters rights rests with understanding which water
uses sustain the homelands."
At the time of Winters, the Supreme Court conceived of the federallycreated homelands as agricultural societies." An agricultural purpose, however, may no longer be reasonable for sustaining these communities." The
Court also believed the accords endowed nations with a reservation of water
for "present and future needs."" Subsequent courts have struggled to determine whether the idea of "present and future" uses only accounts for the original purpose evolved for modem day use, or whether it can include modem
purposes as well." Several courts, including the Ninth Circuit in United States

159. See generallyWinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); Anderson, supra
note 148, at 408.
160. See generallyRoyster, supra note 65, at 71-72. See also Ruth Langridge, The Right to
HabitatProtection,29 PUB. LAND & REsOURCEs L. REv. 41, 47 (2008); Jessica Lowrey, Note,
Home Sweet Home: How the "Pwpose ofthe Reservation'Affects More ThanJust.the Quantity oflndian Water Rikhts, 23 COLO.J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 201, 203-04 (2012).

161. See generallyRoyster, supra note 65, at 71-72. See also discussion infha notes 162-182
and accompanying text.
162. See generally Wnters, 207 U.S. at 576. See also Nicole C. Salamander, A HalfFull
Crcle: The Reserved Rights Doctrme and Tnbal ReacquiredLands, 12 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 333, 343 (2009).
163. See Lowrey, supra note 160, at 203-05.
164. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 566, 575-77; see also Storey, supra note 8, at 193.
165. See Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Righs: Liigation andSettlements, 42 TULSA L.
REv. 23, 26-27 (2006).
166. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; see also Hughes, supra note 95, at 434.
167. Erica Shively, Note, The Future of Quantifling Tribal Water Rights in North Dakota,
84 N.D. L. REV. 455, 466 (2008); see also Babcock, supra note 124, at 1226 ("Beginning with
Winters, federal and state courts have almost universally agreed that the purpose of Indian
reservations is to provide places where tribes can sustain themselves."); Chambers & Echohawk,
supra note 12, at 460 ("In addition, irrigation is not the exclusive measure of reserved rights,
where a reservation requires other uses of water to fulfill its purposes and function as a homeland for a tribe.").
168. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956); Winters,
207 U.S. at 577; Anderson, supra note 148, at 418.
169. Ahtanum, 236 F.2d at 327; Anderson, supra note 148, at 418.
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v. Adai, have rejected the narrow reading and determined that the federal
government did not create reservations solely for agriculture.'0
The Ninth Circuit is leading the way to a broader interpretation of Indian
water rights for non-traditional purposes."' It recognized that a treaty creating a
reservation for "present and future needs" should not be read to limit the reservation's existence to the realities at the time of the treaty.' Courts should not
read the purpose of a reservation in a manner that disfavors the Native Nation
because such reading would conflict with the interpretive canon of construction the Court applied in both Winans and Winters."' While agriculture once
represented the means to be a productive society, this limited interpretation of
reserved rights could relegate Native Nations to living in the past."'
Even if agriculture was the primary purpose for the reservation of water
rights, an additional federal purpose could be enough to secure water for an
energy project." Many of the treaties provided a second federal goal, such as
"other pursuits," that buttressed Native Nations' claims for use of their water
rights beyond agriculture."' For example, the Ninth Circuit, although vacated
on other grounds and interpreting the treaty for other natural resource activities, recognized the "other pursuits" language in the treaty as including nonstatic purposes."'
Although the treaties and case law are susceptible to various interpretations, the fact that other areas of federal water law have clearly distinguished
between primary and secondary purposes for water rights while federal Indian
water law has not should further substantiate any claim that a secondary purpose yields water rights."' In United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court
considered the federal governments allocation of water to sustain the federally-protected Gila National Forest for public enjoyment."' The Court recognized the legislation's primary purpose for the reservation was to preserve timber, and it perceived wildlife preservation and other activities as only secondary aims." The Court only designated federal water rights for the primary purpose, while concluding that state law would govern water rights for the other
purposes."' Because courts have not extended United States v. New Mexico's
reasoning to Indian reserved water rights,"' a secondary purpose should suffice
for the Native Nation to have access to reserved water. Thus, a Winters reser170.
United States v.Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983); Anderson, supra note 165,
at 28.
171. See generallyAdai, 723 F.2d at 1409.
172. Abtanum, 236 F.2d at 327; Anderson, supra note 148, at 418.
173. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81
(1905).
174. See Anderson, supra note 148, at 418.
175. See generallySalamander,supra note 162, at 344.
176. Storey, supra note 8, at 191-92 (citing UnitedStates v, Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated on othergrounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977)).
177. See id.
178. See Royster, supranote 65, at 71-72.
179. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 696 (1978).
180. Id. at 707-08.
181. Id.at 716.
182. Royster, supra note 65, at 72.
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vation of water might be able to sustain a claim for superior water rights for a
renewable energy project.
C. QUANTITY OF WATER

Similar to determining its water rights, the Native Nation also must labor
to quantify the amount of water needed for its renewable project.' Native Nations securing their water rights under the Winters doctrine usually reserve as
much water as needed to fulfill the federal purpose.'" To date, the only quantification standard that the Supreme Court itself has used, although it has affirmed others, is the "practicably irrigable acreage" ("PIA") measure" that
would likely be useless for quantifying water for renewable energy. In 1963, in
Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court concluded that Native Nations reserved water in the amount of the PIA." This calculation involves a "benefit/cost analysis" of the land's ability to sustain crops, irrigation, and profitability."
Even though the PIA standard provides little guidance for quantifying water for modem needs, it is an optional evaluation." In the pivotal 1988 case, In
re Gen. Adjudication ofARl Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys.,
the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the state retained "oversight of
reserved water rights" and could defer to an expert's quantification."' Accordingly, the court deferred to Wyoming's special master who determined the
purpose for the reservation and calculated the necessary amount of water.'"
Although the Supreme Court of Wyoming abrogated its decision on other
grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the deference to a special master
to calculate the amount of water rights."

183. See Charles Carvell, Indian Reserved Water Rights: Impending ConfZict or Coming
RapprochementBetween the State ofNorth Dakota andNorth Dakota Indian Tribes, 85 N.D.
L. REv. 1, 25 (2009).
184. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see also Chambers &
Echohawk, supra note 12, at 453 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01

(1963)) (providing an example where the Supreme Court upheld a reservation to supply water for "all practically irrigable acreage").
185. Langridge, supra note 160, at 46; Jennele Morris O'Hair, The FederalReserved Rights
Doctrneand PracticablyIrnigableAcreage: Past,Present,and Future, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 263,
273 (1996); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See generally Leonard, supra note
6, at 623.
186. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.
187. See Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water Rights: The Arizona Homeland
Standard,Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. REsOURCES J. 835, 836 (2002); Franks, supra note
94, at 553.
188. Storey, supranote 8, at 198. See generaly In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 114 (Wyo. 1988) affd, Wyoming v. United
States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
189. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753
P.2d at 114.
190. See id. at 94.
191.
Wyoming, 492 U.S. at 406.
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Other state courts have followed suit and begun adopting different quantification methods." These state-level quantification standards can account for
water used for modern purposes like renewable energy.' For instance, in
2001, In re GeneralAdjudation of All Rights to Use Water i Gila River
System and Source, the Arizona Supreme Court opted for a different quantification standard." It rejected the PIA standard because it believed the Wind
River Indian Reservation's federal purpose is broader than agriculture." The
Gila River approach effectively eliminates any efficiency and reliability for adjudicating water rights while liberating Native Nations to use their water rights
beyond agricultural purposes.'" Despite the boon that the Gila River quantification gives to Native Nations pursuing water for renewable energy, it is not
controlling precedent and therefore, not reliable.'"
IV. WATER SEITLEMENTS: SUPPLY MEETS DEMAND
Despite the landmark Winans and Witers decisions over one-hundred
years ago, Native Nations have had little actual access to their reserved water.'"
The unused reservation of water is known as 'paper' water" because many
Native Nations still lack the means for actually reaching and exploiting the
water." Native Nations' main options for securing their water rights include
litigation, adjudication, and settlement.' Water litigation is expensive and
slow."' Adjudication can also last decades, as occurred with the Pojoaque
case." Alternatively, Native Nations can pursue a water settlement."
Water settlements navigate many of the complexities of reserved water
rights."' In March 2012, the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a
hearing about Indian water rights."' According to the testimony at the hearing,
192. See Smith, supra note 82, at 692.
193. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. &
Source (Gila), 35 P.3d 68, 76 (Ariz. 2001). After Congress passed the McCarran Amendment in
1952, state courts have the authority to determine the scope and amount of federal Indian reserved water rights. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2012); see also Scott B. McElroy & JeffJ. Davis, Revisitng
Colorado River Water ConservationDistrict v United States - There Must Be A Better Way,
27 ARIz. ST. LJ. 597, 599 (1995) (discussing the effect of the McCarran Amendment).
194. See Gila, 127 P.3d at 79.
195. Id.at 81.
196. See id
197. See id.; Smith, supra note 82, at 692.
198. Smith, supra note 82, at 692.
199. Stephen A. Walker & Keri-Ann C. Baker, Working Mth Native Americans on Water
Issues, AM.
WATER
WORKS
Assoc.
18
(May
2012),
http://wmw.11wlaw.com/files/presentadons/Working-withNativeAmericansonWaterIssuesMay_2012 A
WWA 00095817.PDF.
200. Shively, supra note 167, at 468.
201. Id.
202. See Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketng Western Water: Can A ProcessBased Geographic Information System Improve ReallocationDecisions?, 41 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 329, 341
(2001).
203. Hearngon Indian Water Rights, supla note 10, at 28.
204. Id.; Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 12, at 460.
205. Heangon Indian Water Rights, supra note 10, at 1.
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negotiations and settlements are the "preferred" method for all stakeholders."
The cost, delays, and uncertainty of adjudication and litigation lend towards
settlement as a resolution."' Native Nations began negotiating their water rights
in the 1980s."' To date, Congress has authorized twenty-nine settlements."
Settlements can offer Native Nations quicker and more reliable determinations of their water rights, while also including means to improve infrastructure."' All parties suffer from the uncertainty surrounding water that may be
reserved for a Native Nation." Settlement offers a company at least an opportunity to defend its claims and possibly receive some water rights." Similarly,
settlements afford Native Nations the opportunity to turn their reservations of
water into practical uses more quickly."' Because of the uncertainty of whether
a Native Nation can use its reservation of water for purposes other than agriculture, some nations may prefer the .settlement route. Such a strategy provides better leverage to wield their argument that the reservation of water includes water for modern needs."'
The negotiated terms of the settlements can also benefit Native Nations
because the provisions can explicitly include the means to access the water."'
Many Native Nations do not have the infrastructure to even utilize their water
rights, especially if the source of the water is far away from a remote community."' For example, the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe in Arizona conflicted
with coal companies and farmers over water."' Their water rights involved the
water in aquifers."' Neither Native Nation had the infrastructure to transport
the water from the aquifers to serve their communities."' The settlement proposed to accord the nations water pipes with potable water.'

206. Id. at 28.
207. Press Release, United States Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, Indian Affairs Oversight
Hearing Explores the Benefits of Settling Indian Water Rights Claims (Mar. 16, 2012), available
at http://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-release/indian-affairs-oversight-hearing-explores-bene
fits-settling-indian-water-rights.
208. Tarlock, supra note 144, at 497-98.
209. Hearigon Indian Water Rikhts, supnt note 10, at I (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka); Bruce Finley, Feden-/Settlements Give Colorado Tibes a Share of Water Rhts, DENVER
PosT, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.denverposLcon/news/ci_19303196.
210. Heangon Indian Water Rights, supra note 10, at 1 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka).
211. Id. at 2.
212. See Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 12, at 468.
213. See id. at 460.
214. Leonard, supra note 6, at 630.
215. Heanng on Indian Water Rhts, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka).
216. Shively, supra note 167, at 471.
217. Leslie MacMillan, A Ddlicult Choice on Water, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 6, 2012, 3:39 PM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.coi/2012/04/06/a-difficult-choice-on-water/.
218. Id
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Because many native nations lack infrastructure, the federal government
has initiated a program that will help turn paper water into real water." In
2007, federal agencies formed the Infrastructure Task Force to design water
infrastructure projects for native nations in order to promote potable water.'
While the federal program equips Native Nations with one option for improving their infrastructure, water settlements can further facilitate such infrastructure.

m

Despite the advantages of water settlements, they too can be unpalatable
for Native Nations.' Settlements can be costly and require expert attorney
negotiation teams.' Many Native Nations rely on the federal government to
represent them with negotiation teams who have the expertise to carry out the
settlements.' Yet, the federal government has discretion on whether to furnish
such teams' Furthermore, because the federal government holds water rights
in trust for Native Nations, Congress and the President must approve each
settlement, adding to delay.'
Finally, settlements are a negotiation and Native Nations often must compromise and relinquish some of the water they believe belongs to them to
reach an agreement for immediate water rights and the necessary infrastructure.' These agreements are binding, and once a Native Nation agrees to a
m
These
reduced amount of water, future generations must live with the terms."
settlements are analogous to the treaties that appropriated Indian lands and
forced Native Nations to give up what they rightfully possessed to meet immediate needs." Nonetheless, Native Nations' experience with water settlements
has been monumentally more positive because these settlements can promise
221. U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF TRIBAL WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
FUNDING APPLICATION PROCESSES AND RECOMMENDED PAPERWORK STREAMLINING
OPPORTUNITIES (2011), http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/iff-paperwork-streamlining-recomm.pdf.
222. Id.
223. Merianne A. Stansbury, Negotiating Wnters: A Comparative Case Study of the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 131,
135 (2006).
224. See generally Erin B. Agee, Note, In the Federal Government We Trnst? Federal
Fundingfor Tribal Water Rights Setlemnents and the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights SettlenentAct, 21 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201, 212 (2011).
225. Id. at 213-14.
226. Id. at 203-04.
227. Id. at 222.
228. Hearingon Indian Water Rights, supra note 10, at 29.
229. Agee, supra note 224, at 212.
230. See generallyFolk-Williams, supra note 42, at 74.
231. See Jeff Candrian, Note, Building with Bihnders on: How Policymakers Ignored Indian
Water Rights to the Colorado,Setting the Stage for the Navajo Claim, 22 CoLo.J. INT'L ENvTL.
L. & PoL'Y 159, 187 (2011) ("Water settlements, therefore, represent a 'second treaty-making
era.'"); Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 12, at 469 ("Because Indians were left with too little
land and other resources, and usually paid less than fair market value for the lands that were
taken, generations of Indian poverty resulted. . . . However, that has not been the apparent
outcome of Indian water adjudications and settlements so far, which is evidence that the sorry
lesson of the historic interaction between Indians and the rest of American society during the
1880-1930 period has at last been learned. Actual Indian water use has increased substantially
as water rights have been quantified, rather than being diminished or held constant to protect
non-Indian economies.") (citations omitted).
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each nation's survival for future generations.' Thus, while tribal renewable
energy hosts complex water challenges, Native Nations still have the power to
control their futures.'

V. JEMEZ PUEBLO
Although it is but one of a myriad of communities hoping to convert renewable energy into empowerment, Jemez Pueblo is a bellwether community."' Throughout history, this Pueblo has inspired explorers.' Jemez Pueblo,
along with other communities, helped provoke Francisco Coronado's search
for the City of Gold in the 1500s.' Coronado, however, never found the mythical city, but his contact with Jemez Pueblo inspired the Franciscans to begin
some of their first missions.' Like the myth of the City of Gold, renewable
energy atJemez Pueblo offers great potential but is still just a dream.'
As with the City of Gold, tribal renewable energy appeals to many because
it begets wealth.' For Jemez Pueblo, tribal renewable energy could transform
the community because its only current source of income is a convenience
store and a gas station, bringing in a meager $50,000 a year for a community of
2,500 members." Renewable energy, on the other hand, could yield $25 million over twenty-five years."' Usually, only gaming tribes have seen such riches,
and the Pueblo never has belonged to such a class despite twice requesting
permission from the federal government to build gaming facilities." With over
five hundred tribes in the United States - twenty-one of which are Pueblos,
and nineteen of those Pueblos are in the poorest state in the country, New

Mexico - few tribes receive federal permission to join the class of gaming moguls.' The federal government rejected Jemez Pueblo's request for a gaming
232. Chambers & Echohawk, supra note 12, at 469; see also Heaing on Indian Water
Rights, supranote 10, at 469-70.
233. See generalydiscussionsupraParts II, III, IV.
234. See Bryan, supra note 4 ("The 3,000 members of the Jemez Pueblo are on the verge of
building the nation's first utility-scale solar plant on tribal land...").
235. Henderson, supra note 102, at 132.
236. See id.
237.

See id.; L. BRADFORD PRINCE, SPANISH MISSION CHURCHES OF NEW MEXICO 183

avadable athttp://southwest.library.arizona.edu/spmc/body. 1_div. 14.html.
See generallyBryan, supra note 4.
Id.
DraftEnironnentalAssessmen4supra note 486, at 4; Bryan, supranote 4; WELCOME
TO THE WAIATOWA VIsITOR CENTER, http://www.jemezpueblo.com (last visited Nov. 10,
2013).
241. Bryan, supra note 4.
242. Id.; Jeri Clausing, Feds Reject Jernez Pueblo Plan for Anthony Casino, NATIVE
AMERICAN TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, http./Ann.nativeLmzes.co/business/gahg5971-feds-rejectjernez-pueblo-plan-for-anthony-casino.
243. See Agee, supra note 224, at 214; Clausing, supra note 242; New Mexico Takes the
Top Spot For Poorest State In the Nation, KOAT7 ALBUQUERQUE, Sept. 18, 2012,
http://www.koat.com/news/new-mexico/albuquerque/New-Mexico-takes-the-top-spot-forpoorest-state-in-the-nation/-/9153728/16650398/-/ggybiy/-/index.html;
(1915),
238.
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facility in Anthony, New Mexico in 2011 .'" The government denied the gaming permit because of its concerns about the location's remoteness and difficulties with supervising the gaming activities.'
Native Nations, like Jemez Pueblo, must conjure riches from thin air, or at
least the sun." Such a scheme seems ideal with the sun conferring upon the
Pueblo its presence 310 days each year." For the past four years, Jemez Pueblo has been innovating a way to harvest their main resource.' The Pueblo
envisions placing over 14,000 solar photovoltaic panels in rows on thirty acres
of its trust land in northern New Mexico." Unlike other solar energy initiatives
that directly supply energy to a singular connected structure, Jemez Pueblo
plans to create a utility grid to deliver the energy to its customers.' It received
funding from the Department of Energy as part of a grant to install nineteen
renewable energy projects on tribal land." Jemez Pueblo, however, declined
the award with the explanation that it could not find a buyer."' Because of its
location, the only three potential buyers are Los Alamos County Utilities, the
Department of Energy, or the Jemez Mountains Electrical Cooperative.' Four
years of planning succumbed to market realities, but the uncertainty surrounding water supply also likely undermined the project's feasibility.' Even if
Jemez Pueblo's solar project withers, the Pueblo envisions other projects like
geothermal energy; hundreds of other Native Nations also work to conjure
riches from natural resources, but all projects will need water.'
Jemez Pueblo's attempt to deploy a renewable energy project in a desert
epitomizes the difficulties a Native Nation faces as it plans for the future while
accounting for present challenges such as water scarcity.' To venture even one
of the least water-consuming renewable projects - solar power - Jemez Pueblo

still must ensure a supply of water."'

L.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); Who We Are, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/index.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2013).
244. Feds Reject Plans forJernezPueblo Casino,KOB4 SANTA FE - N. NM, Sept. 2, 2011,
http://santafe.kob.com/news/news/92286-feds-reject-plans-jemez-pueblo-casino.
245. Clausing, supm note 242.
246. See generallyBryan, supra note 4.
247. See Larissa Sommer, Pueblo of Jenez: Leading the Way to a
Renewable Future, TRIBES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, (Jul. 25, 2013), www4.nau.edu
/tribalclimatechange/tribes/southwestjemez.asp.
248. Bryan, supra note 4.
249. Id.; DraftEronmentalAssessmen4 supra note 56, at 3.
250. Bryan, supra note 4.
251. Nancy J. Appleby, Tribal Renewable Energy Projects:Balance Opportunitywth Caution, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com
/rea/news/article/2012/02/tribal-renewable-energy-projects-balance-opportunity-with-caution 1.
252. Email from John Jediny, Envtl. Prot. Specialist, U.S. Dep't of Energy, to author (Oct.
23, 2012, 14:26 EST) (on file with Water law Revient); Email from Greg Kaufman, Natural
Res. Dir.,Jemez Pueblo, to author (Nov. 5, 2012, 10:52 EST) (on file with Water LawReident.
253. Belone, supranote 23, at 21.
254. Bryan, supra note 4; see discussion supra Part III.
255. See generallyBryan, supra note 4; Email from Greg Kaufman, supra note 252.
256. See generallydiscussionsupra Parts II, III.
257. See generallydiscussion supra PartIII.
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Other than buying water, Jemez Pueblo looks to the river sharing its name,
the Rio Jemez, as its water source.' The river is a tributary of the Rio Grande,
one of the few water resources in New Mexico.' It provides water for Jemez
Pueblo, two other Pueblos, and many upstream users." The Pueblos, including Jemez Pueblo, already use the water for many activities including irrigation." Each use, whether withdrawn from the ground water or directly from
the surface water, reduces these tributaries and impacts the larger Rio
Grande." Current water supply cannot meet all the needs, whatever such
needs may be."' For example, during a drought in 1996, the Jemez and Zia
Pueblos pursued an injunction against other irrigation water users because
there simply was not enough water for all uses."'
Jemez Pueblo, like many other Native Nations, still has not established its
water rights to this river despite decades of patience.' Since 1983, Jemez
Pueblo and other water users have been quibbling over the scarce water resources in the region."' In that year, the United States filed a complaint for the
allocation of water from the Jemez River, known as the Abousleman adjudication. Nearly thirty years later, the case continues as litigation because the efforts to reach a settlement could not satisfy all parties."' In July 2011, the U.S.
District Court of New Mexico ordered the parties to reach a settlement or
submit a "discovery plan" by April 2012." By March 2012, it appeared that
the parties would opt for the latter option?"
Following the breakdown of efforts to reach a settlement, the parties will
litigate two issues."' The Special Master separated the Pueblo's historic and

258. CUBA SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DisT., MIDDLE Rio GRANDE REG'L WATER
PLAN: Rio PUERCO & RioJEMEz: SUBREGIONAL WATER PLAN 2000-2050 SUMMARY 8 (2004),
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263. See CUBA SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DIST., supra note 258, at 25.
264. BOSSERT, supra note 259, at 8.
265. See generalyid. at 3.
266. New Mexico FederalDistrict Court Issues Memorandurn and Order in Jewez River
Adjudication on the Indian Pueblos' Water Use Clains, W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 50 (Dec.
2004), avadable athttp://www.argentco.com/htm/f20041214.888790.htm.
267. Id.
268. See generallyBOSSERT, supra note 259, at 3; Letter from Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Department of Justice: Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., to Martha
Vazquez, Judge, United Sates District Court of N.M. (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.ose.state
.nm.us/Adjudication/Jemez962083CV1041/2012/3-March/4234%2003-1512%20STATUS%20REPORT%20Joint%2OLetter%20to%20Honorable%20Martha%20Vasque
z.pdf.
269. See Letter from Ignacia S. Moreno, supra note 268.
270. Id.
271. Id
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existing water rights from its future rights."' In a 2012 order, the New Mexico
District Court described the course of litigation as determiningJemez Pueblo's
water rights under various doctrines including the riparian doctrine, the Winters doctrine, and aboriginal rights."' The litigation will also quantify the water
rights."'

While the solar energy project was unprofitable without a market, it also
was probably not feasible in the long run without resolving the Jemez Pueblo's
water rights."' Although the project was but one opportunity for the community, its troubles could plague future endeavors as well if not resolved."' Even if
Jemez Pueblo's solar ambition has died, it is not willing to give up on its community development."' Other endeavors include pursuing a geothermal exploration project."' Jemez Pueblo has high hopes for its geothermal project because it received Department of Energy funding."' Any renewable energy project that Jemez Pueblo pursues requires a resolution of its water rights through
the Abousleman litigation. While the Sun may have saved the Walatowa in the
past, water will define their future.
VI. CONCLUSION
After centuries of impoverishment, Native Nations yearn to build a different future. They look towards the resources that are the foundations of their
origins. Whether the sun, wind, or streams impart power, Native Nations need
to establish their water rights under federal law to displace the current users of
the needed scarce resource that will enable them to initiate and maintain these
power projects. Until Native Nations secure their water rights and have the
actual means to use the water, including infrastructure, their futures remain
uncertain. Jemez Pueblo endeavors to define it future; if it is successful, other
Native Nations may follow suit."'

272. Id.
273. United States ex rel. Pueblos of Jemez v. Abousleman, No. 83cv01041 MV/WPL (D.
N.M. 2012) (Order granting and denying Joint Motion of United States and Pueblos of Jemez,
Zia, and Santa Ana Requesting Court to Permit the Parties to Engage in Fact-Finding and Related Discovery Prior to Submitting Briefs on Critical Threshold Issues).
274. Id.
275. See generallydiscussion supra Part III; see also supra notes 251-254 and accompanying
text.
276. See generallydiscussion supraPart III.
277. See Email from Greg Kaufman, supra note 252.
278. See generallyid.; Sommer, supra note 247.
Feds Finance Geothermal Exploration at
279. See Kevin Robinson-Avila,
Jemez Pueblo, ALBUQUERQUE Bus. FIRsT (Nov. 22, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.bizournals.c
om/albuquerque/stories/2009/11/23/storv4.html?page=all; Pueblo ofJemez - 2002 Projec4 U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY: TRIBAL ENERGY PROGRAM, http://appsl.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/pr

ojectsdetail.cfm/projectid-47 (last visited Sep. 26, 2013).
280. Bryan, supra note 4.
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CALIFORNIA TAKES ANOTHER COOKIE FROM THE
POLICY JAR: A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
ALEXANDER LOUDEN*
Water agencies are operating under a set of preferences, policies, and guidelines that occurred when water was very plentiful. However, it is time to really
look at the reality water agencies face right now. California's water law system
is an international disgrace.'
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I. ITRODUCTION
California has one of the most unique water law systems in the country,
recognizing both riparian rights and appropriation permits. The state government holds the state's water in trust, and all appropriations of water must
comply with various, sometimes competing, constitutional and statutory policies. Additionally, state agencies rate water uses by how beneficial they are to
society, favoring appropriations for higher rated uses. In 1978, California rec-

ognized the importance of providing a stable yet adaptable framework to ac-

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author extends
his utmost gratitude to Johna Varty and Chris Butler for their dedication and patience editing
this Note.
1. Assembly Floor Session: Readig of A.B. 685 State Water Policy, Reg. Sess. 2011-12
(statement of Mike Eng) aailable at http://calchannel.granicus.coni/MediaPlayer.phpview
id=7&clipid=719 (begins at 00:30:25).
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commodate growing demand for a limited supply of water.' California certainly
operates a system that emphasizes practical considerations over theoretical
simplicity.' Recently, however, serious problems with the quality and expense
of drinking water have highlighted some of California's water struggles.
In 2010, a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly found 884
million people around the world lacked access to safe drinking water' and encouraged an annual update by an independent expert t9 report on the status of
various countries' implementation of safe drinking water efforts.' In August
2011, the United Nations published Catarina Albuquerque's expert report,
which included an investigation of California's system. Although the report
never calls California a "disgrace," as Assembly member Mike Eng construed
it, the report did delve into the inadequacies of many California communities'
drinking water supplies.' For example, in the city of Seville, California, nitrate
levels are so high in drinking water-and the community so poor-that households spend on average twenty percent of their income every year to purchase
safe water, or else risk poisoning themselves.' The international spotlight
spurred California to adopt a policy recognizing a human right to water into
the state's existing legal framework.' Section 106.3 of the California Water
Code ("Human Right to Water") directs state agencies to consider the hardships many communities face trying to obtain safe and affordable drinking
water.'
The history of California water law illuminates the legal issues and adaptations leading to the enactment of the Human Right to Water statute where this
new policy fits in the state's legal framework. To that end, section II of this
Note provides an overview of the unique history that shaped California's water
law since statehood. In section III, this Note generally evaluates potential
changes California may see as state agencies apply the Human Right to Water.
In section IV, this Note specifically addresses groundwater integration concerns. Finally, section V concludes with a summary of the Note.

2. GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS, FINAL REPORT,
1-2, 6-7, 9 (1978) (describing California's historical, contemporary, and potential future adaptations of water law) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
3. Id.at 7.
4. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/292, 2 (Aug. 3 2010).
5. Id. at 3.
6.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND
SANITATION, 1 34-39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.4 (Aug. 2, 2011) [hereinafter SPECIAL

REPORTI (by Catarina de Albuquerque).
7. Id. at 16.
8. Assembly FloorSession: Reading of A.B. 685 State Water Polcy, Reg. Sess. 2011-12
(statement of Mike Eng) aailable at http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view
_id-7&clipjd-719 (begins at 00:30:25).
9. CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3 (West 2012).
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WATER LAW IN
CALIFORNIA
A.

PRE-1928 WATER RIGHTS

Water law in California is notoriously c6mplex, but the system gains clarity
when placed into historical context." California initially adopted a traditional
riparian water rights system, common in much of the eastern United States
and England." Under this early model, property owners had the right to use
water appurtenant to their land, regardless of the use to which the riparian
owner put the water." Riparian owners cannot sever their water rights from
their land."
Two forces at play during California's infancy highlighted the riparian
framework's insufficiency for California. First, frontier settlement and the riparian doctrine are most compatible in places like the eastern United States
and England, where land bordering water supplies is in abundance. However,
water is scarce in California. With a shortage of land adjacent to water supplies, settlers had to modify traditional property rights to allow diversion of
water from land they did not own." Second, during the early stages of California's gold rush and subsequent settlement the federal government owned
much of the land upon which the miners were prospecting (and incidentally
trespassing)." Miners needed water to wash ore but were not landowners and,
thus, had no claim to water under the riparian doctrine. To solve this problem, the miners disregarded the riparian model and instead created an informal system to allocate the scarce resource efficiently and predictably." The
miner's system differed from the riparian doctrine in that it was not based on
ownership of land, and instead granted the first person to divert water for beneficial use a priority right to continued use over later "junior" users." California
developed a legal framework surrounding such appropriations that defined
when a use was beneficial-and thus valid against junior appropriators." What
emerged in the American West was the first iteration of the prior appropriation doctrine, memorably termed "first in time, first in right.""
Although prior appropriation began as an informal custom among miners
trespassing on federal land, in 1855 California's Supreme Court held such
appropriations created a valid and enforceable water right." In the next decade, Congress also recognized the custom as valid and declared non10. Roderick E. Walston, Calornia Water Law HIstorical Orins to the Present, 29
WHrrrIER L. REv. 765, 766 (2008).
11. Idat 768; SPECIAL REPORT, supm note 6.
12. Walston, supra note 10, at 768.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Walston, supra note 10, at 768.
Id.
Discussed Infra Section B.
Walston, supra note 10, at. 768.
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
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appropriated water available for appropriation." Under the prior appropriation
doctrine, property ownership was not necessary; rather, water users could obtain the right to use a specific quantity of surface water by diverting water in
priority." Unlike riparian uses, if the state deemed an appropriation use nonbeneficial, or if the use ceased, the appropriator lost their right to use the water."
California water law is unique. Most states chose to adopt either a riparian
or prior appropriation scheme to suit the water needs of the state without the
inherent tension and complexity of a dual rights system.' But California is not
like most states. In 1884, the Supreme Court of California held in Lux v. Haggzn that riparian rights coexisted with appropriated rights." For a time, riparian
rights were superior to appropriative rights in that riparian owners were entitled to full use of the water flowing appurtenant to their land without regard to
the effect on appropriation rights." In other words, the "California Doctrine,"
as lawyers and judges called the dual rights system, allowed riparian owners to
use as much water as needed to fully satisfy even an unreasonable use before a
prior appropriator could exercise a quantified right to the same surface water."
As such, riparian rights subjected appropriative rights to uncertainty and sporadic unfulfillment, despite their importance to growing statewide development
efforts."
In 1926, California's Supreme Court highlighted the inequitable consequences of operating two systems of water rights allocation in tendem." The
case, Herminghaus v. Southern Cahfornia Edison Company,fueled industrial,
agricultural, and municipal disfavor of riparian-appropriation interaction.
Herminghaus was a farmer who wanted to use the entire flow of a stream to
flood irrigate his fields." The resulting lack of water thwarted an upstream
power development plan." Because Herminghaus did not need to justify a
riparian use against an appropriation use, the court held that the massive diversion was within Herminghaus' right as a riparian landowner."
The superiority the court in Herninghausgave to riparian owners directly
contradicted the development forces that pushed California to adopt the prior
appropriations model in the first place. Since the mining rush in the mid-19th
21. Walston, supranote 10, at 779.
22. Id. at 769.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 924 (Cal. 1884).
26. Walston, supra note 10 at 770 (citing Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607
(Cal. 1926)).
27. Id.; Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 306 P.2d 824, 838 (Cal. 1957) revd sub
nom Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (noting that under the Heringhaus
decision, "no matter how unreasonable the claim of a riparian owner to the full flow of a stream
might be, he had the right to assert it.").
28. Ivanhoe, 306 P.2d at 838.
29. Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926) overrled by CAL CONsT.
art. X, § 2; Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
30.

Herminghaus,252 P. at 609.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 612; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
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century, California's rich soil and booming population meant farmers, power
plants, and municipal water suppliers needed water rights upon which they
could rely to continue nurturing businesses and communities into the future.'
As such, the 1926 Herminghauscase catalyzed a strong reaction from Californians trying to protect mining and agricultural interests at the heart of the
state's economy.'
B. POST-1928 1VATER RIGHTS

In 1928, California fortified appropriative rights with a constitutional
amendment. ' Article X, section 2 not only expressly rejected riparian "superiority," but also created the foundation of California's modern water law system
through three policy provisions. ' As such, the "amendment does more than
merely overturn Herminghaus-itestablishes state water policy."" It prohibited
waste and limited valid water uses-both riparian and appropriative-to only
maximally beneficial uses." It also set a new "lodestar"" for the government to
weigh competing uses: the use must conserve water "with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use ... for the public welfare."" Because the constitution
thus required all water use to achieve maximum benefit and minimum waste
in furtherance of the public interest, the California Supreme Court interpreted
the amendment as requiring state agencies to weigh "reasonable and beneficial" use between afl competing water rights, even riparian rights." The state
legislature then further defined the boundaries of the constitutional mandate
through comprehensive legislation.
Section 1257 of the California Water Code codifies the "beneficial uses"
prerogative of the amendment." Beneficial uses include, but are not limited to,
"domestic, irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses, preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife, recreational, mining and power purposes, and
any uses specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control plan.""
Furthermore, historical determinations do not limit beneficial use because it is
a concept "flexible enough to encompass changing public needs."" Other provisions of the Water Code grant the State Water Resources Control Board
("SWRCB") the authority to carry out the prescribed system of weighing beneficial uses to determine water rights, outlined below in Section c."

33. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
37. Nat Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725 (Cal. 1983).
38. CAL. CONST. art. X, S 2.
39. Walston, supra note 10, at 769.
40. Walston, supra note 10, at 770.
41. NatY Audubon Soc), 658 P.2d at 719; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; see also 12
Witkin, Summary 10th (2005) Real Prop, § 920, p. 1110.
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2012).
43. Id; see id. § 659 (West 2013).
44. NatYAudubon Soc'658 P.2d at 719, discussed Ina Section D.
45. CAL. WATER CODE SS 100-540, 1000-5976 (West 2012).
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C.STATUTORY PRIORITIES OF WATER USE

Since 1913, California statutes have outlined the duties of the SWRCB regarding water rights appropriations along with administrative policies and procedures.' In addition to defining beneficial uses, the California State Legislature ("Legislature") provides agencies with guidance for prioritizing appropriations. To that end, statutes mandate that state agencies like the SWRCB lend
more weight to certain beneficial uses than others. Section 106 of the California Water Code ("section 106") states that domestic uses of water are the most
beneficial uses (i.e., most weighty), followed by irrigation uses. Courts interpret domestic uses to include uses necessary for sustenance of human beings,
culinary purposes, and other household purposes." Courts have held the policy in section 106 binding on every California agency, water district, and city."
However, courts have noted section 106 does not identify how much
weight, relative to other competing and complementary policies, the state
should give section 106.' In other words, section 106 requires state agencies to
acknowledge domestic uses are more important than other uses, but it does
not require state agencies to categorically grant or deny permits based upon a
finding of domestic use." In fact, section 107 of the California Water Code
confirms the legislative intent that allpolicies in the Water Code be given their
"full force and effect."" Further, section 1257 explicitly directs the SWRCB to
consider the relative benefits of all proposed beneficial uses in the permit application process, and authorizes the SWRCB to attach whatever conditions
the SWRCB sees fit to "best develop, conserve, and utilize [water] in the public interest."" Thus, although the statutory priority of a particular use is an important consideration for agencies, it does not determine how much water an

46. Walston, supra note 10, at 771.
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 2012).
48. Deetz v. Carter, 43 Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1965) (holding that a diversion supplying a flow
of water in excess of domestic needs could also be used for irrigation purposes without violating
the priority scheme when a lesser flow would stagnate and become unfit for domestic use). But
see Cowell v. Armstrong, 290 P. 1036, 1039 (Cal. 1930) (holding that the domestic use priority
does not apply to water needed to care for livestock when the livestock was raised to sell in the
market); Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 413 (Cal. 1944) ("it may well be that the commercial
character of the proprietor's business in serving his guests may be so extensive that a lower riparian whose domestic use, whether or not commercialized, would be prejudiced by the business
activities of the upper riparian and to such an extent as to require the interposition of a court of
equity to safeguard his rights. The would especially be true where swimming pools, ornamental
pools, boating, and the like are furnished as a part of the service to the guests, which uses, in
themselves, have been held to be not domestic.") (citations omitted).
49. City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irrigation District, 405 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. 1965) (noting that although a city may condemn property already appropriated to a public use if the city
seeks to apply the property to a more beneficial use, it can only do so if the appropriated property is currently "used for the public purposes for which it has been so appropriated.").
50. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 28 Cal. Rptr. 724, 737 (1963).
51. Id.
52. CAL. WATER CODE S 107 (West 2012).
53. CAL. WATER CODE S 1257 (West 2012).
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appropriator may use; agencies must further all policies relevant to their decisions."
D.THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Generally speaking, the public trust doctrine means that "a state must hold
tide to submerged lands in its navigable waters in trust for public benefit."
One commenter provided a concise summary of California's original public
trust doctrine:
Under the equal footing doctrine', California enjoyed the same rights as the
original thirteen states upon its admission to the Union in 1850. Accordingly,
California acquired title to federally defined "navigable waters" below the
high water mark within its borders, subject only to federal interests in maintaining navigation and regulating interstate commerce. Moreover, once federal law confers title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a state, that
state may redefine property rights between its citizens and itself in relation to
those submerged lands."

Federal navigability definitions thus determine whether a state owns a particular body of water and the land beneath and, therefore, whether the state's
public trust doctrine applies. But, importantly, state courts determine the "contours" of that state's public trust doctrine.' The California Supreme Court has
certainly redefined the public trust doctrine in a recent jurisprudential trend."
llmois Central Railroad v. II2ois, the United States Supreme Court's
seminal public trust case, held that Illinois' public trust doctrine prohibited the

state from granting a private entity ownership of land beneath a navigable body
of water because the transfer would prevent public access to "navigation,
commerce, and fishing."' California adopted Illinois' public trust framework
54. Walston, supranote 10, at 772.
55. Jordan Browning, Unearthng Subterranean Water Rights: The Envronmental Law
Foundationk Efforts to Extend Cahforiak Pubhc Trust Doctrne, ENVIRONs ENvTL. L. &
POL'YJ. 231, 233 (Spring 2011). [hereinafter Browmg.
56. Id. A recent Supreme Court opinion explained the equal footing doctrine:
The title consequences of the equal-footing doctrine can be stated in summary form:
Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable. ... It may allocate and govern those lands according to state law subject only to
"the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of
navigation in interstate and foreign commerce;" [tihe United States retains any title
vested in it before statehood to any land beneath waters not then navigable (and not
tidally influenced), to be transferred or licensed if and as it chooses.
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227-28 (2012) (citations omitted).
57. Browning, supra note 55, at 234 (citations omitted).
58. PPL Mont, 132 S. Ct. at 1235 ("[tihe States retain residual power to determine the
scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed
title under the equal-footing doctrine.").
59. Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine: What It Is,
Where It Came from, and Why ColoradoDoes Not (andShould Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 47, 53 [hereinafter Leonhardil.
60. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see Browning, supra note 55, at
234.
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in 1897." Since then, however, state judicial opinions have expanded the scope
of what the state holds in trust and what the trust protects.
The most influential California case describing the public trust doctrine's
application to the doctrine of prior appropriation was also the first case to do
so." In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,Los Angeles acquired
riparian rights appurtenant to Mono Lake as well as permits from the SWRCB
to several streams that fed the lake." Los Angeles diverted those streams to
augment its municipal supplies as the city grew." As a result, the lake shrunk
rapidly, and environmental groups sued the SWRCB claiming the SWRCB
unlawfully permitted Los Angeles to destroy the shrimp ecosystem and the
aesthetic appeal of the scenic lake." The Audubon court acknowledged the
SWRCB's finding that the city's desired domestic use would ordinarily qualify
as adequate justification for its dismissal of protests." However, while the public trust traditionally protected navigation, commerce, and fishing, the court
held the doctrine may also protect "scientific study, recreation, and ... open
space and habitat for birds and marine life."" Furthermore, the Audubon
court found the doctrine protected not just navigable bodies of water like
Mono Lake, but also non-navigable streams that feed navigable bodies of water." It is unclear whether California's application of the public trust doctrine
to non-navigable streams comports with current constitutional interpretations
of the equal footing doctrine."
Because the public trust protected Mono Lake and its feeder streams, and
the city's diversions would harm the lake, the court remanded the case, requiring the SWRCB to consider public trust interests when reviewing permit applications." The impact of Audubon is that, out of "current and historical necessity" the SWRCB must constantly seek to balance appropriation interests
against contemporary, changing public trust interests." Courts have refined this
balancing approach to require the state to protect public trust resources if the

61. Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 50 P. 268 (Cal. 1897).
62. Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See also City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the public trust doctrine
applied to land ostensibly conveyed free of the public trust so long as the property could still
serve a public trust use); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public
trust doctrine applied to any patent of tidelands).
63. NatlAudubon Soc)', 658 P.2d at 713.
64. Id.
65. Id. (finding that the lake's surface dropped over one foot per year).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 719; Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 114 Cal. App. 4th 689,
709 (2003).
68. Nat Audubon Socy 658 P.2d at 720. See Leonhardt, supra note 59, at 72-75 (noting
the public trust had seemingly "leaped beyond its traditional restraint ... to cover rights not only
in navigable waters, but also in waters tributary to navigable waters."). But see Golden Feather
Community Assn. v. Thermalito Irr. Dist. 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1283 (1989) (holding that the
public trust doctrine did not extend to authorized diversions of non-navigable waters).
69. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. CL 1215,1227-28 (2012).
70. NatYAudubon Socy 658 P.2d at 726.
71. Id at 727-28.
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SWRCB determines it is "feasible."" In other words, regardless of the
SWRCB's past findings, if it determines at any point that it can feasibly correct
an imbalance between the benefits of a public trust use and an appropriation
use, the SWRCB may revoke a prior appropriator's permit in order to further
a state-defined public interest."
E. GROUNDWATER
California's regulatory scheme distinguishes among surface water, percolating groundwater, and subterranean streams." The public trust doctrine only
applies to surface water and subterranean streams-not groundwater.1 Subterranean streams are underground water "flowing through known and definite
channels."" State agencies, principally the SWRCB, regulate surface water and
subterranean streams through the permitting system." All other underground
water is percolating groundwater." Commentators frequently note that this
classification system does not take into account groundwater's substantial, yet
indirect, relationship to surface water." Indeed, all water sources on Earth influence each other through complex hydrological interactions. The reason that
California's legal definitions of water sources does not more clearly mirror
scientific understanding and terminology is likely because legislators sought to
use terms of art already employed in water jurisprudence to avoid constitutional issues while closing a loophole exempting pumping water from a stream
where it flowed temporarily underground from permitting requirements."
72. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
73. Id. See also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 368-72 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the public trust doctrine applied to land ostensibly conveyed free of the public trust so
long as the property could still serve a public trust use).
74. Jan Stevens, Cahfomia's Groundwater:A Legally Neglected Resource, 19 HASTINGS
W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 3, 7 (2013).
75. Ieonhardt, supra note 68 at 75-76 . . . California's public trust doctrine does not
extend to groundwater, at least absent some impact on the pulic use of navigable waters.") (citing
Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
76. Stevens, supm note 74 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §1200); N. Gualala Water Co. v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1585-86 (2006). The SWRCB uses a
four-part test to define an underground stream that requires a permit to pump:
1. Is there a subsurface channel?
2. Does the channel have relatively impermeable bed and banks?
3. Is its course known or capable of being known by reasonable inference?
4. Is groundwater flowing in die channel?
77. Discussed supm Section b.
78.

ARTHUR L. LIrLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER

11

71 (2nd ed.

2007).
79. JOSEPH L. SAx, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's PERMITTING
AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS SUBTERRANEAN
STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS No. 0-076-300-0 at 1 (2002)

("[tlo put the matter as simply as possible, the above categories do not accord with scientific
understanding of the occurrence and distribution of water on and in the [Elarth.") [hereinafter
SAX REVIEW].

80. Id. at 38. ("In short, all the evidence we have indicates that the legislative language was
designed to exclude groundwater generally, except for that which was functionally part and
parcel of a surface stream-in the sense of pumping that directly affected surface flow.").
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The state currently does not regulate overlying users' right to percolating
groundwater-property owners may pump groundwater beneath their land
without a state permit." To be sure, overlying owners of percolating groundwater only have the right to use the water in reasonable and beneficial ways." But
because the state plays no role in regulating groundwater, the task falls to local
agencies and courts to regulate against wasteful use and overdrafting." The
result has been a patchwork of inconsistent rdes that vary among cities, water
districts, and courts."
Unlike overlying owners, the state does recognize appropriative rights for
people who want to pump and export percolating groundwater." If there is
surplus percolating groundwater in a basin, California law allows people to
acquire appropriative rights without state involvement." The state considers the
right perfected once a user takes the surplus water for a non-overlying use."
Technically, senior appropriators have the right to satisfy their full appropriation before junior appropriators can pump, just like with surface water appropriations." However, unlike surface water appropriations, no state permitting
system exists in California to quantify a groundwater appropriation right or the
total amount of water available in a groundwater basin before overdraft occurs." As such, even in an overdrafted basin with no surplus, junior appropriators will often pump their full use anyway.' In fact, where a community relies
on an overdrafted basin, "no case has limited pumpers ... based on claimed
priorities."" Groundwater thus remains largely unregulated and outside the
purview of state agency jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the state of California still holds an interest in all waters of
the state, including groundwater." And California's Constitution authorizes the
Legislature to enact laws to further the reasonable and beneficial use mandate." Some observers argue that despite legislative reluctance to interfere in
groundwater regulation, the courts enforce the public interest in groundwater."
For example, the Audubon court found the SWRCB had jurisdiction over all
water that affects public trust interests, regardless of whether the SWRCB issues permits for that water." So if a groundwater source feeds navigable waters,
the SWRCB may be able to invoke public trust doctrine authority to regulate
8 1. Id.
82. LrrTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 74.
83. Id.; John Hedges, Currentsin Calornia Water Law:- The Push to Integate Groundwater and Surface Water Management Through the Courts, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 375,
382 (2011).
84. Hedges, supra note 83.
85. LrrfLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 76.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 77.
90. Id.
91. LrftLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 77, at 77.
92. Stevens, supra note 74, at 3, 34-35.
93. CAL. CONST. art X § 2; Id.
94. Stevens, supra note 72, at 35.
95. Id.
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against unreasonable uses.' Yet, because the SWRCB does not define
groundwater in terms of its connection to other bodies of water (and is not
involved in permitting for percolating groundwater), lawsuits may be the most
practical way to actually limit groundwater pumping."w

III. HOW WIL THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AFFECT
CALIFORNIA?
As of January 1, 2013, California has a new state policy that aims to provide its citizens with safe and affordable drinking water.' The Human Right to
Water statute declares a human right to water in subsection (a)." Of particular
importance, the right extends only to water "adequate for human consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes."" In subsection (b), the statute requires
relevant state agencies to consider the policy when making certain agency decisions pertinent to the policy."' Subsection (c) restricts state obligations to any
obligations that may exist in subsection (b).'" Subsection (d) limits the statute's
application to existing water supplies." Finally, Subsection (e) limits the statute's implementation from "infringling) on the rights or responsibilities of any
public water system.""
Opposition to the Human Right to Water sprouted as the bill, Assembly
Bill 685 ("AB 685"), worked its way through the California State Assembly.
Those who opposed the bill focused on: (i) the ambiguity of a human right to
water, (ii) the fear of increased costs to state and local government due to potential liability, and (iii) the redundancy of a human right to water in a state that
already prioritizes domestic uses." Moments before the bill passed in the California Assembly, assembly member Manuel Perez poignantly remarked,
"What good is a right that still costs you money ... somebody has to pay for
the water.""
The Safe Water Alliance, a prominent supporter of AB 685, published
The Lega Implications of AB 685 ("report") to address concerns that arose
during legislative debate and amendment throughout 2012. The report first
outlined why California needed the new policy. It pointed out that a significant
number of Californians could not drink their tap water and argued that con96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 36.
CAL. WATER CODE

§

106.3 (West 2012).

Id.

100.
Id.; see also ROSE FRANCIS, SAFEWATER ALLIANCE, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF AB
685 (ENG), CALIFORNIA'S HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER BILL (2012); City of Arcadia v. State Wa-

ter Resources Control Bd. 191 Cal. App. 4th 156, 176 (2010).
101. CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3 (West 2012).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Assembly Floor Session: Reading ofA.B. 685 State Water Pobcy, Reg. Sess. 2011-12
available at http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id-7&cipid-719 (begins at
00:30:25).
106. Id. (statement of Manuel Perez).
107. FRANCIS, supra note 100.
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tamination and aging infrastructure resulted in unacceptably expensive water."
Next, the report defined the scope of legal obligations AB 685 would confer
on state agencies. Despite the grandiose name of the policy, A Human Right
to Water, AB 685 creates no independently enforceable rights for anyone."
Instead, it merely creates a duty for state agencies, triggered when an agency
engages in an administrative action likely to impact water safety or affordability.' As such, agencies have no independent duty to adopt new policies or
regulations; only when agencies are already involved in an action relevant to
safe and affordable water would AB 685 require them to advance the policy's
pronouncement."'
However, the Legislature amended AB 685 after the report with one substantive change-instead of requiring agencies to "advance the implementation"
of the policy, the current statute only requires agencies to "consider" the policy."' Regardless of the broader agency discretion in merely considering the
policy, the same circumstances trigger the duty-adoption or revision of relevant policies, regulations, or funding criteria.
The amendment undeniably dulled the teeth of the statute. Prior to
amendment, the report optimistically asserted that because of AB 685, "at
every relevant juncture, every relevant agency will be required to take another
step (however small) in the direction of achieving universal access to safe, affordable domestic water service.""' However, the amended statute requires no
such steady march towards safe and affordable water. The current language
conceivably, though improbably, allows hundreds of years to go by with state
agencies considering the safety and affordability of water, yet never implementing the goal of universal access.
Yet, it is exactly that type of discretion that is already the foundation of
California water law. The Audubon court grappled with the same issues the
Human Right to Water faced when the Legislature amended it. At first, the
Human Right to Water would have required the SWRCB to constantly advance implementation of universal access to safe and affordable water. But
those who opposed that "steady march" type of language foresaw a collision
course"'-if universal access always outweighed appropriation interests, "either
doctrine fully applied would exclude the other.""' The amended, current version thus reflects and fits nicely into the balanced Audubon approach whereby
the SWRCB must always considerthe human right to water alongside all other

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-7.
Id.at 7.
Id.
Id. at 20 (reproducing the bill's language in its entirety as of aJanuary 13, 2012 amendment); CAL.NVATER CODE § 106.3.
113. FRANcIs, supra note 100, at 8.
114. Ieonhardt, supra note 68, at 73.
115. Id.; Kimberly Thomer, Olivenhain Municipal Water District, Letter Re: Assembly Bill
685 (Eng)-Oppose 1 (2012) ("[clodifving a new 'human right to water' without considering
existing legal authority will lead to conflicts that have not been adequately addressed by this
legislation.").
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water policies and doctrines, including public trust interests and domestic use
pronty.
Indeed, California courts traditionally allowed state agencies wide discretion when carrying out administrative actions that impacted substantive, discretionary state policies."' It is difficult to determine what level of discretion courts
will allow agencies as they carry out actions impacting water safety and affordability. One clue may be the courts' treatment of section 106."' Section 106
prioritizes domestic uses of water above all others, with irrigation use being the
next highest priority." The SafeWater Alliance identified Section 106 as the
closest substantive parallel policy to the Human Right to Water, especially as it
is also binding upon every California agency."' Indeed, courts consistently
point out that California has numerous overlapping policies, all deserving of
state agency consideration." Except for indicating that domestic uses of water
tend to be the most beneficial uses, Section 106 does not identify exactly how
much weight, relative to other competing and complementary policies, state
agencies should give section 106."' Case in point, a domestic use of water from
Mono Lake-critical to the development of California's largest city, Los Angeles-did not categorically trump a public trust use, as seen in Audubon.'" Because the Human Right to Water does not even go as far as Section 106 to
assert that the water used to further its policy is the most beneficial use of water, courts are likely to allow agencies wide latitude when their decisions impact the safety and affordability of water as long as the agency can point to
overriding considerations or policies.
Opponents of AB 685 also had reservations about the bill exposing the
state to potential liability if Californians sued the state because they only had
access to unsafe or unaffordable water." The SafeWater Alliance rejected
those concerns even before the Legislature amended AB 685, when it still
required the state to advance the policy instead of only consider it. The
SafeWater Alliance's report argued that the bill created no new right and the
only enforcement possible, if any, was injunctive relief if the SWRCB, for ex-

116. Cherry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 182, 214
(2010) (upholding lead agency's decision to approve a project despite project's significant environmental impacts when agency finds overriding considerations that are supported by substantial evidence). ,
117. CAL. WVATER CODE § 106 (West 2012) ("lilt is hereby declared to be the established
policy of this State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water and
that the next highest use is for irrigation.").
118. Id.
119. FRANCIS, supm note 100, at 15 (2012) (quoting City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irrigation Dist. 405 P.2d 377 (1965)).
120. Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 738 (1963); see also CAL.
WATER CODE S 107 (West 2012) (confirming that "[tlhe declaration of the policy of the State in
this chapter is not exclusive, and all other or further declarations of policy in this code shall be
given their full force and effect.").
121. Metropolitan WaterDist.28 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
122. Discussed supm Section II.
123. Kimberly Thorner, Olivenhain Municipal Water District, Letter Re: Assembly Bill 685
(Eng)-Oppose 1 (2012).
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ample, failed to advance universal access to safe and affordable water." With
the current language only requiring the SWRCB to consider the Human Right
to Water, it seems unlikely that a court would grant an injunction. Additionally, subsections (c)-(d) of the Human Right to Water expressly limit or exempt
state liability.'" Nonetheless, California state agencies may continue to eye the
Human Right to Water with trepidation if they will have to spend resources
fighting legal battles that they ultimately expect to win.
Furthermore, SafeWater Alliance's report noted the bill would leave untouched the quantitative standard of safety for drinking water. The Human
Right to Water lays out a duty for state agencies to ensure quaitativestandards
of "safe" and "affordable" drinking water for California residents. However,
California already uses quantitativestandards to determine drinking water safety.'" Additionally, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires the United States Department of Health Services, in adopting the quantitative drinking water standards, to consider not only state public health goals and Environmental Protection Agency standards for each contaminant, but also to predict costs of compliance.'" In other words, in setting enforceable quantitative drinking water
standards, federal and state laws already require relevant state agencies to consider both safety and affordability.'"
Moreover, California courts have expressly rejected policy pronouncements of water quality like "pure, wholesome, and potable" as enforceable
standards when a quantitative standard already defines the water quality standard with a numeric value.' In In Re GroundwaterCases, the court held that a
party may not bring an action against defendants complying with state numerical standards." The court reasoned that "[plermitting courts and juries to second-guess the carefully considered decisions of the regulatory agencies on
technical water quality issues would. flout the Legislature's policy choice to entrust such matters to [regulatory agencies.]""'
Given the relaxed requirement that state agencies merely consider the universal access policy found in the Human Right to Water, courts are even less
likely to force state agencies to pay out damages or issue injunctions than the
SafeWater Alliance predicted. Moreover, the state already must consider domestic use supremacy and the public trust doctrine, and these considerations
heavily overlap with the safety and affordability considerations mandated in the
Human Right to Water. Thus, California state agencies would have to disregard not only the Human Right to Water, but several duties they already have
to open themselves up to liability. On the other hand, opponents point out that
although the Human Right to Water exempts local agencies from liability, it
124.

FRANcIs, supm note 100, at 11-13.

125. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 106.3(c)-(d) (West 2012).
126. Id. at 9; see also In re Groundwater Cases, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 837-41 (2007).
127. In re GrounditaterCases, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 841.
128. Of course, the affordability consideration relates directly to public utility water suppliers,
but that cost would likely shift to consumers.
129. In re GroundwaterCases, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 841.
130. Id. at 842-43.
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does not exempt them from lawsuits.'" These local agencies cannot afford the
uncertainty this legislation creates.'" State agencies, too, are not only concerned
with paying monetary damages; additional litigation and possible compliance
with injunctive court orders could impact state and local budgets in the future,
though likely to a relatively modest extent.
In sum, the new policy will likely not have the costly effects some opponents fear. And although ambiguous, the policy reflects and adds to the underlying foundation of California water law by providing exactly the type of agency
discretion California has promoted since statehood." Finally, although water
safety and affordability considerations inhere in many of California's existing
laws, policies, regulations, and its constitution, the Human Right to Water
policy can still orient agency action towards addressing the serious, internationally-condemned water availability problems."
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT' ON GROUNDWATER
Even though the Human Right to Water does not directly implicate
groundwater because groundwater is outside state agency jurisdiction, the new
statute may indicate a legislative wilingness to expand state agency jurisdiction.
Today, groundwater accounts for thirty percent of California's water supply in
non-drought years." For the central coast, it accounted for eighty-three percent
of the general supply in 2003." Municipal water system operators (like cities
and water districts) own many appropriation rights to percolating groundwater-in fact, many California cities rely mainly on groundwater sources." Half
of California residents rely on groundwater for one-fourth of their drinking
water." Unfortunately, however, some of these groundwater sources contain
high levels of contaminants due to pollution from industrial and agricultural
runoff."
The San Joaquin Valley exemplifies the groundwater safety and affordability problems in California. Residents in the San Joaquin Valley rely on
groundwater for ninety percent of their drinking water."' Proponents of the
Human Right to Water specifically pointed to the communities in San Joaquin
132. Id.
133. Kimberly Thorner, Olivenhain Municipal Water District, Letter Re: Assembly Bill 685
(Eng)-Oppose 1 (2012) ("Recent amendments exempt the state from liability but leave local
agencies exposed to costly litigation. Local agencies cannot afford the uncertainty that this legislation would create.").
134. Nat' Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 726 (Cal. 1983).
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ailable at http://calchannel.granicus.con/MediaPlayer.php
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as communities that would benefit from a Human Right to Water."' " However, in the absence of state regulatory authority, the Human Right to Water will
not require anyone to consider the impact of pumping or overdrafting on
many California communities, such as the San Joaquin Valley community, that
rely on groundwater for drinking water.'" Given the legislative debate's focus
on groundwater-reliant communities, perhaps AB 685's drafters intended that
to change.
Quite possibly the Human Right to Water was actually passed to push the
SWRCB to start regulating groundwater-or at least to redefine subterranean
streams (which they already regulate directly) in a way that takes greater notice
of streams' relationship to surface water and navigable bodies of water. Because existing state policies already conform with the goals in the bill, the
seemingly redundant statute may aim to spur state agencies and courts to recognize a more realistic model of groundwater regulation and its relationship to
surface water. Indeed, the statute's language directs state agencies to consider
the human right to water when adoptingnew regulations and revisingold regulations." Of course, many scholars have long pondered the wisdom of broader
statewide regulatory authority:
But this State has a long and deep history of resistance to such integration,
and the prospects of achieving legislative change that wouldn't be piecemeal
or nddled with destructive exceptions seems very dim within the foreseeable
future. In addition, California's exception of riparian uses (which cases indicate includes overlying applications of groundwater) from its permitting system provides another reason to doubt the prospects of full integration of
[groundwaterl administration under a Board ISWRCB] pernitting system."
By admitting that groundwater is directly connected to bodies of water
protected by the public trust and the existing state permitting scheme, the
SWRCB could regulate overdrafting and contamination through comprehensive planning and allocation efforts. However, future state-level involvement
would open the state up to considerable liability. Litigating groundwater appropriation pionities alone-never before attempted"'-would be immensely
expensive. More broadly speaking, if the Legislature forces the SWRCB to reevaluate groundwater pumping throughout the state, it "would lead to waterrights chaos . . . ."' State agency fears of groundwater integration are well-

founded, especially since the state has finally balanced its budget."
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V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, California now has a legislative pronouncement that the state
wishes to secure safe and affordable water for all its residents. However, the
state has a long way to go before it reaches an adequate level of access to clean
water." Although increasing access to water for domestic uses is already the
state's priority, it is not the state's reality. Yet, no matter how ambiguous the
state's duty, or redundant the policy, requiring an additional level of safety and
affordability consideration may well persuade an agency to give greater weight
to domestic uses and apply the policy to more situations than previously. Most
concerning for agencies, the new statute may be the first step towards integrating groundwater into the state's regulatory system. Certainly, groundwater
management is an important goal for a state with such limited water resources,
but state agencies have much to fear from the inevitable cascade of litigation
that would result. Time will tell whether the Human Right to Water is an indicator of legislative willingness to fight a battle for control of groundwater. Given the egregious water safety and affordability conditions in many California
communities, something needs to change.
With the Human Right to Water, California has added what sounds like a
revolutionary cookie to its rather complicated policy jar. But the new policy
simply reaffirms the existing framework of appropriations, while leaving
groundwater pumping virtually untouched (at least for now). Looking to the
future, it is hard to see how the Human Right to Water will either upend California water law or drastically increase state administration costs. But perhaps
this new law is the first step of many that will aim to mend California's notorious scarce-resource distribution inequities. Standing alone, however, the Human Right to Water simply sounds unusual; in reality, it simply builds on the
current staples of California water law legislation-agency discretion and public
trust flexibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The key issue the United States Supreme Court ("Court") decided in TarrantRegional Water District v. Hermann was whether silence with respect to
state lines in the Red River Compact ("Compact"), where the Compact provides that "Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of water in a particular subbasin," created in those states a right to cross state lines in order to
divert their full water entitlement under the Compact.' The decision stands as
an important indication of how the Court will interpret interstate compacts
regarding cross-boundary rights in the future: the Court will not interpret a
Congressionally approved compact to preempt state water laws unless the language of the compact or the subsequent conduct of the parties clearly expresses an intent by the states to surrender plenary authority over the water resources within their borders. The result will likely impact the formation of
future interstate water compacts and may bear upon past compacts silent with
regard to cross-boundary rights. The Court's decision could also impact noncompact waters because the decision left open the possibility of dormant
The author would like to thank Susan Ryan, Attorney at Ryley Carlock & Applewhite,
P.C., for her valuable time and insightful guidance on this Case Note.
1. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305; Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v.
Herrnann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013).
*
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Commerce Clause limitations on a state's sovereignty to legislate against crossboundary diversions of water not allocated by an interstate compact.
In the early 1950s, Oklahoma and Texas experienced severe drought.'
The United States Geological Survey recognized the drought as the worst in
the history of Texas and the most persistent drought on record for Oklahoma.'
During this time, Texas classified all but one of its 254 counties as disaster
areas.' The drought had a severe impact on Texas' water resources and created severe water supply shortages in Oklahoma.' From 1952 to 1956 all sections of Oklahoma, with the exception of a small area in the central part of the
state, suffered from prolonged precipitation deficiencies, serious drought
damage, and critical municipal water supply problems.! States in the region
found it necessary to find long-term solutions and to develop water plans in
order to satisfy increasing demands on water resources.' It was during this time
that Congress, in 1955, authorized Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas
("Signatory States") to negotiate a compact to allocate water from the Red River and its tributaries amongst themselves.! In 1978 these states signed the Red
River Compact, which Congress subsequently approved in 1980.'
Following Congress' approval of the Compact, Texas continued to suffer
from periods of intense drought that, coupled with a significant increase in
population, further strained water supplies in north-central Texas." Between
2000 and 2001, Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), the Texas state
agency responsible for supplying water to the region, attempted unsuccessfully
to purchase water from Oklahoma and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations."
Further, in 2007 Tarrant applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
("OWRB") for a water resource permit knowing that Oklahoma's 2002 water
statutes prohibited the sale or export of water out-of-state and, thus, effectively
prevented out-of-state applicants from diverting water from within the state."
Considering Oklahoma's water law and anticipating rejection of its permit
requests, Tarrant simultaneously filed suit against the OWRB seeking to en-

2. Brief of Arici Curiae City of Okla. City and Okla. City Water Utils. Trust in Support
of Respondents at 3, Taran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1308803 [hereinafter
Okla. City Amici Brief); Brief of the Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n as Arnicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 768641 [hereinafter
Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Briefl.
3. Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 5-6; R.L. NACE & EJ.
PLUHOwsKi, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY, DROUGHT OF THE 1950's wrrH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE MIDCONTINENT, PAPER 1804 79 (1965).

4.
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8. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125-26 (2013); Act of Aug.
11, 1955, ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 84-346, 69 Stat. 654.
9. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305.
10. Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 8; Tarran; 133 S. Ct. at
2128.
11.
Taran4 133 S. Ct. at 2128.
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § IB, tit. 74, § 1221(A) (2002); id.
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join enforcement of Oklahoma's statutes." Tarrant claimed that the Compact
granted Signatory States a right to cross state lines in order to divert water."
Further, Tarrant claimed that Congress' approval of the Compact preempted
Oklahoma's statutes." In fact, the Compact is silent with regard, to state lines."
In response to Tarrant's suit, OWRB argued that each state had the opportunity to divert its full entitlement from within its own boundaries and that the
Compact's drafters never intended to create such cross-border rights."
Tarrant also claimed that Oklahoma's restrictive water statutes discriminated against interstate commerce and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause." These statutes created a blanket prohibition on the sale or
transfer of water out-of-state." In 2009, following Tarrant's constitutional challenge of Oklahoma's water statutes, Oklahoma enacted Title 82, § 105.12(A),
replacing the former statutes and authorizing out-of-state transfers subject to
certain conditions.' While the 2009 statutes opened up the possibility for outof-state transfers, Tarrant maintained that, despite the Oklahoma legislature's
best efforts, the new statutes unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate
commerce just as the blanket ban did before."
Thus, it fell to the Court to determine the intent of the parties where the
Compact was silent with regard to cross-boundary water diversions, and to
consider whether Oklahoma's water statutes were in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Where silence in an interstate compact is ambiguous, Tarrant provides three interpretive tools "to shed light on the intent of the
[clompact's drafters" and to construe the Compact in light of those intentions.'
First, the Court considered the well-established principle that states do not
easily cede their sovereign powers.' Second, under contract principles, the
Court considered the customary practice other states have employed when
forming interstate compacts.' Lastly, the Court considered the parties' conduct
under the Compact.' Before applying these principles, though, the Court dismissed an additional interpretive tool; the presumption against pre-emption of
state law." Finally, the Court dismissed Tarrant's claim that Oklahoma's water
statutes, as amended, violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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This Case Note examines the Court's analysis with particular focus on the
Court's use of the three interpretive tools used to resolve whether ambiguous
silence in the interstate compact creates a cross-boundary right to divert water,
thereby preempting state water law statutes, or if the ambiguous silence does
not creating such a right, whereby state laws governing the use of water within
state boundaries would prevail.

II. BACKGROUND
The Red River is an important geographic feature of the South Central
United States. As a result, both the Red River and its water have been the
source of numerous historical conflicts, particularly between Texas and Oklahoma." The Red River originates on the border between New Mexico and
Texas, runs through the Texas panhandle, continues along the border between Texas and Oklahoma, flows eastward into Arkansas, and then turns
south and flows into Louisiana where it empties into the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya Rivers." Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas each rely
upon the Red River and its tributaries as a source of water for municipal and
other uses.' In the absence of an agreement or a court's equitable apportionment, the course of the river allowed the upstream states, Oklahoma and Texas, to appropriate significant amounts of water to the detriment of Arkansas
and Louisiana." This was particularly problematic for Louisiana who, lacking
the reservoir capacity to store sufficient supplies of water during high flow periods and unable to secure a commitment from upstream states to release
stored water from their reservoirs, had no guarantee of water flow from the
Red River." .
In 1955, Congress authorized these states to negotiate a compact to equitably apportion the water of the Red River basin." The four states signed the
Red River Compact over 20 years later in 1978, and Congress approved it in
1980, thereby transforming the Compact into federal law." For purposes of
allocation, the Compact divides the course of the Red River and its tributaries
into five Reaches, which it then further divides into subbasins."

28. Id.at 2125.
29. Id.
30. Okla. City Arnici Brief, supra note 2, at 1; Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus
Brief, supra note 2, at 1; Brief of the States of Louisiana and Arkansas as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1279456 [hereinafter
Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Briefi.
31. Id
32. Id. at 2125-26.
33. Tarran, 133 S. Ct. at 2125.
34. Id
35. Id. at 2126; Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, § 2.12.
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Map of Reach IL Brief for Re4xmndent 33a.

Figure 1.Map ofReach H
Source: Brief for Respondent Appendix A, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11889), 2013 WL 1308803.
Relevant here, Reach II is divided into five subbasins." The Compact defines
subbasins 1 through 4 as encompassing various tributaries upstream before
they join the flow of the Red River." The Compact assigns control of the water
in these subbasins to the states within which each subbasin resides." Oklahoma
receives all waters within subbasin 1; Texas receives all waters within subbasins
2 and 4; and Oklahoma and Arkansas share the waters within subbasin 3."
Subbasin 5 encompasses the main stem of the Red River and its tributaries,
excluding the parts of those tributaries included, in the other subbasins." Subbasin 5 extends from the Denison Dam, through Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas, to the Arkansas-Louisiana state border. 1 The allocation of water in
subbasin 5 guarantees Louisiana a minimum flow of 3,000 cubic feet per sec-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, SS 5.01-5.05.
Tarran4 133 S. Ct. at 2126.
Id. at 2137 n.2.
Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, §S 5.01-5.04.
Id. § 5.05.
Id.; Tarran 133 S. Ct. at 2137 app.A.
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ond." The Compact grants each Signatory State a right to twenty-five percent
of any water in excess of Louisiana's guaranteed minimum flow.' Section
5.05(b)(1) of the Compact provides:
[tihe Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of runoff originating in
subbasmi

5 and undesignated water flowing into subbasin 5, so long as the

flow of the Red River at the Arkansas-Louisiana state boundary is 3000 cubic

feet per second or more, provided no state is entitled to more than 25 percent of the water in excess of 3,000 cubic square feet."

Tarrant claimed Section 5.05(b)(1) of the Compact created cross-boundary
rights to divert water."
Under increasing pressure to secure additional sources of water following
periods of intense drought and a significant increase in population, and in light
of its failed attempts to purchase water, Tarrant applied to the OWRB for a
water resource permit." Simultaneously, Tarrant filed suit against the OWRB
to enjoin enforcement of Oklahoma's statutes, claiming a right to cross state
lines in order to divert Texas' allocation of water."
Although the Compact is silent with regard to state lines, Tarrant claimed
section 5.05(b)(1) created in each Signatory State a right to cross state lines in
order to divert water allocated to it from Reach II, subbasin 5." OVVRB responded that section 5.05(b)(1) provided each State only a right to access its
share of excess water within its own borders." Further, OWRB noted that Oklahoma state water laws impose stricter requirements on out-of-state users before allowing those users to divert water from within Oklahoma. ' In considering such out-of-state permits, the 2009 Oklahoma statutes require OWRB to
consider several factors before granting a permit to divert water out of State."
OVRB must consider whether an out-of-state user could transport the Wvater
to alleviate water shortages within the state." OWRB must also determine
whether issuance of the permit will "impair the ability of the State of Oklahoma [from meeting] its obligations under any interstate stream compact."' Further, Oklahoma requires legislative approval of out-of-state permits and requires that water use within the state must "be developed to the maximum
extent feasible for the benefit of Oklahoma so that out-of-state downstream
users will not acquire vested rights therein to the detriment of the citizens of
[the] state."m
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, § 5.05.
Id.
Id. S 5.05(b)(1); see also OKLA STAT. it. 82, S 1431 (2013) (text of Compact).
Tanrant 133 S. CL at 2128-29.
Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
Taran4 133 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
Id. at 2129-30.
Id. at 2130.
Id. at 2128.
Id. at 2128-29.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(5) (2013).
Id.S 105.12A(B)(1).
Id. §S105.12(A)(3), 105.12A(D).
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- Tarrant, however, claimed that federal law, in the form of the federally
approved Red River Compact, preempted Oklahoma's statutes." Tarrant
pointed to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding."" As such, Tarrant asserted that the federally endorsed Red
River Compact preempted Oklahoma state law, including those provisions
limiting cross-border diversions."
Thus, it was necessary for the Court to interpret the Compact and determine whether silence with regard to state lines created in the Signatory States a
right to cross state borders in order to divert water from subbasin 5. Interstate
compacts are interpreted under the principles of contract law, with the express
terms of the Compact considered the best indication of the parties' intent."
Given the ambiguous silence concerning cross-border rights in the Red River
Compact, the Court decided that it must turn to interpretive tools in order to
determine the intent of the parties."
APPENDIX B

Map of the Red RiverCmpact Brief fr Respondent 34a.

--

Figure2: Map of the Red River Compact
Source: Brief for Respondent Appendix B, Tarrant,133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11889), 2013 WL 1308803.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Turan4 133 S. Ct. at 2129.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id.
Taan4 133 S. Ct. at 2129.
Id. at 2130 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)).
See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991).
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Tarrant additionally argued that if the Court adopts the OWRB's view that
the Red River Compact does not provide for cross-border diversions of state
water entitlements, the Compact did not fully allocate all of the waters of the
river system and that, to the extent that the system carried excess "unallocated"
water, the Oklahoma statutes impermissibly burdened out-of-state appropriators in acquiring that water.' This dormant Commerce Clause argument thus
turned on whether the Red River Compact, by its terms, left some water unallocated in the river system."'

The Court decided TarrantRegional Water Districtv. Herrmannin 2013,
affirming unanimously the decisions of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma ("district court") and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit").' The district court, acknowledging that a congressionally approved interstate compact becomes a
federal statute, noted that Tarrant's Supremacy Clause claim failed where
Congress did not manifest an intent to occupy the field of water law and where
no conflict between the federal law and Oklahoma's state laws existed.' On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on a presumption against preemption of state law, determined that the Compact did not preempt Oklahoma's
water laws, reasoning that the Compact expressly indicated its intent not to
displace state law and that comments to the Compact did not support preemption." After granting certiorari, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concluded that the congressionally approved Red
River Compact did not grant Signatory States a right to cross state lines to divert water from Oklahoma.' In reaching its decision regarding the intent of the
parties, the Court relied on three interpretive tools.' After first dismissing a
presumption against preemption, the Court considered the sovereign power of
the State, the customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts, and
the conduct of the parties." Finally, the Court dismissed Tarrant's claim that
Oklahoma's water statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause because
the Compact did not leave any water unallocated.'

60. Tarwt, 133 S. Ct. at 2136-37.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 2129.
63. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. ClV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at
7 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009).
64. Tarrant Reg'I Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011); Johna Varty,
Court Report: TarrantReg'I Water Dist. v. Hermann, 656 E3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), U.
DEN"V. WATER L. REv. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://duwaterlawreview.contarrant-regl-water-dist-vherrman/.
65. Tarn4 133 S. Ct. at 2136.
66. Id. at 2137 n.10.
67. 1d. at 2132.
68. Id. at 2136-37.

146

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 17

m. THE PRESUMYTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law, including congressionally approved compacts, preempts conflicting state law.' However, the Court presumes that unless Congress demonstrates a clear intent to the contrary, federal
law does not preempt state water law.' This principle, "rooted in 'respect for
the States as independent sovereigns,'" recognizes that, in fields traditionally
occupied by the states, federal acts do not supersede a state's powers unless
Congress clearly demonstrates that such was its intent. " Although the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily upon the presumption against preemption in forming its
opinion, the Court determined that there was no reason to invoke the presumption in this case."
In its amicus brief supporting Tarrant, the State of Texas ("Texas") attacked the rationale underlying the presumption against an implied preemption of state law." Texas argued that such a presumption was misplaced where
the federal law at issue, in this case the Compact, resulted from negotiations by
the Signatory States and reflected the intent of the parties to preempt any conflicting state laws." Texas argued that with Congress's approval such compacts
become federal law, preempting inconsistent state laws and other established
state-granted rights." Thus, Texas argued that it made "little sense to apply the
presumption when interpreting an interstate compact that Was negotiated,
drafted, and executed by a group of States."" Furthermore, Texas argued, such
an application favoring the contractual interpretation of one state over the objective meaning would "deprive non-breaching States of bargained-for compact
benefits under the guise of respecting State sovereignty."7
The United States also wrote an amicus brief in support of Tarrant on the
issue of preemption and agreed that a presumption against preemption is misplaced when applied to the interpretation of an interstate compact." The United States argued the rationale was not relevant to deciding whether state law
conflicts with the interstate compact because although the Congressionally
approved Compact is federal law, it is not law that is imposed by Congress
upon the Signatory States." Rather, the Signatory States create the terms of the
Compact." Therefore, the United States contended that a presumption against

69. Id.at 2137 n.8.
70. Id.at 2137 n.10.
71. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
72. Tamm4 133 S. CL at 2137 n.10.
73. Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Tamwi4 133 S.
CL 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 768640.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3 (citing Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colbum, 310 U.S. 419, 433-34
(1940); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cheny Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938)).
76. Id at 7.
77. Id.
78. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 16,
Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrman, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (No. 11-889), 2013 VL 768638.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 17.
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preemption of state law, based upon respect for the sovereign States, "sheds
little light on the Compact's interpretation.""
The Court determined that where the Signatory States themselves drafted
and agreed to the terms of the Compact, with Congress acting only to approve
the Compact, there was no reason to invoke the presumption." However, this
did not end the Court's inquiry. Before the Court could reach a conclusion
that the Compact preempted Oklahoma's state water law, it was first necessary
to determine the terms of the Compact and, second, to determine whether
Oklahoma state law was in conflict with those terms.' If the Court determined
that the Compact did not create a cross-border right to divert water, no conflict
would exist between Oklahoma's water laws and the federally approved Compact and, consequently, the Compact would not preempt Oklahoma's statutes
preventing Tarrant from diverting water from within the state."
Therefore, in an effort to construe the terms of the Compact, the Court
continued its analysis, relying on three other interpretive tools to discover the
intent of the parties with regard to a cross-border right to divert water where
the Compact was silent." The Court proceeded to consider the sovereign
power of the State, customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts,
and the conduct of the parties." The Court relied heavily upon a presumption
favoring a State's sovereign power over water resources within its boundaries
and the principle that a State does not easily cede its sovereignty in interstate
water compacts.'
IV. THREE INTERPRETIVE TOOLS TO DISAMBIGUATE SILENCE
IN INTERSTATE COMPACTS
A.SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE STATES

In determining the intent of the Signatory States with regard to a crossborder right to divert water, the Court considered the underlying principle that
a State does not easily cede its sovereignty." A State possesses an absolute right
to all the navigable waters within its territory and an essential attribute of the
State's sovereignty is the power to control public uses of that water." In United
States v. Alaska, the Supreme Court determined that "' [a] court deciding a
question of title to [the] bed of a navigable water must ... begin with a strong
presumption' against defeat of a State's title."'

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
41 U.S.
90.

Id.
Tarant; 133 S. Ct. at 2137 n.10.
Id. at 2130.
Id.
Id. at 2132.
Id.
Se id. at 2132-33.
Id. at 2132.
Id. (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,
367, 410 (1842)).
Id. (quoting UnitedStates v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 5).
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Since the 1800s, Congress has delegated plenary authority to the States
over surface water resources." Initially, local rules and customs, supported by
the silent acquiescence of the federal government, regulated the right to beneficial use of water.' Then, in 1866, Congress acknowledged these local rules
and customs when it passed the Mining Act, expressly deferring to the States
the authority to determine and allocate water resources located within their
respective boundaries.' Subsequently, in 1877, Congress passed the Desert
Lands Act, stating that, "all navigable waters then a part of the public domain
became [public property], subject to the plenary control of the designated
[Sitates."' Furthermore, the Desert Lands Act bestowed upon each state the
right to determine the extent to which the rules of the riparian or prior appropriation systems would apply.' Through the Enabling Act of June 16, 1906,
which permitted Oklahoma to organize a state government and join the Union, Congress granted Oklahoma the power, on an equal footing with the original States, to control the waters located within its boundaries." Subsequently,
on November 16, 1907, Oklahoma entered the Union.'
Still, Congress went further in its delegation of authority to the States with
respect to State waters. On June 17, 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation
Act, providing that nothing in the "Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation . . ."" In passing the Reclamation Act, Congress indicated a clear
intent to continue delegating to each State the plenary power to appropriate
and distribute the waters located within its boundaries."
Arkansas and Louisiana, as co-signatories to the Compact, shared Oklahoma's interpretation of the Compact and Oklahoma's concerns regarding the
issues and implications associated with a potential finding that the Compact
created in each party a cross-border right to divert water.'" As stated in their
joint amicus brief, a decision in favor of Tarrant would constitute a significant
infringement on the sovereignty of these states and would represent a departure from prior implementation of the Compact.'' Louisiana and Arkansas
also argued that, contrary to Tarrant's position, the Compact expressly preserved the right of each Signatory State to administer water rights in accord-

91. Okla. City Amici Brief, supra note 2, at 17 (citing California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935)).
92. Id. (citing CaliforniaOregon Power,295 U.S. at 154).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Desert Lands Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377).
95. Id. at 18 (citing California Oregon Power 295 U.S. at 163-64).
96. Id. at 19 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662-674 (1978)).
97. Oklhoma Statehood, November 16, 1907, NATIONAL ARcIuvEs, http://www.archives
.gov/legislative/features/oklahoina (last visited December 12, 2013).
98. Okla. City Amici Brief, supm note 2, at 20 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012)).
99. Id.at 20 (citing 35 CONG. REC. 6675, 6679 (June 12, 1902)).
100. Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Brief, supra note 32, at 1.
101. Id.
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ance with the laws of the state and to regulate the appropriation, use, and control of water within its borders."
Additionally, Louisiana and Arkansas argued that adopting Tarrant's position that it was the intent of the Signatory States "to permit ... the unfettered
authority of one party to reach across another state's borders to appropriate
water" would require the Court to disregard the plain language of the Compact
and to give no meaning to the clear preservation of state authority over intrastate waters bargained-for in the Compact."'
Tarrant disagreed with this position and implored the Court to infer from
the silence of section 5.05(b)(1) that the Signatory States intended to dispense
with the prerogative of each to control the water within its respective boundaries." The Court sided with Oklahoma and its supporting anici and invoked a
presumption favoring the sovereign power of States over water resources within their boundaries, noting that "States rarely relinquish their sovereign powers, so when they do we would expect a clear indication of such devolution,
not inscrutable silence.""
In interpreting the ambiguous silence of the Compact, with regard to
cross-state rights to divert water, the Court was reluctant to find that the Signatory States relinquished their sovereign powers where the Compact's silence
did not indicate that such was the intent of the parties." The Court suggested
that to adopt Tarrant's position would be to assume that Oklahoma, Texas,
Louisiana, and Arkansas "silently surrendered substantial control over the
water within their borders when they agreed to the compact.""' The Court
determined that the intent to surrender such control was unlikely and that the
presumption favoring the sovereign power of the Signatory States was not
overcome by any clear indication that the parties intended to grant crossborder rights under the Compact." The Court determined a better understanding was that the parties drafted the Compact based upon the view that
States rarely relinquish their sovereign power absent a clear indication to do so
and that, therefore, the States did not intend to create rights to cross-border
diversions at the time they drafted the Compact."
B. CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
In a further attempt to determine the intent of the Signatory States with regard to a cross-border right to divert water, the Court looked to the customary
practice employed in other interstate compacts. 0o
Tarrant argued that not all interstate compacts permitting cross-border diversions contain language expressly indicating as much.' Tarrant identified the
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 2, 9.
Id. at 3.
Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2132-33 (2013).
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Upper Niobrara River Compact ("Niobrara Compact") as one such compact."'
Under the terms of the Niobrara Compact, ratified in 1962, the states of Wyoming and Nebraska agreed to an equitable apportionment of the surface waters of the upper Niobrara River basin."' Tarrant alleged the Niobrara Compact provides that "Itilhere shall be no restrictions on the use of the surface
waters of the Upper Niobrara River by Wyoming except as would be imposed
under Wyoming law" and subject to a number of express limitations on water
storage, direct flow rights, and diversions from the main stem of the river."'
The Niobrara Compact places no restrictions on the diversion of water from
within the state of Wyoming, with the exception of waters in a certain section
of the main stem of the river."'
However, rejecting Tarrant's argument, a number of amici, including cosignatories to the Compact, urged the Court to determine that silence with
respect to cross-border diversions did not customarily create a right in a Signatory State to invade the borders of its neighbor in order to divert water."' In
their joint brief, the states of Arkansas and Louisiana posited that if the Signatory States intended to allow an invasion of their borders by other parties to
the Compact, they would have stated that expressly."' In support of this argument, amici Republican River Water Conservation District, a government
entity charged with the conservation, use, and development of waters of the
Republican River in Colorado, and Rio Grande Water Conservation District,
also in Colorado, suggested that in the event that "a compact does not address
whether one state may appropriate water from within another state, the court
should apply a presumption that the parties did not intend to allow it.""' They
continued by arguing that numerous other water compacts expressly addressed
the issue of cross-border rights when the parties intended to allow it, pointing
to the Upper Colorado River, Republican River, and Rio Grande Compacts."'
The Court agreed with this position, stating that "[mlany of these other
compacts feature language that 'unambiguously permits Signatory States to
cross each other's borders to fulfill obligations under the compact."" A weakness in applying this interpretive tool here is that, although "many" compacts
incorporate such language, this non-relative term does not support a finding
that it is the customary practice in forming interstate compacts to do so. However, Tarrant cited only the Niobrara Compact as evidence of its argument to
the contrary that compacts may permit cross-border diversions without express

111. Id. at 2134.
112. Id.
113. Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Brief, supranote 32, at 13.
117. Id.
118. Brief of the Republican River Water Conservation Dist. and the Rio Grande Water
Conservation Dist. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist.
v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1279458.
119. Id.at6-7.
120. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2133 (2013).
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language to that effect."' The Court was not convinced by the failure of a single
compact to refer to state borders that the Red River Compact also implicitly
permitted cross-border diversions." The Court determined that this evidence
did not detract from the overall custom in the formation of interstate compacts." Indeed, the Court determined that the Niobrara Compact did not actually support Tarrant's position. Given that the Niobrara Compact clearly
defines specific exceptions to the general rule that there are no restrictions on
diversions from the upper Niobrara River, the Court found that the Niobrara
Compact did not create cross-border rights through silence, but rather through
a detailed scheme." The Red River Compact's silence did not strip states of
their sovereignty because, as the Court reasoned and the cited compacts
demonstrated, creating cross-border rights of diversion would require detailed
provisions on monitoring and accounting (which the Red River Compact
lacked) to untangle the resulting "jurisdictional and administrative quagmire.""
C. CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES

Lastly, in its attempt to determine the intent of the parties with regard to a
cross-border right to divert water, the Court looked to the conduct of the parties." With interstate compacts, as with normal contracts, the Court considered a party's course of performance highly probative of its understanding of
compact terms, providing useful insight into the meaning of ambiguous provisions.
The Court held that the conduct of other Signatory States indicated it was
not the intent of the parties to provide for cross-boundary water diversion
rights." The arguments of Arkansas and Louisiana further supported Oklahoma's analysis and interpretation of the Compact as an accurate reflection of
the intent of the Signatory States with respect to cross-border water rights.'" In
their amicus brief, these parties to the Compact adopted "Oklahoma's analysis
and interpretation of the history and negotiation process of the Red River
Compact and shareId] Oklahoma's perplexity regarding the Petitioner's new
notion that cross-border water rights were created under the Compact.""
In a joint amicus brief, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations ("Nations")
also asserted that the conduct of the parties supported Oklahoma's position.'"
The Nations argued that where the Compact language was ambiguous on the
121. Id.at 2134.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.; Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
126. Tarmnt, 133 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
127. Id. at 2135.
128. Id. (citing Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330 (2010)); Louisiana and Arkansas
Amici Brief, supra note 32, at 20.
129. Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2135.
130. See id.
131. Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Brief, supra note 32, at 1.
132. Brief for the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19-21, Tanant l33 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1308805.
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question of whether it allows states to "harvest" water within the borders of
another state, Tarrant's prior course of dealing is significant.'" The Nations
noted that in its prior course of dealings Tarrant sought to negotiate a water
sale contract with both the Nations and the State of Oklahoma." In late 2000,
Tarrant and several other Texas water districts and municipalities, collectively
forming the North Texas Water Alliance ("NTWA"), proposed the purchase
and diversion of approximately 320,000 to 360,000 acre-feet per year of water
from the Kiamichi River and the Little and Mountain Fork River Basins." At
the time NTWA entered into negotiations with Oklahoma and the Nations,
Tarrant did not claim an existing cross-border right to divert water from within
Oklahoma." As evidence of the understanding of the Signatory States, the
Nations claimed that these prior attempts by Tarrant to purchase water from
Oklahoma and the Nations were wholly inconsistent with Tarrant's subsequent claim that, under section 5.05(b)(1) of the Red River Compact, Texas
had a right under the Compact to cross state lines, enter into the territory of
Oklahoma, and construct facilities in order to divert water to which Texas was
entitled from Reach II, subbasin 5." The Nations asserted that these negotiations indicated that Tarrant did not believe that such a right existed under the
terms of the Compact."
Although Tarrant claimed that for certain business reasons it was compelled to negotiate for the purchase of water, the Court remained unconvinced
and agreed with the Nation's analysis." Further, the Court noted that from
1980, when Congress approved the Red River Compact, to 2007, when Tarrant filed its suit, no Signatory State pursued a cross-border diversion." The
Court found it "strange" that Tarrant would attempt to purchase water from
Oklahoma and the Nations if it believed the terms of the Compact entitled it
to make such a diversion without payment."' Thus, the Court determined that
the conduct of the parties also did not support Tarrant's position and, considering all three interpretive tools together, concluded the Red River Compact
did not silently create cross-border diversion rights for the Signatory States."'

V. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Tarrant also claimed Oklahoma's water statutes discriminated against interstate commerce for the purpose of favoring local interests."' Under the
dormant Commerce Clause, state laws may be unconstitutional if they place an
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undue burden on interstate commerce.'" Where such statutes do not regulate
intrastate and interstate activities even-handedly, the Court may strike the laws
down unless the state can show a strong public purpose for such discrimination.'" In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Court determined that a statutory provision conditioning the grant of groundwater permits for interstate transfers on a
grant of reciprocal rights from the receiving state placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and violated the Commerce Clause." Therefore,
the Commerce Clause may, under certain circumstances, place limitations on
a state's power to control water within its borders."
Accordingly, Tarrant maintained that the Oklahoma statutes, by restricting
or prohibiting the out-of-state sale or transfer of water unallocated by the
Compact, impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce and violated the dormant Commerce Clause." Tarrant argued that water within subbasin 5 not already allocated to a Signatory State should be available to Tarrant
by permit."
The Court, however, determined that the Compact left no water unallocated and, thus, did not consider Tarrant's dormant Commerce Clause argument." The Compact grants each Signatory State a right to the amount of water they can put to beneficial use, though no Signatory is entitled to more than
twenty-five percent of the water in excess of Louisiana's three thousand cubic
feet per second minimum flow entitlement. The Compact calls for an accounting for entitlement purposes only in the event that one or more of the
Signatory States deems an accounting necessary." The Court determined that
water in excess of Oklahoma's twenty-five percent entitlement located within
Oklahoma was allocated to Oklahoma unless and until another State called for
an accounting and asked Oklahoma to refrain from using more than its
share." Because the Court found no water left unallocated by the Compact,
the Court held that Oklahoma's water statutes could not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause by restricting interstate commerce of that nonexistent unallocated water.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court ruled unanimously to uphold the decision of the Tenth Circuit,
holding that the Red River Compact did not create a cross-border right to di-

144. City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
145. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (citing Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
146. Sporhase,458 U.S. at 943-44, 960.
147. Taran4 133 S. Ct. at 2136, 2137 fn.8.
148. Id
149. Id.at2137.
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vert water in the Signatory States." First, the Court considered the presumption against preemption of state law and determined that where the States
themselves drafted and agreed to the terms of the Compact there was no reason to invoke the presumption." However, to determine whether the Compact preempted Oklahoma state water law, the Court found it necessary to
determine the terms of the Compact."' In order to determine the intent of the
parties, the Court relied on three interpretive tools: the sovereign power of
states, the customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts, and the
conduct of the parties."
In considering the principle that States do not easily cede their sovereign
powers, the Court determined the Signatory States did not intend to cede their
sovereign powers."' Further, considering the customary practice employed by
other states in forming interstate compacts, the court determined that the
Compact did not create cross-border rights through silence." Lastly, considering the parties' conduct under the Compact, the Court concluded that the
conduct of Tarrant and the Signatory States did not support Tarrant's position
that the parties intended to create a cross-border right to divert water."'
Applying these interpretive tools, the Court determined that where the
Compact was ambiguously silent, the parties to the Red River Compact did
not intend to create a cross-border right to divert water."' Thus, no conflict
existed between the federally approved Compact and Oklahoma's state water
laws that effectively prevented out-of-state applicants from diverting water from
within the state. In the absence of a conflict, no preemption of state law existed. 16

Lastly, the Court considered Tarrant's dormant Commerce Clause argument with regard to Oklahoma's water statutes and waters of subbasin 5 that
Tarrant alleged were left unallocated. However, determining that no water was
left unallocated under the terms of the Compact, the Court did not reach the
question of whether Oklahoma's water statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
The future implication of Tarrantisthat a congressionally approved compact will not preempt state water laws unless the language of the compact or
subsequent conduct of the parties clearly expresses intent by the states to surrender plenary authority over water resources within their borders. If the language of the compact is ambiguous, the Court will look to interpretive tools
with a presumption that the states have a sovereign prerogative that states must
expressly relinquish.
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Further, the Court avoided a dormant Commerce Clause decision that
may have implicated state sovereignty and states' power to control the navigable waters within their boundaries. However, the Court left open the possibility that the dormant Commerce Clause might apply in the future where statutes place an undue burden on interstate commerce with regard to unallocated
waters. The Court in Tarrantshows some indication of a more pronounced
nod to state sovereignty over water allocation within the context of compact
interpretation, but the dormant Commerce Clause still stands as a potential
counterweight to that-deference, at least with respect to "unallocated" waters
straddling state boundaries.

CONFERENCE REPORTS
COLORADO WATER CONGRESS SUMMER CONFERENCE 2013:
LEADING OUR WATER FUTURE
Steamboat Springs, Colorado

August 21-23, 2013

AGRICULTURAL LEADERSHIP FORUM: So WHAT EXACTLY DOES "SAVING
AG" MEAN?

The Colorado Water Congress is a leading nonpartisan voice in shaping
policy and legislation relating to water development, management, and conservation. In addition to working as an advocate for a variety of legislative and
regulatory issues, the Colorado Water Congress provides members with various opportunities for collaboration, networking, and professional development
at several events throughout the year. One such event is the Summer Conference. Hosted annually in a beautiful Colorado resort location, the Colorado
Water Congress Summer Conference offers excellent topical content on water
law and policy. At this year's conference in Steamboat Springs, attorneys, citizen groups, engineers, ranchers, legislators, and others gathered to discuss the
future of water and agriculture in Colorado.
As part of this year's Summer Conference, Ermi Wilson of Wilson Water
Group and the Colorado Water Congress Board of Directors moderated a
panel discussion on an important question: "So What Exactly Does 'Saving
Ag' Mean?" The five panelists shared perspectives on the future of agricultural
water rights in the face of growing municipal demands. The panel consisted of
John Salazar, Commissioner of the Colorado Department of Agriculture;
Marsha Daughenbaugh of the Community Agriculture Alliance; Doug Robotham of the Nature Conservancy; Terry Fankhauser of the Colorado Cattlemen's Association; and John McClow of the Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District.
Commissioner Salazar began the panel discussion with a lively presentation on Colorado's rapidly increasing population and the attendant impacts on
the state's land and water resources. Salazar estimated Colorado's population
will increase by 3-4 million by 2040, a rate faster than the United States growth
rate. Naturally, an increased population will stress the demand for water. Salazar estimated this growth will require an additional 190,000 to 630,000 acrefeet of water per year. Emphasizing the significance of farm and ranch water
rights, the Commissioner declared agriculture a "cornerstone" of Colorado's
economy. In doing so, Salazar argued that agricultural water rights are vital to
the growing state economy and that there is a need to ensure the continued
production of agricultural goods as municipal needs grow.
Marsha Daughenbaugh, Executive Director of the Community Agriculture
Alliance, focused her presentation on one of her organization's strategic anchors: the importance of public education on agriculture. As a third generation
156
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rancher, Daughenbaugh's interests are vested in the partnerships developed
between the Yampa Valley's resort, business, and agricultural interests to assure agriculture's longevity throughout the area. The Community Agriculture
Alliance seeks to preserve the agricultural heritage of the Yampa Valley by
encouraging programs and policies that mutually benefit and connect agricultural producers and consumers. Daughenbaugh and her organization believe
in the continuing philosophy that the agricultural environment is a valuable
part of the community and Colorado must act to preserve it. To share this
conviction, the Community Agriculture Alliance connects and educates various community groups with agriculture in the Yampa Valley and provides
resources for other regions to build a similar connection. Daughenbaugh's
public education work is not limited to promoting the benefits of farming and
ranching. For example, she highlighted agricultural lands providing abundant
open space allowing unique Colorado ecosystems and wildlife to thrive.
Next, Doug Robotham discussed how The Nature Conservancy decides
which lands and habitats to 'protect. The Nature Conservancy works with
communities and businesses to protect and preserve lands and waters vital to
the diversity of life on Earth. In Colorado, The Nature Conservancy has
helped preserve more than 426,000 acres by establishing thirteen preserves
statewide. Robotham pointed to the Nature Conservancy's historic Carpenter
Ranch in the Yampa Valley as "a great example of how agriculture and conservation can come together." A new conservation easement project across the
Yampa River from Carpenter Ranch, the Wolf Mountain Ranch, aims to
permanently conserve up to 6,300 acres that (i) provide critical habitat for Columbian sharp-tailed grouse and sandhill cranes, (ii) support miles of a globally
rare river forest corridor, (iii) represent historically and economically important ranchlands, and (iv) preserve historic and scenic views important to the
local economy.
Terry Fankhauser, Executive Vice President at the Colorado Cattlemen's
Association ("CCA"), encouraged innovation when addressing the issues surrounding agricultural water use. Founded in 1867, CCA is the nation's oldest
cattlemen's association. Beef producers voluntarily join CCA and manage it
cooperatively, working together to speak on behalf of Colorado's more than
12,000 beef producers. As a representative of cattle ranching interests, Fankhauser observed that risk-aversion and inflexibility will not save agriculture.
Instead, farmers and ranchers should be open to creativity where they can gain
efficiency. With confidence, Fankhauser stressed that "agriculture does not
deserve to be saved, but agriculture does deserve the opportunity to survive."
As the final panelist, John McClow offered a perspective on preserving agriculture in the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, which
uses easements in the Gunnison County area to conserve agriculture. McClow
questioned what would happen to agricultural lands if conservation groups
could actually "save" such land. He illustrated two contrasting possibilities
amongst others in a spectrum of options: (i) easements protect the lands in
perpetuity, or (ii) easements protect the lands only until the farmer wants to
retire and sell his water to a municipality (jokingly referred to as the "401(k)
plan"). While conservation groups prefer the perpetuity option, increased land
values in much of Colorado, especially surrounding resort communities, make
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it difficult for conservation groups to incentivize ranchers to preserve agricultural land rather than sell the land to developers. One suggestion posed by
McClow involved state funding for a more sustainable water project to match
population growth and demand, diverting attention away from ecologically
special high-country areas.
The panel concluded with a brief discussion on three relevant and timely
topics: The Walton Family Foundation Report, agricultural water conservation, and leasing/fallowing under Colorado House Bill 1248.
The Walton Family Foundation funded a collaborative effort, working
with interested stakeholders, to identify innovative ways to allow water transfers
from agriculture to urban use while avoiding or mitigating damages to agricultural economies and environmental values. The report evaluated novel water
sharing strategies, and developed actionable recommendations to improve
water-sharing opportunities in the Colorado River Basin and throughout the
West.
Discussion on agricultural water conservation centered first on the issue of
how to define such conservation and, second, whether agricultural water conservation can contribute to instream flows or municipal supply. The panel had
difficulty answering some of the hard questions on the topic but agreed the
problem is still a work in progress.
This discussion lead to the topic of House Bill 1248, which authorizes the
Colorado Water Conservation Board to administer a pilot program consisting
of up to 3 pilot projects, each up to 10 years in duration, in the lower Arkansas
River basin. The projects intend to experiment with fallowing agricultural irrigation land and leasing the associated water rights to municipal users in years
of shortage.
Overall, the panel spoke positively about the Walton Family Foundation
Report, agricultural water conservation, and HB 1248, and viewed each as
progressive support for building a creative new approach to Western water
management.
Heidi Rucktiegle

CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER RESOURCES LAW: A LOOMING
ADAPTATION CRISIS
Denver, Colorado August 29, 2013
On August 29, 2013, the University of Denver Sturm College of Law was
honored to welcome Associate Professor Alex Gardner of the University of
Western Australia (UWA). Professor Gardner began his legal career as a solicitor in Melbourne, Australia, before receiving his Master of Laws in natural
resources law at the University of British Columbia. Professor Gardner has
been on the UWA Faculty of Law since 1988. During this time, he has
worked with numerous research centers including the UWA Centre for Mining, Energy and Natural Resources Law, the National Center for Groundwater
Research and Training, and the Cooperative Research Center for Water Sensitive Cities. Professor Gardner also holds an Adjunct Professorship at the
Australian National University College of Law.
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Following a warm welcome, Professor Gardner introduced his presentation, entitled Chmate Change and Water Resources Law: A Loommg Adaptation Crisis,with a brief overview of the impacts of climate change on southwest
Western Australia, especially declining precipitation and rising temperatures.
These impacts will have serious ramifications for water resources management
in the state and adaptation will be necessary in order to secure enough water
for both human consumption and environmental preservation. According to
Professor Gardner, an important part of that adaptation for Western Australia
will ineludibly require reformation of its water law, especially the right to take
and use water.
Professor Gardner then gave a brief overview of the foundations of Australian water law. Australia is a federation of six states. Its constitution is a marriage of English parliamentary democracy and American federal democracy.
The Australian Constitution distributes legislative power and sovereignty over
natural resources between the states and the Commonwealth (national) Parliament. The Commonwealth Parliament, like the United States Congress, has
limited, enumerated legislative powers. Importantly, those powers do not include the power to legislate with respect to natural resources, while the states
retain the "residual" power to make laws regarding anything, including natural
resources and water. The Australian Constitution also gives states sovereignty
over natural resources, giving them the power to grant rights to take and use
water.
Professor Gardner explained that current Australian water rights laws are
based on a mixture of the English common law riparian tradition and more
modern licensing regimes encompassed by state statutes. Under this system,
landowners have the right to take and use water for domestic purposes, including livestock watering, while water use for commercial purposes requires procurement of a state license. According to Professor Gardner, the general goal
of water management laws in Australia is ecologically sustainable development,
with heavy emphasis on setting aside sufficient water to maintain the environment before determining the amount available for consumptive use.
Professor Gardner next described the current scientific understanding of
climate change impacts on southwest Western Australia. Specifically, a recent
report by the Australian Climate Commission shows that declining rainfall and
increasing average temperatures are beginning to have serious negative impacts
on agriculture and urban water supplies in southwest Australia. Even during
the recent La Nina event, which caused much of the rest of the country to
experience heavy rainfall, the southwest remained dry. Additionally, recent
projections for annual rainfall over the next twenty years almost unanimously
predict continued drying in southwestern Australia. Professor Gardner pointed
out that recent studies by the Indian Ocean Climate Initiative all but confirm
that rainfall reductions in southwestern Australia are consistent with humaninduced climate change.
Professor Gardner then described the water infrastructure and water
needs of the southwest. Southwest Western Australia has a rapidly growing
population of roughly two million with an economy historically rooted in agriculture and mining. Traditionally, the southwest relied on surface water but is
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now heavily reliant on groundwater in order to make up for declining precipitation.
Total water consumption in the southwest increased steadily during the
last decades of the 20th century. However, Professor Gardner highlighted the
fact that recent data show total consumption in the region is stabilizing, population increase notwithstanding. This trend reflects the growing recognition of
water scarcity and the success of reductions in per-capita consumption. In spite
of this, per-capita consumption remains relatively high by both Australian and
international standards. In fact, without further adaptation, growing demand
coupled with shrinking supply due to climate change will produce a water
shortage of 365 gigaliters by 2060.
Professor Gardner then focused specifically on the effects of climate
change on the water supply serving Perth, Western Australia's largest city.
Traditionally, Perth relied primarily on surface water, especially for its public
water supply. As surface water supplies began to dry up in the late 1970s,
Perth began to increase its reliance on groundwater resources and finally resorted to desalination in the early 2000s. However, according to Professor
Gardner, even with increased use of desalination, these combined sources are
proving insufficient in the face of a rapidly drying climate. In the future, water
resource managers will need to find other water sources to meet the demands
of a rapidly growing population.
Professor Gardner, with input solicited from the audience, then proffered
several possible supplementary supplies that Perth could look to in the future.
For example, Professor Gardner suggested wastewater recycling, increased
conservation, and inter-basin transfers. However, using these supplies presents
various obstacles, including ecological concerns and political opposition. Professor Gardner therefore identified "managed aquifer recharge" as one of the
more promising solutions.
Professor Gardner next discussed each of Perth's current main water supplies, beginning with the Perth Hills Dams, the major source of surface water
for the city. Distressingly, over the past century, average run-off into these
dams has fallen by more than fifty percent to an all-time low of thirteen gigaliters in 2010, representing a paltry three percent of the historic average.
Groundwater is another major water source for Perth. Originally seen as a
backup to the Perth Hills Dams, use of the major aquifers underlying Perth,
called the Gnangara Groundwater System, has steadily increased over the past
decade. Now, the Gnangara supplies roughly sixty percent of Perth's water
supply. Increased pumping has lead to a steady drop in the aquifer's level to
such a degree that the upper, or superficial, aquifer is now at its lowest level on
record. This drop has lead to increased drilling into the lower aquifers of the
system, the Leederville and Yarragadee aquifers. Though these lower aquifers
contain relatively large amounts of water, increased use of the Leederville and
Yarragadee has precipitated a drop in the level of the superficial aquifer due to
the hydrologic connection between the superficial and Leederville/Yarragadee
aquifers.
Professor Gardner highlighted the fact that users are over exploiting
Perth's groundwater resources with a newspaper article featuring Loch
McNess, a lake in Perth's northern suburbs. As a boy growing up in Perth,
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Professor Gardner remembered rowing boats on Loch McNess with his family, an activity that would be impossible now that the lake is essentially dry. Professor Gardner then explained how the state water utility has consistently failed
to abide by the legal limits on groundwater drawdown already in place, which
is exacerbating the situation. Unfortunately, it is difficult.to tell whether climate
change or overuse is the primary factor leading to such low aquifer levels. Further complicating matters are the large number of other, non-municipal water
rights holders, including agricultural and industrial users, and well as a significant number of unlicensed users.
In the face of this water shortage, Perth has increasingly turned to desalination. Though approximately half of the city's water now comes from desalination, according to Professor Gardner, the climate is drying faster than the city
can build desalination capabilities, requiring increased reliance on other
sources such as wastewater recycling.
Professor Gardner then discussed the current state of Western Australia's
water law. The current licensing scheme in Western Australia includes a landholder eligibility requirement, a fixed term generally ten years in length, as well
as the right to renew the license after the term has expired. Each license specifies the land upon which the user can apply the water, up to an annual maximum. However, the licensed maximum is subject to scarcity reductions at the
direction of the state water minister. Though there are limits in place to protect the environment, according to Professor Gardner, limited metering and
poor enforcement have severely limited their efficacy.
Though climate change has hit Western Australia particularly hard, the
other states of the Commonwealth have experienced similar problems. This
led the Commonwealth government to develop a National Water Policy to
help deal with the adaptation crisis. As Professor Gardner explained, the key
principles of the National Water Policy include transitioning to tradable water
rights removed from landholder requirements, improving metering and reporting, national oversight of state water markets, proportional sharing of scarcity, and a comprehensive water planning system. Though Western Australia
initially resisted, it has recently accepted the National Water Policy and is
moving toward implementation of a planned water property rights regime
based on a system of proportional sharing of scarcity among licensees.
In closing, Professor Gardner compared the changing nature of Australian
water law with Colorado water law. Western Australia is moving towards a
property rights regime like that in Colorado. However, unlike in Colorado, the
new Australian scheme will incorporate a system of central planning that is
bound to first provide adequate water for environmental flows. Another major
difference between the Colorado system and the emerging Western Australian
system is the formula for sharing scarcity. Instead of a hierarchy founded on
historical priority, the new system in Western Australia will require proportional sharing of scarcity.

NathanialBrown
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24TH ANNUAL SOUTH PLATTE FORUM: THE INS AND OUTS OF
THE SOUTH PLATTE BASIN
Longmont, Colorado

October 23-24, 2013

SWIMMING IN
As part of its twenty-fourth annual proceedings, the South Platte Forum
hosted a discussion on fish in the South Platte Basin. Titled "Swimming In,"
the three-part discussion focused on the heritage of Colorado's state fish, fish
management by flow management, and improvement of urban streams for
native warmwater fishes.
Dr. Kevin Rogers, a fisheries scientist and member of the Aquatic Research Group for Colorado Parks and Wildlife ("CPW"), spoke about the
greenback cutthroat trout (the "greenback"), Colorado's state fish since 1994.
Often referred to as the "blackspotted trout" and once believed to be extinct,
in 1973 the government designated the greenback as one of the first species
listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Downlisted
from endangered to threatened in 1978 and currently poised for delisting entirely, Dr. Rogers noted the greenback is one of the "shining stars" of the ESA
due to the success of multiple conservation efforts.
Dr. Rogers described recent historical research and scientific analyses of
the greenback's DNA that revealed much about the greenback's lineage. For
example, in the mid-1850s, William A. Hammond, a Civil War surgeon and
eventual Surgeon General of the United States Army, served as medical officer
on an expedition from Fort Riley, Kansas that attempted to find a pass to the
Oregon Trail. Dr. Rogers obtained copies of notes Hammond made and sent
to the National Archives at Philadelphia after his expedition. In these notes,
Hammond mentioned the blackspotted trout. Dr. Rogers plotted Hammond's
notes on a timeline and determined that Hammond made his notes regarding
the blackspotted trout in what is now Colorado. Hammond also managed to
collect and send trout specimens to the National Archives. Dr. Rogers reported that scientists analyzed DNA taken from these preserved specimens and
confirmed that the fish that eventually became Colorado's state fish derived
from around sixty populations of Colorado River cutthroat trout on the Western Slope.
Dr. Rogers stated that Colorado has been home to six distinct lineages of
greenbacks, but a-fire near Pagosa Springs in the summer of 2013 wiped out
one of these populations. Another of these six lineages, which Dr. Rogers considers "the true greenback cutthroat trout" due to its lack of hybridization, is
native to the South Platte Basin on Bear Creek near Colorado Springs. In
mid-September 2013, historic rains increased the flow on this creek from a
normal flow rate of five cubic feet per second ("cfs") to an estimated 169 cfs.
According to Dr. Rogers, the September 2013 flood might actually improve
these fishes' habitat on Bear Creak, "assuming they are still there."
In a discussion entitled "Managing Fish by Managing Flows: A Wild Rainbow Story in Elevenmile Canyon," Ken Kehmeier, Senior Aquatic Biologist in
the Platte Basin for CPW, discussed recent successes in wild rainbow trout
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("rainbow") management. Elevenmile Canyon lies southwest of Lake George
in Park County, Colorado. CPW manages the upper section of the canyon as
a self-sustaining wild rainbow trout fishery, which means no stocking is required.
Since 2003, the rainbow population in this area has consistently declined.
In light of this realization, Mr. Kehmeier and his associates began studying the
factors that might have contributed to the decline. According to Mr. Kehmeier, rainbows in this area tend to spawn in mid- to late-April depending on the
temperature of the water, which warm-water releases from the Elevenmile
Canyon Dam can alter. After studying years of data, Mr. Kehmeier's team
determined that in years with sustained populations of rainbows, flow rates
downstream of Elevenmile reservoir and Spinney Mountain reservoir remained stable. However, in recent years with demonstrated low population
growth, overlapping data suggested that flows created by "untimely" releases
from these reservoirs were responsible for the rainbow population decline.
Mr. Kehmeier said releases from the reservoir in April and June simply
"washed out" trout eggs and fry, thus depleting the populations.
As a result of his team's findings, CPW met with officials from Denver
Water and Aurora Water in March 2011 and February 2012 to discuss possible changes to releases and flow rates downstream of Elevenmile Canyon to
attempt to increase the wild rainbow trout population. According to Mr.
Kehmeier, the existing population of rainbows in the upper section of the canyon increased by only seventy fry in 2010. As the result of collaboration with
the pertinent water authorities, the existing population in the upper canyon
section grew by a total of 672 fry in 2011 and 2012. In 2013, demands on
Denver Water prevented it from instituting the improvements from the previous two years. As a result, the population of trout fry declined once again, thus
proving the relationship between flow rates and wild rainbow trout populations
in the upper section of Elevenmile Canyon and the need for continued collaboration between water managers and fisheries managers. Mr. Kehmeier
stated that even with losses in 2013, "if the wild rainbow trout population can
increase two to three years out of every five, the overall population will tend to
improve."
With respect to the September 2013 flood, Mr. Kehmeier said river fish
populations experienced virtually no changes. In fact, from a fisheries standpoint, Mr. Kehmeier said the flood was "almost an ecological reset on a lot of
our rivers," essentially a cleaning of the rivers. Mr. Kehmeier acknowledged
that the September flood was devastating, but he noted "the fish survived the
flood way better than we as people did."
In the final discussion of "Swimming In," Ashley Ficke discussed how to
improve urban streams for native warmwater fishes. Ms. Ficke, a doctoral candidate in fisheries biology at the University of Colorado at Boulder, described
the South Platte as an "urban stream," a transition zone between the mountains and the plains. According to Ficke, "transition zone streams" in Colorado
are highly modified because of their spatial relation to urban areas, differing
greatly from mountain and plains streams in terms of geomorphology, physicochemical characteristics, and hydrology.
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Ms. Ficke described urban streams as home to a unique combination of
species that tend to have a large diversity of body size, lifespan, and reproductive strategy. Accordingly, urban stream species have "impressive physiological
tolerances" to large temperature ranges, dissolved oxygen levels, and salinity
levels. As illustrations of their ability to adapt to changing needs, urban species
tend to be omnivorous and can make wide changes in habitats if compelled to
do so by flooding or seasonal changes.
Despite a high tolerance to urban environments, Ms. Ficke stated that assemblages of fishes in urban streams are declining. These declines are due to
"extensive human modifications" in and around the streams such as alterations
of flow rates, sedimentation, changes to water quality, fragmentation, channelization, and introduction of nonnative species. According to Ms. Ficke, dams
and diversions cause changes in flow patterns that can adversely affect opportunities for foraging, spawning and refuge. Changes in sediment regimes can
suffocate incubating eggs and increase competition for food and predation
amongst existing populations. "More water is not always beneficial," according
to Ms. Ficke: higher flow rates can lead to limited refuge during spates and
floods and limited habitats for spawning and rearing. Hence, urban fish have
"nowhere to hide" in channelized systems. Ms. Ficke concluded by stating that
the persistent introduction and growth of nonnative species in urban streams
will continue to pose significant challenges to existing and future populations
of urban fish species as fish fight for habitat and food.
"Swimming In" proved to be a useful mix of history, biology and the current reality. From tracing the roots of Colorado's state fish, to fisheries scientists collaborating with water managers to spur trout populations while maintaining domestic needs, to the challenges faced by fish that prefer the city to
the country, these speakers fascinated and educated the attendees of the twenty-fourth annual proceedings of the South Platte Forum.
j Keith Tart
DIGGING IN

As part of its two-day conference, the South Platte Forum hosted a panel
that discussed Colorado agriculture and the effects of the September 2013
floods on livestock and crops in the South Platte Basin.
The first speaker, David Petrocco, a local vegetable farmer in Adams and
Weld Counties, discussed the basics of local agriculture, including methods of
applying water to crops, water conservation, and the beneficial uses of water.
As Petrocco explained, timely irrigation is every farmer's main concern. A lack
of adequate water stresses certain crops and affects their marketable quality.
Irrigation wells were useful resources for timely irrigation prior to 2006. However, due to severe drought in 2006 the State of Colorado shut down many
irrigation wells, which impacted the production of crops.
Most importantly, Petrocco discussed the challenges of water conservation. Noting the significance of agriculture, Petrocco suggested that, along with
improving irrigation efficiency, water conservation efforts should focus on cities and municipalities decreasing the watering of golf courses, parks, and road
frontages in order to provide more water to agriculture. Petrocco also dis-
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cussed the problems of pondweeds, aggressive vegetation that grow on the
bottom of rivers that raise water levels, restrict the water's flow, and ultimately
consume a great amount of the water in which they grow. Even though the
South Platte River's quality has improved greatly, Petrocco argued these
pondweeds were a growing concern deserving immediate attention.
Next, Adrian Card and Keith Maxey discussed the on-the-ground impact
of the September 2013 flood on the Colorado farming community. Card
serves as Boulder County's Agricultural and Natural Resources Extension
Agent with Colorado State University in Boulder County. Maxey is the Weld
County Director and Livestock Extension Agent with Colorado State University. Their presentation started with a video showing aerial footage of the flooding and its subsequent destruction in Longmont and other areas of Colorado.
Card and Maxey spoke about how the flooding greatly affected mountain
communities by destroying roads and restricting access. In Weld County, the
flood closed over one hundred roads. Even a month after the flooding, crossing over the Platte River was cumbersome for children trying to get to school
and for farmers making product deliveries.
Card and Maxey then discussed floodwater contamination of local crops.
Concerned with floodwater mixing with various contaminants like raw sewage,
oil and gas spills, and pesticides from agricultural fields, the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) declared that any crop touched by
floodwater was adulterated and thus unmarketable. This had a dramatic and
expensive toll on the affected Colorado farmers. In the South Platte Basin,
crop loss from floodwaters estimated between $3.5 million and $5.5 million.
The final speaker, Sean Cronin, discussed what water providers focused
upon in the aftermath of the flood. Cronin is the executive director for the St.
Vrain and Left Hand Water Conservancy District. Cronin reported that in
District Five of the Conservancy District the flood damaged 101 ditches and
reservoirs, amounting to almost $10 million of estimated damage. Cronin
mentioned, however, that this number might decrease as water levels subside
and infrastructure shows less damage than previously feared.
Cronin then discussed flood recovery. First, Cronin mentioned the availability of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance
available to those who apply. Second, Cronin discussed Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") loans and grants, which apply to individuals who
experienced approximately $1-2 million in damages. The loan carries no interest and no payments for three years. Third, Cronin mentioned partnerships
forming between many different agencies interested in helping support the
affected water users. Lastly, Cronin described local "stream teams," which
consist of local volunteers, engineers, and water experts. The CWCB headed
the state "stream team," which provided technical assistance to local groups by
coordinating and aiding them with financial assistance and permits. However,
aiding water users without creating conflicts and obstacles proved challenging.
Justifiably, water users want to make long-term repairs immediately even
though it might be more beneficial and financially prudent to make incremental short-term repairs.
Cronin commended the emergency response teams and acknowledged
the heroism, human kindness, and leadership during the devastating floods.
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However, he also stressed that Colorado lacked any kind of emergency flood
plan and argued Colorado needed to address and plan for future floods.
Overall, the panel extensively addressed the concerns of the September
flooding, the effects of the flooding, and what Colorado could do better in the
future.
Devon Bell

ENVIRONMENTAL ENTREPRENEURS (E2) ECOSALON
Denver, CO

October 29, 2013

WATER WISE: MEETING COLORADO'S WATER CHALLENGES

Environmental Entrepreneurs ("E2") is an independent non-partisan organization uniting business and environmental leaders to shape state and national policy. E2 is an affiliate of the Natural Resource Defense Council
("NRDC"). Donations supporting E2 go through the NRDC and the two organizations share staff. Due to the close affiliation between the two non-profits,
the NRDC and E2 both value environmental advocacy and sustainability.
However, E2's mission expressly seeks engagement of business leaders to
achieve the shared goals of the affiliated organizations. E2's mission is "Itlo
create a platform for independent business leaders to promote environmentally sustainable economic growth."
On October 29, 2013, at Deloitte Consulting's office in downtown Denver, E2 hosted a panel to discuss the topic "Water Wise: Meeting Colorado's
Water Challenges." Panelists included Will Sarni, Director of Enterprise Water Strategy at Deloitte; Jerry Tinianow, Chief Sustainability Officer of the City
of Denver; Greg Fisher, Chief Planner for the Denver Board of Water Commissioners ("Denver Water"); and James Eklund, Director of the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"). In light of E2's recently released report titled "Colorado Water Supply and Climate Change: A Business Perspective," each speaker addressed questions relating to water conservation and
efficiency in Colorado.
. Will Sarni discussed three categories of value that he contemplates when
consulting with a wide variety of companies to strategize their water management. Sarni asserts that the three risk categories for business value are physical
risks, regulatory risks, and reputational risks. Physical risks, for instance, could
be the temporary unavailability of water. Regulatory risks range from the reallocation of water away from business production to meet more urgent needs
during times of drought to the suspension or withdrawal of the supplier's license or permit. Reputational risks refer to the potential for negative exposure
or public outcry against a business for its water-use practices. Among other
things, when Sarni consults with businesses about the location of manufacturing plants he asks whether the business will have access to water in twenty
years at that location and from where the water to support growth projections
will come. Will Sarni's role at Deloitte Consulting led him to encourage business leaders to incorporate water stewardship into their corporate risk management plans.
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Denver's Chief Sustainability Officer, Jerry Tinianow, discussed the city
government's sustainability agenda. Denver's plan encompasses twelve areas:
air quality, climate change, energy, food, health, housing, land use, materials,
mobility, workforce, water quantity, and water quality. For each of the twelve
resources, Tinianow has specific goals for the government with a separate, but
complementary, set of community goals. Tinianow expressed the city government's water quantity goal to reduce use of potable water for irrigation of parks
and golf courses by 22 percent to an eighteen gallon per square foot average,
and to reduce use of potable water in city buildings by 15 percent over a 2011
baseline. Tinianow stressed that half of the water used in Denver currently
goes toward watering golf courses and parks, though he seemed optimistic
about meeting Denver's conservation goals by 2020.
Greg Fisher, the Chief Planner for Denver Water, outlined how the
Board supplies the Denver area with sufficient clean water and how it plans to
do so in the future. As Fisher explained, Denver Water serves 25 percent of
Colorado's population while only using 2 percent of the state's water. Fisher
claimed there are still conservation opportunities, but acknowledged Denver
Water's successes thus far. Fisher asserted that Denver Water serves 30 to 40
percent more people than it did in 1980, yet it uses the same amount of water
as it did in 1980. One contributing factor for this conservation success was the
dramatic reduction in household use that occurred when Denver Water installed meters on all homes in 1990.
In terms of future conservation, Denver Water's current goals involve a
push for innovation of WaterSense-labeled indoor fixtures and higher water
efficiency levels for households. Since multifamily homes use half as much
water per household on average as single-family homes, Fisher encouraged
thoughtful land use planning as a tool to achieve higher efficiency. Denver
Water will continue employing their four-tiered rate scale in the future, which
incentivizes conservation. The affordable first tier rate ($2.59 per 11,000 gallons per month) accounts for most households' entire water use. But the cost
of water increases sharply above that tier because using more than 11,000 gallons per month indicates outdoor watering. Fisher argued that this tiered scale
is a practical and equitable solution because it allows everyone to have cheap
access to the amount of water they need to live and it discourages uses Denver
Water views as inefficient, such as watering grass. Under Greg Fisher's guidance, Denver Water seems poised and ready for Colorado's water future in
the short term. That said, Fisher predicted that the solutions might need to be
more extreme if the state's population doubles from five million people to ten
million by 2050, as many people expect.
Finally, James Eklund, Director of the CWCB, discussed the context of
Colorado's water situation and the creation of a comprehensive water plan. He
asserted that in certain settings-education, healthcare, and transportation, for
example-we fear the unknown, but with water issues we fear the known because there are so many studies and statistics displaying a tense, dry future for
the American West. Eklund encouraged the audience to trust the state demographers' accuracy in their projections of an additional two million people
in Colorado by 2030. Eklund stressed how critical it is for Colorado's interstate situation that the state has its intrastate house in order due to Colorado's
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status as a headwater state with many binding compacts. Arizona, Colorado,
and Washington are the only states in the West without comprehensive water
plans. Through an executive order in May 2013 Governor John Hickenlooper
directed the CWCB to commence work on the Colorado Water Plan, which
Eklund is currently working on.
The CWCB's comprehensive water plan will be a dynamic document
amended every two to five years. Eklund stated that the CWCB's goals include
addressing the gap between supply and demand, incentivizing quicker regulatory processes for businesses wanting to establish in Colorado, and devising a
statewide comprehensive water plan. Eklund also called for the need to formulate alternatives to "buy and dry," which refers to users (typically municipalities) in one location buying water rights from other users (typically farmers)
and drying up vast swaths of land completely. Eklund concluded by reminding
the audience that Mother Nature and hydrology require that we move quickly.
The E2 conference served as a platform to begin an informed conversation between entities that value a strong economy built on responsible water
use and conservation. A predictable and secure water future for the West is in
the best interest of the community and the economy, so E2's effort to engage a
wide array of participants in the discussion is a step in the right direction.
Emy Dowd

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION AND CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION IN COLORADO INC. PRESENTS: GROUND WATER
REGULATION- HISTORY AND FOCUS ON DIVISION 1, 2, AND 3
Denver, Colorado October 30, 2013
HISTORY OF GROUND WATER REGULATION FROM A TECHNICAL
PERSPECTIVE

James Slattery, a professional engineer who serves as Water Engineer for
the Republican River Water Conservation District, presented on the topic of
the changing ways engineers and hydrologists evaluate the effect of ground
water withdrawals on nearby surface streams. Slattery has provided expert testimony for the State of Colorado in two arbitration hearings and is also an
engineering representative on a team that is designing a $21 million pipeline
system to collect and deliver well field water to the North Fork of the Republican River.
The current techniques for determining the relationship between the
amount of pumped water from underground aquifers and the decrease in surface water is the result of more than a century of evolving ground water measuring techniques. In 1856, Henry Darcy, when experimenting with water flow
as it traveled through porous mediums, discovered a rule to predict groundwater flow in any situation, later becoming "Darcy's Law." This rule was rudimentary in its practicality because it did not include any unit of time, which
made it unruly in application. However, Darcy's Law laid the foundation for
future inventions that sought to predict with greater precision the measure-
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ment of ground water flow and the effects groundwater pumping would have
on surface sources. Darcy's Law was the prevailing measuring technique during the implementation of the majority of Colorado's wells.
Nearly a century later, after analyzing the similarities between water traveling through a porous medium and heat's dispersal through metal, Robert
Glover, from Colorado State University, predicted the magnitude of depletion
pumping a well had on a nearby river. The test, later known as the Glover
Equation, became the standard measuring unit for groundwater extraction on
surface water in Colorado and across the U.S. This test proved more applicable than its predecessors despite the need to rely on certain assumptions during any study. These assumptions included: the tapped aquifer is isotropic and
homogeneous, the surface stream having no meanders, water table is flat, and
the well pumping is consistent.
Upon its creation in 1976, Stream Depletion Factor ("SDF"), an alternative to the Glover Equation, quickly became the industry standard. The approach relies on the premise that, from the time a well is pumping continuously, the affected stream's volume decreases by twenty-eight percent of the
pumped volume. However, the SDF technique had many of the same assumptions implicit in the Glover Equation, and it was not until hydrologists recalibrated the equation in 1974, naming it the "Jenkins and Taylor SDF Approach," that a truly reliable technique existed to address recharge and depletion values on streams from ground water pumping. The Jenkins and Taylor
SDF Approach incorporated irregular aquifer boundaries and stream meanders into the formula, enabling assessors to realize that drawing ground water
has a lagging effect on the surface stream. Steadily pumping a well for a month
will create a depletion in the surface water that month, and, if the surface water
is not recharged, for many months into the future.
After more than a century of evolving techniques, surveying groundwater
has now become digital, in the form of the U.S. Geological Survey
MODFLOW code. The 3-dimensional, public-domain software solves the
groundwater equation in a finite-difference framework. Hydrologists are able
to simulate coupled groundwater and surface water systems with the assurance
of peer review processes. There is still debate in the water law community and
among hydrologists as to just how accurate and reliable MODFLOW is, given
the varied situations to which it is applied. However, with the current technology available, it is impossible to determine with certainty the exact impact on
surface waters by ground water wells.
MODFLOW has proven itself to be extremely valuable. With the aid of
MODFLOW, hydrologists and engineers working on water rights issues in
Colorado, specifically in Districts 1, 2, and 3, are addressing water systems
with levels of certainty that would have been impossible before. In District 1,
the 2002 droughts forced many senior claimants to seek redress from those
with groundwater rights. MODFLOW played an integral role in the subsequent replacement plans in the South Platte River Basin, which also required
the cessation of hundreds of wells. In District 2, the court in the landmark case
Kansas v. Colorado relied heavily on various MODFLOW models to determine that Colorado's groundwater wells were depriving Kansas of state-line
flow of the Arkansas River required by compact. In District 3, the Rio Grande
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Decision Support System is using MODFLOW along with additional geohydrological data to improve regional knowledge of groundwater impacts on
surface water.
Matt Freemann
LEGAL HISTORY OF GROUND WATER REGULATION

Veronica A. Sperling, Esq. of Buchanan and Sperling, P.C. gave a presentation on the Legal History of Ground Water Regulation in Colorado. Although her presentation covered all ground water regulation, Veronica primarily focused on the type of wells that generated most of the legal history- high
capacity irrigation wells that pump tributary ground water.
Most high capacity irrigation wells were drilled between 1930 and 1970,
when there were few ground water regulations. The irrigation wells pumped
large quantities of tributary ground water that would have otherwise ended up
in a stream, thus affecting the amount of surface water available to surface water right holders. Conflict between surface water users and groundwater users
began as early as the 1950's. Ground water regulation's most pressing legal
issue was how to belatedly integrate ground water users with the surface water
prior appropriation system.
The first instances of a legislative attempt to reconcile ground water and
surface water uses were the 1953 Act and the 1957 Act. The 1953 Act required well drillers to obtain a license, give notice before drilling, and submit
well logs after drilling. The 1957 Act repealed the 1953 Act and required the
State Engineer to issue permits to drill water wells. The 1957 Act expressly
stated that the well permit did not confer a water right, and the legislature obligated the State Engineer to issue all permits, provided all the fees were paid.
Ground water regulation's next evolution came in 1965 with House Bill
1066 and the Colorado Ground Water Management Act. HB 1066 defined
the State Engineer's duty to administer tributary ground water within the surface water prior appropriation system. The Ground Water Management Act
allowed the State Engineer to deny a ground water well permit for the first
time.
The 1965 Act was challenged in Fellhaur v. People.The State Engineer
tried to curtail ground water use in the Lower Arkansas Valley. The Colorado
Supreme Court ruled that the State Engineer violated the Colorado Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses. Furthermore, any ground
water curtailment must be supported by reasonable written rules and regulations, reasonably lessen a material injury to a senior surface water rights, and
allow wells to operate as long as senior water users were protected. The court
also opined the need for "maximum utilization" of Colorado's water resources. Maximum utilization is now integrated into statute and called "optimum utilization." Optimum utilization does not advocate using every available
drop of water, as maximum utilization did.
In 1967, partially in response to Fellhaur v. People, Colorado passed
Senate Bill 407. SB407, among other things, called for ground water studies.
The 407 studies concluded that pumping ground water had infringed senior
surface water rights. These results, coupled with increasingly depleted surface
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flows, compelled the state to administratively integrate ground and surface
water uses in the 1969 Act. The 1969 Act encouraged ground water users to
adjudicate their water rights through water courts and integrated ground water
wells into the surface water priority system by using augmentation plans.
Colorado's Water Division One, the South Platte River basin, stayed
closest to the 1969 Act by using augmentation plans to regulate ground water.
The State Engineer promulgated rules governing ground water use for the
South Platte in 1974, which resulted in the State Engineer approving Central
GMS and GASP annual operating plans as temporary substitute supply plans
even though the State Engineer's approval was not authorized by statute. The
State Engineer's power to approve the temporary substitute supply plans was
successfully challenged first in 2002 by Empke Lodge Homeowners'Association v. Moyer and in 2003 by Shnpson v. B/ou.
The same day the Simpson decision was handed down, the Colorado
Governor signed Senate Bill 03-73 into law. SB 03-73 named December 31,
2005 as the date to curtail pumping in all ground water wells in District One
unless the well had a water court approved augmentation plan, a pending application for an augmentation plan, or a well could operate under its own priority without need for an augmentation plan. Division One has approximately
three thousand wells with approved augmentation plans with hundreds more
augmentation plans pending approval.
In 1973 the State Engineer also promulgated rules for Water Division
Two, the Arkansas River basin, which allowed the State Engineer to curtail
ground water pumping up to four days per week to prevent injury to senior
surface water rights. In 1974 the State Engineer tried to promulgate rules that
would further curtail ground water wells, but the Supreme Court in Kuiper v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Radiway Co. that there was insufficient operating
experience under the 1973 rules to justify decreased ground water pumping.
In 1985 Kansas claimed that Colorado violated the 1949 Arkansas River
Compact because ground water wells drilled after the Compact were depleting
the usable flows at the state line. Kansas sued Colorado. In 1994 the United
States Supreme Court held that ground water pumping in Colorado had violated the Compact. In 1996 new well pumping rules were promulgated, replacing the 1973 rules. The 1996 rules imposed an augmentation requirement for
all wells in the Arkansas River basin.
Veronica stated that ground water regulation in Water Division Three, the
Rio Grande River basin, lagged behind Water Divisions One and Two. In
1966 Texas and New Mexico sued Colorado for violations of the 1938 Rio
Grande River Compact. Colorado agreed to meet the conditions of the 1938
Compact and the State Engineer began to substantially curtail surface water
uses. In 1975 the State Engineer proposed new rules that would limit ground
water pumping over a five year period unless a well had a court approved
augmentation plan. The rules were protested and after a lengthy appeal process the District Three water users adopted the "60/40 Agreement" in 1985.
The 60/40 Agreement provided protection only for 1985 use levels and only
for then-existing wells. In 1998 Colorado addressed post-1985 ground water
uses by passing HB 98-1011, which contained criteria to guide the State Engineer in promulgating new ground water use rules. The new rules went into
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effect in 2006. Additionally, Colorado passed Senate Bill 04-222, which prohibited the State Engineer from curtailing ground water withdrawals in Division Three wells that are part of a ground water management sub-district. The
Colorado Supreme Court characterized SB 04-222 as an alternative to court
approved augmentation plans. So far the water court has only approved one
sub-district, Special Improvement District One, although five other subdistricts are planned for Water Division Three. Currently, approximately
three thousand wells located outside Sub-district One. are depleting stream
flows in Division Three. The depletions are not being replaced and the State
Engineer is not curtailing the wells.
Gabiel Kester

THIRD ANNUAL CARVER COLLOQUIUM
Denver, Colorado November 12, 2013
THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACr: EFFECTIVE OR OBSOLETE?

Lawyers, students, scientists, and the general public gathered to watch the
3' annual Carvel Colloquium, an Oxford-style debate about the future of the
Colorado River Compact ("Compact"). The event followed two years of stellar
debates on timely topics- namely the push to build transmission lines for renewable energy sources and the question of who has primacy when it comes to
regulating hydraulic fracturing of oil and gas wells. Professor Jan Laitos, holder
of the John A. Carver Jr. Chair, hosted the debate and served as a moderator.
Speaker-debaters included CEO and Manager of Denver Water, Jim Lochhead, and Assistant Provost of IE Research and Curriculum Initiatives for the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Tom I. Romero.
Mr. Lochhead is recognized as one of the nation's foremost water rights
and natural resources attorneys. He is the former executive director of the
Colorado Department of Natural Resources and past shareholder at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, where he worked on issues relating to water rights,
interstate water matters, the Endangered Species Act, public lands and natural
resources, zoning, land use, and real estate development. Professor Romero
teaches and researches in the areas of the legal history of the American West,
land use, water law, urban development, and local government, and has published extensively on these topics in prestigious law reviews.
Introducing the issue to the crowd, Professor Laitos discussed the value of
Colorado River water in the past, today, and moving into the future. The river
is an incredibly important source for water needs in Colorado and beyond. As
the lifeblood of the West, especially the Southwest, the Colorado River serves
seven states and two countries. Past intelligent management of the river allowed for economic growth in the arid west.
The Compact, signed in 1922 at the Bishops Lodge in Santa Fe, brought
all seven Colorado River Basin states into agreement as to the allotment of
Colorado River water. It has served as the foundation for the "law of the river"
ever since, but has many noted shortcomings. It famously overestimated the
amount of water available from the Colorado River and failed to anticipate
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certain demographic and climatic trends within the Colorado River Basin.
While the agreement has served a noble purpose over the years, many have
questioned the Compact's continued viability. To start the debate Professor
Laitos asked the question: "Is the Compact still relevant; or should we throw it
away and start over?"
Format for Oxford debates allots each speaker twenty minutes to make
their case; afterward, each speaker has the opportunity for a five-minute rebuttal before the speakers accept questions from the audience. Professor Romero
opened with the argument that the Compact signatories need to replace the
Compact with a new system. To follow, Mr. Lochhead took the position that
the agreement maintains viability in today's world.
Professor Romero highlighted the crisis; no other water body has been the
source of more controversy. The Colorado River provides water to over 40
million people, 5.5 million acres of land, Native American tribes, national
parks, wildlife refuge areas and more. The Compact was the first negotiation
of its kind to agree upon water distribution. In the words of Professor
Romero, it is "thus far the most ambitious illustration of interstate agreement."
Professor Romero explained that compacts, like contracts, can change by
mutual consent or judicial decree and are not as resistant to change as constitutions. Although the Compact's format implicitly allows some change, barriers
to such changes exist. Comparing the challenge of amending the Compact to
the Constitution, Professor Romero noted that Congress has amended the
Constitution significantly in the past ninety-one years and could likewise
amend the Compact. In fact, Professor Romero explained that the expectation
that future generations would amend the Compact is evident in the words of
Compact signatory and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover who, noting
that the Compact had ample provision for readjustment at a later date, stated:
It seems to me almost fantastical to be fighting in the shadows of what may
happen ...in seventy-five years hence....If we can provide for equity for the
next 40 to 75 years, we can trust the generation after the next to be as intelligent as we are today. They will settle it in the light of the forces of their day.
Professor Romero argued that the forces of our day clearly indicate it is
time to make a change. We need a new compact sufficiently nimble, adaptive,
and responsive to changing times.
Professor Romero based his argument on three factors. First, the Compact
is based on inadequate understanding of hydrology and an inadequate historical record. Compact participants relied on 1899-1920 records when precipitation and flows were unusually high/wet. They estimated the Colorado River's
flow to be 16 million acre-feet annually. However, the reality is that severe
drought has plagued the river since 1999, with annual flows averaging barelyl2
million acre-feet. Worse, lower average flows are predicted in the future. At
the time of the Compact, none of the signatories could foresee the effects of
climate change - less snow, decreased groundwater, and increased rates of
evaporation-which over time may be potentially catastrophic. Professor
Romero noted that the National Academy of Sciences has predicted that by
2060 water sources will experience a thirty percent decline. Under current
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Compact parameters, the upper basin will bear the brunt of these impending
shortages.
Second, Professor Romero argued the economic and social context of the
Colorado River Basin was unsettled at the time of Compact formation. Although some locations of growth were predictable, for example southern California, the signatories could not have easily anticipated urban booms in Nevada and Arizona. Furthermore, in general the basin has experienced a shift
from agricultural to urban needs. In asimilar but distinct way, user valuation
has changed; people now appreciate the canyons, river and water for what they
are and not their water consumption.
Third, and finally, Professor Romero argued the Compact failed to include important sovereign interests-namely, Native Americans and Mexico.
Despite the notion of equity, fairness, and commitment governing the use of
Colorado River system, neither Mexico nor American tribes had a seat at the
original negotiation table. Compact commissioners felt no legal obligations to
their riparian neighbor to the south. It was not until 22 years later, in 1944,
that the United States and Mexico entered into a contract guaranteeing 1.5
million acre-feet per year (forty percent of the 3.6 million acre-feet Mexico
sought), a contract that left no room for future growth. Unfortunately, U.S.
tribes received even less acknowledgement. From a purely structural perspective, American tribes arguably deserved similar status as states. In fact, fifteen
years before the signing of the Compact, the Supreme Court case Winters v.
United States determined that the federal government impliedly reserved water for needs of native communities at the establishment date of the reservation.
Professor Romero left the audience with the argument that, ultimately, the
basin states need the courage to re-think the Compact, whose shelf-life has
expired, and, at a minimum, the agreement warrants amendments in the face
of significant economic, environmental, and political shifts.
From the other prospective, Jim Lochhead fully supported the Colorado
River Compact as it stands. He pointed out that Denver Water serves over 1.3
million customers, and half of the water comes from the Colorado River.
Much of what drives both the Colorado and U.S. economy is at stake with the
Compact. Mr. Lochhead explained that the basic Compact obligation of Upper Basin states is not to deplete flows to the Lower Basin below 75 million
acre-feet over a ten-year average.
In his argument, Mr. Lochhead made four main points. First, if we were
to follow Professor Romero's suggestion and re-negotiate the Compact, the
Upper Basin states could potentially end up with a reduced Compact allocation. As it stands, the Upper Basin has the right to use 7.5 million acre-feet in
a given year, but currently fails to put that entire amount to beneficial use. This
is especially true in drought years, when the water simply isn't physically available. The Compact also allocates 7.5 million acre-feet to the Lower Basin,
plus an additional 1 million acre-feet for tributary inflow. Unlike the Upper
Basin, the Lower Basin regularly uses its entire Compact allocation. This raises the question - if we were to renegotiate the Compact based on the historic
consumptive use of the Upper and Lower basins, how would allocations differ? Mr. Lochhead believes that the odds are likely that Lower Basin econo-
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mies would demand a larger share of the allocation and the Upper Basin
would be left with less water to develop in the future.
Next, Mr. Lochhead argued the political process required to amend the
Compact makes continued innovation within the current framework a logical
choice. Within the Compact, it explicitly states that Congress needs to give its
consent to any amendment, and then it becomes federal law. Such amendment would also require the approval of seven states legislatures. Noting Congress' recent performance, Mr. Lochhead believes that amending the Compact
is an unlikely outcome. Given the potential for gridlock, Mr. Lochhead argued
we frankly do not have time for this political process to unfold. The last four.teen years are the driest in history. For example, Lake Powell, the main storage facility for the upper basin-yet, is approaching the minimum power pool
of the reservoir. If drought continues and the water falls below the power generation level, then low water levels will compromise operational integrity and
the Glen Canyon Dam will not be able to physically move the required 7.5
million acre feet of water owed to the lower basin states.
Third, alterations in the Compact would undermine nearly 100 years of
law that has come to be known as the "law of the river". States have developed
statutory frameworks and organized agencies around the Compact. Significant
case law at the state and federal level interprets Compact obligations. In short,
a lot is dependent on the Compact. Amending the Compact would be a conplex, time consuming and overwhelming exercise.
Lastly, Mr. Lochhead argued that "if it aint broke don't fix it." Mr. Lochhead believes that the Compact is not as rigid an agreement as detractors often
proclaim. Instead, he believes it is simple and places minimal constraints on
the Department of Interior. Because the document's provisions are clearly
articulated and set forth, it gives states the ability to adapt and be nimble. For
example, states and Department of Interior have implemented important environmental programs in the areas surrounding the Colorado River (e.g. the
Grand Canyon Protection Act protects fish, beaches, and other conservation
goals). Another example of flexibility is the fact that in 2007, basin states negotiated a coordinated operation allowing amazing flexibility through water banking and importation agreements. Mexico is now included in water quality and
quantity agreements. As a highlight, Minute 319, signed by the U.S. State Department and Mexico last year, negotiated water quantity and quality rights
amongst basin states, NGOs, and the Mexican government. The agreement
provides Mexico access to U.S. reservoirs for pulse and base flows, joint projects, desalination, and other projects. Such cooperation allows stakeholders to
provide for environmental, agricultural, and municipal needs in United States
and Mexico. While the world faces enormous challenges ahead, this document is one of the best examples of effective management.
After the rebuttal, Professor Laitos opened the debate for questions. With
overwhelming participation, Professor Laitos asked each debater six questions
at the close of rebuttal. The ColoradoRiver Compact Effective or Obsolete?
proved to be yet another successful event for the Carver Colloquium.
HeidiRuckriegle

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(holding: (i) the Casitas Municipal Water District's water license limited the
district's constitutionally compensable water right to the amount of water the
district could put to beneficial use; and (ii) a diversion potentially constituting a
compensable taking of the district's water right had not yet occurred, rendering
the district's claim not ripe for adjudication).
Constructed pursuant to a contract between the Casitas Municipal Water
District ("Casitas") and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation"), the
Ventura River Project ("Project") provides water to residential, industrial, and
agricultural customers in Ventura County, California. Ownership of the Project remained with Reclamation, while Casitas accepted operational responsibilities. Casitas received a perpetual right to all water that became available
through the Project. The contract required Casitas to apply to the California
State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to appropriate the water
necessary for the Project. SWRCB issued Casitas the requisite license in May
1956, and Casitas began operating the Project three years later. The license
stipulated that Casitas could divert up to 107,800 acre-feet of water per year
into the Project and put up to 28,500 acre-feet per year to beneficial use.
In order to avoid civil and criminal liability under the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") following the listing of the West Coast steelhead trout, Casitas
began exploring ways to mitigate the Project's impact on the steelhead population in the Ventura River. Following consultation with local water agencies and
the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), Casitas concluded that the
most effective way to achieve mitigation would be to improve upstream access
to steelhead habitats. In 2003, NMFS issued an incidental take permit allowing
Casitas and Reclamation to avoid ESA liability if they agreed to construct and
maintain a fish ladder to allow migrating steelheads to safely bypass the Project. NMFS also required Casitas to divert sufficient water from the Project to
allow steelhead passage through the ladder. Under protest, Casitas opened the
fish ladder on December 9, 2004.
On January 26, 2005, Casitas filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims ("trial court"). Casitas first asserted that the United States had
breached the terms of the 1956 contract by forcing Casitas to divert water
through the fish ladder. Alternatively, Casitas asserted that, by imposing the
diversion requirement, the United States had physically taken its constitutionally protected property without just compensation, a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The trial court dismissed the contract claim under the sovereign
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acts doctrine and entered summary judgment for the government on the takings claim.
Casitas appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("court") affirmed the dismissal of Casitas's contract claim. The court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the takings claim,
however, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. On remand, the
trial court held that, for purposes of a takings claim, California law limits a
licensee's compensable water right to its right to beneficial use. Casitas's right
to beneficial use included the right to deliver water to its customers. Even
though NMFS forced Casitas to divert water into the fish ladder, Casitas failed
to show the diversion forced Casitas to actually deliver less water to its customers than it would have otherwise. The trial court dismissed Casitas's takings
claim on grounds that the claim was not yet ripe. Casitas once again appealed
the district court's decision to the court.
On appeal, Casitas claimed that in its first appeal the court held t a physical taking had already occurred due to the fish ladder diversion and, thus, the
trial court erred by conducting its own takings analysis on remand. The court
held Casitas interpreted its opinion in the first appeal too broadly. First, Casitas erroneously relied on concessions that the government only stipulated to
in order to put the case in a posture for sunmary judgment. Second, the court
held. that neither it nor the trial court had addressed the actual scope of Casitas's water right prior to the current appeal. The court held that the trial court
had not erred in conducting a complete physical takings analysis on remand.
Moreover, the court upheld the trial court's holding that, pursuant to California water law, a court will not find a compensable taking unless the government action complained of has actually impacted a licensee's beneficial use.
Casitas then challenged the trail court's holding that the diversion through
the fish ladder would not impinge on Casitas' right to beneficial use until such
time as the diversion caused Casitas to deliver less water to its customers than
it would have otherwise. The court found that the trial court's test was the correct measure of a physical taking in this context and that Casitas had failed to
show that the fish ladder diversion actually impinged on Casitas's deliveries to
its customers.

Casitas also argued that its water license was evidence that the SWRCB
had already determined that Casitas could beneficially use all 107,800 acre-feet
of diversions allowed to it under the license. Thus, Casitas argued, it had a
compensable right to this entire amount. The court first confirmed the trial
court's holding that California does not recognize a compensable property
right in water that a licensee diverts but never puts to a beneficial use. The
court then held that a maximum limit on diversion provided by the license did
not establish that the SWRCB had determined that Casitas could in fact put
that maximum amount to beneficial use. The court also pointed to the fact
that the SWRCB expressly limited Casitas's beneficial use under the license to
28,500 acre-feet per year, thus limiting Casitas' compensable right to that
amount.
Casitas next claimed that diverting water for storage was a perse beneficial
use, compensable under a takings claim. The court disagreed, holding that
California water law does not recognize storage as a per se beneficial use, but
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simply as a means to a beneficial end. Moreover, the license itself limited Casitas's right to an enumerated list of beneficial uses, mere storage not among
them.
Casitas also asserted that its takings claim began to accrue the moment
NMFS required Casitas to divert water through the fish ladder and that such
regulatory action gave rise to its takings claim. However, the court held that a
physical takings claim only accrues when the physical act constituting the taking occurs, not at the time of the regulatory action that could potentially cause
a taking. Under this rubric, Casitas would have to show that the fish ladder
diversion physically impinged on its right to beneficial use, that is, its right to
deliver water to its customers. Because Casitas made no such showing, the
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Casitas' takings claim as not ripe.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that California water law limits a
licensee's compensable water right to the right to beneficial use. The court
held that Casitas's takings claim was therefore not ripe because a governmental
action physically impinging on its right to beneficial use had not yet occurred.
The court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Casitas's complaint
without prejudice.
NathanialC. Brown

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Nevada, 724 F.3d 1181 (9th. Cir.
2013) (holding diversion of water to wetlands for the preservation of waterfowl
habitat is not "irrigation" within the meaning of a decree governing water rights
but, rather, constituted a wildlife use).
The Truckee and Carson Rivers flow through the Truckee River Basin.
The flow from the Truckee River terminates in Pyramid Lake, where it provides the sole source of water to the lake. The lake lies entirely within the Paiute Tribe's ("Tribe") reservation. Under the authority of the Reclamation Act
of 1902, the federal government initiated the Newlands Project ("Project") in
the early 20th century. The Project diverted water from the Truckee and Carson Rivers to irrigate a substantial amount of land in order develop western
agriculture and encourage homesteader settlement.
The Nevada Department of Wildlife ("NDOW") and the Nevada Waterfowl Association ("NWA") submitted an application to the State Engineer
("engineer") to transfer both consumptive and non-consumptive water rights
from agricultural land in the Project to a wetland located at the end of the Carson River. The objective of the transfer was to support the growth of plants
used as wildlife habitat. If approved, the demand for water from the Truckee
River would increase, thereby reducing the water flow into Pyramid Lake. The
Tribe and the United States disputed the application, contending that the intended use was not irrigation within the meaning of the Alpine Decree ("decree"), which governs water rights in the Project. The decree does not permit
transfer of non-consumptive portion of water rights for a use other than irrigation.
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The issue was whether the NDOW and NWA's proposed use constituted
irrigation as defined by the decree. The NDOW and NWA argued that the
intended water use constituted irrigation because the water would support
plant growth. The Tribe and United States claimed that NDOW and NWA
did not seek to transfer the rights for irrigation purposes but rather for the
purposes of sustaining wildlife. The engineer approved the transfer application
because the engineer found that the proposed water use involved plant growth,
which constituted irrigation use. The Tribe appealed to the District Court for
the District of Nevada ("district court"). The district court disagreed with the
engineer and found that the proposed water diversion for waterfowl habitat
was not included in the decree's definition of irrigation. The NDOW and
NWA appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("court").
The court first noted that the Tribe established a cognizable injury; the water flow into Pyramid Lake is essential to the Tribe's cultural and economic
life. The court noted that irrigation use as stated in the decree was only applicable to agricultural uses, specifically uses to grow cash crops and pasture. The
NDOW and NWA were unable to prove otherwise. The decree also incorporated portions of Nevada law, including the Nevada water code ("code"). The
code defines "wildlife purposes" to include the establishment and maintenance
of wetlands. The court noted that the wildlife purposes definition is precisely
what the NDOW and NWA sought to accomplish with the water right transfer. Both the decree and code discuss irrigation solely within the context of
agriculture, and both distinguish agricultural uses from wildlife purposes; neither indicates that a water transfer application to sustain wildlife habitat constitutes irngation.
Accordingly, the court held the district court correctly concluded that the
proposed water diversion for waterfowl habitat was not irrigation as defined by
the decree. The court affirmed the district court's judgment.
Meghan Leemon

Firebaugh Canal Water Dist v. United States, 712 F.3d 1296 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding the Department of the Interior is only required to provide
drainage for lands within the San Luis Unit, has discretion to choose a drainage solution, and is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for failing to
provide drainage to downslope lands).
In 1960, Congress passed the San Luis Act ("Act"), which authorized the
Department of the Interior ("Interior") to create and maintain the San Luis
Unit ("Unit"). The Unit was to provide irrigation water to 500,000 acres of
land in three California counties as part of the Central Valley Project, the largest water reclamation project in the nation. The Act required the Interior to
construct a dam, reservoir, pumping plants, drains, and other facilities in the
Unit. Concerned that the Unit would increase regional drainage requirements,
Congress authorized the Interior to construct drainage facilities to serve the
general areas affected by the Unit. Under this authority, the Interior began
constructing an interceptor drain. The Unit started making water deliveries in
1967.
However, the inability of federal and state governments to agree on environmental standards prevented the Interior from completing the endpoint of
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the interceptor drain. Awaiting approval to finish the interceptor drain, the
Interior constructed the middle portion of the drain and the Kesterson Reservoir ("Kesterson") to receive the Unit's output in 1975. In 1983, studies revealed elevated levels of selenium in Kesterson drainage water. As a result, the
Interior closed Kesterson and the drains leading to it in 1986. Despite this, the
Interior continued to irrigate land within the Unit.
The lack of drainage affected several parties, who filed claims in the District Court of the Eastern District of California ("district court"), including
Firebaugh Canal Water District ("Firebaugh"). In 1995, the district court consolidated these claims, and ruled the Act required Interior to provide drainage
to the Unit. Interior appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
("court") heard Firebaughlin 2000. The court upheld part the district court's
ruling that required Interior to provide drainage within the Unit. However, the
court held that Interior retained discretion on how to satisfy the drainage requirements.
On remand, the district court ruled consistent with the court's holding.
The district court ordered Interior to provide drainage to the Unit immediately, but gave Interior broad discretion to select a drainage solution, requiring
only that Interior submit a plan describing anticipated actions and milestones.
After a reevaluation of the Unit's drainage needs, in 2007 Interior announced
an in-valley solution that relied on water treatment and reuse, evaporation
ponds, and restricting irrigation to some in-Unit areas.
Due to funding problems, Interior's completion of the in-valley drainage
project proceeded slowly and in a piece-meal fashion. In response, Firebaugh
submitted an amended complaint against the Interior. First, Firebaugh sought
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), arguing that Interior's
failure to provide drainage constituted a nuisance and trespass. Second, Firebaugh, invoked the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and argued Interior's failure to provide drainage constituted: (1) a final agency action that was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance
with law; or (2) Interior unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed agency
action. The district court dismissed Firebaugh's first claim, holding California
law does not require water suppliers to prevent drainage onto downslope
lands, and Interior was immune from a FTCA claim under the discretionary
function exception. The district court rejected Firebaugh's second claim as
well, holding Interior's only discrete duty was to provide drainage within the
Unit, and although its actions were frustratingly slow, the Interior's actions did
not presently constitute an unreasonable delay. Firebaugh appealed the district
court's decision.
Addressing the first issue on appeal, the court reviewed the district court's
determination that both the private analog requirement and the discretionary
function exemption barred Firebaugh's claim. Under the private analog requirement, a government agency is liable for negligence only if a private person would be liable for similar acts. With no precedent on point, the court
assumed the existence of a private analog and proceeded to the discretionary
function analysis. To determine if the discretionary function exemption applied, the court employed a two-step analysis. The first step analyzed whether
the challenged actions involved an element of judgment or choice. The second
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analyzed whether that judgment was the kind of judgment Congress designed
the discretionary function exemption to shield- namely, governmental actions
based on public policy concerns. Firebaugh argued the exemption should not
apply because the Act imposed a duty on the Interior that was divorced from
discretion. The court rejected this argument based on its Frebaugh I ruling,
holding Interior had broad discretion in providing a drainage solution. Further, the court reasoned that Interior's actions were grounded in multiple public policy concerns and, therefore, the discretionary function exemption applied, negating Firebaugh's FTCA claim.
For Firebaugh's second claim under the APA to prevail, the court required Firebaugh to demonstrate that Interior failed to take a discrete action
that it was legally required to take. Firebaugh argued Interior failed to make
two specific actions the Act required: (1) to provide drainage to lands outside
the Unit, and (2) to provide drainage to lands inside the Unit. The court rejected these assertions. First, it held the Act merely authorized Interior to construct drainage facilities outside the Unit; Interior was not required to do so.
Congress never gave Interior discretion to choose necessary drainage facilities,
so providing drainage to lands outside the Unit was not a discrete action Congress required Interior to take. Second, although the court recognized that
progress on the in-valley drainage solution was slow, it held Intcrior was not
withholding nor unreasonably delaying drainage within the Unit. The court
reasoned that the scope and cost of the project was the root of the delay, not
Interior failing to take action. Therefore, Firebaugh's second contention failed
as well.
The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Interior was not required
to provide drainage to lands outside the Unit, Interior was not unlawfully withholding nor unreasonably delaying drainage within the Unit, and that the discretionary function exemption prohibited a federal tort claim against Interior.
James Hanseen

Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 721 F.3d 1086 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding area of origin statutes did not control the allocation of federally appropriated water during times of shortage when valid contracts contained no area of origin provision and explicitly allowed for reduced allocation
during times of shortage).
The Central Valley Project ("CVP") diverts water from California's two
largest rivers, the Sacramento and San Joaquin, for beneficial use throughout
the state. The CVP operates under a cooperative agreement between the California State Department of Water Resources and the federal Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"). Under the CVP, the State Water Resource Control
Board ("SWRCB") issued permits to the Bureau to appropriate water from
the Sacremento Valley Basin. Water users then acquire water through contracts with the Bureau, as opposed to the standard practice of obtaining ap-

propriative rights to California water sources through the SWRCB. In the absence of operational constraints or contract terms dictating priority allocation,
the Bureau distributes water on a pro rata basis. In addition, all contractors
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generally receive less than their contracted allocation during times of water
shortage.
Members of the Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority ("Canal Authority") first
signed contracts with the Bureau in the 1960's and 1970's, and many of those
contracts were set to expire in 1995. Members then executed long-term renewal contracts in 2005. The renewal contracts contained language similar to
the original contracts, giving the Bureau discretion to reduce allocations to
Canal Authority members during times of water shortage. The renewal contracts also required each Canal Authority member to initiate actions in state
court to confirm the validity of the contracts. All members did so.
After receiving less than their contractual allocations due to shortage,
members of the Canal Authority sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the U.S. Department of Interior ("Interior") and other defendants.
Members of the Canal Authority argued that the California Water Code
("CWC") entitled them to priority water allocation, even during times of water
shortage. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ("district court") granted summary judgment for defendants, and the Canal
Authority appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("court") addressed
four issues in reaching its decision: (i) whether the Bureau's decision to reduce
water allocations was arbitrary, (ii) whether the CWC required the Bureau to
allocate water based on area of origin statutes, (iii) whether the contracts between Canal Authority members and the Bureau contained language addressing priority allocation during times of shortage, and (iv)whether Canal Authority members could challenge the validity of the CVP contracts.
The California legislature enacted area of origin statutes to address coucerns that the CVP would reduce the amount of water available for local use
within the Sacramento River Basin and Delta area. The primary statute at issue, CWC § 11460, gives priority water rights to users within the area of origin
over export appropriations. Although the Bureau's appropriations were subject to the area of origin statutes, these statutes only impacted the total amount
of water the Bureau could appropriate and did not dictate subsequent allocation under CVP contracts.
In affirming the district court's decision, the court explained in detail the
way the Bureau had interpreted the applicability of area of origin statutes to
CVP water contracts. The court pointed to a paper the Bureau issued articulating its stance that the area of origin statutes applied to water priority rights, not
delivery of water under CVP contracts. The court further noted the Bureau
had been consistent in this approach throughout the renewal contract negotiation process. The court therefore held the Bureau's decision to reduce allocations was not arbitrary.
Although the CVP contracts clearly indicated the Bureau's authority to reduce distributions during times of water shortage, the court noted this language
could not disregard applicable law. However, the court found the contracts did
not flout applicable law, given that courts have upheld the SWRCB's interpretations that Canal Authority members did not have priority to water under S
11460. In addition, the court noted the contracts lacked any language granting
area of origin priority to members of the Canal Authority.
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The court also referenced the validation process each of the Canal Authority members completed. The court held the validation process ensured all
provisions in the CVP contracts were enforceable. The validated contracts,
therefore, prohibited Canal Authority members from challenging the contract
provisions granting the Bureau discretion to reduce allocations during times of
water shortage.
Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment because the Bureau's authority to reduce allocations during times of
shortage was a valid contractual provision, and the contracts contained no provision for area of origin priority. In addition, the CWC's area of origin statutes
did not require area of origin priority in the allocation of water under the CVP
contracts.
RafaelMendez
John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding (i) the 1999
Rules, promulgated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, properly
implemented Katie John I and the federal reserved water rights doctrine; (ii)
the Secretaries properly determined Alaskan "public lands" with a priority for
rural subsistence hunting and fishing under Tide VIII of ANILCA included
waters appurtenant to federal reservations, but (iii) excluded lands upstream.
and downstream of reservations; and (iv) the Federal Subsistence Board
should determine federal reserved water rights for Alaska Native Settlements
on a case-by-case basis).
In 1980 Congress enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") to conserve approximately 105 million acres of Alaskan
public land. ANILCA expresses a preference for Alaskan management of its
provisions, but the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture ("Secretaries")
have the authority to implement ANILCA if Alaska fails to do so. Alaska lost
certification to implement ANILCA in 1990 following McDowell v. Alaska. In
McDowell, the Alaska Supreme Court found ANILCA's rural subsistence
priority violated the Alaskan state constitution because the priority did not
accord with Alaskan subsistence lifestyles.
When Alaska lost its certification, implementation of ANILCA fell back
to the federal government. Since then, the Secretaries and the courts have
further developed the meaning of "public lands." ANILCA defines "public.
lands" as federal lands, waters, and interests therein, except for lands conveyed
or selected for conveyance to Alaska under the Alaska Statehood Act or to a
Native Corporation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA"). Title VIII of ANILCA grants a priority to hunting and fishing for
rural subsistence over hunting and fishing for other purposes on "public
lands." In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
("court") found in Alaska v Babbitt ("KatieJohn I') that, contrary to the Secretaries' 1992 Rules, "public lands" under Title VIII included some navigable
waters and that the Secretaries possessed the authority to identify those waters.
In response, the Secretaries issued the 1999 Final Rules ("1999 Rules"). The
1999 Rules brought navigable waters with a federal reserved water right under
the aegis of ANILCA. The 1999 Rules also identified federal land units that
possessed federal reserved water rights. These 34 land units included non-
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navigable waters on federal land units, navigable and non-navigable waters on
the land units' exterior boundaries, and inland waters adjacent to the land
units' exterior boundaries.
Katie John, as well as other individuals, tribal groups, and environmental
organizations ("Katie John") and the State of Alaska ("State") brought actions
against the Secretaries in the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska ("district court"). Katie John argued the Secretaries too narrowly construed "public lands" in the 1999 Rules. The State, however, argued the Secretaries too broadly construed "public lands." The district court consolidated the
two challenges into one lawsuit. The district court upheld the Secretaries'
middle position because the Secretaries lawfully and reasonably used the
rulemaking process to determine public lands where the United States had
federal reserved water rights.
Katie John and the State appealed to the court. First, both Katie John and
the State argued the 1999 Rules did not qualify for deference under Chevron,
USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chevron"). The
State also argued (i) the Secretaries should have used adjudication and not
rulemaking to implement Katie John I; the Secretaries erred in interpreting
ANILCA to include as "public lands" (ii) waterways not within federal lands,
conservation system units ("CSUs"), or national forests; (iii) marine water; and
(iv) water on land "selected-for-but-not-yet-conveyed" to the State or to a Native Corporation. Katie John argued ANILCA's rural subsistence priority must
apply (i) to navigable waters upstream and downstream from ANILCA's
CSUs, as well as (ii) to waters appurtenant to land the Alaskan Native Allotment Act of 1906 ("ANAA") earmarked for Alaskan Natives.
Before addressing either side's arguments, the court discussed two overarching doctrines involved in evaluating the 1999 Rules and the power of
Alaska over its waters: the federal navigational servitude and the federal reserved water rights doctrine. The navigational servitude allows the United
States to protect and facilitate interstate commerce on navigable waterways.
The federal reserved water rights doctrine traditionally grants the United States
the right to use the amount of water necessary for fulfilling the primary purposes of a federal reservation. In the context of Title VIII of ANILCA, however, the focus is not on the amount of water necessary for fulfilling the purpose of a reservation, but rather the location of the water sources for potential
subsistence use. This novel use of the federal reserved water rights doctrine,
the court warned, may prove a "poor mechanism" for identifying water locations for subsistence use.
The court's analysis began with a discussion of the State's first argument.
The court determined that the Secretaries' use of notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than adjudication was appropriate and consistent with
ANILCA. The Secretaries did not need to adjudicate because they were not
"determining their own water rights" under the federal reserved water rights
doctrine, but rather identifying geographic water locations. The court found
the Secretaries properly left unanswered the purposes of the land reservation
and how much water they needed. Future adjudicators, the court noted, can
resolve those questions as usual.
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Next, the court discussed whether Chevron deference applies to the Secretaries' administration of ANILCA. Under Chevron, the court must implement
any unambiguous intent of Congress, but if the statute is silent or, like
ANILCA, ambiguous, the administrating agency interprets congressional intent and the courts generally defer to that interpretation. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency's decision in matters such as the interpretation of congressional intent cannot be "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion." The court found the Secretaries acted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Secretaries warranted some Chevron
deference. However, the court refrained from granting complete deference
because the court envisioned an integral role for itself in the implementation
of the judicially created federal reserved water rights doctrine.
The court then addressed the State's argument that "public lands" under
Title VIII of ANILCA should not include waters appurtenant to federal reservations. Appurtenant waters are waters adjacent to federal reservations that
play a significant part in the hydraulic cycle of waters on the reserved land.
Under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, appurtenancy pertains to the
water's use, not its physical location. Citing United States v. New Mexico and
Cappaert v. United States, the court noted that the United States may claim
appurtenant waters when they are necessary for the reserved land's primary
purposes. Therefore, the Secretaries reasonably determined that this strong
federal interest allows appurtenant waters to qualify as "public lands" under
ANILCA.
The court also rejected the State's argument that the Secretaries incorrectly identified certain specific lands as "public lands" under ANILCA. The State
argued Sixmile Lake is not "public land" because the lake's shoreline is not on
federal or public land. The court found Sixmile Lake is "public land" because,
regardless of the lake's physical border in relation to the Lake Clark National
Park, the United States may need to appropriate its water under the federal
reserved water rights doctrine. The State also argued, using a map as evidence,
that seven Juneau-area streams fell outside the boundaries of the Tongass National Forest. On the Secretaries' own map, however, the streams fell within
the forest's boundaries. The court noted that neither side presented a conclusive map but found the seven Juneau-area streams were "public lands" because
it was reasonable for the Secretaries to use their own map in their final decision. The State then argued that waters on inholdings-lands within a federally
listed land unit conveyed to Alaska, a Native corporation, or a private individual-were not "public lands" because federal reserved water rights apply only
to waters appurtenant to federal lands. The court found the Secretaries reasonably concluded that inholdings were "public lands." The court noted that
the United States still retained federal water rights even after it conveys the
land to a third party because the water may still be necessary to the reservations' primary purposes.
The court then addressed the State's argument that the Secretaries' headland-to-headland method does not properly exclude all tidal and marine waters from ANILCA's definition of "public lands." Under the Secretaries'
method, "inland waters" include "waters located landward of the mean high
tide line or the waters located upstream of the straight line drawn from head-
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land to headland across the mouths of rivers or other waters as they flow into
the sea." The court found the Secretaries' establishment of a boundary necessary because, under the federal reserved water rights doctrine and ANICLA,
federal reserved rights do not extend to marine waters. Additionally, the court
found the boundary method reasonable because it included tidally-influenced
waters indivisible from waters inland of the high tide land or from waters on
federal reservations.
Next, the court addressed the State's argument that ANICLA's rural subsistence priority should not apply to federal land "selected-but-not-yetconveyed" to Alaska or a Native Corporation. Section 102 of ANILCA specifically excludes such land from its definition of "public lands," but in section
906(o)(2) "public lands" includes lands in the process of conveyance. Faced
with these conflicting directives, the court decided that the definition in section
906(o)(2) superseded section 102 for reasons of practicality. The court noted
the impracticality of requiring the Secretaries to apply various federal laws to
the "selected-but-not-yet-conveyed" lands while excluding them only from the
rural subsistence priority. Accordingly, the court found the Secretaries properly resolved the statutory conflict.
After rejecting the State's arguments, the court addressed Katie John's argument that the rural subsistence priority should include waters upstream and
downstream from federal reservations. If the Secretaries did include these
waters, the court noted, the priority would apply to the majority of Alaskan
rivers and streams. The court flatly denied such a broad application. The court
came to its conclusion after examining three areas of particular relevance.
First, the court looked at the history of rural subsistence under ANILCA. The
court acknowledged past Alaskan discontentment with federal regulation of
Alaskan waters; indeed, one of the main reasons Alaskans pursued statehood
was to regulate their own waters. ANILCA, in light of this historic federal-state
tension, granted rural subsistence priority only to certain public lands subject
to certain limitations. Second, the court discussed the primary purposes of
ANILCA and other Alaskan federal reservations. The court noted ANILCA
mostly reserved land from people rather than for people. The 1999 Rules also
identified reservations whose primary purposes are not rural subsistence. Recognizing the unique nature of federal reservations in Alaska as compared to
the arid Western States, the court noted that many of these reservations allow
for rural subsistence use even if it is not the primary purpose. The court emphatically stated that rural subsistence use on most ANILCA reservations is "a
servitude imposed as a limitation on federal control," not a specific purpose of
the reservation. Third, the court discussed constraints on the federal reserved
water rights doctrine. The court reaffirmed its holdings in Katie John l and
KatieJohn v. United States ("KadeJohnII') that federal reserved water rights
pertain to waters the United States intended to reserve in order to accomplish
the purposes of federal land reservations. Rural subsistence use is not the primary purpose of most ANILCA reservations, but its attachment to the reservations through the federal reserved water rights doctrine suggests it involves
comparable limitations. Thus, after a detailed examination, the court agreed
with the Secretaries' exclusion of waters upstream and downstream from federal lands under ANILCA's definition of "public lands."
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Finally, the court addressed Katie John's argument that "public lands" under ANILCA extends to waters appurtenant to land allotted by the ANAA to
an Alaska Native. The 1906 ANAA and its successor, the ANCSA of 1971,
granted the Secretary of the Interior the power to allot a 160-acre piece of
unappropriated land to an Alaskan Native. In the 1999 Rules, the Secretaries
did not list waters appurtenant to these allotments as "public lands." Instead,
the Secretaries delegated to the Federal Subsistence Board ("FSB") the authority to, decide this issue. The FSB decided to identify which, if any, of these
waters fall within "public lands" on a "case-by-case basis." In opposition, the
State argued that none of the Native allotments, which were conveyed out of
the public domain, could give rise to federal reserved water rights. However,
the court asserted that it did not need to decide that issue to conclude the Secretaries reasonably delegated the difficult and complex matter to the FSB.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision that (i) the
Secretaries appropriately implemented Katie John land the federal reserved
water rights doctrine; (ii) ANILCA's rural subsistence priority can apply to
appurtenant waters; (iii) the Secretaries properly excluded certain lands, including lands upstream and downstream from federal reserved land, from the
definition of "public lands;" and (iv) agencies may determine reserved water
rights for Alaska Native Settlements on a "case-by-case basis."
Emdy Miler

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 716 F.3d 535 (11th
Cir. 2013). (holding (i) the Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act created
no obligation for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to administer its
flood management system in a way that protects and does not interfere with
the Miccosukee Tribe's rights of use and enjoyment for leased and reservation
land, and (ii) the Miccosukee Tribe failed to adequately state due process and
equal protection claims).
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida ("Tribe") brought this appeal
against the United States claiming the Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps")
management of the Central and South Florida Project ("C&SF Project")
caused extreme flooding of tribal lands in violation of its rights under the Constitution and the Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act ("FILCSA").
Several pieces of legislation influenced the actions and outcome of the
case. Congress passed the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850 in order
to bring development to the Everglades of Florida. The Overflowed Lands Act
allowed the establishment of a system of canals, levees, locks, and dams to
encourage a large migration of individuals and to bring development to the
South Florida area. However, the system Florida established proved inadequate to protect against future disaster. Congress then passed the Flood Control Act of 1948, which created the C&SF Project and enlisted the Corps to
work in conjunction with state and local agencies to better implement the project. Though considered a state project, the Corps maintained operational
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control over critical areas of the C&SF Project, including the area at issue. The
C&SF Project addressed three major concerns: preserving the Everglades,
providing a water supply, and improving flood protection to South Florida.
Prior to the C&SF Project, the land in and around the Everglades was commercially useless. The canals, water gates, and pump systems the C&SF Project constructed have kept much of the land drained and useable for agricultural and residential purposes.
The C&SF Project encompasses three geographical areas: the Everglades
Agricultural Area, the Water Conservation Area ("WCA"), and Everglades
National Park ("Park"). In order to keep the Agricultural Area usable, the
Corps drains water from this land into the WCA and, when necessary, releases
the water to flow south into the Park. The contested area lies within the WCA.
The WCA consists of three reservoirs: WCA 1, WCA 2, and WCA 3 (divided into WCA 3A and 3B). Along the southern border of WCA 3 the Corps
installed a series of four gates, referred to as the S-12 gates, to control water
flow from the reservoir into the Park. The Corps maintains exclusive control
over the flow of water from the reservoir into the Park and with this control
comes the ability to influence the ecosystem of the Park. This appeal questions
the propriety of the Corps' decisions concerning the operation of the S-12
gates.
The Corps determines the flow of water from the reservoir to the Park
based on the water regulation schedules it promulgates, taking into consideration the maximum and minimum water levels for various areas of the project
and the authorized purposes of the C&SF Project These schedules consist of
set times to open or close certain gates and channels. The Corps may apply its
discretion and depart from the schedule under certain circumstances, such as
a threat to an endangered species or as a means to maintain the health and
safety of the Tribe. When creating the schedules, the Corps must consider the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"). Previously, the Corps' water regulation schedules caused severe damage to the Cape Sable seaside sparrow's
("sparrow") habitat, thereby threatening the sparrow's population. In response,
Congress implemented three experimental programs in 1983, 1999, and 2002.
The 2002 program, the Interim Operation Plan for the Protection of the Cape
Sable Seaside Sparrow ("IOP"), remains the current operating plan. The IOP
works to create continuous dry periods ideal to accommodate the sparrow's

nesting cycles.
The Everglades area also serves as home to the Tribe. The Tribe holds
rights to land in the Everglades held in trust by the federal government ("reservation land") and land provided through a perpetual lease ("leased land") from
the State of Florida.
Two treaties established the reservation land: the Treaty of Camp
Moultrie of 1823 and the Treaty of Payne's Landing of 1832. These treaties
required native groups in Florida to relinquish all claims to territory in Florida
and attempted to create a reservation in central Florida. The treaties thus gave
the United States control of the Everglades, which Congress transferred to
Florida in 1850. Congress regained control over much of the land through the
establishment of Everglades National Park in 1934. Florida then worked to
establish a permanent reservation for the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes.
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Ultimately, the United States established the Miccosukee reservation in
Broward County on land within the northwest area of WCA 3A.
The Tribe gained additional land interests in the Everglades through lease
agreements with Florida. The original land lease of 1960 was largely impermanent and rested on uncertain legal foundations. The Tribe challenged its legitimacy in 1979. Following several negotiations and public hearings, the Tribe
and Florida entered into settlement and lease agreements in 1982 in which the
Tribe relinquished all rights, tide, interests, or claims to possession of any public or private lands or natural resources in Florida. Further, the Tribe conceded that the rights of use and enjoyment granted were not absolute but were
subject to the water management activities of the South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD"), which served as the local sponsor of the C&SF
Project, and of the Corps. In return, Florida agreed to grant the Tribe a perpetual lease interest, including a right to use and enjoy 143,620 acres bordering the reservation land.
Because the settlement and lease agreements resulted in extinguishment of
tribal land claims, both needed congressional approval to take effect. In order
to approve these agreements, Congress passed FILCSA in 1982. FILCSA
approved the settlement and lease agreements and granted the Tribe rights to
enjoy and use the leased land. In exchange, the Tribe relinquished any aboriginal right, title, interest or claim to land. FILCSA also recognized that the
Tribe received no greater rights or interests outside of those explicitly stated in
the lease agreement. In addition, FILCSA transferred the reservation land
from Florida to the United States ("Trustee Deed") and expressly subjected
the land to all rights, easements, and reservations favoring SFWMD and the
Corps. Ultimately, FILCSA granted Florida and the United States the ability to
continue water management activities on the reservation and leased land without significant hindrance from the Tribe.
This case was first brought before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida ("district court") in 2008, after a fire in the Park
threatened the sparrow habitat and required a deviation from the regulation
schedules that resulted in flooding on tribal lands. The Tribe Chairman contacted the Corps and requested that it mitigate the flooding by keeping the
gates open beyond the regular scheduled closure date, but the Corps, after
review, denied the request. The Tribe brought four counts arising from the
Corps' alleged mismanagement of the C&SF Project. The four counts included (i) a violation of the Tribe's rights under FILCSA, (ii) a violation of the
Tribe's due process rights, (iii) an action under FILCSA for a writ of mandamus against the Corps, and (iv) a violation of the Tribe's equal protection
rights. In response to all four counts, the Corps filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for relief. In support of the motion to dismiss, the
Corps argued any rights granted in the lease agreement and Trustee Deed
were subject to the express provisions of those agreements. From the Corps'
perspective, the agreements provided easements to the SFWMD and the
Corps superior to the rights granted to the Tribe, meaning the Corps was immune from the Tribe's suit. The district court dismissed the first three claims
and granted summary judgment on the fourth. The Tribe appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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("court") seeking a decision -requiring the Corps to protect and not interfere
with its rights of use and enjoyment of leased and reservation land.
The court considered all four counts on appeal. As a general matter, the
court noted that the allegations did not comply with the requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal because the allegations were general, vague, and conclusory
statements. However, the court concluded it could discern enough from the
allegations to dispose of the appeal.
Count One and Count Three alleged the Corps had a duty to protect and
avoid interference with the Tribe's rights of use and enjoyment under
FILCSA. The counts differed, however, in the remedy sought. The Tribe
sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief from the Corps' actions in
Count One and sought a writ of mandamus in Count Three. The Tribe alleged its right of use and enjoyment originated in the settlement and lease
agreements ("agreements") and the Trustee Deed, while the obligation to protect and not interfere originated in FILCSA. The court found this interpretation of FILCSA erroneous. The language of FILCSA only approves the Lease
Agreement and creates the reservation through the Trustee Deed. FILCSA
does not create an obligation to protect or avoid interference with the Tribe's
rights, nor does the language of either the Lease Agreement or the Trustee
Deed create such an obligation. The court acknowledged that the Tribe might
find this obligation in the Corps' responsibility under its easements to conduct
lawful water management activities. The Tribe may have considered the flooding of tribal lands to be beyond the scope of the Corps' responsibilities, equating the flooding to trespassing on tribal lands. The court ultimately dismissed
this notion as the easements were not on record and therefore a determination
of the scope was not possible. Ultimately, the court dismissed both Counts
One and Three as insufficient to state a claim.
Count Two alleged the Corps deprived the Tribe of property without due
process. The court agreed the Corps could not take all or part of the Tribe's
property granted under the agreements and Trustee Deed without due process, but questioned what process was due to the Tribe. The court presented
three factors a plaintiff must allege to claim denial of property without due
process of law: (i) deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest,
(ii) governmental action, and .(iii) constitutionally inadequate process. The
court found the Tribe failed to allege what process was adequate before the
Corps could flood its lands. As such, the Tribe failed to adequately establish a
due process claim.
Count Four alleged the Corps deprived the Tribe of equal protection under the law through its water management practices. The Tribe argued they
were due protections under the Fourteenth Amendment (which the court corrected to refer to the Fifth Amendment) and that the acts of the United States
deprived the Tribe of these protections. Further, the Tribe argued that as a
discrete and insular minority, it was unable to take advantage of the majoritarian protections of the political system. The court again found the allegations in
Count Four to be so vague and ambiguous that it would have to make multiple
assumptions to determine a violation of equal protection rights, including the
identity of the beneficiaries of the allegedly discriminatory flooding management The court refused to entertain such assumptions and found the allega-
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tions to be insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
claims arising under FILCSA and the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as its decision to grant summary judgment for the equal protection
claim.
LIbe Parker

STATE COURTS
COLORADO
In re Water Rights of the City and Cnty. of Denver v. City of Englewood,
304 P.3d 1160 (Colo. 2013) (holding (i) municipality may use properly quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows ("LIRFs") as substitute supply
for decreed appropriative rights of exchange, by virtue of the fact that such
LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable imported transmountain
effluent; and (ii) junior appropriator cannot claim injury based solely upon
municipality's proper operation of its decreed exchanges).
In 2004 the City and County of Denver ("Denver") filed an application for
determination of water right in the Colorado District Court for Water Division
1 ("water court"). Denver requested approval of its use of properly quantified
transmountain LIRFs as a substitute supply of water for its appropriative rights
of exchange decreed in Civil Action ("C.A.") 3635. The C.A. 3635 decree,
which the Colorado District Court for Douglas County issued in 1972, rests
upon Denver's intent to effectuate exchanges on the South Platte River of public stream water as substitute supplies for appropriated water supplied or taken
by Denver. In 1992 the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") interpreted the
C.A. 3635 decree in City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood and
approved imported Colorado River water and imported transmountain water
returning to the South Platte River as wastewater effluent ("transmountain effluent") as permitted substitute supplies for the C.A. 3635 exchanges.
Just as it did in 1992, Englewood filed a statement of opposition to Denver's 2004 application. In response, Denver filed a C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion for
determination of questions of law, requesting the water court to decide (i)
whether Denver could use properly quantified LIRFs as a substitute supply of
water for the C.A. 3635 exchanges, and (ii) whether a junior appropriator within the exchange reach could claim injury based solely on the use of such
LIRFs as a substitute supply source.
Addressing the Rule 56(h) motion, the water court concluded Denver
could use properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as a substitute supply. The
water court compared transmountain LIRFs to reusable transmountain effluent, which was approved as a decreed substitute supply in Englewood, and
noted that the two are legally indistinguishable. In addition, the water court
reasoned that junior appropriators have no expectation as to imported reusable water because senior appropriators can use and reuse imported transmountain water to extinction. Therefore, junior appropriators could not claim
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injury based solely upon the proper operation of the C.A. 3635 exchanges
through the use of imported transmountain water as a substitute supply.
After the water court's determinations of law, Denver and Englewood entered a stipulated final decree with the water court, subject to Englewood's
appeal of the water court's grant of Denver's Rule 56(h) motion. Thereafter,
Englewood appealed the water court's decision directly to the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued this opinion after a de novo review of the two questions at issue. The Court affirmed the water court's decision.
Regarding the first issue, the Court noted the statutory and common law
support for a transmountain water user's right to reuse imported transmountain water to the maximum possible extent, as well as a user's right to use
transmountain water and reusable transmountain effluent as substitute supplies
for appropriative rights of exchange. In addition, the Court discussed its Englewood decision, which noted Denver's clear intent in 1921 to use Colorado
River water as substitute supply for the C.A. 3635 exchanges. The water court
analogized properly quantified transmountain LIRFs to the reusable transmountain effluent discussed in Englewood and concluded that LIRFs could
similarly serve as a substitute supply for C.A. 3635 exchanges. The Court
therefore affirmed the water court's conclusion that Denver could use properly
quantified transmountain LIRFs as substitute supply just as it may use reusable
transmountain effluent, because the two are legally indistinguishable.
Next, the court discussed Englewood's injury claim. Like the water court,
the Court held that Englewood, as a junior appropniator, had no expectation as
to imported reusable water because senior appropriators may use and reuse
imported water to extinction. Thus, Englewood could not claim injury from
Denver's use of imported water for exchanges under C.A. 3635. By this principle, Englewood could not claim injury related to Denver's use of properly
quantified transmountain LIRFs as a substitute supply of water under the C.A.
3635 appropriative rights of exchange.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's order granting Denver's
Rule 56(h) Motion.
Sarahj McGrath
Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P'ship v. Raftopoulos Bros., 307 P.3d 1056 (Colo.
2013) (holding (i) the water court did not need to interpret the phrase "all other beneficial uses" in a previous decree nor determine the abandonment of
commercial and industrial uses where the applicant only sought to change its
irrigation rights; (ii) the water court incorrectly applied the "can and will" doctrine for a finding of reasonable diligence of a conditional water right when it
found that a water right is speculative only when it is impossible to implement;
and (iii) the water court improperly granted conditional water rights because
the applicants failed to prove a non-speculative use).
The Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") reviewed three cases in which the
District Court for Water Division 6 ("water court") granted the parties' applications for two conditional water rights and a change to an absolute right on
Talamantes Creek in Moffat County. The first adjudication of water rights on
Talamantes Creek took place in the 1890s. A single ranching family owned all
of the decreed water rights on the creek until the 1950s, when the family split
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the property and water rights into two parts. Raftopoulos Brothers ("Raftopoulos") eventually acquired the upstream parcel in 1985. Vermillion Ranch Limited Partnership ("Vermillion"), members of which belong to the original
ranching family, controlled the lower parcel. The competing applications both
proposed to appropriate water from Talamantes Creek for commercial and
industrial purposes.
The Court first reviewed Raftopoulos's application. Raftopoulos requested
a change to its existing direct flow rights in order to add alternate points of
diversion for irrigation and to move the place of use upstream. Raftopoulos
also sought a new conditional right to store 1440 acre-feet of water in one of
two as yet unconstructed reservoirs. Vermilion opposed Raftopoulos's application on the grounds that use of the phrase "all other beneficial uses" in the
decrees for the absolute rights ("1974 decrees") did not permit commercial
and industrial uses. In the alternative, Vermillion argued the water rights
should be limited to irrigation, domestic, and stock uses because Raftopoulos
previously abandoned the commercial and industrial uses. The water court
decided the decree included comiercial and industrial purposes in the phrase
"all other beneficial uses," but granted the changes in diversion points and
place of use for irrigation purposes only. The water court also determined
Raftopoulos did not abandon its commercial and industrial uses because it
consistently used the full amount of its water right, albeit for other uses. Finally, the water court granted Raftopoulos's application for conditional storage
rights in two sections of the Elk Ranch Reservoir because Raftopoulos "may"
need the water rights for future mineral development.
Upon review, the Court held that the water court never needed to interpret the phrase "all other beneficial uses" in the 1974 Decrees. Vermillion, in
opposing the application, argued "all other beneficial uses" did not include
industrial and commercial uses, but the Court held the interpretation had no
relevance to the application because Raftopoulos sought to change its irrigation
rights only. The Court further held that the water court did not need to determine if RaftQpoulos abandoned the commercial and industrial uses. The
Court vacated the water court judgment concerning these issues.
The second issue the Court considered was whether Raftopoulos met its
burden to demonstrate a non-speculative intent to use the new conditional
water storage right for commercial and industrial purposes. To obtain a conditional water right, the Court noted, the applicant must show that (i) it took the
"first step," which includes an intent to appropriate the water and an overt act
manifesting such intent; (ii) the intent is not based on speculative sale or transfer of the water to be appropriated; and (iii) the applicant "can and will" complete the appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time. The water
court found Raftopoulos met this burden based on testimony that it "may"
develop mineral rights and "may "need water for that purpose, and that it contracted with Moffatt County for dust suppression. However, the Court reversed and held that without tangible evidence of actual development activities
or a reasonable estimate of the quantity of water required for that development
or for dust suppression, Raftopoulos did not demonstrate a non-speculative
need for the water. As such, the Court reversed the water court decree and
denied Raftopoulos's new conditional storage rights.
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The Court next reviewed the water court's approval of Vermillion's two
applications. Vermillion acquired a conditional water right in 1975 and
amended it in 2003 to include three alternate places of storage that would not
exceed 1200 acre-feet. The first application sought a finding of reasonable
diligence with respect to this conditional water storage right. The second application aimed to expand new conditional storage rights for commercial and
industrial uses and involved constructing reservoirs on Raftopoulos's land for
storage. Vermillion's second application sought to expand its total storage to
2400 acre-feet to provide for industrial and commercial uses.
Raftopoulos opposed both applications on the grounds that both were
speculative because Vermillion could not acquire the necessary permits, did
not assess the condition of the land, and did not show how it would finance
the possible costs of construction. The water court initially denied both applications, but later reversed its decision and entered decrees granting both applications. The water court did not change its findings of fact when it reversed the
judgment, but rather applied a different standard to the evidence. The alternative standard the water court applied stated that the water court could only
deny the applications if it found that impediments made it impossible for
Vermillion to construct the diversions.
The Court looked to the "can and will" requirement found at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2012) to determine whether the water court properly
granted Vermillion's applications. The "can and will" doctrine asks if a project
to appropriate water "can and will be completed with diligence within a reasonable time." According to the Court, the "can and will" test is a balance that
includes relevant factors, including economic and technical feasibility. Though
these two factors are not dispositive of the "can and will" test, the Court relied
on them to decide whether Vermillion exercised reasonable diligence and
noted their relevance in most applications of the "can and will" doctrine.
In opposition to Vermillion's applications, Raftopoulos argued Vermillion
failed to show the economic and technical feasibility of constructing the reservoir meant to store the new conditional water storage rights. The Court recognized that the "can and will" requirement did not impose a burden of proof
upon the applicant to prove feasibility, but also observed that feasibility remained a relevant factor that Vermillion did not address. The Court reasoned
that such evidence could take the form of construction timelines, construction
cost breakdowns, land acquisition budgets, steps to acquire necessary permits,
or analysis of the feasibility of design and construction of the reservoirs. Vermillion failed to present any such evidence. The Court reasoned the failure to
set forth economic feasibility evidence might lead to the conclusion that Vermillion had no intent to build the project. The Court concluded that Vermillion failed to meet its burden to show a substantial probability that the reservoirs "can and will" be completed with diligence in a reasonable amount of
time.
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the lower court's interpretation of
the 1974 Decrees and reversed the judgments granting both Raftopoulos's and
Vermillion's applications for anti-speculation reasons.
Allison Robmette
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MONTANA
W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n v. Mission Irrigation Dist., 299 P.3d 346
(Mont. 2013) (holding (i) the district court improperly issued a writ of mandate
and injunction pertaining to a water use agreement on an issue the parties did

not raise, and (ii) state law did not require irrigation districts to seek member
and judicial approval of a water use agreement to settle the rights of water users on Indian reservation lands).
The Hellgate Treaty of 1855, signed by the United States and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes ("Tribes"), created the Flathead Indian
Reservation in Montana. In 1908, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Flathead Indian Irrigation Project ("HIP") to deliver irrigation water to irrigable lands on the Flathead Reservation. Under the Hellgate

Treaty, the Tribes claimed aboriginal water rights to FIIP irrigation water.
Landowners who comprise Western Montana Water Users Association ("Water Users") also claimed rights to FIIP water for irrigation. Through a Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, the State of Montana, the Tribes,
and the United States proposed a compact to settle the Tribes' water rights
claims. The Mission Irrigation District, Jocko Valley Irrigation District, Flathead Irrigation District, and Flathead Joint Board of Control (collectively "Irrigation Districts") were not parties to the compact. However, as an appendix

to the compact the United States, the Tribes, and the Irrigation Districts proposed a water wse wgreement that would settle the rights of irrigators to receive
FIIP irrigation water on the reservation.
The Water Users brought this action against the Irrigation Districts seeking to require compliance with MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-7-1956 and -1957
(2013) before entering into the water use agreement with the Tribes and the
United States. If applicable, sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 would require the
Irrigation Districts to submit the water use agreement to a member vote and
judicial review.
On December 14, 2012, the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District ("district court") issued an alternative writ of mandate requiring the Irrigation Districts either to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 or to submit
a brief detailing why they need not comply. The Irrigation Districts submitted
a brief that argued those sections did not apply to the water use agreement. On
February 14, 2013, the district court conducted a hearing to evaluate the applicability of sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 to the water use agreement. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the district court found the agreement was beyond the Irrigation Districts' authority, rendering the question of

the applicability of the statutes moot. Accordingly, the district court issued a
superseding writ of mandate and enjoined the Irrigation Districts from entering into the water use agreement. The Irrigation Districts appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court").
The Court first determined whether the district court properly granted the

writ of mandate and injunction. The district court based the injunction solely
on its determination that the water use agreement exceeded the Irrigation Districts' authority because the agreement would give individual irrigators' water
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rights to the Tribes without compensation. However, at the time of the hearing, the State of Montana, the Tribes, and the United States were still negotiating ownership of the FIIP water rights. The Court held the district court's determination that the water use agreement exceeded the Irrigation Districts'
authority was improper because it was unclear whether the water use agreement would actually take away water rights given that none of the FIIP rights
were yet determined.
The Court further noted that the Water Users based their complaint entirely on the applicability of sections 85-7-1956 and -1957, an issue the district
court ultimately did not address. Neither the Water Users nor the Irrigation
Districts questioned the scope of the Irrigation Districts' authority before the
district court. The Court noted that the district court therefore based its writ of
mandate and injunction on an issue that none of the parties briefed or argued.
Further, the Court held that the district court's injunction against the Irrigation
Districts was improper because the Water Users never requested an injunction
prohibiting the water use agreement in their request for relief. The Court accordingly vacated the district court's writ of mandate and injunction, thereby
restoring the district court's alternative writ of mandate, which held the Irrigation Districts must comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957.
The Court next determined whether, as the alternative writ held, sections
85-7-1956 and -1957 imposed a clear legal duty on the Irrigation Districts to
seek member approval and judicial review of the Water Use Agreement. Using the plain language of the entire statute, the Court examined sections 85-71956 and -1957 to determine their applicability to the water use agreement.
The Water Users argued the entire statute's provisions applied to contracts with the United States for loans of money, construction work, or repair
work, and that the statutes applied to the water use agreement based on the
latter two qualifications. The Irrigation Districts coptended that the statute was
not applicable to the water use agreement because, by reading the statute as a
whole, those two provisions only regulated contracts involving a loan of money.
After examining each section of the statute, the Court held that sections
85-7-1951 to -1958, passed later than the rest of the statute, applied only to
contracts that involve a loan of money. Although other provisions in the
broader statute, specifically section 85-7-1906, authorized the Irrigation Districts to enter into any type of contract with the United States, the Court found
that section 85-7-1958 provided that sections 85-7-1951 to -1958 should not
limit the Irrigation Districts' authority to enter into agreements with the United
States under other applicable statutes. The Court emphasized that the Water
Users' broader interpretation of the statute would render sections 85-7-1958
meaningless.
Although the parties disagreed as to statutory interpretation, they agreed
that the Water Use Agreement did not involve a loan of money. Accordingly,
the Court held that sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 did not apply to the water
use agreement, meaning the Irrigation Districts did not need to seek member
approval or judicial review.
Consequently, the Court dissolved the writ of mandate and injunction and
reversed the district court's previously issued alternative writ of mandate.
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Ashley Basta
Roland v. Davis, 302 P.3d 91 (Mont 2013) (holding evidence was insufficient to support a finding of an implied easement because the plaintiff water
rights holders failed to prove apparent and continuous use of an unmaintained
conveyance ditch crossing neighboring property).
In 1993, Gene and Melinda Roland (collectively the "Rolands") purchased a fifty-acre parcel from Roger and Beverly Russ (collectively the "Russes") in Ravalli County. The warranty deed for the property did not contain
explicit reference to water rights, ditch easements, or appurtenances. However,
the Rolands believed a water right from Bunkhouse Creek came with the
property. The Rolands also believed a ditch easement existed, which transported the water from Bunkhouse Creek to the property. Accordingly, the
Rolands and the Russes filed a water right transfer certificate that accompanied
the closing documents and transferred the water right appurtenant to the
deeded land.
In 1994, Fred and Barbara Davis (collectively the "Davises") also purchased a plot of land from the Russes. At the time of the purchase, the Davises did not observe any ditches on the property, although the Smith Ditch,
which leads from Bunkhouse Creek to the Roland's property, historically
crossed the Davis parcel. In the mid-2000s, the Davises participated in a United States Forest Service fire reduction program. After the Davises cleared the
land, remnants of an old ditch that crossed the property became visible.
In 1982, the Russes, before partitioning the land into two plots, filed a
statement of claim for a water right on Bunkhouse Creek to irrigate thirty acres
that would become a portion of the Roland parcel. In 1994, the Montana Water Court ("water court") issued a preliminary decree that included the Russes'
statement of claim. Finally, in 2004, the water court reduced the irrigation right
to twenty acres.
After the water court's 2004 ruling, the Rolands attempted to reopen use
of the Smith Ditch to grow trees as a cash crop, but the Davises did not agree
that a ditch easement existed. In 2009, the Rolands filed a complaint against
the Davises in the Ravalli County District Court ("district court"). The Rolands
sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and
damages for the alleged ditch easement. The Davises denied Roland's allegations and filed a counterclaim to quiet title.
At trial, the parties' experts analyzed a 1958 Ravalli County Water Resources Survey ("Water Survey") that indicated the Smith Ditch navigating
from Bunkhouse Creek across the Davis property to the Roland property. A
1957 field note from the Water Survey also indicated irrigation of part of the
Roland parcel using Bunkhouse Creek water conveyed through the Smith
Ditch. However, the district court, relying on historical United States Department of Agriculture aerial photographs, found that an access road constructed
before 1979 severed the Smith Ditch as a means of conveyance to the Roland
property. The district court also found the Rolands' predecessor in interest
abandoned the Smith Ditch when he constructed the access road. The district
court therefore concluded that the Rolands did not have a ditch easement
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across the Davis property. The Rolands then appealed the district court's decision to the Montana Supreme Court ("Court").
The Court considered two issues on appeal: (i) whether the Rolands' purchase of the property included a ditch easement by operation of law; and (ii)
whether the district court properly determined that the Rolands did not have
an implied ditch easement that crossed the Davis property.
Regarding the first issue, the Court agreed with the Rolands that any water
rights associated with the parcel automatically transferred to the Rolands upon
purchase of the land. However, the Court also stated that water rights and
ditch easements represent separate and distinct property rights. The court held
that a person may own a water right without owning a ditch right. Accordingly,
the Rolands owned water rights to the parcel but did not necessarily receive a
ditch easement to transport the water.
The Rolands next argued they received an implied easement with the purchase of their parcel. The Court noted that to establish an implied ditch easement the Rolands needed to prove three elements: (i) separation of title; (ii) a
use that was apparent and continuous at the time the Russes divided the property; and (iii) reasonable necessity of the easement for the beneficial enjoyment
of the land. The Court held the Rolands met the first element because the
Russes retained ownership of both properties until the Rolands purchased the
fifty-acre parcel in 1993.
Regarding the second element, the Davises argued that the Rolands' predecessor in interest abandoned the ditch easement because the Russes never
used Smith Ditch prior to selling the parcel. In response, the Rolands argued
that mere nonuse was insufficient to establish intent to abandon an easement.
The Court agreed with the Rolands but replied that the Rolands must do more
than establish that his predecessor in interest did not abandon Smith Ditch. In
order to prove the existence of an implied easement, the Rolands needed to
establish apparent and continuous use of the Smith Ditch at the time they purchased the property in 1993.
With respect to apparent use, the Rolands argued the Davises should have
discovered the ditch through reasonable inspection. First, the Rolands pointed
to language in the Davises' deed indicating they took the property "subject to"
all apparent easements. Additionally, after purchasing the land Fred Davis
admitted seeing remnants of a ditch once the snow melted on the property,
but he also stated that water never flowed in the ditch. The Court held the
Rolands failed to present evidence that the Russes took any steps to undo the
impediments to the Smith Ditch.
With respect to the continuous use of the easement, the Court noted that
the Smith Ditch remained unused at least since 1979 because the Rolands'
predecessor in interest constructed the access road that halted the flow of
Smith Ditch. Next, the Rolands did not produce evidence that any predecessor in interest attempted to correct the impediments on Smith Ditch before
the Russes sold the properties. The Court therefore held the Rolands failed to
establish continuous use of the Smith Ditch easement at the time of the property's purchase. The lack of apparent and continuous use led the Court to
determine that the Rolands did not acquire an implied ditch easement across
the Davises' property, which eliminated the need to proceed to the final ele-
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ment of the implied easement test. The Court also did not have to determine
if the district court properly held that the easement was abandoned because
the Rolands failed to establish that they received an implied easement in the
first place.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the
Rolands did not have an implied ditch easement that crossed the Davis property.
DaneMueller
City of Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist., 307 P.3d 317 (Mont. 2013)
(holding the Park Conservation District's declaratory ruling was not arbitrary
or capricious because the weight of evidence supported Natural Streambed
and Land Preservation Act governance of the disputed channel as a natural
streamr).
The City of Livingston ("City") unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme
Court of Montana ("Court") a Sixth Judicial District Court order, which affirmed the decision of the Park Conservation District ("PCD"). The PCD
decision declared that a channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River was part of
the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River and, therefore, the Natural
Streambed and Land Preservation Act ("Act") governed the channel.
The disputed channel is located near Livingston, Montana. Heart K
Ranch ("Ranch") used the disputed channel to divert water to satisfy Ranch's
water rights. In order to obtain water, Ranch had to remove rocks and other
accumulated debris to allow the water to flow into the channel during times of
low flows. The PCD approved this practice under the Act, which allowed a
water right holder to alter the state of a natural stream with approval from the
conservation district.
In 2011, the City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling on the Act.
The City argued that the channel was not subject to the Act because it was not
a natural watercourse and, thus, Ranch did not have the authority to conduct
maintenance activities to remove accumulations on the channel. The PCD
reviewed the narrow issue of whether the channel in question was a natural
watercourse subject to the Act, or an irrigation ditch that would not be subject
to the Act. There was no dispute as to whether the Yellowstone River itself was
subject to the Act. The PCD ruled high flows shaped the channel as a natural
part of the Yellowstone river. Furthermore, no evidence indicated the channel
was a man-made irrigation channel. Thus, the PCD held the disputed channel
was a natural watercourse and Ranch's maintenance activities fell under the
governance of the Act. The City appealed the PCD ruling to the district court,
which affirmed the PCD ruling. The City then appealed the decision to the
Court.
On appeal, the City contended the PCD's decision was arbitrary and capricious, and the channel was not a natural channel from the Yellowstone River, but rather a man-made irrigation ditch. The Court first set out a standard of
review, explaining that a court cannot alter a decision by the PCD, even if evidence in the record is inconsistent or could support another result, unless the
PCD was arbitrary or capricious.
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The Court first examined whether the disputed channel fit the PCD definition of a natural stream. The PCD applies the Act to natural, perennial
streams, including flood channels, high water channels, and other channels
where water naturally enters during high water or normal flow. The Court
noted the channel was a contiguous channel to the Yellowstone River, an undisputed natural stream under the Act, and water naturally entered the channel
at times of high water flow. These facts were sufficient for the Court to uphold
the PCD determination that the channel was a natural stream under the Act.
To determine if the PCD's declaratory ruling was arbitrary or capricious,
the Court next reviewed the PCD's decision making process. The City argued
PCD overlooked various documents in the record referring to the disputed
channel as a "ditch." The Court held the City did not show that these references to a ditch arose in the context in which the decision maker was deciding
whether the channel was natural or man-made. Furthermore, the reference to
the channel as a ditch was only marginally relevant to the specific channel's
status under the Act, especially compared to actual physical evidence to the
contrary . Moreover, other similar historical references to the waterway supported its status as a natural channel of the Yellowstone. Although there was
evidence in the record that could support a different decision by the PCD, the
court held it was not enough to overturn the declaratory ruling under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Because the PCD relied on numerous pieces of evidence to support its
decision and reasonably concluded that the channel was a natural watercourse
the court accordingly affirmed the declaratory ruling of the PCD.
Sarah Cassmnis
Weinheimer Ranch, Inc. v. Pospisil, 299 P.3d 327 (Mont. 2013) (holding
water court made no administrative or judicial error in denying, for lack of
sufficient evidence, a water right holder's motion to amend his water right to
an earlier priority date).
In 1991 Weinheimer Ranch, Inc. ("Ranch") acquired a sixty acre-foot per
year water right from Francis Weinheimer. Francis acquired the water right
from his father Franz Weinheimer, who originally filed a notice of appropriation for the water right in 1971. In 1984 the Montana Water Court ("water
court") issued a Temporary Preliminary Decree ("decree") for the Judith Basin River that provided a 1900 priority date and a historical diversion point in
Section Four for the Ranch's water right. The decree also provided an 1897
priority date for George Pospisil's ("Pospisil") senior water right. Pospisil owns
land adjacent to the Ranch. According to the decree, Odenwald Creek was the
point of diversion for both water rights.
In 2002, after Pospisil placed a call on Odenwald Coulee, the Ranch filed
a motion with the water court to amend its water right's historical right, priority
date, and source. The Ranch filed a supplemental motion in 2003. Pospisil
thereafter filed an objection to the Ranch's proposed amendment of the historical right and priority date. However, Pospisil did not contest that, due to a
past clerical error, the listed source should be amended from Odenwald
Creek to Odenwald Coulee. Before the water court considered the motion,
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Senior Water Master Kathryn Lambert ("water master") held a hearing on the
motion.
The Ranch relied on two documents, both discovered in 2002, to support
its motion to amend the water right. The first document was a Notice of Appropriation of Water Right ("1896 notice") filed by Adrian Odenwald
("Odenwald"), the Ranch's predecessor in interest. Among other things, the
1896 notice listed a priority date of 1882, the diversion point as Section Nine,
and an attestation by Odenwald that the information listed on the 1896 notice
was true and correct. The second document was a 1969 Montana Water Resources Survey of Fergus County ("survey"). The survey stated Odenwald filed
the 1896 notice for a water right with an 1882 priority date. In addition, the
survey separately described the Ranch's current water right. Weinheimer also
testified, and Pospisil conceded, that no ditch existed from Section Nine to
Section Four since the 1930s.
After consideration, the water master recommended the water court deny
the Ranch's motion due to insufficient evidence. The water court accepted the
water master's recommendation and denied the Ranch's motion to amend its
historical right and priority date. The water court further ruled that the Ranch
abandoned the water right described in the 1896 notice and mentioned in the
survey because the Ranch, or its predecessor in interest, failed to properly file
a claim on the water right as state law required. Finally, the water court
amended the water master's ruling that no surface water existed in Section
Nine since 1882, ruling instead that the evidence only supported a finding that
no surface water existed since the 1930's.
The Montana Supreme Court ("Court") considered two issues on appeal.
First, the Court considered whether the factual record mandated an inference
that the 1896 notice mistakenly listed Section Nine instead of Section Four as
the point of diversion for the Ranch's water right. The Ranch argued that
Odenwald never owned land in Section Nine and that Odenwald actually diverted the water only a quarter mile from the diversion point detailed in the
1896 notice,_ suggesting a mistaken point of diversion listing. But because
Odenwald attested to the validity of the 1896 notice, because no party brought
up the accuracy of the 1896 notice for more than a century, and because the
Ranch and its predecessors already filed claims with a 1900 priority date, the
Court held the water master reasonably declined to infer mistake in the listed
point of diversion.
Second, the Court analyzed whether the water court made a clear error in
its findings of fact. The Ranch first argued that because Section Nine did not
contain a water source to appropriate and because Odenwald never owned
land in Section Nine, the 1896 Notice mistakenly listed the diversion point as
Section Nine and should have listed Section Four. The Court noted it was not
clear that no water flowed in Section Nine, but reasoned that even if it were
clear, that fact would not prove Odenwald intended to appropriate water from
Section Four. Additionally, the Court noted it is common for a water right to
originate outside the physical boundaries of a water right holder's property, so
not owning property at the diversion point did not prove mistake in the 1896
Notice. The Ranch then argued that the two water rights mentioned in the
survey-the Ranch's current water right and the water right described in the
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1896 notice-actually represented the same water right. The Court stated that
another reasonable interpretation of the survey was that the two water rights
were distinct. The Court held that the Ranch failed to prove error on the part
of the water court.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of the Ranch's
motion to amend its water right.
GabielKester

NEW MEXICO
Bounds v. New Mexico ex rel. D'Antonio, Nos. 32,713 32,717, 306 P.3d
457 (N.M. 2013) (holding (i) New Mexico Domestic Well Statute ("DWS")
requiring state engineer to issue domestic well permits without regard to the
availability of unappropriated water did not violate prior appropriation pnnciples as enshrined in the New Mexico Constitution; and (ii) the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate how the DWS deprived holders of a property interest in senior appropriative rights).
Horace Bounds ("Bounds"), a farmer and rancher in the Mimbres basin
in southwestern New Mexico, brought a facial constitutional challenge- against
New Mexico's DWS, which requires the state engineer to issue domestic well
permits without also determining the availability of unappropriated water. On
June 15, 2006, Bounds filed an action for declaratory judgment in New Mexico's Sixth Judicial District Court ("district court"), arguing three counts in his
complaint. The first count asked the district court to rule the DWS unconstitutional as it requires the state engineer to issue domestic well permits without
determining the availability of unappropriated water. Bounds argued this permitting system operated to the detriment of senior water holders and in violation of New Mexico's prior appropriation standard. The second count asked
for a ruling that the issuance of domestic well permits, in accordance with the
DWS, constituted a taking under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. Lastly, Bounds asked for an injunction preventing the state engineer
from issuing new domestic well permits without also determining if unappropriated water was available. The New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau
("NMFLB"), an independent and nongovernmental agency representing many
farm and ranch families, filed a motion to intervene, which the district court
granted. The state engineer then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
the language of the DWS evidenced clear legislative intent that domestic well
permits were outside the scope of the general prior appropriation system.
The district court: (i) ruled the DWS unconstitutional as a matter of law as
it concluded the DWS was an impermissible exception to the prior appropriation standard; and (ii) rejected Bounds's takings claim because he was unable
to show any injury to his existing senior water rights as a result of the DWS.
The state engineer appealed the district court's constitutional holding to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's holding. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that the prior appropriation doctrine contained in Article
XVI of the New Mexico Constitution sets forth only general and broad prmiciples, while the New Mexico legislature had authority to enact a specific statuto-
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ry system for administrating for water appropriation. Therefore, the legislature's exception to the existing priority administration system was not a per se
violation of the priority doctrine. Bounds and NMFLB ("Petitioners") then
each filed petitions of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Mexico
("Court") to review the Court of Appeals' constitutional holding.
The Court addressed two of the Petitioners' challenges: (i) the DWS required the state engineer to issue domestic well permits without acknowledging
whether unappropriated water was available, thereby violating New Mexico's
Constitutional prior appropriation doctrine; and (ii) the failure to provide notice prior to the state engineer's issuance of those domestic well permits violated the Petitioners' due process rights.
First, the Court considered Petitioners' facial constitutional challenge de
novo. Although Petitioners failed to establish that the DWS creates specific
risk of impairment to water rights holders- a necessary element to sustain a
facial constitutional challenge- the Court exercised its discretion and decided
nevertheless to rule on the merits of the case. Article XVI, Section 2 of the
New Mexico Constitution states, "[Piriority of appropriation shall give the
better right." With the language of the DWS in mind, the Court held that the
language "better right" merely provides guidance when two existing water rights
are in conflict. The Court noted that the DWS was just a permitting statute; it
was silent on how the state engineer was to administer domestic well permits.
Nothing in the DWS prevented the state engineer from administering domestic well permits in a priority system, as the New Mexico Constitution requires.
Mistakenly, Petitioners equated the issuance of a permit under the DWS with
an absolute right to acquire and utilize that water pursuant to the issued permits. However, contrary to the Petitioners' contentions, the DWS did not
grant applicants an absolute right. Like all water rights, any drilling rights
granted by the DWS were ultimately conditioned on the availability of water.
Therefore; because the DWS dealt with permitting and not administration, it
did not facially violate the New Mexico Constitition's prior appropriation
standards.
Next, the Court addressed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the prior appropriation doctrine set forth broad principles and nothing else. The Court
specifically rejected this ruling and stated that such an interpretation could lead
to an improper level of legislative and administrative discretion over priority
water rights.
Last, the Court considered whether the DWS violated the Petitioners'
procedural and substantive due process rights. In order for the Court to declare a violation of due process, the Petitioners must show an actual and personal deprivation or injury. However, as the district court held, Petitioners,
specifically Bounds, were unable to show DWS caused any injury to their water rights. The Court rejected Bounds's claim that any new appropriations in a
closed and fully appropriated basin would necessarily cause Bounds injury.
Although Bounds produced an expert witness, that expert failed to show the
effect of the domestic wells on Bounds' water rights. Thus, the Court rejected
the due process challenge, concluding that any alleged injury was only speculative.
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Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals's decision that the
DWS did not violate the United States Constitution and the New Mexico
Constitution, and that the DWS did not violate Petitioners' due process rights.
Devon Bell

NORTH DAKOTA
Maddock v. Andersen, 830 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 2013) (holding that the
district court did not err in denying injunctive relief to appellants in challenge
to stop water flow onto their land from a drainage ditch on appellees' adjacent
property by holding (i) appellees demonstrated a reasonable necessity and use
for the drainage ditch; (ii) appellees could not reasonably avoid injury to appellants' property; (iii) the appellees' benefit of homestead protection outweighed
the injury to appellants' crops; (iv) "Act of God" designation properly described
increased rainfall, and; (v) appellants failed to mitigate the water flow's damage).
Appellants Francis and Deborah Maddock ("the Maddocks") appealed the
District Court, Dickey County, Southeast Judicial District's denial of permanent injunctive relief in the Maddocks' suit against Larry and Jane Andersen
("the Andersens") to stop water flow onto the Maddocks' farmland from a
drainage ditch on the Andersens' property. The Maddocks alleged the Andersens' drainage ditch, which in the past properly drained water into a slough on
the Andersens' farm, now unreasonably drained and pooled water onto the
Maddocks' land and caused injury to a portion of their crops. Expert witnesses
from both parties testified at trial about water flow from the drainage ditch,
slough, and other areas. The district court concluded the Maddocks failed to
prove the drainage ditch contributed primarily to the pooled water on their
land. The district court also concluded the Andersens satisfied the reasonable
use doctrine as applied to surface water drainage by showing they needed the
open drainage ditch to protect their homestead, and they took reasonable care
to prevent unnecessary injury to the Maddocks' property.
The Maddocks appealed the district court's ruling to the Supreme Court
of North Dakota ("court"), arguing that the district court erred in (i) finding the
Andersens complied with the reasonable drainage use rule and (ii) denying the
Maddocks' prayer for injunctive relief.
The court defined the surface water drainage reasonable use doctrine: a
landowner, acting in good faith and with a legitimate purpose, could drain
surface waters from his land to another's land. The court further stated that
surface water drainage satisfies the reasonable use doctrine if: (i) there is reasonable necessity for such drainage; (ii) the draining land's owner takes reasonable care to prevent unnecessary injury to the receiving land; (iii) the benefit to
the drained land outweighs the receiving land's injury; and (iv) the draining
land's owner reasonably improves the natural drainage system, where practicable, or adopts an artificial drainage system.
The Maddocks first argued that the district court should order the drainage ditch's closure because the Andersens did not show a reasonable necessity
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for it. The district court found the Andersens' expert witness credible, however, when he testified that a drainage ditch closure would cause a 2.2 foot water
rise on the Andersens' land and flood their homestead. The district court thus
held the Andersens showed a reasonable necessity for the ditch.
The Maddocks then argued that the Andersens did not take reasonable
care to prevent unnecessary injury to the Maddocks' land, because the ditch in
question, as well as other ditches, improperly drained into the slough. The
district court found, however, that the Andersens' 1960's drainage ditch construction complied with then-current federal agency drainage and soilconservation standards. Further, the district court concluded the Andersens
could not take reasonable steps to avoid injury to the Maddociks' land. Additionally, the district court stated, as a matter of public policy, the benefit of
protecting the Andersens' homestead outweighed the injury to a portion of the
Maddocks' crops.
The district court found that the Maddocks had failed to sufficiently establish the alleged water flow came from the Andersens' property and not other
sources. It also recognized that the Andersens' properly proved the increased
rainfall that caused increased water drainage was an "Act of God," because an
abundant and natural wet cycle typically causes crop loss. Finally, the district
court found the Maddocks failed to mitigate damages by delaying the local
township's culvert installation on a nearby road. The culvert would have provided timely pooled water drainage from the Maddocks' land.
The court found no error in the district court's findings of fact or its conclusion that the Andersens satisfied the surface water drainage reasonable use
doctrine, nor in its denial of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed
the district court's judgment.
Sarah .McGrath

